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POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION AND DIPLOMACY 
THE ANGLO-SCOTTISH BORDER 1550-1560 
PAUL GERARD BOSCHER 
ABSTRACT 
The administration of the Anglo-Scottish border 
posed a perennial problem for successive Tudor governments. 
Yet, it was one to which they devoted close attention. A 
prodigious amount of thought and effort were expended on the 
seemingly endless complexities of border administration, 
often to little avail. The importance of these attempts, 
their successes and failures warrant a detailed analysis. 
This study has set out to achieve two aims. It is first 
concerned with the impact of the border policies over the 
decade of three successive Tudor governments. The French 
presence in Scotland during the same period and the more 
often than not hostile reaction of the English regime meant 
that the border became an important focus for much diplomatic 
activity. To understand the political problems of the 
border during the period due weight must be given to Anglo-
Scottish and indeed Anglo-French relations. Therefore, the 
second aim has been to set the border firmly in a diplomatic 
context. The geographical difficulties facing the Crown in 
this peripheral region of the kingdom have been dealt with. 
In addition, it is essential to grasp something of the 
complexity of border society to enable us to understand the 
problems of government. Therefore, consideration has been 
given to the social and economic background of the border. 
The administrative and judicial structure of the border is 
examined in order to assess the significance of the govern-
ment's attempts at reform in these areas. A concomitant 
preoccupation with officials and administrators produces 
important bases which further illuminate ·crown policy and 
the inter relationship of the government with the locality. 
Finally, the decade was one of war and military tension, 
and so much discussion has been devoted to the diplomatic 
side of the conflict as well as to the campaigns themselves. 
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PREFACE 
The sixteenth century Anglo~Scottish border has not 
been lacking in historians to shed light on its past. 
Border historiography can be roughly categorised into three 
divisions, the quality of which vary enormously. To begin 
with many local writers imbued with regional loyalties and 
local patriotism have produced work of a very diverse nature. 
h . . h . 1 Many of t em follOWlng 1n t e footsteps of S1r Walter Scott 
have been attracted by the colour, romance, excitement and 
almost Homeric quality attached to the border. 2 Many of the 
works of this nature while professing to be serious history 
are in fact no more than glorified tourist guides or pious 
family histories. Many of these writers chose their inform-
ation indiscriminately and presented it haphazardly. In 
particular, their attention was drawn to the boldness and 
audacity of the border reivers. commenting on the latter, 
Trevelyan dismissed these so called qualities, for him the 
borderers ". . . like the Homeric Greeks . . . were cruel coarse 
savages slaying each other as beasts of the forest". 3 
Howard Pease argued that as for the predatory tendencies of 
the inhabitants of the region, the borderers were only 
making a virtue of necessity. As for their alleged savagery, 
this was merely a facade for" ... underneath the 'barbarous-
ness' lay the warm heart, the set purpose and the firm faith 
VIII 
4 
of the Borderer". While these works have shaped many 
popular conceptions of border history, they have shed little 
serious light on our understanding of border institutions 
let alone the political, social and economic context in 
which they operated. 
The border came under the close scrutiny of anti-
quaries during the revival of interest in historical studies 
that took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. In 1777, Nicolson and Burn produced their 
"History and Antiquities of Westmorland and Cumberland~' 5 
while in 1848,George Ridpath, a Scottish border clergyman 
produced his "Border History of England and Scotland'.' 
Ridpath's work is the earliest and certainly the best of 
the older border histories. He produced an uncritical 
political narrative which ignored social and economic 
factors. He conscientiously made use of a variety of 
printed sources but he was obviously limited by the 
relatively restricted range of materials that was avail-
able at the time. Four years later in 1852, James Raine, 
the Librarian of the Dean and Chapter of Durham, produced 
his "History and Antiquities of North Durham~· an account of 
the history of the County Palatine of Norhamshire and its 
appurtenances. With Raine we enter the early era of the 
parochial histories. Raine's approach was essentially 
antiquarian : he used many unprinted documents but in a 
haphazard fashion. Raine's work has its limitations cover-
ing as it does a long period and concentrating on a 
IX 
relatively small area of the border. 
The calendaring begun in the 1890's of the massive 
corpus of state papers relating to the border brought fresh 
light to our understanding of the region. The standard 
modern histories of the three northern counties while 
retaining much value are essentially parochial histories. 
Often, as of necessity in such encyclopaedic works, the 
events of the sixteenth century are covered in a cursory 
fashion. Again,in works of this nature it is often diffi-
cult to grasp an overall view of border society. As for 
the work of individual scholars, border history entered a 
new phase with the work of Rachel Reid. Her learned articles 
and monograph on the Council in the North constituted a major 
contribution to our understanding of the border and one of 
its key institutions. In the same mould is Tough's great 
pioneering work on the borders during the reign of Queen 
Elizabeth. Since the appearance of Tough's study in 1928, 
historians such as M. E. James, M. L. Bush and s. J. Watts 
by highlighting particular aspects and individuals or by 
focussing on a specific area have added to our understanding 
of the border and its multi-faceted relationship with the 
Crown. 
However, the important mid-Tudor decade while it has 
often been alluded to has not received the detailed treat-
ment which it deserves. The period 1550 - 1560 was one of 
almost unprecedented activity in border affairs. It is 
X 
unique in the extent to which England's relations with 
France had an important bearing on border policy. It is 
because of the latter that I have attempted to examine 
border affairs through a dual perspective. Any analysis 
of the impact of government on the border cannot be dealt 
with in isolation or fully understood if it is separated 
from an assessment of the diplomatic relations between 
England and Scotland and the latter's ally, France. 
In this study I have sought first of all to examine 
the border region and its society because in order to 
understand border politics and administration it is neces-
sary to look at the social and economic context in which 
politics and administration functioned. This exercise 
allows one to ascertain how and why border society was so 
unstable, volatile and prone to violence. An examination 
of the machinery of law and order in the marches also 
enables one to draw some conclusions about the effective-
ness of justice in the region. The social bonds of border 
society and the structure of kinship groups have been inves-
tigated in some detail. I have sought to demonstrate the 
reasons behind, and the effects of,the high degree of 
communal solidarity particularly in the Dales. Historians 
such as M. E. James have tended in their examination of 
border social stratification to concentrate on the descending, 
vertical links between men that gave the border a tenuous 
degree of stability and social cohesion but they have 
commented little on the horizontal links which bound men to 
men. 
XI 
In my analysis of the political infrastructure and 
throughout the succeeding chapters I have attempted to 
answer a series of questions. The control of the border 
required skilful management as this part of the realm had 
a long tradition of disorder. To cope wiLh the problem a 
settled and institutionally well developed system of local 
government had grown up. In examining the interaction of 
this government with the central government we need to 
discover how localised or how centralised political power 
was. This necessitates not only examining the roles of 
the magnates in royal government but also the activities 
of royal officials. As for the working of the administr-
ation, I have sought to demonstrate as far as is possible 
the exteRt of its operational efficiency, determining how 
crude or sophisticated government was as well as trying to 
identify continuity and change in the formulation of policy. 
It is not only essential to define border government 
but equally important to gauge its impact. 
The problem of execution is a fundamental one: how did the 
central government impose its will on the provinces? and 
how did it respond to border lawlessness? These are some 
of the questions I have sought to answer. In addition, the 
fact that the border adjoined a potentially hostile realm 
was something English governments had to bear in mind 
constantly. I have attempted to assess the effects of 
foreign policy on the government's attitude to the border. 
This has entailed an examination of England's relationship 
with Scotland after the long years of war in the 1540's. 
XII 
As the decade progressed it became clear that Scotland's 
unique relationship with France had significant ramific-
ations for the border policies of English governments. 
This study has been based on a wide variety of 
materials. The most important is the mass of English 
record sources and correspondence both printed and 
unprinted. Beginning with the former, the Privy Council 
Registers and the various Foreign Calendars furnish much 
information on border affairs. The Calendars of the Patent 
Rolls also play a significant role in elucidating the 
government's policy through appointments to the various 
border offices. An important printed source is the Calendar 
of Border Papers, but this does not begin properly till 
1580. Prior to that date material relating to the border 
is to be found widely scattered in the Foreign Series of 
Calendars. 
The Public Record Office contains an extensive range 
of manuscript material relevant to border affairs, especially 
in the sequence of State Papers. Apart from the massive 
collection of Border Papers much penetrating data is to be 
found in uncalendared memoranda. I have made much use of 
the two volumes of uncalendared documents entitled 'Laws 
of the Marches•, (SP15/5-6). These contain a mass of 
miscellaneous documents relating to the sixteenth century 
border. 
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The Exchequer Accounts not only furnish much detail 
on government expenditure but information not found else-
where can be gleaned from a careful examination of the 
rolls. A complete set of the Berwick Treasurer's Accounts 
unfortunately does not exist but sufficient accounts have 
survived, and these added to the various statements of 
account among the State Papers enable one to arrive at a 
fair assessment of the state of the government's border 
finances for most of the period. 
The British Library contains a good deal of unprinted 
material dealing with border affairs particularly among the 
Harleian and cottonian collections. Especially significant 
is the account of the border in 1551 written by Sir Robert 
Bowes and an important series of letters relating to the 
border commission of 1556. 
The other major repository of material relating to 
the border is the College of Arms archive which contains 
the Talbot Papers, some of which were calendared by Lodge 
in his "Illustrations of British History~· The Talbot Papers 
provide much detailed information on the state of the Marian 
border, shedding considerable light on the difficulties 
faced by border administrators and the role of the Wardens 
in march government. 
As for printed materials other than record sources, 
especially worthy of note are the unique accounts of the 
state of the border in 1542 and 1551 by Sir Robert Bowes 
XIV 
and Sir Raufe Ellerker printed in Hodgson and in the less 
easily accessible"Reprints of Rare Tracts"by M. A. 
Richardson. Bishop Nicolson • s ''Leges Marchiarum"contains 
a printed account of the 1553 border commission as well as 
Wharton's "Order for the Watch". Both are taken from 
SPlS/5-6. Two important sets of correspondence, those of 
Sir Ralph Sadler edited by A. Clifford and.the Duke of 
Norfolk edited by s. Haynes ,illuminate early Elizabethan 
border policy. 
On the Scottish side I have restricted this study 
mainly to the diplomatic transactions between the two 
countries. The sixteenth century Scottish border has been 
adequately covered in Rae's magisterial study. I have 
dealt with Scottish border affairs only in so far as they 
illuminate some aspect of English border policy. Here, 
the nineteenth century Scottish mania for editing has meant 
that there is a wealth of Scottish records in print. This 
is not only true of record sources but in addition many 
learned Scottish societies have edited some important 
narratives and series of correspondence. Much additional 
material shedding light on the tripartite relationship 
between England, Scotland and France is to be found in the 
diplomatic records edited by Teulet and Vertot. 
Some material relating to the Anglo-Scottish border 
is contained in two of the major French archives, the 
Bibliotheque Nationale and the Archives du Ministere des 
XV 
' Affaires Etrangeres. These contain much unprinted corres-
pondence between the French and Scottish governments which 
reflects the close interest that the French took in border 
affairs. 
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PREFACE 
Notes 
1 In particular see Sir Walter Scot Border Antiquities, 
London 1814, and Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, 
2 
ed. T. F. Henderson, Edinburgh 1902; but see also 
H. Pease, Northumbria's Decameron, Newcastle - upon 
- Tyne 1927, G. Watson, The Border Reivers, London 
1974. 
"As the duel and battle were raged for years 
about the walls of Troy between the Archaians and the 
Trojans, so for centuries the long contest raged upon 
the Borderland between the English and the Scots, and 
the earth streamed with blood". H. Pease, The Lord 
Wardens of the Marches of England and Scotland, 
London 1913, 2; Tough wrote dryly of Pease's work, 
"It does not aim at being a scientific history", 
Tough, XVI. 
3 G. M. Trevelyan, The Middle Marches, London 1930. 
4 Pease, op. cit., 32. 
5 For full details of further works mentioned in the 
Preface, the Bibliography should be consulted. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY BORDER 
Anatomy of a Society 
In the sixteenth century the border towards Scotland 
comprised the three counties of Northumberland, Cumberland 
and Westmorland. 1 The outstanding physical features of the 
region are its mountains and hillSJ despite advances 1n 
land improvement the three counties contain nearly half the 
total acreage of mountain and heath lands in the whole of 
2 England. The Cheviots form the largest area of 
continuous high ground. These hills extend over an area of 
some 200 square miles running at an elevation of 1,500-2,600 
feet in a south-west to north-east direction. The range is 
dominated by the Cheviot itself at 2,676 feet; the stump of 
an ancient volcano, it is encircled by a cluster of summits 
about 2,000 feet high. The surrounding terrain is one of 
peat bog and heather 
... the most part thereof and especially to~arde the 
heighte ys a wete flowe mosse so depe that scarcely 
either horse or cattall may goo thereupon excepte yt 
be by the syde of certayne lytle broukes & waters 3 that springeth forthe of the said mountaine ... 
On the Scottish side the hills drop sharply to the 
raised plateau of Teviotdale whereas the incline on the 
English side is much more gradual. The slowly descending 
2 
gradient makes up the dales, moors and scarplands between 
the highlands and lowlands of the coast and Tyne. The 
Cheviots form the watershed of many fast flowing rivers 
which follow roughly parallel south-east courses to the 
sea. The more northerly system forms the broad low lying 
vales of the Coquet, Aln and Till. These valleys were 
settled early and contained many rich villages. 
Further south-west, cut off and separated by the high 
Otterburn moorlands, are the narrow deeply dissected valleys 
of the Rede and North Tyne. The valleys of the South Tyne 
and the Tyne were much more accessible forming the main east-
west route across the narrow waist of the country, rising 
nowhere over an elevation of 600 feet. 
Crossing the Pennines the uplands form a wide series 
of plateaux heavily intersected by small rivers and streams. 
The wastes of Bewcastledale give way further west to more 
fertile low lying land up to the Solway Firth. 
The lowlands on the east side of the English border 
were much more extensive,beginning where the Cheviot Hills 
. 
and moors leave off, stretching in a crescent from the Tweed 
down the coast to the Tyne. This coastal plain is covered 
by glacial deposits varying in character. North of the 
Coquet the limestone is overlain with clay and sand, a loamy 
mix providing potentially good farming country. South of 
the Coquet the coastal plain is underlain with coal deposits 
and covered with heavier clays and loams. 
3 
As with all upland areas border communications were 
a serious problem. The Romans were the first to leave their 
imprint, building a series of roads taking advantage of the 
natural lines of communication. The main route from east 
to west began at Newcastle and passed through the Tyne gap 
taking in Corbridge and Hexham and running roughly parallel 
to the Roman Wall to Carlisle. It was known as the 
Carelgate or Stanegate. One of the main arteries running 
north-south was Dere Street or Watling Street running from 
York to Corbridge and up through the Rede valley crossing 
the Cheviots at Gammelspath. The other main highway, the 
Great North Road, followed the east coast route from 
Newcastle to Berwick. This passed through Morpeth, Alnwick 
and Belford. In addition to these, there were other minor 
Roman roads as well as an array of tracks and ancient drove 
roads connecting the smaller towns and villages. 
The little surviving evidence we have suggests that 
even the main connecting routes were generally in a poor 
condition. Sudden rain could quite easily make the roads 
impassable especially for carriages. The Earl of Westmorland 
writing of his journey from Morpeth to Alnwick in October 1557 
complained that he had 
... susteyned some paynes ... the waters was so 
great as I never saw theyme greater; so that 
although we were dryven to leve the hyeway and 
seke byways, yet did our horsses swyme in many 
places. 4 
The nature of the terrain was such that pack horses were 
5 
widely used for the transport of goods. Though even this 
4 
mode of transport had its limitations. Sir Robert Bowes 
and sir Ralph Ellerker, royal commissioners surveying the 
border in 1542, recommended that it was preferable to 
transport timber for the repair of the northern fortifi-
cations by sea, " for sparinge of muche caryage whiche 
surely ys verry nedefull the caryage of beasts be so small 
d k . th t' " 6 an wea e 1n ese par 1es .... 
Heavy rainfall also diminished the efficiency of 
overland transport by swelling the many rivers. Rising 
spates and deep pools could make them formidable barriers, 
rendering fording impossible. Bridges were few and far 
between and often in a poor state of repair. 7 
The vast majority of borderers were farmers. On the 
fells the characteristic settlement was the stead or single 
farm. Arable land was restricted to a few closes nearby and 
sheep and cattle were pastured on the hills. In the low-
lands, villages were common. Mixed farming was practised 
and a wide variety of grains was grown, but owing to the 
limitations of geography and climate, the border was predo-
minantly pastora~. This feature of the border economy 
frequently brought forth comment from southern observers 
who were shocked by the lack of ploughland and took it as 
an indication of poverty. Much has been made of the economic 
backwardness of the region. Poverty, however, is a relative 
concept, and thus, often difficult to identify; the land 
may have been poor but this was to some extent compensated 
by the fact that there was plenty of it. 
5 
The wills and inventories of the period reaffirm the 
importance of livestock, especially horses, sheep and 
cattle. Horses were bred as draught animals but also to 
fulfil tenurial obligations connected with border military 
service. Numerous sheep and cattle were pastured on the 
uplands, the hills and fells providing enormous areas for 
free range grazing. Northern wool, however, was coarse and 
hairy and of a poor quality. The London Merchant Adventurers 
considered it not worthwhile including it in their monopoly. 
Their colleagues at Newcastle were granted a licence to 
export wool and woolfells at a reduced rate, because the 
wool of the border was so " 8 coarse and poor". 
Transhumance was widely practised. The herds and 
flocks were driven at the beginning of April to higher and 
fresher pastures. Temporary lodges or 'shealings' were 
built to shelter the herdsmen and their families, for often 
whole communities shared in the seasonal migration, returning 
h d . . . h h 9 to t e lowlan s 1n August 1n t1me for t e arvest. 
Border farmers grew a wide variety of grains but the 
wills and inventories of the period testify to the predomi-
nance of the poorer grains such as oats, barley, bere or 
10 bigg and rye over wheat. Oats formed the chief grain of 
Cumberland and Westmorland, barley coming second. Oats 
could thrive on poorer wetter soils which wheat would not 
11 tolerate. They gave a high yield and were versatile. 
They were not only milled to provide flour for oat clap 
bread, a staple food,or used for porridge, they could also be 
6 
malted for the brewing of beer and provided fodder for 
livestock. Wheat and rye were grown throughout lowland 
h b d d h b d . 12 Nort urn erlan an on t e Cum erlan coastal plaln. 
The shortness of the growing season and the nature 
of the soil meant that there was a shortage of corn in the 
North. Supplementary Baltic grain was imported into Newcastle 
or came via the southern ports, especially King's 
Lynn. 13 Berwick was heavily dependent on imported victuals. 
The area known as the Merse in south-east Scotland afforded 
the richest corn growing region in that country and was 
. . 14 h . . conven1ently near Berwlck. T ere lS even some suggest1on 
that the Berwick garrison preferred to buy fresh food from 
. h h h . 1 15 Scottls mere ants tan trust royal Vlctual ers. Bowes 
recommended in 1551 that to shelter Scottish merchants who 
brought their wares to the market on Calf Hill a house 
should be built, 
... wherein the said Scottish people might in colde 
and stormye wether have fyer and meat and drinck for 
their money to repose them selves withall, otherwise 
they shalbe not able to kepe market there this wynter 
tyne wich wilbe a great hinderance of fresh victualls 
to the towne. 16 
Afraid that Lord Hume would stop the Merse farmers victuall-
ing Berwick, the Deputy Captain of the town, John Carey, 
17 
remarked anxiously to Burghley, "Wee ned no other seidge". 
The prevailing tenure on the border was customary 
b d . h 18 tenure, known as or er tenant r1g t. Tenants were bound 
to perform military service on the border at their own 
expense, horsed or on foot. These tenements were known 
7 
respectively as 'nag tenements' or 'foot tenements•. 
Border service could continue for up to forty days. 19 It 
not only involved repelling the Scots, but included follow-
ing the fray (hue and cry), rescuing stolen goods and live-
stock and keeping watch and maintaining beacons. Borderers 
were expected to keep themselves fully equipped to carry 
out these services. All forms of border tenure stipulated 
these provisions and unfurnished tenants who held by tenant 
. h . b . . 20 r1g t were l1a le to ev1ct1on. 
Apart from these provisions, a whole range of local 
customs quite different from customary tenures in other 
parts of the country existed. 21 Some tenements were held 
at will or by lease. The holders, though not enjoying the 
security of tenant right which was comparable to freehold, 
were still liable for border service, paying small rents and 
fines. In other holdings, tenant right was by inheritance, 
free of entry fines,and tenants were liable to pay only 
small fixed gressoms. Other tenants were arbitrarily 
charged with entry fines which, in theory, were meant to be 
reasonable. Coupled with this was a •running gressom', a 
form of recognition payment made every two to five years. 
Successive Tudor governments sought to strengthen 
tenant right and protect tenants against unscrupulous land-
lords who demanded excessive gressoms. Lord Dacre in his 
perennial mud slinging against his enemy and fellow peer, 
Wharton, was well aware of the sort of accusation that would 
focus the Council's attention. Dacre informed the government 
8 
that Wharton's officers had been taking excess fines and 
gressoms on Crown leases, thereby contravening letters 
patent which stated that Crown lands were to be leased to 
men of service with accustomed rents and no fines. As a 
consequence of Wharton's rapacity Dacre remonstrated 
" ... the countreyes now utterly impoverished and oppressed 
22 
... and the service therby decayed". Two years earlier 
Wharton had written to the Council in a similar vein inform-
ing the Lords that Dacre was obstructing him in granting 
h d . 23 tenements on t e west bor er to men of serv1ce. 
The government was equally sensitive to the possible 
dangerous repercussions of illegal enclosures, especially if 
they involved depopulation. The social and economic back-
wardness of the sixteenth century border was a strong 
impediment to this kind of change, yet it occasionally 
occurred. It brought swift reaction from the Council and 
the whole matter of border enclosure was the subject of 
. . . 24 Parl1amentary leg1slat1on. 
In seeking both to curb the taking of excessive fines 
and the consequent depopulation threat, the Crown was 
endeavouring to kill two birds with one stone. It was 
anxious to maintain the necessary force equipped with horse 
and weapon, thus ensuring that border security would be 
unimpaired,but it also wanted to weaken the influence of 
Lords upon their tenants, as this often took the form of 
a servile dependence which led men to follow their landlords 
into rebellion,as in 1536 and 1569. 25 There was, however, 
9 
no ready solution to the problem which continued despite 
the warnings of frontier officials of the 'decay of service'. 
The Crown lacked that degree of control over the border and 
its conservative landlords, and without the sustained 
surveillance necessary to curb them, such abuses continued 
as before. 26 
The government's concern about the problem of man-
power, that is the military security of the border, was 
justified because it was one of the most vulnerable areas 
of the kingdom and also among the most sparsely populated. 
Bouch and Jones on the basis of the Carlisle Diocesan 
returns for 1563 have estimated the combined population of 
Cumberland and Westmorland as 73,332 (45,786 and 27,546 
. ) 27 respect1vely . For Northumberland no such Diocesan 
returns exist for this period but a rough estimate can 
be gained from the muster certificates. The musters of 1584 
appear to be the earliest complete figures that we have 
available. From these Watts has estimated the population 
of Northumberland as 74,300. Taking these two surveys 
together results in a density of only 30-35 persons per 
square mile in the three northern counties, which was well 
h . 28 below half t e nat1onal average. 
Before taking a closer look at border society and 
its environment, it is necessary to take stock of the 
political situation on the border, focussing on the natural 
leaders of border society and outlining the main threads of 
Crown policy in the period preceding the mid decade. Up to 
10 
the mid 1530's the dominant figures in border society were 
the Percy Earls of Northumberland. Their influence spread 
over the entire border through the vast Percy estates in 
Northumberland and Cumberland where they were the largest 
29 landowners. By an extensive patronage system the leading 
gentry of the north were attached to the Earls. They served 
them in their households as their familia, they acted as 
keepers of their castles or served them on their estates as 
stewards, bailiffs and receivers, or they were bound to them 
h h h . . . . 30 t roug t e rece1pt of 1ucrat1ve leases or annu1t1es. 
This relationship of man to lord was an important cohesive 
force in border society and constituted a powerful factor 
in maintaining political stability. 
The other great families of the north, the Cliffords, 
Earls of Cumberland, the Nevilles, Earls of Westmorland and 
the Dacres, Lords of Greystoke, Gilsland and Morpeth, 
mirrored to a lesser extent Percy influence in the north. 
All augmented the power that great landed wealth gave them 
by acting as royal officers. They monopolised the important 
office of Warden and they acted as constables, keepers and 
stewards of the royal castles and lands. They served as 
Justices of the Peace and of the Forest and acted as 
. . . d d . 31 CommlSSloners of Gaol Del~very an Oyer an Term1ner. 
The Crown, although aware of the dangers inherent 
in such a system,depended on the cooperation of the northern 
nobility because of its own lack of a standing army. It 
was the nobility, the natural leaders of border society, 
11 
who raised the inhabitants of the border, often their own 
tenants, for the defence of the country against the Scots. 
Henry VII and more particularly his son were much 
more reluctant than their predecessors to see the 
border ruled through its territorial magnates. Neither 
monarch particularly wished to destroy local power but both 
sought to exercise a more effective and more responsible 
control, ensuring that those who wielded power and influence 
should act more directly in the interests of the Crown. The 
first two Tudors achieved this by appointing 'inland' men 
to the offices of Warden and Lieutenant or by playing off 
one magnate family against the other as, for example, the 
introduction of Lord Dacre into the office of the East and 
'dd h d' . 32 Ml le Marc es, a tra ltlonal Percy preserve. This policy 
was facilitated by the personal character of the sixth Earl 
of Northumberland. He was weak and highly unstable and his 
financial recklessness made him a mere tool in the hands of 
the Crown. Royal pressure was exerted on him to make the 
King his heir and on his death in 1537 the vast Percy inheri-
tance fell to the Crown. Shortly before the Earl's demise 
an abortive attack was launched against Lord Dacre. In 
1534, he was arraigned before the Lords on trumped up 
charges of treason. Surprisingly, he was acquitted. Never-
theless, he was deprived of the West March. 33 
The failure of the Pilgrimage paved the way for the 
restructuring of northern government. The Council of the 
North was re-organised on a permanent basis. Its area of 
12 
jurisdiction was extended to include not only Yorkshire but 
Durham and the three northern counties. The Council was 
given wide powers to proceed in cases of treason, murder, 
felony and civil disputes. The government effected a neat 
political compromise by ensuring that some of the members 
of the new Council were former participants in the 
Pilgrimage. This meant that vigorous action was taken 
against the disaffected as the gentry strove to prove their 
unswerving loyalty by attacking the King's enemies, their 
recent confederates. These changes had a profound impact 
on the structure of political power in the border. The main 
effect was that the influence of the Crown was more strongly 
felt than ever. The government was able to reward its 
followers with confiscated monastic lands and leases from 
the Percy inheritance. The forfeited lands of rebels after 
the Pilgrimage were also distributed to the Crown's 
34 
supporters. The gentry now looked to the Crown for 
reward and advancement. They were obligated to the King 
directly by patronage instead of through the Percies. By 
attracting the members of the prominent border families 
many of them former Percy feed men into the royal service, 
the King could offer the prospect of greater rewards. This 
was illustrated in 1544 when Sir Thomas Wharton, a former 
Percy officer, was raised to the Peerage and given the 
office of the West March. Wharton, who was amenable, 
ambitious and anxious to comply with royal policy,was a 
success symbol, the embodiment of Henrician policy towards 
the border. 
13 
After the political changes of the 1530's, the 
gentry were left as the leaders of border society. They 
served as Justices of the Peace or on the various commissions 
concerned with border government. They occupied various 
border offices in the gift of the Crown, and in periods of 
crisis or open warfare served as Captains bringing their 
tenants to serve at the command of the Warden. The border 
gentry were small as a class. Bouch and Jones estimated 
that the gentry and their families of the two lake counties 
c.1500 numbered 6-700 persons or about 1% of the population. 
The figure for Northumberland is almost the same. 35 
The small number of gentry coupled with the fact that 
many of them were non-resident gave rise to problems in 
border administration, as sometimes there were not enough 
men of adequate social status for the smooth running of 
border government. The relative poverty of the border 
gentry meant that there were insufficient higher and middl-
ing gentry to fill the more important positions in local 
36 government. 
The border gentry were an essentially conservative 
and insular class. They tended to marry within the region, 
and thus all the major families were interrelated. Their 
society was introspective and self-sufficient. Standards 
of literacy were low amongst them. Out of the sixty four 
Northumberland gentry who signed the recommendations of the 
royal commissioners on the border in 1561, only nineteen 
could sign their names. In another list of the 146 principal 
14 
d . ld . 37 . lan owners only flfty four cou wr1te. Slr John Forster was 
clearly not exaggerating when,apologising to Walsingham 
for his brusque straightforwardness,he commented" ... for 
we that inhabite Northumberland are not acquaynted with any 
38 lerned and rare frazes". One of the more notorious traits 
of the northern gentry and a worrying concern of the govern-
ment was their inveterate quarrelsomeness. Sir Robert Bowes 
in his survey in 1550 wrote 
... the whole countrie of Northumberland is much 
geven to riottes speciallie the yonge gentlemen 
or headsmen and divers of them also to theftes and 
other greater offences. 39 
Border officials often found that because of existing feuds 
among the gentry it was sometimes difficult to secure their 
cooperation in frontier affairs and their service could be 
more of a hindrance than a help. 40 
The social organisation of the border assumed two 
different aspects. The first one, the more ubiquitous, 
was based on feudal concepts, the relationship of man to 
man on a tenurial basis. The tenant in return for rents and 
services paid to his Lord expected as of right that his 
Lord would 'maintain' him, looking after his interests and 
protecting him against his enemies. The semi-feudal ideals 
underlying this relationship inspired strong feelings of 
tenant loyalty: it was no mere commercial link between 
master and man. The second aspect, more particular to the 
border, was a powerful social bond based on blood relation-
ship, known as 'surnames'. Although reminiscent of 
15 
primitive tribalism these kinship units must not be seen 
as hardy survivors. It seems that they rather developed as 
the natural reaction to the recurring chaos that the Anglo-
Scottish wars of the fourteenth and fifteen centuries brought 
to the border. The ineffectiveness of traditional lordship 
encouraged the need for new forms of social organisation to 
41 protect and defend. The surname was led by one or more 
'headsmen' who were responsible for the good behaviour of 
the rest and entered pledges to the Warden as a guarantee 
of this : 
... of every surname their be sundrye famylies 
or graves as they call them of every of which 
theire be certayne headsmen that leadeth and 
answereth for the rest. And doe lay pleadges 
for them when neede requiereth for goode rules 
of the countrey. 42 
Surname groups existed all along the border and in 
the cases of the Armstrongs, Grahams, Bells, Halls and 
others, they stretched across it, some were highly localised, 
. d d . 43 p d' b others were Wl ely scattere 1n small groups. re 1cta ly, 
surname groups were strongest in the most troubled areas of 
the border, in Tynedale, Redesdale and Liddisdale. 
The surname groups arose as the response of the 
borderers to a lack of law and order but, paradoxically, 
they themselves often threatened the peace of the border 
because of the frequency of feuds among them and their 
capacity for sustaining them. The turbulent nature of 
border life provided numerous incidents that could generate 
a feud. The borderers' reaction to theft and violence 
16 
against themselves or their kinsmen was not to seek redress 
by the ordinary processes of the law, which had a limited 
success, instead, they often took matters into their own 
44 hands, exacting a similar but sure revenge. These organised 
blood feuds or 'deidlie feides' could have dreadful conse-
45 quences. This was chiefly because of the corporate 
revenge that the surname pursued for the hurt to one or 
more of its members : it was a matter " ... nocht of ane in 
ane, or few in few bot of thame ilk ane and al, quha ar of 
h . . 'b 46 tat fam111e stock or tr1 e". 
Carey, the Deputy Governor of Berwick,writing to 
Burghley, commented on the sense of community and the 
security and even immunity from prosecution that a surname 
group could offer to its members. Taking the example of 
someone who caught a borderer 'red handed' committing a 
crime and handed him over to the Warden, Carey noted that 
if the guilty" ... be but foote lownes and men of no esteame 
emongst them", the matter would pass but if the culprit wasof 
a surname group his apprehender was most likely" ... dearly 
to buy yt". Retribution was essentially a communal, not a 
personal concept. The surname would seek revenge, killing 
the individual who had surrendered one of their members to 
. . . . 47 JUStlce and two or three members of h1s kln. Carey's 
remarks are interesting for they suggest that for a borderer, 
belonging to an important and feared surname conferred social 
status. In fact, it was as much a criterion for social status 
as owning a horse. With reference to the latter factor, 
Leslie commented that "A filthie thing thay esteime it, and 
17 
a verie abiecte man thay halde him that gangis upon his 
fute, ony voyage quhairthrouch curnis that al ar horsmen". 48 
The effects of this revenge seeking were often wide-
spread setting" ... all the whole countrey by the eares"~ 
as other surnames took sides. Feuds extended beyond the 
grave, their memories kept alive through the medium of the 
popular border ballads. 49 
The kinship links between English and Scottish 
surnames havealready been noted; however, in a discussion 
of the social organisation of the border this international 
aspect of relationships deserves greater attention. The 
territorial line that formed the Anglo-Scottish frontier was 
one that existed in name only. The border was a homogeneous 
frontier region economically and socially. Interaction 
between the two nations was constant" •.. they are a people 
that wilbe Scottishe whenthey will, and Englishe at theire 
50 pleasure". 
Trading links between the two peoples on the border 
were strong. The 'Cornplaynt of Scotlande' speaks of the 
" grit familiarite that inglis men and Scottis men hes 
hed on baitht the boirdours, ilk ane vitht vtheris, in 
h d . . . d . h d h . 51 marc an e1s, 1n sell1ng an by1ng ors nolt, an sc e1p". 
It has already been noted how the farmers of the fertile 
vale of the Tweed found a ready market for their produce 
especially in the garrison town of Berwick. The latter and 
Carlisle were the two main entrepots for Scottish produce 
coming overland. It was compulsory for all overland 
18 
Scottish goodsto pass through one of these two towns. 
Scottish merchants bringing goods into England exclusively for 
Berwick and its garrison were exempt from tolls by ancient 
custom, there was even a special site reserved in Berwick 
52 for the 'Scotch market'. The Scottish government frequently 
complained that their merchants were contributing to the dearth 
of victuals by selling their goods to the English, especially 
in Berwick. There is some evidence that advantageous prices 
were to be had by exporting to England. William Mudy, a 
Scottish merchant,informed the Regent in 1555 that he had 
" ... ressavit for the schipe and fysche neirhand ane 
thousand merkis", but he lamented that he, " ... wauld have 
gottin ane thousand pund fra the Inglis man (if) youre 
53 grace hed grantit me licence to sell". 
It is also evident that there was widespread permanent 
settlement of Scots on the English border. The Cornplaynt 
boasted that 
... there be abufe thre thousand Scottis men, 
and there vyfis and childir, that has duellit in 
ingland thir fyftye yeir by past, and hes conquest 
be there industre batht heretage and guidis. 54 
The government was worried about the number of leases 
granted to Scots, many reasons were suggested for this. 
It was said that Scots livestock became immune from theft 
by their fellow countrymen and consequently the Scots could 
afford to pay higher rents. Scots were also popular as 
55 
servants. There was also frequent intermarriage between 
the two peoples. This was especially prevalent on the 
19 
west border particularly in the Debatable lands. Scottish 
brides appear to have been popular among the Berwick 
garrison. 56 A Scottish marriage was often seen as an 
insurance measure, one writer informed Burghley of the 
English surname of "Ruttligis and there alleyaunce with 
Scotland which is but little, for they are every mans 
57 praye". (Italics mine) 
The government was especially concerned by the 
weakness of security that cross border contacts and 
Scottish immigration involved. The Scots were often 
regarded as a kind of fifth column for it was allegedly 
no difficult matter to acquire intelligence of English 
military intentions from Scots residing on the English 
58 border. Hertford in 1542 and Huns~on in the reign of 
Elizabeth both complained of this, the latter declaring 
that 
... no exploit or purpose can be so secretly 
resolved uppon, but uppon the gathering of any 59 
men togeather, the Scottes have straight warning. 
The collusion of Scottish and English thieves also 
caused concern. In a document 'Notes of Advice for Punish-
ment of Crime' tendered to Mary of Lorraine, the anonymous 
author warned the Regent against 
... the aquentenc at is betwen Scotland and 
Ingland amangis the theifis one bayth the 
bordouris ... quhilk, madem, beyng nocht weill 
luket apone, sall ever hald your grace in ane 
bessenes. 60 
William Patten in his account of Somerset's 1547 expedition 
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into Scotland complained at length of the borderers• 
collusion with the Scots. He claimed that each side wore 
letters embroidered on their caps,or hankerchiefs tied on 
their arms, to enable them to recognise each other" ... and 
so, in conflict, either each to spare the other, or gently 
each to take the other". English borderers were to be seen 
talking in battle with the enemy and were more concerned to 
take prisoners than achieve victory. 61 
Although marrying Scottish women and intercommuning 
with Scots without the licence of the Warden were classed as 
62 March treasons, it proved impossible to enforce laws 
preventing social contacts between the two peoples. The 
views of the government in London as to what was permissible 
and the actual state of affairs on the border were clearl-:-: 
worlds apart. Much of this was due to the fact that in a 
country where the government was based in the south-east 
corner of the kingdom, the border was remote. It normally 
took five days for letters to reach Carlisle and Berwick 
from London. In winter conditions it took eight or even ten 
63 days. 
The border was a land of sprawling parishes, small 
villages and hamlets. The scarcity of parish churches was 
alleviated by large numbers of dependent chapelries. 
Livings were poor and the best of them were often appro-
. d 64 h . . pr1ate . T e relat1ve poverty of the border was rn1rrored 
in the lack of sufficient schools. Provision for schooling 
was uneven over the region. In Northumberland, there were 
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only three endowed grammar schools. The school at Alnwick 
was founded in 1448, but the other two were both recent 
foundations. Those of Newcastle and Morpeth were founded 
in 1545 and 1552 respectively. The Morpeth foundation 
was supported by Lord Dacre who held the Barony of Morpeth. 
The new school was funded by a grant of the lands of three 
former chantries. 65 It is doubtful if there was a school 
at Berwick, an entry in the Guild Books for 12 October 1555 
reads" •.. Rembrance to spek to the dene (of Durham) 
consarnynge the kepene of a Skowll in Bewyke and for a 
66 larnyd mane to mantyne the same". 
No school was recorded in the 'Valor Ecclesiasticus• 
for Cumberland. There is, however, evidence for the 
existence of schools at Penrith and Cockermouth. In 1545, 
a school was founded at Carlisle under the provisions of the 
Cathedral Statutes 67 of Henry VIII. 
Westmorland, on the other hand, was well provided 
with schools. Appleby grammar school was the most senior 
foundation originating in two chantry bequests of the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The school just 
managed to sustain a continued existence, for although the 
dissolution of the chantries removed the revenues on which 
the town school depended, Queen Mary compensated for this 
by granting £5 lOs 8d out of the rectory for the maintenance 
of the schoo1. 68 There were also schools at Brough, Kendal 
and Burgh. 
22 
The provision of schooling in the three border 
counties compares very unfavourably with contemporary 
Yorkshire which, although containing twice the population 
of our region, possessed no less than 46 grammar schools. 69 
The North, unlike Yorkshire, was badly affected by the 
dissolution of the chantries which were the largest class 
. . . d . h h h 70 of lnStltutlons connecte Wlt t e sc ools. Later 
evidence, however, suggests that the number of schools 
quoted underestimates the scale of educational provision 
as there were many unendowed schools and there may have been 
many priests hidden from the records who did some teaching 
h . . 71 to supplement t elr lncome. 
The poverty of the border was directly related to 
adverse conditions of soil and climate 'but also to the 
chronic lawlessness of the area. As a whole, Tudor society 
was a rough and volatile one; breaches of the peace were 
everyday occurrences. Men were quick to take affront at 
the slightest insult and quarrels could frequently result 
in bloodshed. This ready resort to violence was exacerbated 
by the fact that the law required all men between the ages 
of sixteen and sixty to possess and practise the use of 
arms. Society looked upon martial prowess and chilvarous 
valour as praiseworthy qualities in any man: "Pleasure ln 
acts d'armys" was the motto Lord Wharton had inscribed over 
his new ga tehouse at Wharton Hall. 72 In addition to this, 
the insecurity of the area was heightened because the border 
was essentially a buffer zone between two frequently 
hostile powers. They constituted the" ... bulwarks and first 
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defence of the realme, the people whereof susteyne the first 
brunt and furie of the enemye, with fier and sworde and all 
manor of hostilitie, most commonlye when they least, looke 
f 't" 73 or 1 • It was because they were bound to rise to the 
defence of the realm against the Scots that the inhabitants 
of the three northern counties and the Bishopric of Durham 
. 'd' 74 were exempt from Parllamentary subs1 1es. Borderers were 
expected to weaken the enemy by stealing his livestock and 
destroying his crops, depriving him of the resources with 
which to wage war. Border service nourished a tradition of 
violence. The inhabitants of the border were quick to profit 
from a situation that gave them employment and legitimised 
their thieving activities. At the height of the Edwardian 
hostilities with Scotland, Wharton informed Somerset that 
borderers on both sides were anxious that the war should 
continue for their own private gain. Open warfare unleashed 
a tide of official violence that swept through border 
society. It was a short step from participating in looting 
and burning expeditions across the border to engaging in 
similar activities on return. The biggest problem of Tudor 
governments was to control these activities in peacetime. 
The transition was not an easy one, for border society had 
' d 75 become 1nure to war. 
The wealth of the borderers was assessed in herds and 
flocks and so the chief object of the thief's attention was 
livestock : horses, cattle and sheep, 
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Of Liddisdail the comrnoun theifis 
Sa pertlie steillis now and reifis, 
That name may keip 
Hors, nolt nor scheip; nor yit dar sleip 
For thair mischeifis. 76 
The bulk of thieving expeditions concentrated on livestock 
but anything of value could be regarded as prey, 
Thay spuilye puir men of thair pakis, 
Thay leif thame nocht on bed, nor bakis, 
Bayth hen, and cok 
With reill, and rok the lardis Jok 
all with him takis. 77 
Prisoners for whom ransoms could be demanded were also 
78 taken. However, it must not be assumed that the borderers 
confined themselves to raiding exclusively across the border: 
" ... nathir gyve thay mekle betuene, quhither the Scottis or 
. . d . 78 the Inglesmen stelle or relue or ryue away prayls". 
On the Scottish side it was claimed that the Liddesdalers, 
Have neirhand herreit hail, 
Etterick forest and lawderdail; 
Now are they gane, 
In lawthiane; 
And spairis nane 79 That they will waill. 
over the border Englishmen could complain, " that they 
are worse handled with Tyndail men & suche other ... then 
with the Scottes themselfes". 80 
Although raiding was seasonal, Sir Robert Carey, an 
Elizabethan Warden noted that 
. . . the last moneths in the yeare are theyr cheife 
time of stealling : for then are the nightes longest, 
theyr horse at hard meat, and will ride best, cattell 
strong, and will drive furthest; after Candlemas 
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(February 2) the nightes grow shorterg all cattell 
grow weaker, the oates growing clearer, they feed 
their horses worstg and quickly turne them to 
grasse. 81 
Faced with the daily threat of loss of life and 
goods from across the border and from their own countrymen, 
the borderers had responded to the situation by forging 
strong social links with each other. Moreover, in their 
struggle for safety, they changed the landscape of their 
region. Both recurring Anglo-Scottish warfare and the 
chronic insecurity of border life resulted in the fact that 
the border was one of the most heavily fortified areas of 
the kingdom. The Elizabethan antiquary, William Camden, was 
overwhelmed" ... many castles in this tract I purposely omit 
for it would be endless to ~numerate them all". 82 
Besides the great medieval strongholds of Berwick, 
Norham, Wark and Carlisle, to name but a few, the border is 
studded with fortified houses in the form of free standing 
stone towers known as 'peles•. These were common throughout 
the border, usually extending within a twenty mile radius 
of the frontier line. They were, of course, thickest on 
the ground in the more exposed areas such as along the 
open Solway crossings. Peles were also widely scattered in 
the vulnerable East Marches. From there they extended in 
a thick crescent following the edge of the Cheviot foothills 
from Chillingham to Haltwhistle. 83 These towers provided 
security for the gentry, wealthier landowners and their 
dependents. They were stone built, oblong in form and 
usually contained three storeys. Access to the higher 
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floors was by means of an interior spiral staircase, often 
built clockwise giving free advantage to the sword arm of 
the defender 84 whose opponent's was hampered by the wall. 
The inhabitants relied mainly on defence, the massive thick-
ness of the walls and spartan provision of doors and windows 
d . . 85 rna e peles almost 1mpregnable aga1nst marauders. More often 
than not a'barmkin'was attached to the pele. This was a stone 
wall or wooden palisade enclosing an open space, acting 
rather like the bailey of a medieval castle. It afforded 
protection to the humbler inhabitants of the area and their 
livestock. 86 Warning of impending danger or a summons for 
help was by means of a lighted beacon situated at the top 
of the pele. Further down the scale was an array of semi-
fortified dwellings built for comfort as well as defence. 
Many vicarages and church towers were built for defensive 
purposes as at Embleton, Corbridge, Shilbottle and Elsdon. 
Contemporaries were loud in bewailing the poor state 
of the great border castles. Repeated attacks by the Scots 
coupled with neglect and inadequate repairs had seriously 
reduced their usefulness as a means of defence. Even the 
poor state of the towers and barmkins was enough to worry 
the commissioners Bowes and Ellerker. The reason for the 
latter,they suggested was that the gentry who were bound to 
keep their towers and barmkins in good repair and ensure 
that a person of some competence was resident were failing 
in their duties. They eschewed living on the extreme border 
and " for their more easye quyetness & savynge of expences 
did withdrawe themselfes in fermes or other small houses 
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within the cuntreye further distante from the sayd borders 
to the great decaye of the same". 87 
The weakness of the defensive capacity of the border 
was a constant worry to Tudor governments over the decade. 
Their attempts to reverse the decline in the border 
defences will be examined as they constitute a major aspect 
of each administration's border policy. 
The Marches 
For purposes of administration and defence the border 
was divided into three marches, the East, Middle and West. 
The East March was the smallest of the three. It 
was made up of the extreme north of Northumberland and 
comprised Norhamshire, Islandshire, Glendale and Bamburghshire. 
Beginning at a place called the Hanging Stone just east of 
Carham, the march followed the Anglo-Scottish border south 
h h . 88 to t e C evlot. Several parts of this stretch of the 
border were claimed by both realms. They were known by 
contemporaries as 'debatable' or 'threap lands'. Certain 
tracts of land were said to be •jn plee or threip' between 
the two kingdoms, lawful to be pastured by both peoples but 
. d b . h 89 h . h d d occuple y nelt er. T e flrst parcel one un re acres 
in extent, known as the Midrigdge lay near Wark. The 
second which constituted some three hundred acres was known 
as the Threap Ridge. The third, further south, apparently 
unworthy of a name,was forty acres in extent, containing 
28 
" morishe evill ground of litle valore". 90 These lands 
were pastured by the Scots tenants of Hadden and the 
English of Wark and Carham. They proved the source of end-
less disputes. The Scots ploughed in the Debatable lands 
in an effort to enforce their claim. This could not be 
tolerated by the English since once a precedent was esta-
91 
blished English claims to the lands would be lost. To 
combat this, the royal commissioners in 1542 destroyed 
growing crops. 92 The Scots, it was also claimed,dammed 
burns altering their course with the result that they flowed 
further into England and gave their own borderers more 
territory. Again, the commissioners reacted by breaking 
the dams and allowing the streams to flow in their former 
channels. 93 
There had been many previous attempts by commissioners 
of both realms at the amicable settlement of these lands 
but they had ended in deadlock over the difficulty of ascertain-
ing which particular piece of territory pertained to each 
'd 94 . . . Sl e. As Wlll be seen, future comm1ss1ons were no more 
successful. It was only when the border became the 'Middle 
Shires• in 1603 that the question was finally resolved. 
It was generally agreed that the river Aln formed the southern 
boundary of the East March with the Middle March but the 
matter aroused much controversy. Bowes declared in 1551 
that" ... of the perfect boundes betweene theis two marchies 
95 I coulde never be certeyne". The northern boundary of the 
East March was the Anglo-Scottish frontier formed by the 
Tweed. At the extreme east end, just before the Tweed met 
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the sea, the border branched off slightly northwards to 
form a district of approximately eight square miles, known 
as the 'bounds' or 'liberties' of Berwick. The Tweed, 
chiefly because of the richness of the salmon fishing there, 
proved the cause of innumerable disputes between the two 
realms. The Scots were permitted to draw their nets over 
the whole river provided they landed them on their own side. 
Bowes noted that the English were singularly fortunate as 
the most convenient landing places were on the south side 
h . 96 . . of t e r1ver. The Tweed was a formldable defens1ve 
barrier when in flood but otherwise there were numerous 
places at which it was easily fordable. These fords had to 
be carefully watched and trenches dug beside them to impede 
97 the passage of marauding Scots. The East March was more 
open to incursions than the other two marches. Ease of 
access was coupled with the attraction that the march 
contained some of the richest farm land of the border, 
especially in Glendale, "••• a very good plenteous and 
98 fertyll countrye". The East borderers also felt themselves 
at a disadvantage in other respects for they claimed that, 
while their march contained only 120 villages and steads, 
they were surrounded by the Scottish East and Middle Marches 
which contained 400, " ... wherof divers ar markett townes 
and very popolous". 99 The bulk of Scotland's population lay 
towards the border, especially along the Tweed valley and 
h f h S 1 . h 100 d t e coasts o t e o way F1rt . As a means of efence 
there were numerous peles and barmkins in the East March, 
but they were still insufficient for all the inhabitants 
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some of whom, it was alleged, were forced upon suspicion of 
war to take their livestock and goods far away to 
safety, leaving their lands to waste. 101 This was especially 
true of the villages in the eastern part of the march, 
... for the said waste townes lye in such wylde 
& dessolate places so far from any strength or ayde 
of Englyshmen & so nere the plenyshed grounde of 
Scotland that the wysest borderers in those parties 
doo thinke yt a great jopardye for such as shoulde 
Inhabyte in them. 102 
Bowes and Ellerker recommended that to improve the 
security of the area it should be " .•• better stablyshed 
& fortefyed" with towers and barmkins. £100, they claimed 
was sufficient to build a tower and 200 marks a barmkin. 
The commissioners advocated that rewards should be given 
to those who had built strongholds,and money for repairs 
103 given to others to encourage the rest. 
The East March was dominated by the fortress town 
of Berwick-upon-Tweed, for three centuries the shuttlecock 
of war between England and Scotland. The town was secured 
permanently for England in 1482. Once the richest Scottish 
burgh, Berwick had never recovered its former prosperity 
since first taken by the English in 1296. In the late 
sixteenth century, the Mayor of the town lamented 
... this towne standinge in the outplace of the 
lande, invironed with a barren and verye poore 
soil, doth not yealde anye revenues towardes our 
comon chardge as other townes in Englande, but 
everye poore man dothe open his purse to 
contribute thereunto. 104 
Cut off from the rich agricultural hinterland of the Merse 
31 
the urban economy was heavily dependent on the rich salmon 
fishing of the Tweed and on supplying the needs of the 
garrison. However, there was also a small amount of trade 
in hides and wool. Berwick, whose civilian population 
numbered some 2,000 was by far the largest town in what 
was a fairly thinly populated march. It was the major 
market town in the East March, Wooler was the only 
105 
other market town of any consequence there. 
The surviving Guild Books of Berwick provide much 
evidence of the importance of the salmon industry to the 
town. A considerable proportion of the town's population 
must have been engaged in the packing and preserving of 
salmon. Frequent mention is made in the records of"fore-
stallers and regraters";the burgesses were deeply concerned 
about breaches in the local market regulations and preven-
tive measures abounded. One common method of supervision 
was severely to restrict the hours of sale. Market tolls and 
tolls to •strangers' were farmed out to a consortium of 
106 Freemen for £21 6s Bd per annum. The privileges of the 
town rested on a Corporation Act passed in the last 
Parliament of Edward rv. 107 This stated that all merchants 
carrying merchandise out of Scotland were to bring it 
to Berwick to enable it to be customed and sold. All sales 
of goods to the Scots were to be made within Berwick. The 
Statute also granted to the town the monopoly of the 
Northumberland coastal trade :no manner of goods were to 
be shipped or landed between Tynemouth and Berwick. As 
for the privileges of the Freemen, they were granted the 
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common ground of the Snook and Magdalene fields which were 
within the bounds of the town. 108 The freemen were also 
to have the rent of the Crown fishings in the Tweed provid-
ing in return sixty barrels of salmon annually to the 
sovereign's household. The salmon trade was to be solely 
in the hands of the freemen. 109 
Although Berwick was a port, its trade was of minor 
significance. The customs revenues amounted to only 
110 £129 19s 6d for the two years 1553-1554. The customer 
and comptroller of the customs were paid by the Crown and 
the issues and profits of their office went towards the 
upkeep of the garrison. The water bailiffs were responsible 
for incoming ships, making sure that they paid anchorage. 
These offices were farmed out to two freemen for an annual 
fee of £20. 111 The economy of Berwick was firmly linked 
to the military establishment there. This included not only 
furnishing supplies and materials for the fortifications but 
also the everyday food, drink and clothing for the garrison-
ing crews. The surviving evidence refers particularly to 
the role played by the merchants of the town in the 
provision of foodstuffs to the men. The soldiers were 
provided with food through a victualler who was under govern-
ment contract to furnish them with supplies at fixed prices 
according to a book of rates. The victualler kept an 
account with each man and at pay day was paid by the 
Treasurer the amount that each man owed; this sum was then 
deducted from the soldier's pay. If the victualler's supply 
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was short, he issued tickets which were supposed to be 
equal in value to the food but, as the troops frequently 
complained, they were in fact taken at a heavy discount by 
the shopkeepers of the town. 112 
The military establishment of Berwick was considerable. 
The figures for the permanent or ordinary garrison as it was 
known tended to fluctuate. On average, however, it seems 
to have numbered some 200-260 officers and soldiers. This 
excludes the men's families and the servants, bakers, 
butchers, brewers and other hangers-on who were attached to 
the barracks. 113 
Berwick was the headquarters of the Warden of the 
East March. The Captainship of the town and castle usually 
went with the office of Warden, enabling both these officers 
b . h . . d . 114 to com 1ne t e1r forces for 1ncrease secur1ty. Berwick 
was an important supply base and served as the arsenal for 
h b d d h . h . f h 115 Nort urn erlan an t e B1s opr1c o Dur am. 
Subordinate to the Captain of Berwick were the 
Captains of Norham and Wark. After Berwick, these two 
strongholds were the most important in the East March. Their 
garrisons were bound to assist the Captain of Berwick or the 
Warden whenever occasion demanded. 116 
Norham castle lay just south-east of Berwick on a 
rock overlooking the Tweed and belonged to the Bishop of 
Durham. Bowes in 1551 commented adversely on the inade-
quacy of the military establishment provided by the Bishop 
34 
who allowed in wages only a captain, constable and two gunners. 
He remarked tha-t Norham " ... standeth marvellously well 
for the defence and relief of the countrye", protecting the 
frontier down to Wark and guarding the Tweed fords from 
Berwick bounds to the mouth of the Till. Bowes noted that 
the castle was in 'much decaye' and he outlined extensive 
117 
repairs. 
Norham formed the administrative centre of 
Norhamshire, a fairly extensive triangular shaped district 
stretching from Tweedmouth at its apex westward along the 
Tweed to Cornhill and south-east to Budle Bay, just north 
of Bamburgh. Norhamshire with Islandshire and Bedlington-
shire (a small enclave in the Middle March) formed outlying 
parts of the Bishopric of Durham. Though the Bishopric's 
status as a County Palatine remained intact,the independent 
judicial powers of the Bishops had been severely curtailed 
in the mid 1530's as part of Cromwell's attack on independent 
jurisdictions. By the Resumption Act of 1536 the princely 
prerogatives enjoyed by the Bishops of Durham for over six 
centuries were vested in the Crown. Despite the fact that 
the palatine privileges were for the most part abolished, 
h d d . . h . . . d 118 t e form an 1gn1ty of t e 1nst1tut1on were preserve . 
Norhamshire was still regarded as a liberty within which 
the Warden had no authority; justice was administered by 
the Captain and his officials who were appointed by the 
Bishop. 119 These liberties were often a menace to the 
Warden's authority. Lord Grey , Captain of Berwick, 
complained that when he banished whores and thieves from 
35 
the town, they were received into the liberties of 
Norhamshire and Islandshire leaving his hands tied. 120 
Although the Farne Islands and Holy Island were part of 
the County Palatine, their Captain and small garrison were 
appointed and paid by the Crown and they were placed under 
h d . . 121 t e comman of the Capta1n of Berwlck. 
Wark, Norham's sister castle, was the mainstay of 
defence from there to the Cheviot and the chief bulwark 
guarding the fertile vale of the Till. Like Norham, the 
castle did not belong to the Crown but to the Greys of 
Chillingham, although it had been held by the Crown in 
wardship since 1531. 122 Despite the fact that an extensive 
range of works had been carried out at Wark in the 1540's, 
Bowes commented on the poor state of repair of the fortress. 
The previous work had included attempts to strengthen the 
castle by building another wall inside the old and packing 
the intervening space with earth; this, however,was never 
completed. Bowes recommended that this task should be 
taken up again and that the embankment be made so as to 
encompass both the castle and town. This he argued would 
contribute" ... much savety to the castle specyally from 
mynorye where unto the said Inner ward of the castle is 
much subject". The town thus enlarged would constitute an 
ideal place of refuge for the villagers in the area. Bowes 
was also concerned to increase the 'plenishinge and 
inhabitacion' of Wark. This could be achieved and at the 
same time a stop could be put to the widespread cross border 
traffic and customs evasion by the granting of 
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... a market every weeke and two fayres in the 
yeare where the commerce and enterchaunge of all 
wares and marchandize passing betweene the realmes 
of England and Scotland uppon horsback ... should 
be had and made. And the tolle and custome their 
paid for the same to goe to the fortifications. 123 
The arbitrary territorial division between the marches, 
which made the East March the smallest of the three, was 
most likely due to the fact that it contained the most 
easily accessible routes into England for any potential 
Scottish invasions; therefore the march required a greater 
degree of defence. The Middle Marches, though less vulner-
able as far as full scale enemy inva?ions were concerned, 
nevertheless presented a wide range of particular problems 
d dm . . 124 to Tu or a 1n1strators. 
The Middle Marches comprised the remainder of 
Northumberland not included in the East Marches. It was a 
vast upland area, consisting for the most part of the Cheviot 
mountains and foothills. For forty miles the Cheviot range 
formed the boundary between the two kingdoms and,thus,was a 
deterrent to troops with heavy artillery. Yet, it was 
easily accessible to raiders because of the innumerable 
. 125 . h . d h passages across 1t. Scott1s ra1ders coul follow t e many 
river valleys such as those of the Coquet, Jed, Rede and 
Kale Water as well as the numerous tributary streams flowing 
from the Cheviot watershed. These led directly into the 
126 
rich valleys of lowland Northumberland. The farmers of 
this region suffered greatly from the raiders of Teviotdale 
and Liddesdale who were the 'greatest theaves and truce 
breakers in all Scotland' and . 127 notor1ously lawless people. 
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As if this was not enough to contend with, peaceable 
Northumberland farmers also had to endure the depredations 
of their own countrymen. 
In his survey of the Middle March, Bowes noted that 
the greatest problem that presented itself to the Warden 
was the" •.• good observation in order and rule of the 
countryes of Tyndall and Riddesdall". 128 These two remote 
river valleys in the western highlands of Northumberland 
were the most troublesome areas of the border: " .•• that 
countrye of north Tyndall is much given to thefte and must 
be kept contynually in dread of justice ... the Tyndalls be 
so much inclyned to wildness and disorder". Redesdale was 
. . . 
1 2 9 d h b d h 1n a s1m1lar state. Lowlan Nort urn erlan was t e 
obvious target of raiders from these valleys but they even 
raided each other. 130 The habit of the Tynedalers and 
Redesdalers of •inbringing• Scots added fuel to the flames. 
The commissioners of 1542 found the people of the area 
surrounding the two valleys 
... abashed and oute of all courage by the greatt 
and manyfold losses hurtes and overthrowes wich 
they have of late susteyned and had by and of the 
said Tynedales Ryddesdales and Scots of 
Lyddesdale. 131 
Victims of theft, for fear of incurring deadly feud at the 
hands of the powerful surnames of the two dales, would not 
attempt to retrieve their goods by raising the hue and cry. 
They sought to come to terms with the thief, seeking a part 
of their goods in composition rather than trying to obtain 
restitution by lawful means. 132 
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The reasons for the disordered state of these two 
valleys were manifold. A contributory factor was that they 
had formerly been part of lay liberties which had come to 
an end in 1495/6 in the case of Tynedale and as. late as 
1540 in that of Redesdale. 133 Although fully incorporated 
into Northumberland, the two valleys like all liberties still 
remained to some extent havens for fugitives from justice. 
Even after their special status had been terminated, the 
inhabitants of the two valleys still claimed exemption from 
the jurisdiction of the sheriff. 134 This feeling of judicial 
separateness was not easily eradicated and was no doubt kept 
alive by the fact that these areas continued to be ruled 
. h d' h . 135 separately by the1r own keepers ol 1ng t e1r own courts. 
These were subsidiary factors. Bowes was clear as 
to the primordial reasons for the anarchic state of the two 
dales, " ... surely the great occasion of the disorder of 
both those countreys is that there be moe inhabitants 
within either of them then the saide countreys maye 
136 
susteyne". 
The valleys were densely populated. The commissioners 
of 1542 estimated that they were capable of producing 1,500 
horse and foot, this suggests they contained a population 
somewhere in the region of 10,000. The conspicuous lack of 
towns inthe area, apart from Bellingham, meant that oppor-
tunities for employment and supplementary means of liveli-
hood other than husbandry were limited. 
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Aggravating the situation was the widespread tenure 
of gavelkind, the division of tenements on the death of the 
occupant. This factor led Bowes to remark that "The people 
of that countrey (specially the men) be lathe to departe 
forth of the same but had rather live poorely theire as 
137 theaves then more wealthyly in another countrey". This 
custom of Tynedale and Redesdale persuaded younger sons to 
stay at home by promising them a share in the family holding. 
The government recognised the danger of too many people 
pressing on the land; crime and beggary increased -and the 
inhabitants could not afford to equip themselves for border 
service. 138 The only way of alleviating the problem, Bowes 
argued, was forced resettlement elsewhere. Bowes and 
Ellerker drew attention to the strong degree of communal 
solidarity in the two dales and believed that this was one 
of the reasons why the inhabitants would have to be forcibly 
resettled, " ... for their delyte ys muche in the greatt 
nombres of their countrey thynking them of most strength and 
139 power thereby". Bowes recommended that the "••• super-
fluous people of these two countreys ••• " be sent far 
southwards away from their kin and friends, so that if they 
began their criminal activities, they might not so easily 
seek refuge at home. 
This emphasis on the fact that the excess population 
of the two dales should be settled far beyond the border is 
evidence of the conspicuous suspicion and regional prejudice 
held against these people. Bowes alleged that "••• other 
true countreys be very lathe to have any of the Tyndall or 
40 
140 Riddesdall inhabitinge amonge them". Their notoriety 
was such that in 1554 the Newcastle Merchant Adventurers 
passed an act concerning the taking in of apprentices, 
stipulating a fine of £20 if any member took an apprentice 
from either of the two dales because" ... the parties there 
brought upp ar knowen, either by educatyon or nature, not 
b f h . 141 to eo onest conversatlon". The commissioners of 
1542 revived the recommendation that the keepers of the two 
dales should have strong garrisons in a proper fortified 
base, thus enabling them to maintain a strong control over 
the area and dispense justice quickly and effectively. 142 
Chipchase castle was regarded as the most suitable 
residence for the keeper of Tynedale. It was part of the 
Heron inheritance and for this reason the Herons were 
. 143 frequently appo1nted as keepers. Bowes, however, was not 
wholly content with this arrangement and he urged that the 
Crown should have a suitable place at its disposal for the 
keeper to be based at. He suggested that the former Percy 
f b . d h 144 castle o Langley e repa1re for t at purpose. 
Harbottle castle was universally recognised as the 
best base for the keepership of Redesdale. It was precisely 
for this reason that the castle, once part of the Talboys 
inheritance, had been surrendered to the Crown in 1545. Its 
immediate use as a military and administrative centre was 
ruled out by the fact that it was in a ruinous state. 145 
The inaccessibility of the area of the two dales was 
the greatest drawback to its effective government. The two 
41 
valleys were natural fortresses : "There countrey is soe 
stronge full of woodes marresses and streat passages ... " 
that horsemen could only enter the area with great diffi-
146 d 1 . d b . . culty. Some egree of contro was exerc1se y appo1nt1ng 
a surname leader as keeper or by taking regular hostages as 
security for good behaviour. Bowes pointed out the 
ineffectiveness of offering periodic royal pardons to the 
. h . h' bo d h 147 . . d 1n ab1tants as t 1s merely ern 1 ened t ern. He 1ns1ste 
that the keepers of the two dales should have sufficient 
financial resources to maintain at least twenty five horse-
148 
men each, to be able to control the area. 
The maintenance of an efficient system of watch could 
be a positive deterrent against marauders. The enormous 
difference in land area between the East and Middle Marches 
and the weakness and vulnerability of the Middle March are 
illustrated in Wharton's order for the watch. The East 
March required only 200 'searchers and setters• while the 
Middle March needed some 50o. 149 
The more peaceable lowlands of the Middle March were 
well populated with fairly large towns in the fertile river 
valleys and coastal areas. Towns such as Warkworth, 
Rothbury, Alnwick and Morpeth were important centres of 
goods and services. The last two were alternative residences 
of the Warden. These towns, however, were dwarfed by the 
city of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. With a population of some 
10,000, Newcastle was the third or fourth largest town in 
150 England. Leland, writing in the reign of Henry VIII, 
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could still be impressed by the fortified walls of the city, 
" the strength and magnificens of the waulling of this 
town far passith al the waulles of the cities of England and 
151 
most of the townes of Europe". Newcastleg the provincial 
and trading capital of the North, was a county borough with 
its own sheriff, justices and quarter sessions. By the 
sixteenth century coal had replaced wool as the city's chief 
export and Newcastle was to rely increasingly for its 
prosperity on its position as an international port at the 
heart of the great northern coalfield. 
Although a part of the Middle March, 152 Newcastle 
figures little in the events of sixteenth century border 
history and the fortified walls which so impressed Leland 
served no useful purpose. However, the city's economic 
importance to the border cannot be exaggerated. Newcastle 
was an important distribution centre for corn imports parti-
cularly from King's Lynn but also from the Baltic. Its 
merchants furnished the border fortifications and garrisons 
with tools and supplies. In times of danger, their ships 
were commandeered for service against the enemy. The 
merchants of the city performed the role of bankers, safely 
keeping money when it was felt that Berwick was under threat. 
They also acted as a source of loans, advancing money for 
the administration of the border and the pay of the 
garrisons. The customs revenues of the port provided a 
readily available source of cash to help maintain the border 
fortresses, thus lessening the dangers of moving large 
h . 153 amounts of·money from t e cap1tal. 
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The West March was made up of the two shires of 
Cumberland and Westmorland. 154 The march border with 
Scotland stretched from the base of the Cheviots in the 
east and thereafter was formed by a series of streams~ the 
Kershope, Liddel and Esk. After following the latter for a 
mile, the border line cuts off across country to the Sark 
which it follows to the river's mouth and the head of the 
S 1 . h 155 o way F1rt . Here again, the border was by no means 
clearly defined due to the presence of a large tract of 
Debatable land. This lozenge shaped piece of territory 
roughly eight miles long and four miles broad extended from 
the Solway Firth eight miles in the direction of Liddesdale. 
Its eastern margin was bounded by the Esk and Liddel and 
156 the west and northern boundaries by the Sark and Tarras. 
Prior to its division by an Anglo-Scottish commission 
in 1552, the disputed area was a district of notorious 
157 lawlessness. As in the case of the much smaller 
Debatable lands in the East March, the inhabitants of both 
realms were accustomed to pasture their herds and flocks 
from sunrise to sunset •withe owt a stobe or stake', that is, 
they were to refrain from cultivating the land or otherwise 
attempting to set up a permanent abode which might indicate 
legal possession. If this custom was contravened, it was 
lawful for the Warden to destroy and burn the settlements, 
confiscating the goods and livestock and making prisoners 
Of the l'nhabl'tants. 158 S h · t' f uc aggress1ve ac 1ons, o course, 
were designed to prevent appropriation by the opposite realm. 
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The custom of not setting up •stobe and stake' was widely 
ignored by the inhabitants of the Debatable land. The area 
was occupied by the highly localised surname of Graham on 
the English side and the more widely dispersed Armstrongs 
on the Scottish side. Each kingdom was anxious to maintain 
a precarious hold on the territory and each side was anxious 
to prevent any permanent encroachment by the other. This 
was achieved in a similar fashion by both governments by 
159 
making periodic devastatory raids on the area. This 
policy only exacerbated local strife and international 
discord in an area which was already a bone of contention 
between the two realms. Since neither side could make any 
claim against the marauders who inhabited the disputed 
district without thereby admitting that the land 
belonged to the country to whom the claim was made, the 
Debatable land became a haven for criminals. It was the 
chief resort of 'broken men•, fugitives from the law. 
Acknowledging no lord or surname leader, such men raided 
bo h "d h bo d . h . . 160 t s1 es of t e r er w1t 1mpun1ty. 
The problems associated with the Debatable land 
illustrate the weakness of the West March land frontier. 
The Liddel and the Esk were easily fordable streams although 
they were short as the Solway Firth intervened. However, 
even the latter possessed a serious weakness as a defensive 
barrier since it was fordable as far as Bowness. Raids 
could be timed to coincide with the treacherous tides as 
these would cover the retreat of the raiders and effectively 
. 161 bloc!~ any pursu1 t. 
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As a result of these geographical factors, the 
West March was fairly heavily fortified. Wharton, who had 
a long experience as Warden of the West March, remarked that 
the area was " ... naturally so strong and commodious of 
. h . d h . h 162 1tself av1ng many goo ouses 1n t e same". Peles lay 
thick along the border line, Solway crossings and in the 
fertile Eden valley. The chief stronghold in the east was 
the royal fortress of Bewcastle dominating the bleak 
Bewcastle waste. In 1556/7, it was reported, "The walles 
of the helle castell is in soche ruyne and decay ... a man 
may clymbe up the walle wher ye lyme is bettsurthe with 
163 
whether takyng holde betwyx the stones". The main strength 
of the West March was the castle and city of Carlisle but 
once again the castle was reported to be in a ruinous 
d . . 164 . h h d h con 1t1on. Car11s1e, t e seat of t e War en of t e West 
March, commanded the western littoral, the narrow lowland 
entry into England. This position,exactly like its opposite 
number Berwick, gave it a key strategic importance in the 
border defences. This said, however, the military establish-
ment of Carlisle was incomparable to that of Berwick. Its 
peacetime garrison was small, often as low as twenty eight 
. d' d 165 off1cers, sol 1ers an gunners. 
The bulk of the population of the West March lay in 
the county of Cumberland and it was mainly upon their border 
service that the Warden relied. 166 Westmorland's distance 
from the border line meant that levies could not be raised 
at short notice. Moreover, it was claimed that the men of 
Westmorland " ... are not expert in the fells nor in border 
46 
stratagems; the enemy are forewarned and ready for them, 
and except in an open invasion, they are no help to the 
Warden". 167 
This survey of the Anglo-Scottish border has 
attempted to provide not only a backcloth to the period 
which will be discussed but it has also aimed to penetrate 
deeper into the political, social and economic make up of 
border society. Only when we have grasped the diverse and 
complex nature of many of these factors can we begin to 
arrive at an accurate understanding of the framework in 
which politics and government worked. Now that we have seen 
some of the problems which faced the Crown in its efforts 
to maintain law and order in the border area, we must turn 
our attention to the special system of government which 
was developed to administer this turbulent and far flung 
region of the kingdom. 
The Structure of Government 
The most powerful officers of the Crown in the 
marches were the Lord Wardens. There were three of them 
each ruling over a march. The office of Warden was medieval 
in origin and grew up out of the necessity of keeping the 
North in a continuous state of defence against the Scots. 
Prior to the Scottish Wars of Independence, the defence of 
the marches and the settling of international disputes had 
been the responsibility of the sheriff and his officials. 
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When the situation erupted into war the military powers of 
the sheriff were handed over to professional soldiers. After 
the 1290's there was a hardening of political divisions and 
the character of the border changed. It became increasingly 
militarised. Eventually, the frequency and duration of the 
Anglo-Scottish wars led to the appointment on both sides of 
the border of keepers who were given authority to array the 
shire levies for frontier defence and to maintain military 
order by the use of courts martial. At first, their 
commission was renewed at periodic moments of danger. Later, 
they began to be retained in office during peacetime to 
maintain truces with the Scots and punish infringements of 
them. After 1309, the office of Warden of the Marches, as 
. b 168 1t was known, ecame permanent. 
During the course of the fourteenth century, the 
power of the Warden's office was extended, reaching its 
apogee at the end of the century. Wardens were not only 
given authority to maintain truces and raise men for the 
defence of the border, they were able to make and renew 
truces with the Scots. They could hold 'March Days•, 
meeting with the Warden of the opposite march for mutual 
redress of wrongs. Within his own march the Warden was 
able to convene Courts of Wardenry to punish breaches of 
the truce and irregular dealings with the Scots. To aid him, 
he was given authority to appoint deputies and subordinate 
. . d h' 169 off1c1als un er 1s own seal. 
By the sixteenth century the duties incumbent on 
the Warden were manifold and encompassed every aspect of the 
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strength and security of the border and the government and 
welfare of the borderers. He was responsible for the 
maintenance of frontier fortifications, making reports and 
recommendations, carrying out surveys, overseeing repairs 
and ensuring that the forts were adequately supplied with 
necessary munitions and provisions. In addition, the Warden 
was to see that border officers were resident. This was 
essential for the security of the frontier and was held to 
be an important factor in attempting to relieve the poverty 
of the North. Servants of the Crown were resident consumers 
of goods and services and it was held improper that the 
government should give fees to officers to be 'forrenlie 
dispended' elsewhere. The non-residence of officers was a 
major problem on the border, and the Warden had the power, 
subject to confirmation by the Council, to remove non-
. d . . d h 170 res1 ent or 1ncompetent off1cers an replace t em. The 
warden was to see that the gentry performed border service 
and carried out his instructions. He played an important role 
in maintaining peace and harmony between the gentry of the 
North. As a representative of the Crown in an office of 
authority conveying considerable prestige, the Warden was 
in an ideal position to settle disputes between the intract-
able border gentry. Further, complaints to the Council 
were often referred back to him to settle. Alternatively, 
the Warden bound gentry to appear before the Council to have 
h . d' d h . d 171 h d t e1r 1sputes settle at t e Councll Boar . T e War en 
could be appointed to oversee enclosure commissions. 
His other duties included the apprehending of criminals, 
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the investigation of murder, arresting counterfeit coiners 
and examining and punishing those guilty of seditious 
172 
ru.mour. 
The Warden was the eyes and ears of the Crown in the 
locality and he was consulted by the Council on every aspect 
of border administration including the men most apt to serve 
. . . h . h d . . 173 1n off1ces 1n t e g1ft of t e Crown an on commlSSlons. 
During our period there was no accredited English ambassador 
to the Scottish court, and so the Wardens played a crucial 
role in maintaining a steady stream of reports on Scottish 
affairs to the government. They obtained information from 
spies and informers, the upkeep of whom was incidental to 
h d f . 174 t e War en's o flee. 
The emoluments attached to the Wardenries were not 
inconsiderable, but varied from march to march. The East 
March was the highest paid, for with the Wardenry went the 
Captaincy of the town of Berwick. The Warden received 
700 marks per annum for himself, £10 each for two deputies 
175 
and 40s each for 2 warden sergeants. The captaincy of 
Berwick castle which often, but not always, went with the 
Wardenry paid 100 marks, with allowance for 10 marks each 
176 for forty soldiers and 6d per day for ten gunners. For 
the Middle March the fees were slightly less, 500 marks 
with the usual £10 each to two deputies and 40s each for 
177 two warden sergeants. 
The keeperships of the two dales which were attached to 
the Wardenry of the Middle March were each worth £26 13s 4d 
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with added allowance for fifteen light horse for each 
keeper. A single 'land sergeant' held office for the two 
dales: he received £20 with an added allowance for four 
horse. 178 
As with the East March the Captaincy of the city of 
Carlisle went with the Wardenry of the West March. The 
warden here was allowed 600 marks with the usual fees for 
179 his deputies and sergeants. The Captaincy of the citadel, 
a separate office from the city, was worth 100 marks with a 
separate allowance for twenty horse and was, more often than 
180 
not, attached to the Wardenry. 
In addition to these official fees, the Wardens were 
in receipt of valuable perquisites. As Captains of Berwick 
and Carlisle, they received income from various tithes and 
f . h' . h 181 1s 1ng r1g ts. The Warden's appointment to the steward-
ships of church and Crown lands augmented their income but 
also gave them command over the tenants on these lands 
enabling them" ... to have the men of that countrey in a 
182 
more redynes at all tymes when ned shalbe or requyer". 
The Wardens, moreover, enjoyed the forfeitures and 
profits from the march courts. These were considerable and 
ld h . h d . . 183 cou amount to t ree t1mes t e War en's or1g1nal fee. 
Despite what at first sight might appear to be a 
lucrative position, the Warden had to maintain from his 
fees a large body of staff. Aside from clerks and gaolers, 
who were essential to the running of march administration, 
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the Warden had to employ a retinue of horsemen to attend 
upon him. These were usually made up of his household 
184 
servants and the sons and younger brothers of local gentry. 
As a further aid, the Warden could call upon the services 
of all the officers of the Crown in his march over whom he 
had supreme command. Besides this, all borderers were 
bound to aid the Warden in the apprehending of malefactors 
d . 185 as a part of bor er serv1ce. 
The mounted retinue of the Warden was essential as 
he was responsible for suppressing and bringing to justice 
thieves and malefactors over a widespread area. Many border 
commentators stressed the fact that to mitigate the disastrous 
effects of 'self help' the Warden had to apprehend criminals 
. d' 186 1mme lately. The significance of the Warden's mounted 
retinue is graphically portrayed by Careywho, looking back 
on his Warden days, remarked 
... we had a stirring world, and few days passed 
over my head but I was on horseback, either to 
prevent mischief, or take malefactors and to bring 
the border in better quiet than it had been in times 
past. 187 
During periods of international tension or war with 
Scotland the Warden was often granted additional horse 
which were paid by the Crown but it is clear from the 
demands of the Wardens for supplementary forces of professional 
soldiers that the Warden's retinue was inadequate for the 
policing of the border. 188 
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Besides maintaining a retinue of horsemen out of 
his own pocket, the Warden was expected to support a large 
household and provide hospitality not only for Scottish 
ambassadors and commissioners passing to and fro but, as 
well, for any visiting gentry. The cost of entertaining at 
189 international days of truce could be equally onerous. 
It was argued that the traditional perquisites of the 
Warden's office were an all important source of income 
compensating the deficiency in his official salary which it 
was essential to maintain if he was to continue to dispense 
. b h . . 190 SUlta le OSPltallty. 
Any reluctance to accept the office of Warden was 
almost wholly confined to southern candidates. Their unwill-
ingness does not seem to have stemmed from any pecuniary 
criteria but rather from the fact that they had no wish to 
be posted to what was widely regarded as an administrative 
backwater. The correspondence of border officials frequently 
reveals their anxiety and sense of isolation and neglect. 
The severity of the northern winters was a forceful deterrent, 
the effects of which led one Elizabethan Warden to remark 
If I were further from the tempestuousnes of Cheviot 
hills, and were once retired from this accursed 
contry, whence the sunn is so removed, I would ;not 
change my homlyest hermitage for the highest pallace 
ther. In the meane season geive me leave to commend 
and pray for your happiness, that are blessed with 
the sun of the south, and that one rayon of such 
brightnes may deliver me from the darkness heere : 
which I protest is no less to me then hell:. 191 
A more fundamental factor that militated against the success-
ful employ·ment of southern men as Wardens was the recognition 
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by the government that a sufficient local power base was 
essential to the smooth functioning of the office. That 
the potential candidate held lands in his prospective 
Wardenry was a positive advantage in his favour. 192 The 
possession of landed wealth in his march enabled the Warden 
to call upon the loyalty of his tenants, or kinsmen, who 
would form the nucleus of any force raised for border 
service. It could also provide the Warden with enough 
influence and respect to enable him to weld together the 
divergent forces in border society, uniting them in the 
service of the Crown and the maintenan~e of border security. 
The Warden had to win the cooperation of the local gentry : 
" ... noe warden can serve without them, no more can he serve 
b h h h . . . d 193 y t em, w ere t er 1s no un1on nor k1n ness". The gentry, 
as the natural leaders of border society, were expected to 
set an example in their good behaviour and cooperation with 
the Warden. Close collaboration between the Warden and 
gentry was important because Lords were responsible for 
their tenants. Upon the Lord or his bailiff fell the duty 
of producing any offender, and making sure he appeared before 
the Warden. Failing this, the Lord might be made liable for 
the redress of his tenant's offence. 194 
Another important duty incumbent on the gentry was to 
lead the 'fray'. Their unwillingness to perform this caused 
the Wardens a great deal of concerng 
... if the gentilmen coulde be brought to ryse to 
frayes and do their duties, her Majestie needded not 
be att theis greate chargis, but their is such mallis 
amonge them, and such mistrust one of another, as 
54 
thoughe the fraye come hard by their doares, they 
will not once sturr, unles yt be some frendes goods 
of theirs that be· taken awaye. 195 
Even with adequate land holdings in his march a Warden might 
be a conspicuous failure if he did not succeed in winning 
the respect of the local gentry. During the late 1530's, 
when the Crown took over the nominal leadership of the 
Wardenries and employed gentlemen as deputy wardens instead 
of the customary magnates, the government in order to secure 
their cooperation was obliged to pension the leading gentry. 
In this way it attempted to replace the traditional loyalty 
of the gentry to the border magnates by offering pecuniary 
rewards to induce them to support the Warden. 196 Wharton's 
1 d . h h 'd b 197 an s ln t e West Marc were consl era le, and many 
of the royal pensioners there were associated with him either 
through blood, marriage or friendship. Yet, despite all 
these advantages, Wharton's Wardenship was a failure. He 
himself attributed his difficulties to the 'distain' with 
which the borderers treated him. In their eyes this parvenu 
from the minor gentry of Cumberland had ursurped a great 
border office which, by right, belonged to the Dacre family. 
The Crown was finally compelled in 1549 to replace Wharton 
with Lord Dacre. 198 
The scheme of pensioning the leading border gentry 
proved abortive. It resulted in a split in the gentry 
between those who had been granted a pension and the less 
fortunate who had not. Thieving and violence continued 
unabated, "The contrey men lokyng thorough the fingers therat, 
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bidding suche as take pensions of the Kinges highnes ... to 
kepe the watches, for the contrey woll (not)". 199 The scheme 
was finally abandoned in the early days of Edward's reign. 200 
However, the close cooperation between Wardens and the gentry 
was important for the efficiency with which border service 
was carried out and also because of the close connection 
between the wardens and local government. 
Of no less importance to the links between the 
Wardens and the border gentry was the relationship of the 
Warden with his fellow wardens. It was essential that they 
h d . h h h 201 s oul confer regularly w1t eac ot er. This was to 
ensure a united front in their dealings with the Scottish 
Wardens and effective action against criminals. According 
to border law, Englishmen committing offences in Scotland 
were to answer for their crimes in the march they left. 202 
The Warden's power was restricted to his own march. 
Criminals, therefore, seeking to avoid justice could quite 
easily flee into the adjacent march. No Warden took prece-
dence over another but it was essential in times of danger 
or open warfare that the government of the border be coordi-
nated and that someone should have overall control of the 
marches. For this reason, when danger threatened, a Lord 
Lieutenant was appointed. The office was usually held by a 
nobleman. The Lieutenancy, however, had not yet become a 
permanent feature of county administration; it was an ad hoc 
appointment which expired when the danger had passed. His 
commission gave the Lord Lieutenant far reaching powers to 
provide for the defence of the region over which he was 
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appointed. He was able to levy men, array them, and lead 
them against the enemy, whether foreign foe or native rebel. 
The Lieutenant's authority was enforced by martial law and 
his jurisdiction extended over all liberties and towns 
within his Lieutenancy. The Warden, in common with all 
other royal officers, was bound to assist and obey the Lord 
. 203 L1eutenant. 
Under normal circumstances the activities of the 
Wardens were regulated and supervised by the Privy Council. 
Their handling of international a£fairs on the border was 
closely watched by the Scottish government. The Warden's 
attitude and performance at meetings with the Scots was 
reported by their Wardens to the Edinburgh government which 
in turn was ready to report any slackness or double dealing 
on the English Warden's part to his sovereign. In direct 
correspondence with the English Wardens the Scottish govern-
ment could threaten to inform their superiors unless they 
cooperated honestly and justly with their Scottish counter-
204 parts. 
The Wardens received their orders and directives from 
the Privy council but Wardenry affairs also came under the 
purview of the council in the North. The Council was 
responsible for the orderly government of the North. It 
possessed almost full jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters in the five northern counties. Yet, its jurisdiction 
over the Wardens existed more in theory than in practice. 
It does seem that it was content to leave the enforcing of 
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law and order in the three northernmost counties to the 
Wardens. Although according to its commission the Council 
was to be peripatetic, holding quarter sessions at York, 
Hull, Newcastle and Carlisle, it ceased to hold sessions 
outside Yorkshire after 1550 because of administrative and 
1 . . 1 d. . . 205 OglStlCa lfflCUltleS, Nevertheless, the links between 
the Warden and the Council, and the latter's role in the 
administration of the marches, should not be underestimated, 
d . . be h . 206 All War ens were ex-offlClO mem rs of t e counc11. They 
remained in close touch with the Lord President, informing 
him regularly of the state of the border, of their nego-
tiations with their opposite numbers and the vicissitudes of 
. h . . 207 d . h .. Scott1s pol1t1cs. All or ers concern1ng t e c1v11 
administration of the marches were sent from the Council to 
the Wardens for transmission to the 208 J.P.s. Information 
and instructions from the Privy Council were often sent to 
the Lord President to be relayed by him to the Wardens. The 
Lord President also played an important role in maintaining 
harmony between the Wardens and the leading gentry of their 
march. His status as a leading nobleman with the added 
prestige of a great office and the advantage of being near 
at hand made the Lord President an ideal mediator in any 
d . 209 1sputes. 
The rare mention of the sheriff in the records 
confirms the decline in the importance of the shrievalty. 
By the mid sixteenth century the sheriffs had been shorn of 
much of their former power. Their duties relating to the 
administration and supervision of the Crown land and feudal 
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rights in each shire had passed to the escheators, feodaries 
and receivers, and their judicial power in criminal matters 
had largely been transferred to the J.P.s. Outside the 
border, the sheriffs were still burdened with many adminis-
trative duties for they continued to act as the executive 
agents of those to whom their powers had passed. In the 
marches, however, the executive role of the sheriff in 
relation to the Justices was lessened by the fact that the 
latter who were overshadowed by the Wardens had a much less 
important role to play in border affairs. In addition, the 
extensive clerical work and administration arising out of 
the deliberations of the muster commissioners was also dealt 
with by the Warden. Neither was the sheriff the principal 
channel of communication between local magistrates and the 
Privy Council. All letters on border affairs authorising 
enquir1es and demanding administrative decisions were 
dispatched to the Warden's office and not the sheriff's. 
The Warden was responsible for maintaining law and 
order internally as well as dealing with incidents committed 
by Englishmen in the opposite march. Each realm recognised 
that the frontier area presented special difficulties where 
the administering of justice was concerned. On both sides 
of the border the inhabitants were subject to an extraordi-
nary set of laws, known as 'Border Laws•, in addition to the 
laws of their respective realms. Border Law possessed a 
unique dual nature: on the one hand,it governed the activi-
ties of the borderers with their own countrymen and, on the 
other, it controlled the relations of men with those on the 
opposite side of the frontier. 
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According to Richard Bell, a warden clerk by his own 
210 
admission of some thirty years experience, the Border 
Laws were derived from three principal sources. The first, 
the Ius gentium, "wich ruleth all, and amongst all people 
nations", shared the same basic principles as the civil law 
of the realm. Secondly, because of the intrinsic lawlessness 
of the border, the "•• .vile and corrupt manners and unto-
wardnes of the subiect of both the realmes", included in the 
Border Laws were certain treaty articles agreed on between 
the commissioners of each Prince at border meetings. 
Thirdly, the Border Laws stemmed from" ... the customes, 
contynuallie used on the borders in certaine cases, aswel not 
h d d . h 'd d . 211 compre en e 1n t e fowesal laws an treatles". 
The infringement of any of the Border Laws constituted 
what was technically known as march treason. The use of this 
term denotes the gravity of the offence, for the offender was 
held to be doubly guilty, of violating the laws of his own 
Prince as well as those of the opposite realm. The serious-
ness of the offence was further emphasised by the fact that 
all march treasons were, in theory if not in practice, 
capital offences. 212 March treasons can be conveniently 
divided into three groups. The first dealt with crimes 
which directly or otherwise, in peace or in war, caused 
injury or brought danger to individuals or country through 
illegal, unlicensed trafficking with the Scots. These 
included the •inbringing• of Scots with malicious intent. 
It was also march treason to accompany a Scot or in any way 
aid him by providing shelter, food or drink, acting as his 
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guide or supplying him with arms. Horse dealing with the 
Scots and even marrying a Scot without the Warden's 
licence were regarded as march treasons as was betraying 
intelligence to the Scots in time of war or even if any 
Englishmen "make pointement with any scotteman or that 
tristeth or entercomometh with them by any manner of meanes 
213 
rideth or goeth with any of them" 
The second class of march treasons concerned 
offences in which Englishmen dealt with their fellow 
countrymen but in which the Scots or Scotland were involved. 
This included conveying English thieves or rebels into 
Scotland or otherwise aiding or abetting them to the 
prejudice of Scotland. It was march treason to unjustly 
accuse Englishmen when Scots were responsible for the crime. 
Dereliction of duty with regard to border service, including 
failure to follow the fray, neglecting to observe the 
watches or more generally refusing to cooperate with or to 
obey the Warden,was also considered march treason. 
The last group of march treasons comprised offences 
which involved hurt or danger to the Scots in peacetime. 
This included raiding in Scotland, murdering or maiming 
individuals there as well as taking prisoners or troubling 
any Scot travelling within England protected by the 
d . 214 War en's l1cence. 
The Border Laws that were drawn from the clauses of 
international treaties were 'certayne and playne•, and 
there was no latitude for the Warden to exercise his 
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discretion. As for the remainder they were, as one 
commentator alleged, 
... not lawes and customes written, but delivered 
from hand to hand by tradition, full of ambiguitie 
and uncertaintie, such as has been subject to the 
variable opinion of men in all ages, and not at 
this daye agreed upon by the best skilled 
Borderers. 215 
The danger inherent in the complex and customary 
nature of Border Law meant that a man could be sentenced to 
death" ... by a lawe not written, by a lawe not generally 
nor alwayes agreed on to be a law, and consequentlie by a 
1 h f b . . 216 awe w ereo we cannot reasona 11e take not1ce". The new 
Warden, at the holding of his first Warden Court, was 
supposed to empanel a jury of the leading borderers in the 
march who, under oath, would list march treasons. Given 
that this was actually achieved, there was still the possi-
bility that the juries' conclusions in the three marches 
would conflict with each other, with the dangerous conse-
quence that what was considered to be march treason in one 
march was regarded as a mere trespass in another. The onus 
of deciding whether a crime constituted march treason or not 
. h . . h h d 217 1n t e last 1nstance lay Wlt t e War en. One of the 
charges against a prominent Elizabethan Warden, Sir John 
Forster, was" ... that in criminall causes he hath judged 
that to be march treason, which is not, and put hir 
. . b. . 218 
maJestles su Jectes to execut1on". 
There had long been a call for a written code of 
Border Law in order to dispense with recurring uncertainties. 
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In 1537, 'A remembrance for ordre & good rowle to be hadde 
and kept in the northe partes• recommended such a code. 219 
In 1580, a draft act listing march treasons was drawn up, 
but there the matter rested. The reason why the act never 
got further than the draft stage is not known but it maybe 
that the government felt that any threat to the Wardens• 
prerogative in deciding what constituted march treason would 
be a dangerous precedent and lead to the weakening of their 
power in what was a traditionally lawless area. 220 
Domestic Border Law, that is jurisdiction over offences 
which involved no infringement of the frontier, was adminis-
tered by the Warden through the march courts. By his 
commission the Warden had authority in these courts to hear 
and determine all complaints and pleas that arose between 
subject and subject and to enquire, hear and determine all 
march treasons between Prince and subject. 221 
There were no regular sessions of Warden Courts, their 
convening was at the discretion of the Warden and they were 
d d h . d' d 222 d d calle as an w en necess1ty 1ctate . Bowes recommen e 
that two we.eks before the holding of the court proclamation 
should be made in the market towns of the march advertising 
all 'gentlemen, freeholders, officers and headsemen' to 
attend the Warden Court. Letters missive were issued by the 
Warden to the chief gentlemen of the march to attend; these 
men would make up the juries and assist the Warden. 223 
A corrupt Warden, it was alleged, might only give an hour's 
warning of an impending court, 
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Yf he list lay march treason to a man's charge 
that dineth at his tabill, after dinner he may 
ympanell a jury excircumstantibus albeit his 
howshold servantes or such as ar knowne enemyes 
of the person to be tryed and take away his head 
before supper. 224 
Complainants were to cause those they complained 
upon to be arrested to answer at the court. Bowes suggested 
that it was expedient that defendants charged with march 
treasons should be attached and imprisoned before the 
court commenced. 225 After the reading of the Warden's 
commission by the warden sergeants the juries were empanelled 
and sworn in. 226 Three juries were involved, a grand jury 
forindictingprisoners, a petty jury for their trial and a 
227 jury for matters between party and party. After the 
grand jury had considered the charge each prisoner was 
arraigned, judgement was read and a plea entered. If the 
plea was not guilty, the case was tried by the petty jury. 
The prisoner had no right to peremptory exception or excep-
tion for cause as in the common law courts, nor could he 
228 plead benefit of clergy. 
Those convicted by verdict of march treason were 
sentenced to death, there was no right of appeal from a 
Warden Court. However, it was alleged that Wardens often 
withheld judgement and even pardoned convicted march traitors 
... wich almoste princely power wrongfully and 
undewtifully usurped by the wardens hath ingendred 
a settled opinion in all borderers that the 
wardens have ... absolute authoretie to pardon 
the life of a convicted march traitor after 
judgement. 229 
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The lands goods and livestock of convicted march traitors 
were seized for the Crown, though it would seem that they 
230 
often went to the Warden. 
Despite the charges against Forster and claims that 
a Warden "who if he be covetous through greedie desyer of 
. . d h h . . h b d 231 conf1scat1ons woul ave all t e laws wr1tten w1t loo ". 
It appears from the little evidence that we have that even 
if juries did convict a person of committing march treason, 
sentence of death was seldom carried out. At a Warden court 
held for the East and Middle Marches from February 3 to 8 1556, 
out of sixty eight individuals indicted for march treason 
only five (all Scots) were condemned to die. 232 
Although their commission conferred upon them a 
criminal jurisdiction, the Wardens' authority was further 
bolstered by the fact that they were frequently included 
h 1 . . f h 233 h . . on t e loca comm1ss1on o t e peace. T e comm1ss1ons 
for the three northern counties were small and inadequate 
for the vast areas they had to cover and the amount of 
judicial work involved. The Quarter Sessions, the most 
important aspect of the J.P.s'work, were often disorderly 
and sometimes they were not kept. Law enforcement was weak. 
The Justices, for example, often failed to remove forcible 
entries, " ... which makes every tyrant a Kinge, and bruseth 
the weakest against the walls". 234 It was alleged that 
felons were released on insufficient sureties with the 
result that" ... a Northumberland bayle is as good as the 
235 Quenes pardon". Unlike the rest of the country, the 
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Assize judges visited the three northern counties only once 
236 
a year. Capital felonies and the more important cases 
were reserved for the Assizes but even these could be over-
awedp 
Hardlie deare anie gentlemen of the cuntrey be of 
any jury of lyfe and death yf anie of them be 
indyted, as the justices of that (northern) circuit 
can testefie, they are growne so to seke bloode, for 
they will make a quarrel for the death of theire 
grandfather, and they will kyll any of the name they 
are in feade with. 237 
In this situation the Warden Courts which had the 
considerable advantage of having powerful military backing 
to enforce and protect decisions superseded the sessions of 
the Peace and were the most important law courts in the 
marches. 238 
The omnicompetence of the Warden Courts is testified 
by evidence of their jurisdiction in other areas. They 
were used to settle the ransoms of prisoners or disputes 
h bo d . h . h d 239 over t e capture of oty ur1ng t e war w1t Scotlan • 
They were made responsible for enforcing the enclosure 
articles drawn up by Wharton in 1553. 240 The Warden Courts 
not only had the power to punish breaches of the peace but 
it is also clear that on occasion they judged civil causes 
241 between party and party. 
There were complaints that the Wardens usurped the 
functions of the Justices. 242 The Wardensp however, seem 
to have successfully challenged these arguing that their 
authority was the only effective means of maintaining law 
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and order in an area where clan connections impeded the 
regular administration of justice. Collaboration rather 
than conflict was the rule between the J.P.s and Wardens, 
and in any rivalry over disputed jurisdictions, as in many 
other matters, the Crown clearly saw that it lay in its 
. ba h d 243 1nterest to ck t e War ens. 
The management of the border had in many respects to 
be conducted on international rather than national principles. 
It was essential to the maintenance of peace on the border 
that both Englishmen and Scots should be able to obtain 
redress at each other's hands for wrongs committed. The 
immediate reaction of a victim of theft or violence on the 
border was the same as elsewhere in the realm, namely to 
raise the hue and cry and pursue the perpetrators of the 
crime. This was known on the border as following the'fray• 
or the•trod~ The matter was complicated by the fact that 
the pursuers might have to traverse the frontier. The 
Border Laws provided for this contingency. The trod took 
two forms, hot and cold trod, signifying immediate pursuit 
or within six days in the case of the latter. On entering 
the opposite realm the pursuer was bound to inform the first 
person he met of that realm in order that he" ... taketh 
wittnes that he is in a lawful! trode, and prayeth ther 
companey and assistaunce in his pursuite". 244 
Aside from this method, the normal means of securing 
justice from the opposite realm was by preferring complaints 
and agreeing to redress on both sides. This could only be 
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accomplished at formal meetings. Border meetings were 
categorised into two kinds, ordinary between the Wardens 
for common justice and those at a higher level between 
royal commissioners sent to draw up treaties of peace or 
. . h . d . d. . d w d 245 d 1nvest1gate t e m1scon uct of 1n 1v1 ual ar ens. Bor er 
meetings between the Wardens for mutual redress were known 
as 'Days of Truce'. 
After the day and place had been decided upon between 
the Wardens, proclamations were issued informing the inhabi-
tants that all bills of complaint against the Scots should 
be handed in to the Warden clerks. These bills were simple 
statements of the deed, usually a theft, its perpetrators, 
246 
and a computation of the goods stolen. These were 
entered onto rolls and forwarded to the opposite march. The 
Warden there was responsible for seeing that the defendants 
d d h h . 247 h were arreste an broug t to t e meet1ng. On t e 
appointed day, after exchanging assurances that each would 
respect the peace or 'truce', the Wardens appointed the 
Assizes, the English Warden choosing six Scots and vice-
248 
versa. The juries then proceeded to examine the bills, 
each Assize trying the bills of complaint from the opposite 
249 
realm. During the enquiry witnesses were called to 
testify to the truth or falsehood of the claims. The next 
stage was the 'fyling' of the bills. If the jury decided 
that the charge was proved the bill was endorsed 'foul'. If 
the defendant failed to appear, it was noted 'foul condi-
tionally', if he was found to be innocent the bill was noted 
250 
'clean'. 
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In addition to the jury system, other and more 
ancient forms of judgement were recognised. The accusation 
of the plaintiff could be rebutted by compurgation or •oath 
helping•. By this method the collective oath of his own 
countrymen would support the defendant's own sworn denial 
and this was sufficient to clear him of the charge. Another 
means of procedure was that of •avowal' in which a witness 
of the same nation as the accused would come forward and 
251 
avow to the jurors the truth or falsehood of the charge. 
After the bills had been fyled, the jury set about 
assessing the amount the guilty person was liable to pay 
to the plaintiff. The principle of compensation was not 
based solely on the value of the stolen livestock but the 
convicted man was liable to pay 'doble and salfye', that is, 
twice or thrice the value of the stolen stock. Thus, the 
plaintiff was reimbursed the costs of pursuing his claim 
d h d . d h' . d d 252 h an t e accuse f1ne for 1s m1s ee s. T e value of 
certain classes of goods such as horses and household 
belongings were decided upon by the sworn testimony of the 
complainant. The value of other livestock was assessed 
d . . d . 253 accor 1ng to a f1xe tar1ff. The rapid rise in prices 
during our period caused many problems as the tariffs soon 
bore no relation to the intrinsic value of the goods. In a 
call for their updating in 1552 the Scottish Privy Council 
noted that" ... becaus the prices ar now risin, gif the 
malefactouris now suld pay bot thai prices, it suld be 
occasioun to thame to steill and reiff, and sway thai suld 
254 
wyn be the samyn". 
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The performance of redress by the culprit was 
guaranteed by a pledge system. The guilty person or his 
representative was delivered to the opposite realm to stand 
surety. If after forty days the required amount of 
compensation had not been paid, the aggrieved person was 
entitled to have the pledge lawfully executed and call for 
h h . 255 anot er to replace 1m. 
Bowes, in his 'Form and Order of a Day of Truce~ was 
concerned to give an ideal account of the procedure to be 
followed. It is clear that his description was rather a 
perfection to be aimed at than an account of the actual 
proceedings. Discrepancies between precept and practice 
were commonplace. This important factor cannot be stressed 
enough if we are to arrive at an accurate understanding of 
the complexities involved and the formidable obstacles that 
stood in the way of borderers seeking justice at these 
international courts. 
Judging the effectiveness of Days of Truce might at 
first sight seem a difficult task. This is mainly because 
of the fact that the Wardens were more likely to complain of 
delays of justice and the failure of a Day of Truce to 
produce satisfactory results than otherwise. However, the 
balance of the evidence is so heavilyweightedtowards the 
negative aspects, the breaches and failures of Days of Truce, 
and the reports to the contrary are so sparse that the 
evidence supporting the ineffectiveness of the system seems 
irrefutable. 
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The frequency with which Days of Truce were held was, 
of course, dependent on the current state of Anglo-Scottish 
relations. Open warfare between the two countries brought 
the automatic suspension of Days of Truce and often surname 
256 feuds too could prevent meetings taking place. The 
relationship of the English Warden with his opposite number 
was also a contributory factor. Not only was it important for 
the smooth running of international justice at Days of Truce 
that the wardens should be on good terms with each other but 
close collaboration was essential for the effective pursuit 
of fugitives as there was an ever present tendency for 
malefactors to fly into the opposite march to escape justice. 
To alleviate this problem, the Warden sent warning to his 
opposite number of an intended 'raid' against refractory 
borderers. 257 When the state of relations between the two 
permitted, and where the poverty of the victims necessitated, 
the Warden could apply to his opposite number for immediate 
redress of the injury rather than a borderer having to suffer 
the delay of waiting for a Day of Truce. If the •principal' 
was satisfied immediately the accused was acquitted of any 
d . . . 258 a d1t1onal compensat1on. 
The importance of equality of social standing between 
the Wardens in a hierarchical society was demonstrated at a 
famous Day of Truce which ended in unmitigated disaster. 
The meeting was between the Warden of the Middle March, 
Sir John Forster, and Sir John Carmichael, Deputy Keeper of 
Liddesdale. Forster declined to make delivery of a thief 
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who had been fyled conditionally at a former Day of Truce 
alleging he was sick. Carmichael told him "You clocke 
justice and are not willing yt should procead". Forster 
denied the accusation and Carmichael sensing his contempt 
added" ... and I am of as good a howse as yours". Forster 
retorted that he was the Queen's Warden and Carmichael but 
a keeper. This caused some Scots to cry "I saye, I saye, 
comparison, comparison ... a jedworthe, a jedworthe". The 
Tynedalers in Forster's entourage joined in the chorus with 
"A Tynedale, a Tynedale". The ensuing affray resulted in 
the deaths of eleven men and many more wounded with Forster 
. h b . . h h . . 259 and Carm1c ael arely escap1ng w1t t e1r 11ves. 
A large part of the Wardens• sensitivity over their 
social status stemmed from the fact that at Days of Truce 
they acted as representatives of their respective sovereigns. 
Great emphasis was placed on the maintenance of display and 
decorum appropriate to the dignity of each ruler. The 
gentlemen who accompanied the Wardens to the Day of Truce 
had to be suitably dressed and horsed, and "••• a conveniant 
number of the best horsed and decentlie appointed & 
sufficientest gentlemen of his company" went into Scotland 
260 to seek assurance. 
A rigid etiquette was observed at these meetings, 
any infringements of which often resulted in the meeting 
being called off. It was customary for some English 
gentlemen to cross the border first and ask assurance of 
the Scots. The Scots reciprocated and, after the assurance 
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was proclaimed, both sides met usually in Scotland. Despite 
this, Carey still refused to meet Sir Robert Kerr unless the 
latter would meet him in the middle of the Tweed. 261 Even 
after the meeting was postponed to a 'dry' march, Carey still 
refused because he declared some Scots alleged that England, 
" dyd oue that duty and obedyence to Scotland to come 
over into Scotland to them". 262 A compromise solution to 
the dilem~~ was to cast lots to discover who should make the 
. 263 f1rst move. 
Once the meeting had assembled, despite assurances 
given on both sides, the temptation to resort to violence 
to settle old feuds, or to avoid or protract justice was 
often too great to be avoided. Even a minor misdemeanour 
such as the pickpocketing of the warden's purse could cause a 
264 
sufficient disturbance to have the meeting ~alled off. 
It was precisely because such a relatively small incident 
could erupt into a full scale riot that even the most minor 
infringements of the peace carried with them the severest 
. 265 h h d penalt1es. T e customary nature of marc law presente 
its own problems,and uncertainty over a minor point of law 
could bring a Day of Truce to an end. 266 
A maJor weakness in the procedure of proffering bills 
of complaint was that the plaintiff had to name the 
assailant or thief, without which a claim for justice or 
compensation could not be made. The Constable of Alnwick, 
Lord Hunsdon, informed Cecil, 
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... haUyng browght a grete booke of spoyles, that 
hathe byn comytted vpon hys lords tenants can put 
only 5 ynto the Rowle, for he nor they that have 
been spoyled can gyve in theyr names that hathe 
spoyled them. 267 
On another occasion of 52 incursions by the Scots only ten 
were eventually entered in the rolls for lack of names. 268 
In the proceedings of the court the Wardens sought to 
obtain a sensible compromise solution within the bounds of 
what was possible rather than observing the strict rule of 
the law. Sir William Bowes, an acknowledged expert on 
Border Law, wrote, 
As the treaty of amity between the princes is rather 
contractus bonae fidei than stricti juris, I think 
it should be so interpreted, that neither realm gain 
by the other's loss. 269 
Bowes was alluding to the whole spirit of the Day of Truce; 
that matters should proceed within the framework of a work-
able agreement ratherthan both sides standing on the 
punctil iousness of the law, in particular he was referring 
. . . . b . 270 . . d to the pr1nc1ple of 'rest1tut1on y equ1valence' ma1nta1ne 
in the widespread practice of the 'balancing of the bills'. 
This method was arranged on a quid pro quo basis in 
which each side would agree to give satisfaction for a number 
of bills up to a specified amount. In September 1555, 
Lord Dacre and the Master of Maxwell agreed to deliver for 
bills up to £20 either side, 271 proceeding 'in valewe for on 
valewe' 272 " so as the same may go arme in arme and they 
they delyver". 273 Less often, the Wardens agreed receyve as 
74 
to redress an equal number of bills irrespective of their 
value. 274 The bargaining principle in the transactions at 
Days of Truce was carried further when Wardens would refuse 
to answer for certain bills unless others for graver 
offences were redressed first. This type of bargaining 
could prove fruitful as the worse excesses were answered 
275 for, but it could alsoresult in legal deadlock. The 
frequent changing of Wardens also presented problems despite 
the fact that, as in the case of the sheriff, the discharged 
Warden was bound to continue in office till his successor 
entered the Wardenry and published his commission. The 
vacancy was an ideal opportunity which thieves and malefactors 
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were quick to exploit to their own advantage. The new 
Warden, desiring a fresh start,would often refuse to answer 
for bills presented or fyled before he assumed office. In 
this way, the vacancy came to be regarded as a •jubile', an 
unofficial amnesty by the criminal elements in border 
. 277 SOClety. 
The actual procedure of the court itself at a Day of 
Truce was not conducive to the regular dispensing of justice. 
A fundamental principle of the court was that bills of 
complaint could only be heard by the countrymen of the 
accused. Englishmen were not permitted to testify against 
Scots and vice-versa. 278 The system of avowal virtually was 
inoperative since, through fear and threat of incurring 
deadly feud, avowers were seldom forthcoming. Scots, it was 
alleged, would bind one another under oath under threat of 
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deadly feud not to give evidence against their own country-
men.279 Another factor that deterred avowers was the possibi-
lity that Scots might appeal to their Privy Council against 
the avowal. 280 Th t f t' h' h d d d e sys em o compurga 1on~ w lC epen e 
for its effectiveness on the oath takers regard for its 
sanctity, was shot through with difficulty as perjury was 
'f 281 rl e. 
Even after a conviction had been procured it could 
seem the easiest part of the operation compared with the 
difficulties and complexities involved in obtaining compens-
ation for the plaintiff. As the Wardens themselves rernarke~ 
there was little point in fyling bills unless delivery and 
redress ensued. On many occasions the staggering number of 
bills proved too much for the overworked administration to 
deal with. Here again, the temptation arose to select the 
gravest •atternptates•, and'cast the rest into oblivion'. 
Often, the borderers were simply too poor to meet the amount 
. d d 282 of compensat1on awar e . 
The pledge system which operated to guarantee payment 
of compensation was fraught with difficulties. The keeping 
of the pledges in safe custody was a continual headache for 
283 the government and cases of pledges escaping were frequent. 
The length of captivity of some of the pledges and even their 
deaths in prison suggest that the borderers often gave up 
men of no connections as pledges and were careless of their 
284 
welfare. Pledges were handed over with the sheer 
. . b' . . . h . 285 1mposs1 1l1ty of sat1sfy1ng t e compensat1on. The ruling 
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that pledges could be executed if satisfaction was not forth-
coming after forty days was a dead letter because of 
. 286 fear of repr1sals. 
Faced with the many barriers that militated against 
recourse to the law as the ordinary method of obtaining 
justice, the borderers adopted other means of securing 
redress. There always remained the alternative of attempting 
to recover their goods by composition even though these 
'complottes and combynacions' with the Scots were regarded 
as march treason. A much surer method was simply to exact 
revenge, raid for raid. If redress was not forthcoming by 
the ordinary means of the law, it was held legal by the 
customs of the border to counter raid in revenge. These 
reprisals, however, for unredressed offences would only be 
made providing the Warden's licence was obtained. 287 These 
tendencies were not incompatible with a theoretical devotion 
to law and detestation of violence. 
Such retaliatory methods, legal or otherwise, must 
have often appeared to the ordinary borderer as the only 
possible means of obtaining recompense for his losses with 
any degree of certainty. Yet, even to the end of the 
century, borderers preferred bills of complaint to the 
warden clerk against the Scots hoping for redress at a Day 
of Truce. It can also be said, however, that the system 
was never applied with a constaney that might in any appreci-
able degree have curbed the predatory habits of the 
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borderers. Self help and the legal processes existed side 
by side and were complementary to one another but the 
balance was tilted in favour of the former. It seems that 
Bowes truthfully portrayed the situation when he wrote, 
... neither will the distressed people, out 
of theire slouthful dispaire, to any amends, 288 bring in their Bills with requisite expedicon. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BORDER 1550 - 1553 
Auld allies and Auld enemies A Historical Re trospect 
As long as England remained only 'half an island•, 1 
the peace and security of the Anglo-Scottish frontier 
depended heavily on the state of relations between the two 
realms. During the period 1550-1560, however, the fortunes 
of both England and Scotland were firmly connected with 
international relations on a broader European basis which 
equally influenced border affairs. During the first half 
of the period, the powerful Valois monarchy under Henri II 
had not only brought Scotland tightly within its grip, but 
for a time, even England seemed in danger of becoming a 
. . d 2 cl1ent klng om of France. The latter half of the period 
witnessed the marriage of Mary Queen of Scots to the 
Dauphin, an event which marked the apogee of French influence 
in Scotland. Concurrently, the accession of Mary Tudor and 
her marriage to Philip of Spain brought_ about a diplomatic 
revolution, wresting England from the apron strings of France 
and bringing her firmly into the Habsburg orbit. With the 
advantage of historical hindsight, we know that the set of 
circumstances brought about by these two marriages were 
shortlived, but to contemporaries the political fortunes of 
both England and Scotland seemed inexorably linked with those 
100 
3 
of Europe's two great powers. European politics during 
the first half of the sixteenth century were dominated by 
the dynastic struggle between Habsburg and Valois. The 
course of events, on this wider European scale, had notable 
effects on the policies of each of the two realms. It 
followed naturally that they also had important ramifications 
where the two opposing forces met, on the Anglo-Scottish 
border. 
The wider international perspective of border politics 
was very graphically illustrated in a conversation held at 
a border meeting which took place in the summer of 1557 
between commissioners of both England and Scotland to settle 
outstanding differences between the realms. The Earl of 
Westmorland remarked to his Scottish counterpart,the Earl 
of cassillis, referring to the recent English declaration of 
war on France, "My lord I thinke hit but foly for us to 
treate now togyther, we having broken with France, and ye 
beinge Frenche for youre lyves". "By the misse", replied 
Cassillis, "I am no more Frenche then year a Spanyard". 4 
These extraneous political ties were not only reflected in 
attitude but, as we shall see, were translated into action. 
Bearing in mind the nexus between international affairs and 
the chain of events on the border, it is essential that we 
have some understanding of English and Scottish domestic 
politics within a framework of international relations, as 
well as some idea of the course of events immediately preced-
ing our period. It is to this theme that we must now direct 
our attention. 
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"To Englishmen . . . Scotland appeared as a country 
5 they must patronise, a poor shabby sort of place". English 
contempt towards Scotland was that of a rich, organized and 
efficient country for a poor and by sixteenth century 
standards, underdeveloped one. Centuries of intermittent 
warfare and periodic English claims to suzerainty over the 
northern Kingdom had nurtured a distrust and contempt between 
the nations that fell not far short of racial hatred. 6 So 
much so that in the midst of the intense negotiations with 
the Scottish Protestants in late 1559, Cecil could write 
that only in their mutual Protestantism and in little else 
did the Scots and English share common ground, 
... so many slightes and finesses have been used before 
tyme be ye nation yet weare it not yet in this common 
case of religion there is no respect of nation, I wolde 
be lathe to comitt truste to any word or promesse. 7 
Scotland was England's hereditary enemy, "The natural 
inclination of that realme has ever been against this realm 
with falsehood and cruelty since the realms had their names 
8 
of England and Scotland". Scottish attitudes towards the 
English were scarcely less uncompromising, "Tha ar dissait-
ful volfis quhilkis hes euir been oure ald enemeis". 'Our 
auld ynemyis of Ingland' is an all too familiar phrase in 
the Scottish State Papers. 
France, conversely, was Scotland's Auld ally, " ... 
thair ald ffreind and confiderat", 9 "C • etoint les deux 
nations du monde qui avoint de tout temps meilleure amytie 
10 
ensemble". Although the Scots maintained that" ... the 
102 
awld liegis, bandis, amitie, and alyansse" had been" •.. 
renewit and conferrnit be everie King and princes sen the 
tyrne of Achaus Kyng of Scotland and Chairlis the maine King 
11 
of France", the Franco-Scottish alliance was of a much 
more recent origin. It can be traced back to the thirteenth 
century when both kingdoms were threatened by the overween-
ing power of the Angevin monarchy. It was a logical step in 
the development of the Scottish people into a small self 
conscious kingdom. The Auld Alliance was Scotland's only 
support against her much more powerful and aggressive 
neighbour and the principal means of upholding Scottish 
sovereignty and independence. The first formal treaty was 
that made in 1295 between John Balliol and Philip IV, 
renewed at Corbeil in 1326 and thereafter by each successive 
. 12 K1ng of Scots. 
The treaty was then an offensive and defensive 
alliance based on mutual hatred and fear of England. The 
French King promised to aid his Scottish allies and vice 
versa. That the Scots would invade England in support of 
France was a fact that every English King with continental 
ambitions had to face. Not only were the Scots inflicting 
blows on their hereditary enemy and so fulfilling the terms 
of the alliance, but their poverty was an important spur to 
plunder, " ... the King of France has Scotland, which is as 
a scourge for England, nor is it credible how willingly the 
Scots pass into England, because being almost savages and 
poor they go joyfully with hope of gain". 13 
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The political links between Scotland and France were 
of paramount importance but the Scots themselves readily 
acknowledged that they were" ... tied to thame (the French) 
. . . d h. . h. 14 be sa mon2e knots and llnks of fr2en sc lP 2n al t lngs". 
The trading connections between the two nations were consi-
derable, resulting from the fact that the economies of the 
two peoples were complementary. The Scots exported mainly 
primary produce, herring, salmon, hides, wool and woollen 
cloth whilst their imports from France consisted chiefly of 
wine and salt, including moreover a wide range of luxury 
15 goods. The Scots traded with the French as privileged 
partners. They enjoyed the valuable right of direct access 
to the Gironde wine growers and as such were exempt from 
16 
most Normandy custom dues. An important Scottish export 
to France were the many Scottish soldiers that served the 
French Kings. At the fall of Calais in 1558, Scottish horse 
escorted the civilian inhabitants out of the town. A 
regiment of Scottish mounted troops founded by Charles VII, 
the famous Garde Ecossaise, served the French King in the 
. h d 17 same capac2ty as Henry VII's Yeomen of t e Guar . 
Cultural links with France were also very much in 
evidence. Although Scotland boasted three universities there 
was a Scottish college at the University of Paris. Melville 
travelled to Paris with "twa Scotis scollairs". In 
January 1553, a licence was granted to one James Lawder, a 
prebend of St Katherine's to pass to France, " ... that he 
h d b d • • • • d ' 1 18 may aue an get etter eru 2t2oun 2n mvs2k an playlng' . 
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The Scots were attracted by the beneficial effects of the 
French climate. In 1551, the Archbishop of St Andrews 
undertook the journey" ... for recovering of his heill and 
remeid of the seickness quharewith he is now hevelie vexit". 
Referring to the mid-decade human traffic between the two 
realms, Michel remarked" ... que jamais rapports entre 
19 deux pays furent plus frequents". 
France set standards of cultural and social behaviour 
especially at the Scottish court of Mary of Guise. Since 
her coming into Scotland she had worked hard to foster good 
relations between the two countries notably by encouraging 
marriages between her French ladies and the Scottish 
b . . 20 no lllty. 
Mary, Queen of Scots since her marriage to 
James V in 1538 and Dowager Queen since his death in 1542, 
was the embodiment of French influence in Scotland. She 
was well acquainted with the labyrinthine complications of 
Scottish politics and had learnt the skills of playing one 
faction off against the other in order to achieve maximum 
political gain. She had a great capacity for facing up to 
difficulties at hand and making the best use of the limited 
resources at her disposal to meet the situation. The 
shifting sands of Scottish politics and the dangerous 
sequence of events through which she lived had made of her 
a consummate intriguer. 
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To her great political energy she added an interest 
in military affairs. During the English occupation she had 
been the mainstay of Scottish resistance. She did not 
hesitate to take the field with the troops, visiting sieges, 
giving orders for defence, encouraging men with long 
evocative speeches and even shaking their hands. Throckmorton 
21 
once said of her that she had 'the heart of a man of war'. 
The Dowager had two great aims : to marry her daughter to 
the Dauphin and to protect her interests in her infancy by 
procuring the Scottish Regency for herself, thus serving 
both the interests of France and the ambitions of the house 
of Guise. She saw France as the only effective defender of 
Scotland's independence. In her opinion, the affairs of 
Scotland and France were of equal importance to the French 
King to whom she was loyally devoted, " ... apr~s dieu je 
22 
nay jamais rien voulu maistre que leroy". 
The interests of France were further buttressed in 
Scotland by the prominence of the French ambassador, Henri 
Cleutin, Sieur D'Oysel et de Villeparisis. D'Oysel had been 
sent as ambassador on the accession of Henri II to confirm 
the league between Scotland and France. He enjoyed the 
complete confidence of the Dowager, a fact proved by the 
numerous attestations in her correspondence of her total 
trust in his wisdom and ability. 23 Writing to her brothers 
she informed them, " ... vous asseurent rna foy que c'est le 
. ...... 
meilleur amy que J'aye par de~a et le meilleur serviteur 
. . 24 . de quelque natlon que ce solt". Although ln many respects 
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their confidential relationship can be compared to that 
shared between the Imperial ambassador, Simon Renard, and 
Mary Tudor, it is certain that D'Oysel's influence was much 
more pervasive. This was especially evident in military 
affairs. The ambassador was", .. ane man of singular goode 
judgement and weill experiementit in weiris and weill 
. . . h . 25 
est1mm1tt 1n France forte sam1n". The Dowager attributed 
much of the success of the Franco-Scottish resistance during 
the latter half of the war with England directly to him, 
"J'ose dire qu'apres Dieu il est une des principales causes 
de notre victoire". Nevertheless, the ambassador's 
'sudayne and vehement cholere' did not endear him to the 
26 Scots. 
If D'Oysel's advice was of paramount importance to 
the Dowager, of equal significance was the weight she gave 
to her brothers• counsels. She maintained a regular 
correspondence with them, for Guise family ties were 
27 ' immensely strong, "Moi qu1 suis sans mary et sans pere 
~ . ' . n•ay plus recours, apres D1eu, qu•a vous mess1eurs mes 
fr~res, et principallement ~ vous qui estes nostre chef". 28 
Her loyalty to her brothers, she wrote, was second only to 
that which she owed to the King. 29 Time and time again, 
the Dowager poured her heart out to them in frank letters 
justifying her conduct and seeking their advice. D'Oysel 
in a revealing letter to the Duke of Guise in 1555 reinforced 
the Dowager's requests for counsel, 
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•.• Elle vous supplie au reste, monseigneur, ne vous 
lasser de luy donner de vos bons advis, car seurement 
vous la touchez plus vivement d'un seul mot de lettre 
que ses serviteurs (the Scots) de cent mil : ce qu'elle 
prend di si bonne part qu'il sert beaucoup a ses 
affaires. 30 
The Guise, already influential under Francis I rose 
to positions of great influence at the court of Henri II. 
h . b . . t f . 31 . d . h h . . . T lS r1ll1an am11y JOckeye w1t t e1r pol1t1cal 
opponents,the Montmorency, for the direction of French 
government policy throughout the mid-decade of the sixteenth 
century. 
The eldest brother of the family, Francis, Duke of 
Guise, was the most gifted. He was a superb soldier and 
excellent war leader, factors which were powerful recommend-
ations in the eyes of Henri II. Francis married Ann D'Este, 
a grand daughter of Louis XII, and so was attached to the 
French royal house. 32 No less ambitious than Francis was 
his brother, Charles, Cardinal Archbishop of Rheims and first 
peer of France. Charles had been head of Henri's household 
as Dauphin, the King was very fond of him and had solicited 
the red hat on his behalf several times before it was 
finally granted soon after Henri's accession. The Cardinal 
appeared a smooth and conventionally devout ecclesiastic, 
but at the same time, he was a master of dissimulation and 
political chicanery. A vast accumulation of benefices gave 
him enormous wealth and ecclesiastical patronage making him 
a veritable minister of ecclesiastical affairs. 33 
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As if the combination of these two strong characters 
was not enough, other considerations combined to give the 
Dowager's family enormous influence at the French court. 
Diane de Poitiers, the King's celebrated mistress, was a 
political ally of the Guises. Their relationship was 
cemented by the marriage of Claude de Lorraine, Duke 
d'Aumale to Diane's eldest daughter. Diane de Poitiers 
hated the Guises• principal opponent, the Constable Anne 
de Montmorency. The latter was against military adventures 
abroad, and rather sought retrenchment at home coupled with 
an alliance with the Emperor to combat heresy. 
Despite the formidable power of the Guise party at 
court and other factions that actively pressed for French 
expansion and a belligerent approach to foreign affairs, 
these aims would have had little prospect of success had 
their various plans not had the willing ear of Henri. 
The King had come to the throne in 1547 on the death 
of his father, Francis I. He was passionately devoted to 
war and physical exercise and set himself to regain the 
English held fortresses of Boulogne and Calais. He was 
determined to maintain French interests abroad and as 
Dauphin had been conspicuous in opposing the humiliating 
34 Treaty of Crepy. Henri was persuaded by the Guise to 
shift French military effort away from Italy to his own 
north east frontier. A preliminary safeguard to military 
action against English held positions in France was the 
putting into operation of successful diversionary tactics 
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b . . f • . h 1. 35 y mak1ng effect1ve use o France s Scott1s al 1es. 
The furnishing of military aid to the Scots would 
have the effect of killing two birds with one stone. A 
Franco-Scottish army would expel the English from their 
positions in Scotland, French influence would be reasserted 
(as well as a crown being obtained for the Dauphin Francis) 
and English attention would be turned from their positions 
in France. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to construe 
Henri's motives as being entirely selfish. His father's aid 
to the Scots had been small and erratic but Henri was 
concerned to buttress the Scots: old allies were not to be 
oppressed. 36 Once the King had committed himself, he 
wasted little time in firmly backing the Scots with all 
possible energy. As the Constable informed the Dowager, 
•.. vous suppliant croyre qu'il est impossible de 
mieulx faire pour vous que l'on faict et que en cela 
leRoy mestre telle affection qu'il n•y obmect riens, 
non plus que s'il estoit question de sa propre 
royaume. 37 
The Anglo-Scottish wars which preceded our period 
lasted from 1542 to 1550. They have been given adequate 
38 treatment elsewhere, and so it is only necessary for 
our purposes to touch upon the main events. 
Henry VIII's revived enthusiasm in the 1540's for 
continental adventure made necessary the securing of his 
back door by making sure of his northern frontier. Aside 
from this, Henry had several grievances against the Scottish 
king,not the least of which was James V's steadfast refusal 
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to join his uncle in the latter's attack on the old church 
and his stubborn alliance with the French. Negotiations 
over a treaty of amity with the Scots in 1542 came to nothing, 
for among Henry's aggressive demands was that James should 
come in person to London to seal the peace. Henry now 
resorted to force in order to bring the Scots into line and 
secure his rear. In October 1542, the Duke of Norfolk 
conducted a series of ill managed border raids into 
Scotland. The Scots,who seem to have been disposed to 
peace and were in no way anxious to repeat the disaster of 
Flodden,were finally goaded into making a response. Their 
counterattack was an ignominious failure: plagued by 
division and jealousy .they were routed at Solway Moss 
on 23 November 1542. The defeat, it was alleged, sent the 
grief stricken James to his grave three weeks later. 
At a stroke, the clock had been put back to 1286 
and now the opportunity lay before Henry of·not only secur-
ing his northern frontier but of forever ending the threat 
from Scotland by uniting it with England through the 
marriage of his young son Edward and the Queen of Scots. 
All the advantages lay on the king of England's side. The 
French were embroiled in Italy and unable to help their 
allies; Scotland was weak and vulnerable,and with a six 
day old Queen at the helm the prospect lay ahead of a long 
and dangerous royal minority. The Scottish nobility were 
in complete disarray. Events moved even further in Henry's 
favour when the Anglophile Earl of Arran, although 
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admittedly a weak and feckless character,was proclaimed 
Regent. Arran had Cardinal Beaton, the leader of the Franco-
Papalist faction,arrested, showed himself willing to reform 
the Scottish church and even proceeded with negotiations for 
Mary's marriage to Edward. 
In July 1543, the Scots envoys put their signatures 
to the Treaties of Greenwich, agreeing to peace with England 
and the royal marriage; yet, Henry still failed to persuade 
the Scots to renounce their French ties. 
The treaties had little chance of success from the 
moment of their inception. They were ill received in 
Scotland,and Arran, weak and irresolute, saw his position 
slipping away, and yielding to French pressure, allied with 
Beaton. In December 1543, the Scots Parliament denounced 
the Treaties, renewed the Auld Alliance and passed a series 
of heresy laws. The sudden change of events made Henry 
determined to wreak vengeance on the treacherous Scots. 
English claims to suzerainty were revived in formal terms 
and the Earl of Hertford was sent in May 1544 on a punitive 
killing and burning expedition. However, the result of this 
destructive invasion, repeated in September 1545, was only 
to stiffen resistance against the English whose cause in 
Scotland at the end of the reign, despite the murder of 
Beaton by a group of Scottish lairds, seemed further from 
success than ever. 
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The pursuance of the war with Scotland and Henry's 
efforts to bring about the marriage continued into the 
reign of Edward VI, as Hertford, the figure in charge of 
the war during the last years of Henry's reign, was now 
Duke of Somerset and Lord Protector. 
The accession of the aggressive Henri II with his 
eyes turned towards the English possessions in France added 
new urgency to the situation. It became essential to 
neutralise the French cause in Scotland if England's conti-
nental possessions were to be maintained. Somerset took 
his stand on the Treaties of Greenwich, justifying a 
renewal of hostilities against the Scots on the grounds that 
Mary had been promised to Edward. In September 1547, he 
crossed the border at the head of a large military force and 
destroyed the Scottish army at Pinkie. The result was 
second only to Flodden as a disastrous defeat for the Scots 
and only further alienated them from the prospective 
marriage. The Bishop of Galloway summed up Scottish opinion 
in the aftermath of Pinkie when he wrote 
... we be swa cruelly owrthrawin in this matter we 
will randyr to the Twrk rathyr nor to be onrewangit 
... thocht the wysdome off Ingland be extemit greitt, 
thay gane nocht the rycht way to mak unuon off thyr 
twa realmis. Gyf thay thynk to hawe hartlynes, thay 
suld traist ws moir tendyrly. 39 
Somerset tried to secure the country by establishing 
a network of permanent garrisons, in an effort to turn 
victory into conquest and force the Scots to come to terms. 
113 
The latter, for their part, were driven into the arms of 
France. In January 1548, the Regent undertook in return 
for a French Duchy and other favours to obtain the Scottish 
Parliament's consent to the marriage of Mary and the 
Dauphin, her removal to France and the handing over of the 
major strongholds into French hands. 
The steady collapse of Somerset's Scottish policy 
began in June 1548. The French trickle of arms and men 
turned into a deluge with the landing of 10,000 seasoned 
troops in Scotland. A joint force of Scots and French laid 
siege to Haddington, the centre of English operations in 
Lothian. Under the walls of the town, a Scottish Parliament 
agreed to Arran's former promises, Mary was conveyed to 
France and Henri took it upon himself to guarantee the 
freedom and independence of Scotland. 
With Mary's journey to France, the raison d'etre of 
the war ceased to exist and Somerset had lost all hope of 
enforcing the Treaties of Greenwich. Yet, still he 
persisted. The English were now on the defensive and the 
orders to the commander of Broughty castle fairly illustrate 
the paralysis of English policy towards Scotland at this 
juncture, "Yow shall for this tyme lie there as you were ded 
for the while, kepyng only that fort, and not entermedle in 
. . h . . h 40 eny w1s w1t any sk1rm1s or attempt". 
The English government's energies were finally 
diverted from the Scottish war, not because of French and 
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scottish successes, other extraneous factors intervened. 
Peasant unrest at home simmering since early spring 1549 
. 41 . had errupted into a 'generall plage of rebelllng' wh1ch 
culminated in Ket's rebellion in the following July. This 
forced the Protector to alter his military plans for 
Scotland,and German and Italian mercenaries intended for 
action there were diverted instead to suppress domestic 
insurgents. 42 As if the situation had not deteriorated 
enough, the French now added fat to the fire by seizing the 
opportunity of England's weakness at this moment of crisis 
to declare war in August 1549. At the head of his army 
Henri swept into the Boulonnais capturing all the outlying 
fortresses within a few days. 
Somerset, faced with a war on two fronts, and with 
England's financial and military resources stretched to the 
limit was forced to admit defeat. Haddington was evacuated 
in September 1549 and the majority of the forces in Scotland 
were also rapidly withdrawn, to be deployed for the pro-
tection of Boulogne and to secure obedience at home. 
The rebellions and the ruinous war with France and 
~ 
Scotland combined seriouslyAundermine confidence in the 
Protectorship and eventually brought about Somerset's fall. 
The first priority of the new leader of the Council, 
the Earl of Warwick (Duke of Northumberland after October 
1551), was to consolidate his position. To achieve this 
43 
end, he was anxious to seek peace. The realm was not only 
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at war on two fronts but was wracked by social unrest and 
on the verge of bankruptcy. Northumberland realised that 
a military solution to the Scottish problem, given the 
present state of affairs, was inconceivable. He was well 
aware of the strength of the French and that if, in fact, 
Boulogne was not ceded, it would be taken by force; the 
only possible answer to the war with Scotland was to with-
draw. In November 1549, negotiations for a peace settle-
ment were set in motion. The peace terms agreed on 
24 March 1550 reflected the superiority of France and were 
little short of outright surrender. They provided for the 
immediate cession of Boulogne; Scotland was comprehended 
in the peace and England agreed to yield up her few remain-
44 ing strongholds there. 
The effects of French aid to the Scots during the 
wars and the Treaty of Boulogne were to bind Scotland and 
France more firmly together. Scotland became the main focus 
of Henri's ambitious schemes. The French King assumed the 
role of Protector and promised to defend the liberties and 
laws of Scotland, ", .. as he dois his awin Realme of France 
and liegis of the . 45 sam1n". The distinction that the Scots 
were careful to make between the two Kingdoms was not so 
apparent to the French. Henri clearly regarded them as 
one. Flushed with success, he informed his ambassadors 
abroad of his victories in self-satisfi~~ terms, "J' ai 
. ,/ . . ' pac1f1e le royaume d'Escosse, que Je t1ens et possede avec 
/ . ' tel commandement et obe1ssance que J'ay en France". An 
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equal matter for self congratulation was the King's 
influence in England, expressed in scarcely less exaggerated 
terms 
... auxquels deux royaumes j•en ay joint et uny 
un autre, qui est l'Angleterre ... je puis disposer 
comme de moi-mesme, du roy, et des sujets et de ses 
facultez : de sorte que lesdits trois royaumes 
ensemble se peuvent maintenant estimer une mesme 
monarchie. 46 
Henri was anxious to exploit his successes over the English 
and the peace obtained for the Scots by impressing upon 
the latter that he had gone to war as part of a disinterested 
policy on their behalf. The attack on Boulogne, the French 
were careful to insist, " a este faicte plustost pour 
divertir plustost leur dessaings d'Escosse que pour aultre 
utilit~". 47 The Scots, for their part, gladly acknowledged 
that " ... bot be the Kyngis mageste lawboris all the boundis 
. "48 
of Scotland is als fre as thai war in ony of ouris day1s. 
They felt 
... thairthrow addettit to his Hienis mare than thai 
ar hable presentlie to acquite ... as he that is the 
sure and onlie defendar and releiff, under God, of 
all this realme, and hes deliverit the samyn furth 
of the thraldome in the quhilk it wes for the tyme, 49 
as saifit fra the apperand perpetuale subjectioun. 
Effective power now lay with the Dowager, her French 
advisors and the military leaders who commanded the large 
50 French army that still remained in the Country. 
We have discussed English intervention 1n Scotland 
and as a consequence the significant increase in French 
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influence there, as the latter especially forms an important 
backdrop to our period. The nexus formed between England, 
Scotland and France had considerable repercussions on border 
affairs. It is to these that we must now direct our 
attention, as we examine the peace of 1550 and its after-
math, the border under Northumberland. 
The Question of the Debatable land and the Treaty of Norham 
Although the Anglo-French peace at Boulogne had 
been agreed upon in March 1550 and the Queen of Scots had 
accepted the comprehension of Scotland in the peace the 
51 following month, as was customary on these occasions, no 
separate peace treaty with Scotland had yet been drawn up. 
Representatives of both realms met on the border in April, 
yet nothing is known of the outcome of these negotiations. 
It is however probable that they were concerned with the 
routine business of the exchange of prisoners and the 
52 
reciprocal payment of ransoms. A number of contentious 
issues still poisoned the relationships between the two 
sides. The English were slow to withdraw from their remain-
ing Scottish fortresses and still held Roxburgh, Eyemouth 
d d . 53 bo . . h an E rlngton but, a ve all, 1t was EngllS refusal to 
part with their claim to sovereignty over the Debatable 
land which was to bring matters to a head. 
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Following a concerted effort to restore order to 
the frontier area, the Regent Arran conducted a series of 
judicial eyres. In May 1550, he led an expedition into 
Liddesdale and Teviotdale. These 'raids' had the dual 
purpose of restoring order and punishing those formerly 
under assurance. Liddesdale surnames,in particular, were 
most prominent in the lists of Scots sworn to serve the 
. h 54 Engl1s Crown. As part of this policy, the Warden of 
the Scottish West March was ordered to proceed against the 
unruly inhabitants of the Debatable land who, it was 
claimed, not only", .. nychtlie, day, and continualie rydis 
and makis quotidiane reiffis and oppressionis upon the pur" 
but, to make matters worse, 
•.. all evill doaris and faltouris resortis to the 
said Debatabill land, and quhatsumever falt thai 
commit ar welcum and ressett be the inhabitantis 
thairof, and assistis and takis plane part with theif 
and tratour in thair evill deidis, and na trew man 
offendit to can get remeid, nor na trespassour can be 
put to dew punischement. 55 
The last part of this statement was not entirely accurate. 
Yet it remains true to say that there was no regular 
judicial machinery for the ordering of this anomalous part 
of the border other than the traditional method of periodic 
d . 56 evastat1on. 
In early August, Maxwell's opposite number, Lord 
Dacre, had got wind of his intention and warned him he 
would resist any attempt against the Debatable land. 
Maxwell insisted that he had been ordered by the Regent and 
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Council to suppress fugitives and he had no intention of 
endangering the peace. 57 On August 11, Maxwell with a 
force of 400 horse and 2,000 foot came to the house of 
Sandy Armstrong on the Debatable land. e Dacre,forwarned, 
had arranged for the house to be filled with smouldering 
peat and turves, so preventing the Scots from blowing it 
up. He also sent a token force to dissuade the Scots from 
any further aggressive action. The two sides stared at 
each other across the border. 58 
This may on the face of it have seemed a small 
international incident but in essence it concerned a matter 
of great importance. The Scots were not only denying 
English sovereignty over the Debatable land but Sandy 
Armstrong and his surname intended to go over to the Scots 
if England did not afford him and his men protection. 
Dacre warned the Council of the consequences, 
... if he shall turn him for his safeguard to Scotland 
then the King's majesty shall lose his service, who 
hath served very dutifully all the time of these wars 
and the habitation of that ground where he and his 
band dwelleth shall be noisome to this realm. 59 
A more important surname that threatened to turn coat was 
the Grahams. This surname was, in fact, the largest in 
the Debatable land and its members were equally conspi-
cuous in their past service to the English Crown. The 
Grahams and Armstrongs were heavily intermarried and were 
noted as being strong allies. 60 
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The Grahams had supported Henry VIII against the 
rebellious commons in 1536/7,coming to the rescue of the 
besieged castle of Carlisle and in the rout of the rebels 
took 140 prisoners, earning the commendation of the Duke 
61 
of Norfolk. During the war with Scotland, the Grahams 
served wellJ they were present at the victory of Solway 
62 Moss. The aftermath of the battle, a later Scottish 
Warden alleged, saw the beginnings of the Grahams• wealth 
and power. It was asserted that from the prisoners they 
took they 
... gat of thair ransoms and spuilyie worth ane 
hundreth thowsand merkis; with the quhilk substance, 
and spuilyeis that they have gottin in Scotland 
sensyne, far surmounting in valu ane hundreth thowsand 
pund Scottis, the saidis Grahames hes biggit to 
thameselffis .•• aucht or nyne greit stane houssis, 63 imprynnabill for the warden of Scotland his power. 
The Grahams also offered their fighting skills to 
serve the King abroadJ fifty Graham horsemen served Henry VIII 
in the French campaign of 1544, the second largest contingent 
from the West March. 64 For these services, the Crown 
rewarded them with grants of land in the Debatable land 
65 provided they served the interests of England. 
Dacre was concerned that if the government abandoned 
these men, England would not only lose their valuable 
service but they would under Scottish allegiance represent 
a constant threat. On the other hand, intervention with 
military force on their behalf would endanger the peace. 
The Council shared Dacre's dilemma and on this occasion 
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could only order the Warden to encourage the surname to 
remain loyal to England, aiding them if he deemed it 
necessary but avoiding a final breach with the Scots. 66 
It seems clear that the tension between Warwick and Somerset 
was having an adverse effect on the situation as Dacre not 
infrequently complained of the Council's tardiness in 
replying. 67 The Council's only positive reaction to the 
crisis was to protest to the French through their ambassador 
in England. The English ambassador in France was also to 
insist that Henri should use his influence in Scotland to 
68 pacify the matter. The government's attitude, however, 
was not entirely passive; Dacre, if provoked, was ordered 
to proceed against the Scots, the Warden of the East March 
was instructed to send him 300 hackbutters should he require 
them. 69 
For the moment, the solicitations of ambassador 
Chemault in London and Henri's intervention had pacified 
the situation but the matter could not be shelved as the 
Scots refused to give redress to the Armstrongs and other 
Debatable land surnames without, in doing so, recognising 
English claims. In opposition to this, Dacre's officers 
were insisting that the complaints of the Debatable land 
must be settled before other Scottish bills of grievance 
could be considered. The threat of armed intervention by 
the Scots over the Debatable land served to bring the 
whole question into the open. The English government was 
quite clear about its stance on the matter; it claimed that 
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since there had been no mention of the Debatable in the 
Treaty of Boulogne, then the English were to remain in 
peaceful possession. 70 The Scots, well aware of English 
attitudes towards the Debatable land and emboldened and 
supported by the French, wished to force the issue; four 
ensigns of foot under the French commander, de Thermes, had 
formed the nucleus of Maxwell's force which,they insisted, 
had not been to invade English territory"··· mais pour 
chasser de la quelques brigands qui troublent et empechent 
. , / . la neutral1te de tout temps gardee en lad1cte terre 
/ 71 debatable". 
The Council welcomed French diplomatic intervention 
but were still sensitive about their failure in Scotland 
and the prospect of negotiating with their former enemies. 
Theywished to make it clear that the Scots were not to be 
considered as a constituent part of a tripartite_ pact 
negotiating on equal terms but as merely comprehended in 
the Boulogne Treaty. The government scorned the overtures 
of the Scottish envoy, the Master of Erskine, sent by the 
Dowager in September 1550 to treat on the matter in 
d . 72 lSPUte, 
Marye we knowe that thei (the Scots) have required 
divers thinges more than reasonable, which wee oughte 
not to satisfie, and therfore if thei seeke redresse 
of any thinge (as we thinke thei have no cause), than 
lett the Frenche Kinge by his ministers declare it, 
and we shall accordinglie make him aunswere whith 
whom the Treatie hath been concluded, and not with 
them. 73 
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The French hoped that the matter could be decided 
upon between officers on the frontier but they felt that 
their prestige was at stake in Scotland and they were 
determined that the Scots should have what belonged to 
them or rather,as Henri thought, what belonged to him. 74 
In January 1551, the French sent a special envoy, Louis de 
Saint Gelais, Sieur de Lansac, to act in conjunction with 
the French ambassador. The immediate purpose of Lansac•s 
mission was to settle the dispute over the Debatable land 
but it also provided an opportunity to clear up all 
outstanding differences between the two realms. Since the 
end of the war, the English had prevented the Scots from 
fishing in the TWeed and had maintained a garrison at 
Edrington just outside the bounds of Berwick. Furthermore, 
settlement had yet to be made regarding the ransom of 
. 75 pr1soners. 
At their first interview with the Council on 
1 February, Lansac and the ambassador asked that Edrington 
and the TWeed fishings be restored, that the Debatobl~ 
land be used as before the war and that Englishrne.n formerly 
held prisoners in Scotland should not be exempte9 from 
paying their ransoms. They argued that the comprehension 
of Scotland in the Treaty of Boulogne implied that it should 
be restored in its entirety. They hoped that such a 
reasonable request would not mar such a well established 
peace,or Henri as Scotland's Protector would be bound to 
intervene and defend the Scots just quarrel. They argued 
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that the restoration of the status quo ante was the only 
76 
way to ensure a secure and lasting peace. 
The English were adamant. Paget argued that 
Edrington, the Tweed fishings,and the Debatable land were 
English possessions held by right of conquest, Henry VIII 
having gained them in his wars against James v. It followed 
therefore that Edward held them legally by right of inheri-
tance. The Treaty of Boulogne by making no reference to 
these matters had confirmed Edward's ownership. As for 
the ransoms, those arranged before the treaty would be 
77 honoured. 
Lansac reported back to France that at first he had 
. .... found the Engl1sh 'fort haulx ala main•, subsequently there 
was an apparent change in their attitude when news arrived 
that Scots and French forces were massing on the border, 
prepared, if necessary, to determine events by force. As 
a result of this the Council sent a secretary to Lansac 
asking him to write to D'Oysel informing him of the advant-
ageous terms the English were prepared to give and that an 
envoy would be sent to France with full powers to satisfy 
the King. In return, Lansac agreed to write to D'Oysel 
informing him that the negotiations were making progress and 
instructing him to desist from force. 78 
Once again, the Council were reduced to the self-
abasing position of seeking the French ambassador's 
intervention to prevent border raids. English dependence 
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on France did not go unnoticed. The Imperial ambassador 
reported that as part of Northumberland's policy of 
proceeding in close alliance with Henri, nothing was done 
. h h' d d . 79 Wlt out 1s ambassa or's a v1ce. 
The lengths to which the English were prepared to 
go to propitiate the French can be exaggerated, but the 
diplomatic pressure of the French was relentless and 
vigorously encouraged by the Scottish Queen Dowager who 
was then in France. Sir John Mason, the English ambassador 
in France,placed the blame for the French hard line in 
negotiations squarely on the Dowager, 
The Scottish Queen desireth as much our subversion, 
if it lay in her power, as she desireth the preserv-
ation of herself, whose service in Scotland is so 
highly taken here, as she is in this court made a 
goddess. The credit of the house of Guise in this 
court passeth all others. 80 
In the face of this pressure the instructions that were 
given to Sir William Pickering, the envoy to France, were 
nothing short of capitulation. The English were negotiating 
from a state of hopeless weakness, yet the Council still 
sought to redeem something from the situation. With this 
in mind, Pickering was instructed to resurrect the claim 
to Roxburgh and Eyernouth, arguing that by the Treaty of 
Boulogne these rightfully belonged to England. This move 
would make it appear that England was conceding more. 
If the French would not give way on the forts and the Tweed 
fishings, the English were prepared to relinquish them for 
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the sake of a secure peace, redress on the border and 
the retention of the Debatable land. If Henri found the 
latter unacceptable, Pickering was to relent and suggest 
81 that it remain neutral. 
The French, as was to be expected, accepted the 
final terms and Lansac and Erskine were sent back as 
commissioners to settle the matter. On 1 April, the two 
were back in England requesting the appointment of English 
. . 82 . . 
commlSSloners. The government appolnted the Blshop of 
Norwich, Sir Robert Beckwith, Sir Thomas Challoner and 
Sir Robert Bowes. Although trained negotiators, the first 
three men must have leaned heavily on Bowes's extensive 
. . bo d . 83 exper1ence 1n r er affalrs. As for the Scots, the 
Dowager was determined as in earlier negotiations that the 
weighty presence of France should be felt by the inclusion 
of a Frenchman in the commissioners. Originally, it was 
decided that D'Oysel would be a member of the commission 
with the Bishop of Orkney or Ross, Erskine and Lord 
Ruthven. This was later altered, the Scots finally appoint-
ing the Bishop of Orkney, Lord Maxwell, Erskine, Lansac and 
Robert Carnegie of Kinnaird, all strong adherents of the 
84 Dowager. 
The commissioners met on 12 May at the Reddenburn 
near Wark, a common Truce Day meeting place of the Wardens 
of the East Marches. A dispute immediately arose over 
the size of the scottish commission which had five 
members. The Scots remonstrated that Lansac was merely a 
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special envoy and not a commissioner who had been sent at 
the French King's behest to report upon the details of 
Edward's promises to Henri and in case difficulties arose 
to work for good agreement between the two parties. In 
actual fact, Lansac seems to have acted as spokesman for 
the Scots. The English objected to his high-handedness, 
claiming that Lansac spoke of the outcome of the negotiations 
as though they were a foregone conclusion and that the 
English merely had to set their seals to the Scots demands; 
they protested at his inclusion and insisted that the two 
. . b 85 commlSSlons be of equal num er. 
The second meeting followed the next day at Norham 
church and although Lansac was absent the attitude of the 
Scots was no less unrelenting. The English commissioners 
insisted that for the sake of peace and to demonstrate 
England • s new amity with France, Edward " . . . culde be 
content to departe with that, that by right was his" 
meaning Scotland but the King was anxious for a clear 
delineation of the bounds. In this way through English 
initiative the specific question of the Debatable land 
was transformed into a discussion on the whole subject of 
the exact frontier line. Both sides acknowledged that this 
uncertainty had been the cause of much of the earlier 
tension and bloodletting between the two peoples and was 
best eliminated, " ... and we neverthemore assured, nor they 
the lesse at large, to clayme afterwards what further 
incertain encrochment any ambicious or busy headed borderer 
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wold putt in their rnynd ... for aslong as this pyke was lefte 
undredressed occasion of newe breache would never want". 86 
The Scottish commissioners were reluctant to discuss 
the principle of division regarding the Debatable lands in 
the East March and were confidently hoping that England 
would merely concede these parcels of land to Scotland. 
Feeling hard-pressed, the English commissioners insisted 
that Edward's promise to Lansac " ... was but condicionally 
. . . so that his Highnes might be assured of tharnitye". It 
was only after they had related at length the wide powers of 
their commission that the Scots consented to write to the 
d . . 87 Governor for renewe 1nstruct1ons. 
In the meantime, the commissioners got down to 
preliminary discussions on the Debatable lands in the East 
March. They anticipated many problems, 
Truly my lords though the parcel in varyaunce be but 
of small value, yet we see much dificultye ... the 
inhabitantes of either border being so parcyall as 
they be and addicted of selfwillynes to wrong treade 
owte the boundes either to their own advauntage. 
The lands from Wark to Cheviot presented the greatest 
difficulty of definition, " ... we thinke neither parte doth 
rightly knowe their own but by gesse and pretence". The 
only practicable solution was for the commissioners 
themselves in person to plot out the boundary. They agreed 
to meet on 15 Mayp " ... to survey a long the lymyttes such 
places as we contende upon to see yf our selfe maye better 
take the mattier up then the countrey will". 88 
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The matter of the Debatable lands on the East March 
came abruptly to a halt as the Council were afraid that, 
because of diplomatic pressure from the French, they would 
have a solution forced upon them. The bounds were to be 
left, " .. , for that we thinke the tyme doth not seame 
(appropriate for) us to mak such bargaine ... in dead the 
leavinge of the lymittes in generalities as they were before 
h . d' f h . tie 89 t e warre 1s moste commo 1ous or t e Klnges Ma "· The 
change of heart was sudden and can only be ascribed to 
English sensitivity to the risk of loss of face. 
Northumberland, the leader of the Council, was anxious to 
build up his power in the North. He was fully aware that 
the matter of division was an explosive issue among the 
borderers. As such, the Duke could not afford any loss of 
prestige by accepting a division that was too favourable to 
the Scots. On the other hand, the Council were anxious that 
the Scottish initiative for the division of the Debatable 
land on the West March should be examined, provided of course 
that England did not come off the worse from the proceedings. 
To achieve this aim, the river Esk would have to be the 
dividing line. This meant that the southern and larger part 
of the Debatable land would fall to Scotland and they would 
have the lands of the Priory of Canonbie which they had 
always claimed. This the Council were prepared to accept if 
England would secure the advantage of having Armstrong's 
Tower and a landing place of strategic importance on the Esk 
known as 'Black Bank', "We understande the same place of 
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blak bank to be of such moment of the service of the king 
that if it fall not out in the division to the kinges parte 
we think it not fitt to make any devisione of the said 
90 debtable". 
The French were fully aware of the diplomatic 
straitjacket the English commissioners now found themselves 
in and their reluctance to negotiate from such a weak 
position. Their frustrating lack of manoeuvrability was 
self evident: one minute the English asserted they had a 
wide commission to settle disputes, and the next they 
prevaricated by insisting that they must write 
to the Council for further powers and instructions. 
Challoner complained to Cecil wishing that their affairs 
could be brought to a successful conclusion: "I litle like 
this cuntrie, and methinkes Octobre is fayrer here then 
Maye!". The commissioners had not received a reply to their 
letter in eleven days, speedy replies were imperative and 
delays could only be detrimental to their proceedings. 
Challoner contrasted their plight with that of the Scottish 
commissioners whose "Governor lieth hard at their noses, 
d h . h d h" 91 an so may t ey n1g tly sen unto 1m". 
The French were exasperated at what they clearly 
interpreted as English double dealing and time wasting. 
Lansac, writing to the French ambassador in London,bitterly 
resented the English commissioners' refusal to implement 
the promises he alleged the Council had made to him : 
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si j•ay jamays affayres avecques les Anglois, je ne 
me firay pas tant en leurs belles promesses et paroles 
que je ne preygne par escript ce qu'ils m•auront 
accord~; car j•ay es~ en grande payne pour ce qu'ils 
m'ont dist n•avoir poinct de charge de satisfaire a ce 
qui est~ accorde a vous et ~ moy, en plain Conseil. 92 
Once again, the English had relented in the face of French 
pressure and appear to have dropped their demands that Lansac 
. . 93 
should be excluded from the CommlsSloners. 
The outcome of the negotiations was finally embodied 
in the Treaty of Norham which was drawn up on 10 June 
1551. 94 Territorially, the treaty restored the status quo 
as between Henry VIII and James V, and not as Edward had 
claimed to the date of the Treaty of Boulogne. As a 
consequence of this, Edrington was handed over to the Scots 
and they were permitted to enjoy the Tweed fishings adjudged 
to be theirs at the same time. 95 There was no specific 
reference to Roxburgh and Eyemouth to which a claim had been 
raised in February 1551, 96 which confirms the view that the 
claim was merely a diplomatic gestureJ besides,the two 
fortresses were covered by clause one. No mention was made 
of the Debatable lands in the East March. As to the crucial 
factor of the Debatable land itself, not only did the treaty 
stipulate that its status was to remain unchanged, and that 
it was to remain neutral, but it was to be cleared of its 
inhabitants. The latter were given until Michaelmas to 
remove themselves, their goods and cattle. The remainder of 
the treaty was for the most part concerned with the affirm-
ation of familiar aspects of March Law and maritime law 
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governing shipwrecks. As for the vexed and complicated 
question of pledges and prisoners remaining on both sides, 
the treaty stated that all men were to have their freedom 
d h . 'b 97 restore to t em as qu1ckly as poss1 le. 
Clearly, the commissioners were unable to reach any 
positive agreement on the subject of the Debatable land. 
This can be seen as something of a diplomatic success for 
the English in that they had managed to ward off a division 
that might have been detrimental to their interests and 
allies among the surname groups on that sensitive part of 
the border. Yet, despite this, the question of sovereignty 
was still left open and the prospect of division was not 
ruled out completely. The evacuation was, in fact, 
provisionary, " ... unless it be otherwise in the meantime, 
of the said variable ground, by good ways and means agreed 
and concluded between the Princes". 98 
The English had perhaps gained something of a breath-
ing space but the fact that the problem of the Debatable 
land had not been settled was to prove a major drawback to 
a firm peace. The second clause of the treaty remained a 
dead letter as the surnames that inhabited the land were 
unwilling to leave and this was to prove occasion for further 
trouble. Thus, the Treaty of Norham was in many ways a 
temporary expedient. The commissioners shelved the 
Debatable problem at the expense of the much larger one 
of restoring order to the border area as a whole, for only 
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in the settled conditions of peace could the international 
machinery of Days of Truce operate. 
The Division of the Debatable Land 
Bearing in mind the atmosphere of distrust that 
existed between the two sides, the Treaty of Norham can 
still be regarded as an important advance in the restoration 
of normal relations. As a usual border peace settlement 
which followed the formal cessation of hostilities between 
the two realms, it was in itself long overdue. Nevertheless, 
the deferment of the Debatable problem which had been the 
raison d'~tre of the commissioners• assembly, made the 
peace of Norham something of a peace on paper. Wharton, 
writing to Northumberland in September 1552, blamed Scottish 
intransigence as the reason for the commissioners• failure. 
The Scots, he claimed, wished to keep the Debatable as a 
running sore between the two sides, 
I cannot but thinke they (the Scots) meane some 
inglinge or strange purpose for that matter of the 
debateable land And to kepe yt as it is to be a 
pyke between this realme and that. 99 
He attributed this not only to traditional Anglo-Scottish 
hostility but also to the fact that many Scots were becom-
ing aware of the increasingly dominant role the French 
were playing in Scottish politics and they wished to rob 
them of the prestigious diplomatic coup that the peaceful 
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division of the Debatable land would gain for them. The 
Scots also looked askance at the growing friendship of 
England and France, putting paid to any chances of English 
military intervention (on religious grounds?) on their 
behalf against the French. The Scots, Wharton claimed, 
sought 
... to work there purpose at all tymes with France 
for in no wyse they wold haue France And this realme 
agree for ... many of the noblemen and others of that 
realme at this present tyme ar in grete mallie and 
displeasur agaynst the doinges and prepatyres for 
doings as they judge to be in the Frenchmen agaynst 
ther liberties and rights of that realme. 100 
During the last phase of the Debatable land problem, 
it was once again the Scots who took the initiative into 
their own hands. Since Norham, no accord had yet been 
agreed upon nor, it appears, had the inhabitants left. In 
late November 1551, the Scots government sent out orders, 
" to raise certane hakbutaris and peonaris to be at the 
birnyng of the Debateable land". Letters of Proclamation 
were despatched to the border Sheriffdoms charging men to 
be at Hawick on 8 December, " ... bodin in feir of weyre to 
pas upoune the thevis of the Debatable ground" under the 
leadership of Lord Maxwell. The operation was to entail 
not only the dispersal of the inhabitants but the destruction 
of any fortified houses; Maxwell was accompanied by 'peno-
naris, maisonis (and) quariouris', with 'pikkiss and 
. h' 101 mattokkls', for t lS purpose. 
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In keeping with the custom of the marches, Maxwell 
had not only discussed the impending raid with the new 
English Warden, Lord Conyers, but it was to be a joint 
venture between the two men. 102 The raid was scheduled 
for 10 December when the Council suddenly ordered Conyers 
to break off negotiations with Maxwell. owing to the recent 
murder of one of the Armstrongs, they judged the moment not 
propitious" ... doubting lest if any great company shold be 
assembled by the Xth of December to over ryde the Debateable 
as is appointed, somme greater inconvenience might growe, 
and thereby the peace and amitie empayred". 103 The Scots 
interpreted Conyers's change of heart as mere malicious 
procrastination and saw no reason why Maxwell should not 
go ahead with the intended raid as planned. The raid took 
place 10-11 December; it is significant that no force was 
raised to prevent Maxwell's action as in the previous year. 
The expedition caused something of a furore as in the course 
of the engagements several Grahams were killed which sparked 
off a feud between that surname and the Maxwells which was 
to last well into the decade. 104 Maxwell had responded to 
the killing by sending a gentleman to Conyers to act as 
guarantor until the matter had been investigated but since 
Maxwell had carried out the raid in the face of Conyers's 
' ' h d 105 oppos1t1on, the latter refused to accept t e ple ge. 
Wharton, with a wider experience of march affairs, was 
acutely conscious of the intractable situation that Conyers 
was creating. Yet, he could not understand the hostility 
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with which the Council regarded Maxwell's raid on the 
Debatable , since it was entirely in keeping with the 
provisions of the Treaty of Norham that the ground should 
return to a state of uninhabited neutrality after Michael-
106 
mas. The matter was further taken out of the Warden's 
hands when the Council ordered Conyers to continue the 
suspension of communications with Maxwell and not to nego-
tiate with the Scots in any matter of importance without 
the advice of the Warden General, the Duke of 
Northumberland. 107 A clearer view of the matter was 
obtained when Conyers was called to London to attend the 
January Parliament of 1552. 108 The Scots, however, pressed 
the matter with the French ambassador asking that 
commissioners be appointed to pacify the border and clear 
up all contentions since the peace, but no mention was 
made of altering the status of the Debatable land. In 
mid-January 1552, the English revived the idea of the 
division of the Debatable with the French ambassador and 
later that same month, the Scottish government agreed that 
the principle of division was the only possible solution 
capable of bringing order to that troubled area of the West 
March. 109 It was agreed that the commissioners should meet 
at Carlisle and Dumfries and not in the Debatable land 
itself as their proceedings would be hindered by the lawless 
inhabitants of the area, "••• every parte being affectyoned 
to their owne pryvate purpose ... in dede, the lesse pryvey 
the Borderers be made to the devision hereof, the more likely 
. . h h. h 110 1t lS t e t 1ng s all take place". 
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The English commissioners were headed by the Earl 
of Westmorland and included Wharton, Sir Thomas Palmer 
and one of the signatories of the Treaty of Norham, Sir 
Thomas Challoner. The Scottish government appointed the 
Earl of Cassilis to lead their commission which was also 
made up of Lord Maxwell, James Douglas of Drumlanrig and 
. h d . d h' 111 R1c ar Ma1tlan of Let 1ngton. 
The instructions to the commissioners clearly 
delineated the Council's priorities. They were to make 
sure that the strategically important landing place on the 
Esk, known as Black Bank, fell to England and they were 
if possible to procure those areas where allies of England, 
including the Grahams and Armstrongs, dwelt. The stone 
house of the latter was especially to fall to England in 
any division. The fertility of the land was also a factor 
b 'd d 112 to e cons1 ere . 
The commissioners met in late Apri1. 113 Events got 
off to an unpromising start when the English commissioners 
refused to have anything to do with Lord Maxwell,fearing 
this might lead to further trouble. The Scots were adamant 
that the English should go over to Scotland firstJ this, 
the English refused to accept. Both sides jealously guarded 
the traditional forms of diplomatic protocol lest concessions 
might become precedents and work to the detriment of each 
other's prestige in the future. 
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Finally, the English gave way over Maxwell and a 
compromise was agreed upon over the meeting place, the 
two sides met on the sands in the middle of the Solway Firth 
at low tide. Much of the business of the first meeting was 
taken up listening to the mutual recriminations of the 
M d h bo h d . . d 114 axwells an Gra ams, t locke 1n b1tter feu . 
From Cassilis•s report of a meeting early in May, we can see 
how the English commissioners acted closely within their 
instructions. The Earl reported that they "••• maid ane 
merk and passit throw ane part of Cannabe and maid al the 
best land to them and bayth Sande Armestaringis howse and 
Thome Gramis". The Scots' offer to compromise on the houses 
with each side taking one was refused. Cassilis found 
the English amenable but restrained by their instructions. 
The Earl foresaw that only the matter of Canonbie was likely 
115 to cause controversy, as he and his fellow commissioners 
had been instructed among other things, " ••• providing 
alwayis that ye enter nocht to na divisioun of the landis 
of the Priorye of Cannoby as debtabill". 116 As far as the 
restoration of order was concerned some progress was made. 
The machinery of Days of Truce had come to a halt because 
of the friction between Maxwell and ConyerSJ now under the 
auspices of the commissioners complaints were taken and 
117 
arrangements were made for the Wardens to meet. 
Matters were going so well that on May 25 the Dowager 
reported to the Duke of Guise that the commissioners had 
reached an accord, but her optimism was ill founded as they 
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broke up soon after without having reached an agreement. 118 
The Scots took advantage of the lull in the nego-
tiations to renew the pressure on those living in the 
Debatable land. On this occasion Maxwell's official 
actions coincided with his personal feud against the Grahams. 
An attempt to burn one of the Grahams houses by the Scots 
brought fierce reaction. The Grahams pursued the Scots as 
h . . 119 far as Annan were one of Maxwell's k1n was slaln. 
Conyers referred the matter to the Council and so delayed 
replying to Maxwell. The Duke in his reply urged 'a greater 
redynes' in the despatch of affairs and wrote to the 
Grahams, " ... chardgeing theym with moche fearsnes and 
crueltye and the Councell wyll not suffer to do soche out-
" 120 rages as the peaxe might therbye be broken or vyolated • 
Conyers's handling of the situation contrasted 
sharply with that of Dacre~ in 1550. 121 The latter was 
experienced and had been able enough to act quickly and 
efficiently to control the situation before it got out of 
hand. Conyers's inexperience, however, meant that the 
government could not trust him to act on his own initiative. 
The Warden was instructed to do nothing without the consent 
of the Warden General and the Duke, of course, remained 
with the Council. Delay was at the heart of Conyers's 
dilemma due to the fact that he was forced to write 
frequently to the Council, he was unable to answer Maxwell 
d d . d 122 an so nee less tens1on was create . The Wardenship 
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under this sort of restrictions was clearly beyond Conyers 
and he was soon suing the Warden General for his discharge~ 23 
The course of events had also served to highlight the sheer 
impracticability of having a non-resident Warden General and 
this was an important factor in persuading the Duke to appoint 
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a resident deputy in the person of Lord Wharton. 
The commissioners assembled again in June on the 
initiative of the French ambassador. This time, 
Northumberland himself was personally involved in the 
negotiations. The matter was discussed in Admiral Clinton's 
house at Sempringham during the Duke's journey north, two 
h . . h d b . 125 of t e commlSSlOners, C alloner an Palmer, e1ng present. 
At this juncture, the stumbling block was not over the lands 
of the Priory of Canonbie which the English were now 
prepared to concede but the two houses of stone belonging to 
the surnames of Armstrong and Graham. The line proposed 
by the Scots made both these houses over to Scotland;. the 
English commissioners were now instructed to relent all 
else, if necessary, in the hope of procuring these for 
England. The matter dragged on into July with no apparent 
126 
agreement. On August 16, the French ambassador presented 
the Scots' last offer,which was accepted by the King. The 
land was finally divided by treaty on 24 September 1552, 
h . bo h 'd . 127 t e terr1tory on t Sl es becom1ng Crown land. The 
division was effected by a diagonal line from the Esk to 
the Sark, with the bulk of the territory falling to the 
141 
Scots. The English retained the smaller southern parcel 
where the majority of the Grahams lived. The boundary was 
marked by a continuous mound known as the 'Scots Dyke'. 
Although England had retained the house of the 
h . h d 128 h Gra ams, 1t lost t at of San y Armstrong, so t e 
eventual outcome was along the lines of the compromise first 
h . 129 suggested by t e Scots 1n May. 
The division of the Debatable land brought to an end 
a long and intractable problem, the complexity of which was 
reflected in the interminable negotiations. The clarific-
ation of the situation, especially with regard to the poli-
tical allegiances of the inhabitants, went a long way in 
bringing a much needed peace and order to the West March. 
However,as we shall discover later, old habits died hard 
and the division left a legacy of bitterness and unrest which 
was to continue for some time. The lengthy duration of the 
negotiations,as we have noted, indicates how intricate the 
problem was, but one must also take cognisance of the effect 
of the uncompromising attitudes of both sides, with memories 
of the previous war still fresh in their minds. Throughout, 
the proceedings were dominated by the French ambassador and, 
despite the fact that commissioners were appointed to meet 
on the spot, the issue was eventually decided between the 
ambassador and the Council. However, it would be wrong to 
view the division of the Debatable as a product of Anglo-
Scottish cooperation: it came about chiefly as a result of 
French pressure to resolve the controversy once and for all. 
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Personnel and Policy 1550-1553 
Border policy under Northumberland falls into two 
distinct phases. The period prior to his assumption of the 
office of Warden General was one of uncertainty. The 
council remained anxious about its hold on the country, 
plagued by fears of a popular revolt in Somerset's favour. 
Its attitude towards the North was confused and marked by a 
series of trial and error appointments destined rather to 
deal with the situation in the short term than as part of 
a more concerted, carefully through-out policy. In the 
aftermath of the war, the government was also understandably 
more preoccupied with consolidating the peace with France 
than devoting its attention to the North. After the Duke 
took up the Warden Generalship of the three marches, a 
greater singlemindedness of purpose became noticeable, the 
government of the border assumed a more positive direction. 
Slowly the government was formulating a more constructive 
policy towards the North. A new energy was conspicuous in 
the oversight of affairs while a tighter administrative 
control was achieved. Under the Duke's inspiration a 
programme of reform was set on foot; this included an 
organised system of watch and plans for enclosures and new 
fortifications, all with the purpose of improving the 
security of the area. 
At the time of the fall of the Protector, the Earl 
of Rutland held the office of Warden of the East and Middle 
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Marches; Rutland had been in charge since May 1549. He was 
young and inexperienced and overwhelmed by the enormity of 
the task: The Earl wrote often to the Council complaining 
frantically of the insufficient number of troops among 
whom disease was taking its toll, supply shortages, and the 
recurring problem of controlling recalcitrant mercenaries. 
He wrote begging for his recall as early as October 1549. 130 
The government, however, was heavily preoccupied by the 
faction struggle that led to the fall of Somerset and the 
installation of the Earl of Warwick as head of the Council. 
The Councillors, as one of Rutland's captains sent to 
accompany German mercenaries to Dover reported" •.. ys in 
that unquietnes and troble emong thame selfes that noe man 
can have noe tyme to speke wythe thame". 131 The Earl's 
frequent solicitations were finally successful when in 
January 1550 he was replaced as Warden by Sir Robert Bowes~ 32 
Bowes had previously served as Warden of the Middle March 
during the reign of Henry VIII. He was a man of wide 
experience and as a soldier, common lawyer and member of the 
Council in the North since 1525, he was well versed in 
bo d ' 133 r er affa1rs. Bowes had barely established himself 
in office when it was contemplated that he be replaced by 
Warwick. On 20 April 1550, the Council decided that 
" ..• forasmuch as the Frenchemen arr much encreased in 
auethoritie and power with the Scottes, having the Scottishe 
Queene also in their handes, therfore the Borders towarde 
Scotlande hath nowe most neede of a notable ruler". 134 
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Warwick's Wardenship was not envisaged as a wholly 
resident post. He was given " libertie after thesta-
blishement of substanciall ordre there to retourne to the 
courte or to remaigne in the cuntrey at his pleasour". 
This provision would enable him to maintain his position in 
the Council by his presence. The displaced Warden, Bowes, 
was to be given a pension until the King could offer him 
. b . . 135 
su1ta le alternat1ve off1ce. The same month saw the 
beginning of the Earl's acquisition of what were to be 
formidable land holdings in the North. In order to bolster 
his position in the Wardenry, Warwick was granted former 
Percy lands in Northumberland and Yorkshire worth £660 per 
136 
annum. Despite these arrangements, the political 
situation did not permit Warwick to take up.his post: he 
still needed to consolidate his position vis a vis Somerset. 
In July 1550, it was decided that Warwick should not go 
north, "···but rather for many urgent consideracions attende 
on the Kinges person". Bowes was instructed to remain as 
Warden. 137 
The latter's reprieve was shortlived,for in February 
1551 the Council reverted to their policy of appointing 
aristocratic Wardens when they appointed Henry Grey, Marquis 
of Dorset, as Warden General of the three marches. 138 
Bowes was heavily engaged in the peace negotiations leading 
to the Treaty of Norham, thereafter the government decided 
to capitalise on his incomparable experience of border 
affairs. He was sworn of the Privy council in September 
145 
and further rewarded by the twin appointments of Master of 
139 the Rolls and Master of the Savoy. He performed a most 
useful service in compiling a detailed survey of the borders 
for Dorset's use. 
The appointment of the Marquis is not easily under-
stood aside from the fact that he was a close supporter of 
. 140 . h . Warwlck. Weak and 1nept, e had l1ttle to recommend 
himself save his nobility. Dorset's patent initially gave 
him authority to appoint Deputy Wardens but this was over-
ridden and the Council instructed him to appoint 
Sir Nicholas Stirley, the Captain of Berwick, as Warden of 
the East March, Lord Ogle Northumberland's only resident 
peer to the Middle March and Lord Conyers to the West March. 
Both these noblemen and, in particular Lord Ogle, came from 
families with long traditions of serving the Crown in the 
141 
marches. By these appointments, Warwick was seeking to 
strengthen support for himself in the border by winning over 
142 the northern peers. The task was essential as it 
coincided with the fall of the powerful Lord Dacre. 
As a supporter of the Protector, Dacre had been 
appointed Warden of the West March in April 1549 and Captain 
of Carlisle the following August, replacing Lord Wharton. 143 
The latter•s ascendancy in the West March had been largely 
at the expense of the Dacre interest there. Wharton had 
long wrestled with the limitations to his power that Dacre 
influence posed there. He complained bitterly of the 
146 
Protector's favouring of Dacre, accusing the latter of 
seeking to undermine his reputation. In the face of Dacre's 
opposition and the weakness of support from the government 
his services, he remonstrated, would be rendered ineffective 
Pray be my good lord, for unless His majesty, 
and you, and the Council favour my services, I am 
not able, were I twenty-times more powerful, to 
serve in an office of such importance as the 
wardenry of the west marches. 144 
Dacre's replacement of Wharton as Warden was a clear 
recognition of the latter's failure. 
The fall of Somerset brought into suspicion recipients 
of his favour, especially in such a sensitive area as the 
marches. Not only was Dacre removed from the Wardenry in 
April 1551 in favour of Lord Conyers, but on November 25 
145 
of that year, he was arrested and sent to the Tower. 
146 This was ostensibly because of a feud with the Musgraves, 
but more likely, as the Imperial ambassador noted, to 
prevent Dacre as a sympathiser of Somerset from being at 
his trial. It is not without significance that Dacre was 
released soon after. 147 
Dorset's period of office was as shortlived as his 
aristocratic predecessor, Rutland's,had been in 1549/50. 
The Warden was beset by problems and wrote frequently to 
the Council complaining of a shortage of cash with which 
to pay the garrisons. The uncertainty of the peace with 
the Scots exacerbated the already distracted state of the 
147 
border: the Warden despaired of obtaining justice from the 
Scots and asked what action he should take. Matters were 
made worse by Dorset's continuing poor health: in September 
1551, he asked to be relieved of the office. 148 
Dorset's resignation in October 1551 paved the way 
for Warwick, now Duke of Northumberland, finally to take up 
the office first proposed to him in April 1550. 149 
Northumberland's patent as Warden General gave him power 
to appoint Deputy Wardens but it also allowed him a 
substantial armed retinue of one hundred light horse. 150 
The positions of the three Deputy Wardens were regularised. 
They had originally been appointed under Dorset; now royal 
patents were made out to them. These patents are of 
interest as they contained the careful stipulation that 
their holders were not to infringe upon the authority of the 
Warden General,or,when he is present in the marches, to act 
without his special licence. 151 Northumberland was deter-
mined to exercise a firmer personal control over his 
subordinate Wardens. Conyers was ordered not to proceed 
' ' ' h h ' 152 1n matters of 1mportance Wlt out t e Duke's adv1ce. The 
right of the Warden of the Middle March to appoint the 
Keepers of the two dales was overridden when the King 
appointed George Heron Keeper of Tynedale and the Warden, 
Lord Ogle, was reprimanded for encroaching upon the 
' 153 ' off1ce. Efforts were also made to 1mprove the state of 
affairs at Berwick. The Marshall, Sir John Witherington, 
was ordered to be resident and was then replaced by 
148 
Thomas Gower. Similar action for non-residence was 
threatened against the Chamberlain, Sir Robert Ellerker, 
and the Treasurer, Richard Bunny. 154 
In May 1552, it was decided that the Duke be sent 
to the border in order for him to supervise and direct 
matters more closelyJ the council argued that, 
... the state of thinges presently in the North 
Partes requireth to be substantially looked unto 
and put in sume good ordre in tyme, whereby the 
countrie may the better be guided and the Kinges 
majesties frontiers and peeces there the safelier 
kept and mainteyned. 
His stay was not to be a prolonged one for it was agreed 
that " ... having settled the same in sume better ordre of 
good and pollitique governaunce", the Duke should return 
155 to court. 
The visit must be seen in the light of the Duke's 
156 policy of gaining a tighter political hold over the North. 
In the commissions of Lieutenancy issued in the same month, 
Northumberland was appointed Lieutenant of Northumberland, 
157 Cumberland, Berwick and Newcastle. The Duke was 
obsessed by the spectre of a popular northern rebellion in 
Somerset's favour: this explains the attack on Lord Dacre 
and the preoccupation of the government with the North's 
affairs. From the time of the first arrest of Somerset 
in October 1549, it was feared that he, or his adherents, 
might "perchaunce attempt some thinges prejudicial! to his 
Highnes' peeces in Scotland and others upon the frontiers 
149 
th .. 158 ere . Among the accusations against Somerset were 
those charging him with the intention of having several 
border fortresses surprised and occupied by his supporters 
d h . . h 159 an , at t e same t1me, rous1ng t e commons to revolt. 
Northumberland was also concerned to enforce his authority 
by his presence as there were signs that the border gentry 
160 
were not cooperating with the new Wardens. 
On 16 June 1552, the Duke • 0 • took horse at 5 am" .. 
and left for the North. Five days later, he was at 
Sempringham in Lincolnshire holding discussions with two of 
the commissioners for the Debatable 
writing from York he observed 
1 d 161 an . A week later, 
I finde thies Parties in as good order and Quietnes 
as ever I saw yt in any Plas, and as loving and as 
obeydient a sort of gentellemen I have found in thies 
Parties, and as redye to do me Honour and Pleser for 
my master's sak, as Hart can wishe. 
9 h Du 1 . 162 On July, t e ke was at A nw1ck. From there he 
. d d h . 163 JOurneye to Newcastle an t en across country to Carl1s1e. 
Here, the Duke's view of the state of the distracted West 
March contrasts firmly with the •good order and Quietnes' 
that he found in Yorkshire. Yet, the situation was not 
irredeemable and the Warden General complimented himself 
on the fact that such notorious surname groups as the Halls, 
Potts and Forsters had submitted themselves, " •.. wherat a 
great many in these partyes doth moche merveyle specially 
seing the theves know how yvell I can bear with theyr 
doinges". Northumberland postponed proceedings against 
150 
malefactors until he had heard from the Council but he 
recommended that they be granted customary pardon. A more 
important suggestion made by the Duke was that a Deputy 
Warden General be appointedg 164 without the latter he 
predicted the ruin of the area. It seems that after seeing 
the state of affairs especially in the West March at first 
hand Northumberland realised the absolute necessity of 
h . 'd w d 165 av1ng a res1 ent ar en General. 
Northumberland's advice was accepted by the King 
and Council. The outlaws were pardoned and a Deputy 
Warden General was appointed, " .•• wherefor his Matie 
thinketh none more mete then the lord Wharton, in whom the 
sayd duke hath thereto a good opinion". 166 
Lord Wharton had been out of favour since Somerset 
removed him from the West Wardenry in 1549. He now became 
the mainstay of Northumberland's influence in the marches. 
He was appointed Deputy Warden of the three marches in 
July 1552, 167 and was installed by the Duke in person at 
168 Newcastle on 12 August. 
The placing of Wharton was the signal for a general 
overhaul of border officers. All three Wardens were 
replaced in November 1552. Ralph Grey of Chillingham was 
appointed to the East march, Lord Eure to the Middle and 
Sir Thomas Dacre of Lanercost to the West March. 169 In a 
letter discussing the new appointments, Northumberland 
indicated some of the criteria involved in choosing the 
new Wardens. 
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Lord Eure was placed in the Middle March where some of his 
lands lay; he was to reside at Woodington where his close 
proximity to Tynedale and Redesdale would enable the Keepers 
d d . h h 170 an War en to mutually ass1st eac ot er. The new 
Warden of the East March, Ralph Grey, was the heir of 
Sir Thomas and could spend 6 or 700 marks a year: " ... though 
young, he is witty and of good courage, and much esteemed". 
That Grey was married to a daughter of Sir Thomas Grey of 
Horton who lived close by was an added advantage as the 
d . d h. . 171 latter agree to a1 1s son-ln-law. 
Sir Thomas Dacre's promotion to the West Wardenry 
was most probably a direct result of Wharton's intervention 
on his behalf. Dacre, the illegitimate half brother of 
Lord Dacre, had turned his back on the northern peer and 
allied his fortunes with those of his brother's enemies. 
Wharton spoke of him in affectionate terms as his 'cosyn• 
and" ... a man of good actyvitie, moche intelligence and 
experience upon the Bordores, and of goode conduct in such 
172 
affares". Sir Thomas had been very active alongside 
Wharton in the Anglo-Scottish war of the 1540's. 173 As a 
reward for his service he had been granted the lands of the 
dissolved priory of Lanercost, which further incensed his 
brother against him as he had been angling for it. 174 
Sir Thomas's promotion to what had been Dacre's old office 
must have rubbed salt into the peer's wounded pride, and 
friction between the two half brothers continued throughout 
the decade. 175 
152 
Changes curbing governmental pluralism were also 
made in an effort to improve the efficiency of march 
administration by increased specialisation. An important 
principle of this policy was "••• that no one man shuld have 
tow offices". Following this, the Captaincies of Berwick 
and Carlisle were separated from the Wardenships. 176 
Wharton's influence was further bolstered by the 
appointment of his son-in-law, Sir Richard Musgrave, to 
h . . 177 h h t e Capta1ncy of Carllsle castle. Anot er of t e 
Musgraves, Cuthbert, the former Captain of Eyemouth, was 
appointed Keeper of Redesdale in October 1552. 178 
Although the Duke clearly acted upon the advice of 
Wharton in the placing of men, he was not concerned merely 
to adopt a passive role in march affairs and leave his 
deputy unsupervised. The Duke expressed surprise in 
December 1552 that Wharton had delayed in placing the two 
Wardens of the East and Middle Marches, and the Council was 
instructed to write to the Deputy in no uncertain terms 
d . h. d . h h 1 79 or er1ng 1m to procee Wlt t e matter. 
The immediate result of the Duke's visit and his 
appointment of Wharton as Deputy Warden General was that 
the Duke encouraged him to draw up a number of articles for 
the better governing of the rnarches. 180 Wharton drew up 
the articles in consultation with the chief Crown officers 
on the border and the leading gentryJ these were convoked 
to Newcastle early in September 1552. The assembly was an 
153 
impressive one and the occasion must be seen as the pinnacle 
of Wharton's career. At Newcastle, the principal men of 
the border met under his leadership; it was a visible 
indication of his ascendancy, the summit of his power and 
prestige and forcibly illustrated the confidence the new 
regime held in him. 
Included in the articles of reform was the usual 
reassertion of the more important aspects of March Law. No-
one was to harbour or otherwise aid malefactors, Scottish 
or English, or speak with the Scots without licence and 
men were to follow the fray upon pain of death. Prepar-
ations were also set on foot for a series of March Courts 
and Days of Truce and all complaints were to be handed to 
the Wardens within seven days. The articles insisted that 
Warden Courts were to be regularly held and the leading 
borderers were to attend. The non-residence of border 
officials was condemned. The latter as well as the gentry 
were to see their soldiers and tenants armed and horsed in 
181 the proper manner. 
Without doubt, the most lasting outcome of the 
Newcastle conference was the series of watches Wharton 
. . d h h h 182 h 1nst1tute for t e t ree marc es. T e system was care-
fully organised with the parcelling out of the border from 
end to end with almost military precision. Crown officers 
and leading gentry were to act as overseers appointing 
'setters and searchers'. The long lists of the latter 
exemplify the impressive familiarity which was a marked 
154 
feature of border society. They are illustrative of just 
how closely related a society it was which could name and 
appoint several hundred searches and watches for each 
march. 183 The articles ordered that the watch be kept 
nightly and daily from 1 October to 16 March, but the dates 
d b d . ' d h d d' ' 184 coul e mo lfle at t e War en's 1scret1on. 
In considering the new system of the watch one is 
led to remark, as is often true of many reforms, that such 
plans were more easily conceived than executed. The great 
difficulty was to ensure that the borderers performed their 
duties. Wharton provided for this by writing to the over-
seers of each circuit ordering them to make spot checks from 
time to time. The monthly certificates of the state of their 
circuit were to be sent to Alnwick with the defaulters for 
' hm 185 pun1s ent. Wharton's system of watch was of lasting 
importance. It was still being referred to at the end of 
Elizabeth's reign, when Wardens were continuing to urge that 
it should be observed. 186 
One is impressed by the thoroughness of Wharton's 
system. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the problem 
of the watch was never adequately solved. The provision of 
an effective system of watch was the perennial headache of 
border administrators. The keeping of the watch was classed 
as being part and parcel of border service and therefore was 
generally unpaid. Bowes and Ellerker in the previous decade 
had recommended that the then King's ~entlemen Pensioners 
155 
should pay for the upkeep of the watch, paying each man 
4d per night. The pensioners, however, protested that the 
financial burden was intolerable, adding that their cattle 
were stolen whether the watch was kept or not. The tax 
plan was revived again early in Elizabeth's reign but 
nothing seems to have come of it. The unwillingness of 
borderers to operate a proper system of watch constituted 
a serious obstacle to the security of the marches. 187 
The conference at Newcastle was used as a platform 
for a series of reforming measures but it was also an 
opportunity to drive home the new order on the marches. All 
officers and gentlemen were to give knowledge of the 
assembly to their subordinates 
... to the intent every subject may use himself 
accordingly, and not for want of knowledge to run in 
such pain as will be unto him or them for not doing 
of these or any others against the commonwealth or 
the country, or against the peace and Ancient Customs 
of the Marches. 188 
The conference gave a major impetus to the new order on 
the border but the concern for peace and security did not 
end there. In the following months commissions were 
established by Wharton for the damming of fords and passages 
and the enclosing of areas with hedges and ditches for 
similar reasons of security. Again, as with the system of the 
watch, the border was divided into circuits with the leading 
gentry of each area acting as commissioners. If any land-
owners refused to cooperate, or if any dispute arose between 
156 
bL 
them, their names were to referred to Wharton, "••• that I 
A 
may with t,he advice of learned Counsel, and their consent, 
determine their titles, minding the commonwealth and the 
h f 'nh . 189 urt o no man's 1 er1tance". 
In addition to these administrative reforms, the new 
Deputy Warden General submitted to Northumberland 'certain 
Remembrances'. These constituted a comprehensive set of 
notes, a perceptive set of memoranda on border affairs 
akin to the Bowes's surveys. These were no doubt intended 
as a means of familiarising the Warden General with his 
new charge. Wharton was employing the experience of a long 
career in march administration, using his unrivalled know-
ledge of the border and its problems to produce these much 
needed changes. Wharton's articles are striking in their 
thoroughness : every contingency is provided for. They 
illustrate the remarkable flexibility of Border Law and the 
sort of ordinances a Warden could draw up and enforce by 
means of the Warden Courts. Wharton's activity was designed 
as well, no doubt, to increase his stature in Northumberland's 
eyes: his memoranda and correspondence testify to this. Thus, 
he asked the Duke to send "suche recorde .•• of felony murther 
or march treason found in any court kept before your grace 
... for I mynde to have a kalender of names of all offenders 
190 
on the marches in fellony or march treason". 
Wharton's measures must not be allowed to obscure reform-
1ng activity in other quarters. Change was also long overdue 
in the garrison town of Berwick. A number of articles were 
157 
drawn up by the Captain Sir Nicholas Stirley to improve the 
economic and military efficiency of the town. They may have 
been prompted by the Mayor and Corporation who wrote to the 
Duke in June 1552 requesting that their privileges be con-
firmed and the ordering of the town be looked into by the 
d h . . h 191 War en General upon 1s Journey t ere. Stirley•s articles 
may have been produced at the same time but they were 
certainly not drawn up in conjunction with the Mayor and his 
colleagues since many of them reflect the traditional animus 
192 between the civil and military governments of the town. 
Stirley recommended that Berwick's position as a 
staple town for trade with Scotland in accordance with 22 
Edward IV C.8 be rigorously enforced and its commercial 
position protected by English ships being prevented from 
trading directly with Scotland. 193 To further increase trade 
Holy Island should be made a fishing town and all the -fish 
brought to Berwick. 
The Captain was concerned about what he saw as the 
inadequate Parliamentary representation for the garrison of 
the town. He urged that a burgess be chosen by the Captain, 
his Council and the garrison as at Calais, "for the burgesses 
chosen by the freemen do lyttell regarde the profet of the 
soldiours procuryng nothyng elles but their owne private 
h d . . 194 welt e and comma 1t1e". Stirley•s recommendation 
illustrates how widely accepted Statute Law had become as 
a vehicle of reform. Turning to the duties of the Freemen, 
158 
Stirley urged that the latter be ordered, "to make uppe 
their Towle bathe whiche shuld be the Counsel howse of the 
said Towne and their prison for punnyshement of offenders 
the want wherof is no lyttel hyndrance to justice". 195 
The Freemen were equally negligent of their civic 
duties. This could be seen by the appalling state of the 
town's streets, " ... for nowe they be so fowle that when 
laromes (alarms) do happen the soldiers cannot passe throughe 
them to the releiffe of the walles". 196 Regarding the 
accusations of the inhabitants that he was buying up all the 
wheat for his own profit, the Captain suggested that he and 
his Council should join with the Mayor in setting victual 
prices, " in suche sorte as is used in Calles". 197 
Lastly, Stirley hinted at the adverse effects links of kin-
ship had on the administering of impartial justice, when 
he proposed that the Recorder of Berwick be " . . . asowtherne 
man more indifferent for such an office, then any other man 
198 borne in these partes". 
It 1s difficult to say whether or not these articles 
were ever implemented. We know that the Duke took order for 
the town during his tour in 1552 but no details have 
survived. Stirley's position at Berwick was in serious doubt 
after November 1552 because of his bungling of the George 
. . 199 . . Par1s affalr. Nevertheless, the art1cles are of 1nterest 
because they further indicate the sort of opposition that 
existed between the two governments of the town and the kind 
159 
of problems that faced Elizabethan administrators when they 
drew up the new establishment for Berwick in 1559/60. 200 In 
addition, if not actually initiated by the Duke himself, 
they also lend further proof of the keen interest 
Northumberland took in the running of the town. 
The Duke's regime left a more permanent mark on 
Berwick, especially regarding the field of fortification. 
Soon after the peace, the government set about the reorga-
nisation of the border fortresses. In July 1550, Sir Thomas 
Palmer and Sir Richard Lee were sent to inspect the northern 
201 defences. Palmer was an able professional soldier and 
confident of Northumberland; his partner, Sir Richard Lee, 
was a man of very different standing. Formerly surveyor of 
the King's works, he had been engaged in improving the forti-
fications at Calais as well as giving advice on siegecraft 
and the building of fortifications on the Scottish frontier 
during the late war. He was in the words of Colvin"··. the 
acknowledged English expert on military engineering,and he 
had acquired a status and a reputation such as no man of 
h . . h d . d . h 202 1s call1ng a enJoye 1n t e past". 
Lee and Palmer were ordered to inspect the fortific-
ations on Holy Island and give order for improvements there. 
Next, they were to proceed to Berwick. The Council had 
already decided that the old castle was no longer able to 
effectively protect the town or port, Lee and Palmer were, 
therefore, to inspect the ground and draw up plans for a 
160 
new fortification, work was to begin immediately. Soldiers 
as well as pioneers were to be used for the task so that 
the building would be well advanced before the onset of 
winter. The commissioners were also to survey Norham and 
Wark and then continue on to Carlisle. As for the latter, 
if any minor repairs could be done out of hand, they were to 
see them completed. 203 
Lee and Palmer's report does not seem to be extant. 
Yet we have sufficient evidence from scattered reports to 
give us a clear idea of the lamentable state of the northern 
defences. They had suffered much from intermittent Scottish 
invasions, natural decay and neglect. continual patchy 
repairs had not served to reverse the downward trend. 
With regard to Berwick, the commissioners lost no 
time. In August 1550, the plan of the proposed fortific-
ation was sent to the council with a simultaneous request 
500 . 204 for p1oneers. On September 6, the Council approved 
the plan for the building of a fort to traverse the east 
h h d d . d 205 wall of t e town, t e famous E war VI c1ta el. In 
April 1551, Gower, the Surveyor at Berwick, and Bowes, the 
Warden of the East March, were ordered to speed up the 
fortifications. 206 The same month, the Imperial ambassador 
reported 7 or 8 ships going north with building supplies 
207 for the new bulwark. The concern of the young King who 
like his father showed a keen interest in fortification is 
attestedJ Edward noted in his diary in September 1551 that 
a part of the wall of Berwick had fallen because the working 
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h b h d d . d h d . 208 of t e ulwark a un erm1ne t e foun at1on. In June 
1552, the Duke toured the North, a declared purpose of the 
visit being the inspection of the northern defences. The 
visit was partly determined by a controversy over whether 
or not to demolish the medieval wall, since the new fort 
was to cross it, 209 the operation seemed necessary. It was 
finally decided that such an action would leave the east 
side of the town open towards Scotland, and therefore 
vulnerable to attack. For the moment the wall was to remain 
and the fort within and without the wall would simply be built 
up to it. Gower was ordered to follow the directions of the 
h . . . 210 Duke for t e fort1f1cat1ons. Northumberland's visit 
coupled with the gathering of large amounts of men and 
supplies for the North, led the Imperial ambassador to 
211 believe that preparations for war were underway. The 
wages bill gives substance to the ambassador's fears; from 
December 1550 to the end of the reign £13,489 13s 8d was 
212 
spent merely on the wages of the workmen. There is 
evidence that the building costs were becoming a burden on 
the already shaky finances of Northumberland's regime. 
Investigations into the Office of the Works event-
ually led to the dismissal of the Surveyor in September 1552. 
Gower had led a chequered career. In 1543, he was appointed 
Surveyor of the Works at Berwick. Early in Edward's reign, 
he stepped into his father's shoes as Marshal and he was 
then appointed Captain of Eyemouth. It seems that Gower 
was much indebted by the ransom he was forced to pay after 
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his capture at Pinkey. 213 Early in 1552, he petitioned for 
a remission of £100 of the £250 he was found to owe the 
Crown. Although his suit was granted, the Officials of the 
Augmentations pursued him for the total sum. Gower appealed 
to Northumberland who, in asking Cecil to look into the 
rnatter,argued that the great responsibility placed upon 
Gower justified the reduction of the debt, Gower's 'dyly-
gence and husbandrye' in his office would quickly compensate 
for it. Northumberland's trust, however, proved to be ill-
placed. Gower was removed from all his offices in September 
1552,rnost likely because of irregularities in his handling 
of funds. 214 In November 1552, the Council sent Valentine 
Brown to the North and asked Wharton to assist him with a 
' ' ' h ' ' ' 215 v1ew to rnaklng econorn1es on t e fort1f1cat1ons. Work 
still continued on the fort, which was far from completed 
at the end of the reign. 
Northumberland's regime concentrated its efforts on 
Berwick. Carlisle received only cosmetic repairs amounting 
216 to some £45. Little was done to arrest the decay of 
Wark but the deprivation of Tunstal and the annexation of 
the County Palatine of Durham meant that the strategic 
bo d h . h . ' 217 r er fortress of Nor am carne 1nto t e Klng's possess1on. 
Bowes in his report had bewailed episcopal neglect 
and argued that the castle was of such importance for the 
security of the frontier that it should be taken into the 
King's hands. 218 In May 1553, the office of Captain was 
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granted to Richard Bowes, (a younger brother of Sir Robert), 
who had in fact been in charge of Norham since 1546. 219 
The new arrangements for the fortress compare favourably 
with the former. Whereas the Bishop,Bowes claimed,provided 
. b d 220 h only for a Capta1n, Consta le an two gunners, t e 
Edwardian indenture considerably strengthened the garrison, 
adding two extra gunners, two porters, four watchmen and ten 
light horsemen. The fees were to be paid out of the rents 
h h . 221 of Nor ams 1re. 
Aside from making improvements in fortifications we 
have seen how Northumberland's government sought both to 
strengthen its position in the marches and improve their 
security by a number of other means. These included the 
imposition of a more direct control over the reins of govern-
ment in the person of the Duke himself, the installation of 
his supporters and the introduction of improved measures to 
increase the safety of the border. Another important aspect 
of this policy was the Duke's attempt to win over the hearts 
and minds of the borderers to the new regime by setting in 
motion the Protestant evangelisation of the marches. The 
Duke's chosen instrument to spearhead this process was the 
Scottish reformer, John Knox. In April 1549, Knox was 
appointed preacher at Berwick. During the summer of 1551, 
he preached regularly at Newcastle. Knox also accompanied 
the Duke on his tour of the North, acting as his official 
preacher. 222 In the administrative shake up of 1552, a 
more permanent post for Knox in the North was envisaged 
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h h 'd d h . h . . 223 w en e was cons1 ere for t e B1s opr1c of Carl1sle. The 
latter suggestion was not pursued,for Knox's career in the 
North came to an abrupt end later that year after a violent 
Christmas Day sermon in Newcastle. Bearing in mind the 
young King's illness and the probability of the accession 
of the Catholic Mary, Knox spoke out against the men in high 
places whom, he claimed,were plotting for the restoration 
of Popery. He denounced such men as traitors to God and 
the King. The sermon caused an uproar in the town, arousing 
the wrath of the Catholic Mayor, Sir Robert Brandling. 224 
The repercussions of the affair reached London.Knox, 
confident of royal support,had complained to Northumberland 
who replied by sending letters of recommendation in the 
preacher's favour. Writing to Cecil, the Duke noted " yt 
semeth to me, that the L Wharton him selffe ys not all 
togyther without syspycyon, how the sayd Knokes doinges hath 
byn there taken". 225 Wharton was to be informed that Knox• s 
preaching had the King's blessing and no man was to trouble 
him. Cecil was also instructed to write to Brandling, 
" for his gredy accusations of the poor man wherein he 
hathe (in my poore opynyon) utteryd his maleycyous stomacke 
d h . d' 226 'd h towar est e K1nges proce 1nges". Ev1 ence suggests tat 
the real backing for Knox came from Edward himself rather 
than the Duke as Northumberland realised that it was not 
politically expedient for Knox to remain on the border 
•· ... otherwyse some hynderaunce in the matter of relligion 
may rise and growe amongst the people, being inclyned of 
165 
nature to gret unconstancy and mutacions". It was 
essential to preserve the peace and especially to put a 
stop to the number of Scots resorting to him that the 
h b d d 227 . . preac er e recalle to Lon on. Th1s solut1on, however, 
was more easily effected than the former. Knox was recalled 
to court early in 1553 to deliver the Lenten sermons before 
the King. As for the removal of the Scots from Northum-
berland, Wharton emphasised the impossibility of the task, 
"••• for the Scotes ar a great nombr and hath a long conty-
228 
uewance (there)", 
Northumberland's appointment of Knox was a bold 
beginning in the establishment of a Protestant preaching 
ministry on the border. Knox's mission was shortlived and 
ultimately doomed to failure. The fiery Calvinist preacher 
was an affront to powerful Catholic conservatives in the 
mould of Wharton and Brandling. Northumberland, in his 
continual anxiety over the preservation of law and order, 
quickly sacrificed any religious principles involved in the 
withdrawal of Knox for the sake of civil peace. 
Any assessment of the policy of Northumberland 
towards the border must emphasise the enormity of the task 
that lay before the government and the short space of time 
it had available to complete its work. The advent of the 
new regime saw the realm at war on two fronts. continuing 
sporadic unrest still existed in the aftermath of Ket's 
rebellion and the situation was worsened by a serious 
financial and economic crisis. The government's first 
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priority was to rid itself of the war with France and 
Scotland. Thereafter, the regime sought to consolidate 
the precarious peace with Scotland, but on its own terms. 
Border policy became inextricably linked with foreign 
policy. England's influence was weak and the initiative 
lay with the victorious French who were anxious to bolster 
their prestige in the eyes of their Scottish allies. The 
English were goaded along acceding to French demands. It 
was only through long drawn out and stubborn negotiations 
that they were able to achieve a just settlement. The out-
come of the series of border meetings between the represent-
atives of the two nations was positive in that the problems 
arising out of the Debateable land were finally resolved by 
its division. This enabled some semblance of order to be 
brought to that troubled district in particular,and in 
making secure the peace of Norham, to the border as a whole. 
Regarding domestic policy towards the border, 
Northumberland's actions demonstrate a rigid singleminded-
ness of purpose. The Duke was haunted by the prospect of 
rebellion from that quarter and, as a result, became 
obsessed with northern security. In July 1550, the govern-
ment urged that members of the Council in the North should 
. h bo d 229 11ve nearer t e r er. Wharton's commission as Deputy 
Warden General gave him power, ", .. to enquire, in the 
absence of the said duke, by oath of good men of the said 
h . . h h . . 230 marc es of cov1ns w1t t e Klng's enem1es". With these 
fears in mind, Northumberland built up his power quickly, 
167 
taking into his hands the bulk of the former Percy estates, 
the Ducal title, the Lieutenancies and the Warden General-
. 231 
ship of the three marches. Northumberland worked hard 
in seeking the support of the border nobility and the gentry. 
The Duke also took the trouble to view the problems of his 
office at first hand during his 1552 tour which, as Wharton 
correctly observed,"The like of such a painfull, carefull 
and most noble Journey by any subject of such Authority 
heretofore hath not been seen on all these marches with any 
1 • • II 232 now 1v1ng . At the same time, a new direction was taken, 
a new energy and tighter control werediscernible in border 
policy. The Duke brought to an end the series of incompetent 
0 
and inexperienced Wardens and promoted and strongly backed 
Wharton, encouraging him to use his organisational ability 
to improve border security. Northumberland was impatient 
with administrative delay and ordered matters to be carried 
out expeditiously. He upbraided Wharton for his delay 
in the installation of officers, adding that "The grettist 
lakk that ys in our doinges ys delaying of thinges when 
theyre restythe no more to be don but ever to gyve order". 233 
However, the Duke had little time to stabilise or consoli-
date any lasting policy towards the North, but he was 
successful in maintaining his authority there. The return 
to a tolerable law and order situation after the long years 
of war was something of an achievement, yet, throughout 
all the Duke's dealings with the border, his actions were 
double edged. His concern about northern security was 
168 
mixed with fears that unrest from that quarter might 
undermine his regime. In his writing to Cecil about 
234 
"thernest care I have for that northe partes", one 
cannot help remaining suspicious of the Duke's underlying 
motives. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BORDER 1553 - 1556 
The International Dimension 
There were limits to what Northumberland's regime 
could do to establish peace and security on the English side 
of the border. Maintaining good relations with his Scottish 
neighbours was one aspect but the Duke could not be held 
responsible for the peace and stability of the Scottish 
frontier. Here he was hampered by a situation entirely 
beyond his control. The transition period between the decline 
of Chatelherault's influence and effective power and the 
Dowager's eventual assumption of the Scottish regency 
engendered a serious weakness in government and opposing 
factions on the border held free play. Before we examine 
the border under Mary Tudor, we must therefore take stock 
of the changes in the international situation that her 
accession and marriage brought about as well as the ramific-
ations on the border of the transference of the Scottish 
regency to Mary of Guise. 
Mary Tudor succeeded to the English throne in the 
teeth of French opposition. Her success against Queen Jane 
was a political defeat for Henri of the first magnitude. The 
French were acutely aware of Mary's close connections with 
the Emperor, her 'protector•, and realised there was a strong 
possibility that the Queen would marry an Imperial candidate. 
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The Habsburgs had built up a huge empire by dynastic 
marriages, and it now seemed that England would be yet another 
marital coup. Not only was she strategically placed to guard 
the sea route from Spain to the Netherlands but England also 
completed the encirclement of France and would play her role 
in the Habsburg-Valois dynastic conflict. The French had 
backed the wrong side with the result that the new regime 
looked upon them with extreme suspicion. Soon after Mary's 
accession the Imperial ambassador, simon Renard, summed up 
this distrust, 
It ought to be kept in mind that the one object of the 
alliance between Scotland and France ... is to seek an 
opportunity of usurping this realm. Your Majesty has 
seen how the French sought to use the Duke of 
Northumberland to let them into England and exile your 
Majesty, trying all the scandalous means they1could think of, as they are still doing in secret. 
Despite this mistrust Anglo-Scottish relations under Mary 
had auspicious beginnings. The French ambassador, Noailles, 
reported that Mary was inclined to peace and the new Queen 
responded to the Scottish government's demand for frontier 
redress by appointing commissioners to meet those of the 
Scots. 2 The tide somewhat turned when news broke of 
Mary's intended marriage to Philip. There were soon rumours 
that the French King would dramatically increase the number 
of his troops serving in Scotland which would be used as a 
diversion if England went to war on the side of the Emperor. 3 
Increasing fears of French machinations materialised when 
the extent of their complicity in the Wyatt rebellion became 
apparent. Not only was the French ambassador in England 
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involved but his counterpart in Scotland had also been in 
touch with the rebels. 4 
The French political and diplomatic defeat that the 
Spanish marriage entailed was to some extent assuaged by the 
continuing success of French policy in Scotland. In April 
1554, the Scottish regency was transferred to Mary of Guise. 
With the great offices of state monopolised by Frenchmen 
and their troops garrisoning many of the main strongholds, 
5 French domination of Scotland seemed complete. The Spanish 
marriage placed England firmly in the Imperial camp and, 
consequently, Scotland assumed a place of even greater 
importance for the French. Once she had secured the regency, 
the next important goal of the Dowager and the French was 
to push ahead the marriage of her daughter, the young Queen 
of Scots, with the Dauphin. Writing to the Duke of Guise in 
January 1554, the French ambassador in Scotland, D'Oysel, 
shrewdly noted that the Scots must be persuaded that the 
marriage was to their own advantage and not simply aimed at 
promoting the interests of French foreign policy; he was in 
no doubt of the importance of the match " ... je vous diray 
seulement de relief, Monseigneur, qu'il ne se joue pas de 
ces peu de choses maintenant pour le bien ou dommages des 
6 
affaires du Roy, ayans les voisins que nous avons". In 
the same letter D'Oysel outlined the other French objectives 
whose realisation was of paramount significance if Scotland 
was to play to the full her role in Henri's ambitious 
schemes. The ambassador was aware that instead of draining 
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the King of cash it would be better for Scotland to 
contribute to the King's affairs but this was a long way 
off. To reverse the situation the economy of the country 
had to be improved, especially the mines and the fisheries, 
Scotland was full of resources that needed developing. 7 
Before this could be achieved,however, the authority of the 
Crown had to be restored. The Regent and her French 
advisers were deeply concerned about public order and the 
reassertion and strengthening of the government's authority. 
In particular, they were appalled by the disordered state 
of affairs on the border : " ... ce peuple ne demande et ne 
d~sire que repos et justice. Mais il y a en toutes 
fronti~res des chefz des races et maisons que je ne scaurois 
mieux appeller que bandouliers, que ne vivent que de proye, 
. d . d . 9 SOlt es AnglOlS OU es ESCOSSOlS mesmes" Scottish 
representations to the English government complaining of 
frontier disorders and procrastination in granting redress 
came thick and fast during the regency of Mary of Lorraine. 
These complaints were sent to the Privy Council through the 
medium of the French ambassador as there was no resident 
diplomatic representative of the Scottish Crown in London. 
The French were careful to ensure that under no circums-
tances were the Scots to negotiate with the English 
independently of the French. 10 
Besides the desirable goals of peace and order on 
the frontier, other factors with wider implications had to 
be taken into account. With both England and Scotland firmly 
implanted in opposing camps on the Continent, eventual 
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hostilities on the border were a strong possibility. The 
reparation of existing border defences and the building of 
new fortresses were crucial aspects of the Dowager's 
frontier policy. 11 In May 1554, her brother the DJke 
warned her that now, in peacetime, was the moment to 
strengthen her frontiers : " ... le temps qui est doulx et 
paisible requiert que vostre fronti~re soyt plus fort qu'elle 
,. 
n'a este jusques icy, de sorte que vos voysins ne puissent 
vous venir veoir si ~ leur ayse et qu'il y ayt quellque 
. 12 .. d h place qu1 les arreste". Fort1f1e olds could also be used 
as bases for Scottish expeditions into England in the event 
of war : " il y ayt autre moyen au monde pour faire 
' saiges, ceulx de deJa, et empescher que ceste Royne n'employe 
. ' d . 13 ne ses hommes, ne son argent a1lleurs qu'a gar er sa ma1son". 
The Dowager acted on her brother's advice. In the 
spring of 1555, the Scottish Parliament granted heavy taxes, 
. h b' . . . h bo d . 14 
"gre1t tote 1gg1ng of fortls 1n t e r our1s". D'Oysel 
was anxious to obtain French engineers for the construction 
15 h' b . d' d . of a new fort at Kelso, w 1le u11 1ng an repa1rs were 
carried out at Langholm and Annan. 16 These places were 
garrisoned by detachments of French troops. The stationing 
of these troops in scotland was a major grievance of 
Elizabeth's government against the Dowager and one of the 
main reasons that encouraged her to support the Congregation 
with armed force. Yet, it is less well known that during 
h . h' . 17 t e re1gn of Mary t lS was a common ground for compla1nt. 
In the Parliament of 1556, the Dowager set forth a plan 
which proved abortive; it was to raise a permanent tax based 
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on a thorough assessment of every man's goods, from the 
nobility down to the humblest cottar. The scheme, which 
had all the bearings of a 'taille', met vigorous opposition 
18 
and was dropped. The motive behind the plan was to raise 
money for a standing army, " ... quhairthrouch the better 
weiris tha mycht susteine against Ingland gif perchance tha 
mett". 19 Sufficient finance to maintain a permanent mili-
tary force had considerable advantages over the Scottish 
system of quartering in which the country was divided into 
areas, the lieges of which each served under a lieutenant 
on the border for a specific period until another 'quarter' 
took their place. The proposal is of interest because it 
illustrates what lay in the mind of the Dowager and her 
French advisers; Scotland's role in French foreign policy 
was to be anything but passive. 
The aftermath of Wyatt's rebellion saw English rela-
tions with France and Scotland at a very low ebb. The 
Council was worried over French reinforcements for Scotland 
fearing that these would be used to aid any disaffected 
Englishmen who might . 20 r1se. Noailles's comments to the 
Dowager at this time graphically convey the Council's 
nervousness : 
... Je vous puis bien asseurer qu'elle et les seigneurs 
de son Conseil ont grand jalousie de vous, Madame, et 
de vostre estat, de facon qu'il n'y a rien qui plus 
leur desplaise que de veoir que quelque chose de France 
passe en vostre royaume. 21 
The unravelling of minor plots concocted by both the Scots 
and French kept the Council and the Wardens on their toes 
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especially in the charged atmosphere that followed the 
Wyatt rebellion. An Italian servant of one of the conspi-
rators had fled to scotland and was plotting at Berwick. 22 
A servant of the Earl of Bothwell, one Pringle,travelling 
in the entourage of the Bishop of Ross, on the instructions 
of the Dowager and Henri had offered the Percies rewards 
and armed support to raise rebellion on the border. 23 The 
Council reacted by intercepting correspondence to scotland 
24 from England and France, and, in February 1554, committees 
were set up to supply the needs of the national defences 
. d' . 25 1nclu 1ng Berwlck. The Wardens were alerted to be on 
their guard, more arquebusiers were drafted into Berwick, 
inventories were taken of munitions and ordinance and orders 
were given that 500 men from the Bishopric should be ready 
t . d f . h. h . 26 o go to 1ts e ence w1t 1n one our's not1ce. 
Sir Robert Bowes was instructed to go to Berwick to aid 
the Warden 1n inspecting the town's defences as well as 
those of Wark and Norham. 27 The Wardens were ordered to 
28 take musters. The gentry of Northumberland whose names 
the Warden of the East March had reported to the Council as 
being reluctant to enter Berwick for its defence were urged 
by the government" ... to shewe themselfes more forwarde in 
service thenne they have erste doone, whereby they shall 
29 
well redubb thier former slacknes". Paget, a prominent 
member of Mary's Council, informed Renard of a plan devised 
by the English to beat the French and Scots at their own 
game. It involved using the exiled Earl of Lennox whom the 
Regent had already contacted promising him the return of his 
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title and lands if he would support her against the Duke. 
Lennox, with English financial assistance, would enter 
Scotland using this cover and then join the Duke against 
the Regent, not only driving her out of the country but 
making himself King and so throw Scottish affairs into 
hopeless confusion. This, Paget claimed, would not only 
strengthen Mary's position but with her backdoor secured 
the Queen would be able to aid Philip and the Emperor 
against the French. 30 The scheme had little chance of 
success as even before the French got wind of it they had 
long suspected Lennox's true motives behind his efforts to 
b . d 31 get ack 1nto Scotlan . 
Tension died down only to flare up again at the end 
of 1554 when it was reported that the Vidame of Chartres was 
. . d 32 . to be sent w1th troops 1nto Scotian . Aga1n, Renard 
supposed their aim was to create trouble on the border, 
giving discontented factions a chance to rise. The French 
troop numbers were wildly exaggerated, on 3 February, Renard 
reported 3 or 4000 embarking for Scotland, and a week later 
15,000. 33 The figures excite disbelief but the capacity 
of the French to deploy large numbers of troops in Scotland 
was never underrated by the English government especially 
after their experience of the Anglo-Scottish wars during the 
previous decade. The purpose behind these carefully leaked 
reports was well understood by the Council. In December 
1554, Wotton wrote that the French believed the Emperor was 
soliciting English aid for the new year campaigning season 
and this was why the French were sendi11g troops to 
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Scotland. 34 Noailles had written to D'Oysel in August 
1554, "La disposition du temps estre telle, que nous ne 
35 pourrons longuement demourer en bon mesnage". His fears 
were bolstered during the 1554/5 Parliament which met in 
November as this would give the government the opportunity 
to declare war against the French. 36 The surest (and 
cheapest) method to keep Mary from breaking the peace was 
37 to send some foot and five or six warships into Scotland. 
The stories did contain a kernel of truth, the troops were 
in fact six bands of discharged Scots mercenaries and 3-400 
fresh French troops sent to replace the bands already in 
Scotland. 38 Despite the fact that these rumours were a 
diplomatic ploy of the French, the government could not 
afford to ignore them. Conyers, the Warden of the East 
March, was instructed 
... to have the rather a speciall eye and regarde to 
his charge, so that he maye be hable to mete with all 
practises that shuld happen to be offered, and to 
learne by his espialles ... where the said souldyours 
shall lande, and whetherwardes they take thier 
journey, and what assemblies are made towardes the 
Borders. 39 
The Scots were to have no more letters from post horses. 
Berwick was munitioned, and the Warden in conjunction with 
Bowes was ordered to view the state of the town and muster 
the garrison to discover" ... howe many of them or the towne 
40 dwellers be Scottes or suspected so to be". The alarm 
died down when Conyers confirmed from spy reports that the 
41 troops were returning mercenaries and French replacements. 
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The failure of the conference at La Marque early in 
June 1555 dashed hopes of an early European peace. French 
diplomatic successes in Italy led the English to be unsure 
of their future designs. 42 In the same month, the Earl of 
Shrewsbury was appointed Lieutenant in the North, " for 
defence of the realme against the Scottes in cace of 
invasyon". 43 The news that a Danish fleet had anchored 
off the east coast of Scotland added weight to English 
44 fears. D'Oysel believed that English borderers were 
45 increasing in boldness since they suspected war. In the 
rising tension the Wardens were warned to keep peace with 
the Scots. 46 The Truce of Vaucelles concluded on 
4 February 1556 relieved the situation, paving the way for 
h . . b h 'd 47 t e resumpt1on of peaceful relat1ons etween t e two s1 es. 
Finance and Fortifications 1553-1556 
The first priority of the new government was to 
reduce the financial drain engendered by the large numbers 
of troops and workmen in service on the border. 48 The 
instructions drawn up for Bowes and Cornwallis,appointed 
commissioners to meet the Scots in 1553,spoke of the 
" ... greate and excessive somes of money due at our towne 
of Barwicke". This included not only the wages owing to 
the ordinary and extraordinary garrisons but the Council 
also noted the burden of the cost of the" ... crenes for 
biuldinges and other causes". 49 The commissioners as well 
as meeting the Scots were to review the situation of the 
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northern garrisons, discovering what debts were owing and 
taking musters, so that all superfluous men could be 
. 50 discharged. 
The Berwick Treasurer's accounts show that payment of 
debts contracted during the Scottish war still bore heavily 
d . 51 h . d' 'd . on current expen 1ture. T e most 1rnrne 1ate cons1 erat1on 
of the government, however, was to find enough ready cash 
to pay off the surplus troops and the bulk of the workmen 
since, with the onset of winter, the building season had 
come to an end. In November 1553, the Receiver of Yorkshire, 
John Fisher, and Sir Edmund Peckham, the Treasurer of the 
Mint were sent to Berwick with cash and warrants to the 
Receivers of Crown lands in the North and the York Mint 
52 
worth £7,100. They were to confer with Bowes and 
Cornwallis and order the pay, " ... so as the porest man may 
be fyrste payde, and suche as be not necessarie to contynue 
discharged, after the said paye without delaye". 53 
In April 1554, the debt at Berwick still stood at 
£15,000. 54 In February of that year, a committee headed by 
the Treasurer Winchester and which included Cornwallis was 
set up to deal with Berwick and the marches. 55 Part of its 
task was to investigate the activities of the Treasurer of 
Berwick, Richard Bunny. The latter had already been in 
trouble during the previous reign for misappropriation of 
56 funds. Bunny was sent to the Fleet on 7 November 1553, 
" ... for his mysbehaviour both in using the Quenes Majesties 
treasure in his charge and in trifling before the lordes of 
197 
the Counsaill", the Treasurer was found to owe the Crown 
£2,800. 57 Bunny was released to accompany Fisher and 
Peckham to Berwick but in March 1554 was back in the 
58 Fleet. In June of that year, he was charged with fraud 
and the forgery of the Duke of Northumberland's hand and 
only released upon being bound by a recognizance of £2,000 
and the surrender of his lands worth £53 per annum to the 
59 Crown. A further audit of Bunny's accounts revealed that 
he owed the Crown £2,362. Despite this the former Treasurer 
h . h' . . d 60 was successful ln av1ng lS case re1nvest1gate . He 
requested that he be disallowed £1,596 which he claimed 
61 had been" ... loste by the faule of money". A further 
£500 he alleged had been paid to the Duke and £175 19s 
he argued was due for him and his clerk's wages. These 
sums were allowed even though in the case of the latter the 
accountant sceptically observed, "The same some doth not 
appere to be fully due to him". 62 Bunny's indebtedness to 
the Crown had been reduced from a figure of scandalous 
proportions to a manageable £90 4s 3d. 63 
Berwick's new Treasurer, Giles Heron, does not seem 
h h . . d' 64 to ave taken up lS post 1mme lately. Richard Ashton, 
the Crown Receiver in the three northern counties who had 
been appointed paymaster prior to Heron, continued to 
discharge these functions until December 1554. 65 
The disbanding of men was still the government's 
chief concern at Berwick. In June 1554, Conyers was ordered 
not to replace men who died and to dismiss the extraordinary 
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' ' h 66 garr1son at M1c aelmas. From May to December 1554, 
67 £9,654 was disbursed in prests and wages. Bearing in 
mind that the cost of the ordinary garrison amounted to 
some £1,772 per annum, we can see how much of the money was 
accounted for in wages arrears. Considering the infamous 
reputation of Tudor captains it is heartening to note that 
many of them were singled out for special payment, receiving 
£5, 
... by way of rewarde in consideracion of their long 
tarieing at Barwicke aftre their dischardge and their 
souldiers for that the money was not then presentlie 
readie for their payment. 69 
Ashton's accounts show that the government still 
continued to make payments for the fortifications at 
Berwick, yet the sum involved was so small (£292), it would 
70 
seem that work had virtually ceased. Incidental payments 
71 
were expended for repairs to Harbottle castle and Tynemouth 
and work on Carlisle castle went ahead while the notably 
large figure of £823 was spent on the reparation of the 
72 
walls of the city during the years 1554/5. With the 
exception of the latter, the historian might be forgiven 
for thinking that Mary's government had renounced, in the 
face of financial retrenchment, its responsibilities with 
regard to the maintenance of the frontier fortifications. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. These piecemeal 
repairs were carried out on information given by the 
frequent surveys into the state of the northern defences 
ordered by the government during the first years of the 
reign. 73 The recurrent threat from the Scots and the FrPnch 
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across the border and the lamentable state of the northern 
defences drove home to the government the inadequacy of 
spasmodic repairs. In the light of the new political 
situation in Scotland~ the whole defence system of the North 
needed overhauling. 
Another important aspect of the security provision 
for the border that the government sought to couple with the 
fortifications was the problem created by •enclosure' or, 
more precisely, •engrossing' - the concentration of several 
holdings in one hand which led to the diminishing of 
tenancies so weakening the military capacity of the 
border. Examples of border landlords engaging in depopu-
lation enclosure, that is to say, converting arable lands 
to pasture,are rare, for the upland areas of the border had 
long been devoted to pastoral farming anyway. Yet, so 
sensitive was the government to the problem that any initia-
tive on the part of landlords that would result in the 
decline of tillage provoked an immediate response from the 
Counci1. 74 In April 1554, Wharton wrote to the Earl of 
Shrewsbury asking him to intervene on behalf of the tenants 
of Richard Graham in the West March who were threatened 
with expulsion, arguing" ... that they have been serviceable 
75 
men". In May of the following year, the Treasurer 
Winchester wrote to the Council in the North asking that 
the tenants of one Mr Lisle who had been expelled by their 
landlord be reinstated in their lands and have their 
leases confirmed. Winchester also informed the Council that 
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the government was soon to bring into being new legislation 
that would provide for the welfare of the border. 76 
The result was a statute for the building and repair 
d h . 77 of castles an t e maklng of enclosures. The statute 
determined that after 1 December a commission to endure for 
seven years would be appointed to survey the three northern 
counties and the Bishopric of Durham. The six commissioners 
were to enquire" ... what and howe many castles, fortresses 
and fortelettes, villagies,Houses and Habitacions have been 
decayed", in the allotted area and those considered worth 
repairing and rebuilding. If necessary, new fortifications 
were to be built. The commissioners were also to investi-
gate what lands could be suitably enclosed and converted to 
tillage. The area covered by the act was circumscribed to 
78 
within twenty miles of the border, as this was thought 
to be the most vulnerable area. The act was to be self-
financing. Three of the commissioners were given power to 
question men under oath as to who held the rights to the 
land. The landowners were to be assessed by the 
commissioners according to their wealth, the lands of the 
Crown being included. The Commissioners were to appoint 
the necessary officers for the collecting and spending of 
the money and they were empowered to punish non-compliance 
by fine; in this, they were to be assisted by the Sheriff 
and all royal officers in the marches. The act also made 
provision for the taking up of men and supplies at reason-
able prices for the purposes of building and enclosing. To 
ensure the upkeep of repairs and sufficient maintenance the 
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commissioners were " to make and ordeyne statutes 
ordinances and Provisions from tyme to tyme as the case 
shall require for the safegarde,conservacion,redres,corre-
. d . h . 79 cc1on an reformaclon of t e prem1sses". 
We can see a parallel of what this particular clause 
of the act was designed to achieve in the indenture between 
the Crown and Ralph Grey. In May 1554, the castle and manor 
of Wark, which had been in the hands of the Crown since the 
death of Sir Edward Grey in 1531, owing to the minority of 
his son and heir Ralph, were restored. In return, the 
latter took upon himself, under bond of £500, to keep the 
castle in good repair, furnishing it with a resident captain, 
a porter, two gunners and eight soldiers. It was agreed 
that the castle would be visited by Grey or by a deputy 
twice yearly in peacetime and that Grey would remain resident 
. . 80 1n t1me of war. 
The ordinances of the commissioners certified in 
Chancery and ascribed with the royal assent were to bind all 
persons. In the event of non-compliance the foregoing 
procedure was required before proceedings leading to 
. d b . d 81 forfelture caul e 1naugurate . 
The provision for enclosures was not an innovation in 
Crown policy towards the North. The leases of the Debat-
able lands distributed early in the reign of Edward VI had 
stipulated that the leaseholders were to make ditches and 
hedges on their lands. 82 Wharton's scheme drawn up in 1553 
for the enclosjng of grounds bears ~ close resemblance to 
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many of the clauses of the 1555 Act and it is not unreason-
able to suppose that it served as a prototype for the 
. . 83 
Mar1an statute. 
The argument for the enclosing of grounds was two-
fold, involving both security and economic considerations. 
The Marian commission was revived in the same form in 1561 
and, from the lengthy instructions issued then, we can 
. d d' h . 84 arr1ve at a clear un erstan 1ng of t e government's mot1ves. 
The security reasons for enclosures were unequivocally 
stated : 
The meanynge and reason of makinge of the sayd 
inclosures is to strengthen the townes, villages or 
hamlettes in such sorte as thennemye or theefe shall 
not have free passage and recourse to the howses, 
barnes and barmekyns ... but by straight and narrow 85 
wayes and passages and emonges hedges and ditches ... 
By this means defence was more practicable against the 
marauder : 
... a fewe men maye resyste and annoye them, and it 
serveth also good that the waies of and betwene the 
sayd inclosures be made narrow and somewhat crooked 
that thenemye or theef maye be mett withall at corners 
and there annoyed by bowe or otherwyse. 86 
The enclosures were to be ditched. The instructions 
specified that trenches were to be four feet deep and six 
feet wide and double set with quickset. 87 
The enclosing of grounds was seen from an economic 
viewpoint to be advantageous, allowing the farmer to protect 
his stock and crops and pursue more efficient farming 
methods than would otherwise have been possible. Bowes in 
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1551 had argued that " the grounds nowe open and barreine 
to be placed, hedged and ditched ... to make villiage 
88 pastures and meadowes better then they be". March adrni-
nistrators were rightly or wrongly obsessed with the 
conviction that the potential of border farm lands was not 
being fully exploited. Arable farming was considered more 
desirable than pastoral farming because it was more labour 
intensive. Increasing the amount of manpower in the marches 
meant more borderers for border service. 89 Enclosing 
suitable land would enable the borderers to 
... better enjoye and take the comoditie and pprofytt 
of theyr land adjoynge to the frontiers, the which is 
in many places very fruitfull and thereby bannyshe 
those that be ydle and unprofitable subjectes of this 
realme, or elles trayne and exercise them in some 
travell and servyce for the manurance of theyr landes 
to the benefyt of theyr countrye. 90 
The government was anxious about the depopulation of 
the 'uttermost fronter•, those areas nearest to the border, 
and not with a decline in population. Bowes further 
advocated that the fortresses on the East March be repaired 
as this" ... would cause that sundrie villages waisted by 
warres, and being long tyrne uninhabitated, to be repeopled 
and plenished wich were a great streinghe to these 
. 
91 borders". The prerequisite for the safe carrying on of 
agricultural pursuits was the provision for adequate shelter 
during raids by the Scots. This explains the logic behind 
the government's purpose in combining the issues of forti-
fications and enclosures ln the same act. 
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No time was lost in implementing the act. On 
Christmas day 1555, a warrant was issued for the patent 
. . . h . . 92 
appo1nt1ng t e comm1sS1oners and three days later the 
names of the commissioners were sent to Wharton who was to 
93 instruct them to meet without delay. It is clear that 
the Wardens and Wharton in particular were to be the driv-
ing force behind the commission. The Council gave further 
indication of the priorities to be considered, ordering 
the commissioners 
... speciallie amonges other thinges to considre the 
breddeth and depenes of the ditches to be made, in 
what places the newe dwelling howses maye to all 
purposes be best placed for the salfegarde, defence 
and annoyaunce, what decaied howses and castles are 
to be chiefelie first repaired, to cause the dwell-
inges to be placed as nere the frontiers as maye be, 
and to considre the making of heigh wayes. 94 
Few details of the activities of the commissioners 
have survived but we know that the Crown conscientiously 
pursued its policy of repairing those royal fortresses that 
fell within the provisions of the act. Work was begun at 
Bewcastle in the spring of 1556. Repairs were carried out 
on the walls of the hall, new floors were also added to the 
bakehouse and brewhouse at a cost of £83. 95 This, however, 
as the survey ruefully commented, could only be regarded as 
the tip of the iceberg. The north wall of the castle, it 
claimed" ... is consumed and cleare gone ... the walles of 
the holle castell is in soche ruyne and decay ... a man maye 
climbe up the walle wher ye lyme is bettsurthe with whether 
takyng holde betwyx the stones". Most of the barmkin wall 
around the castle had fallen into the ditches and even they 
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It being well wattered ronde abowte the castell with 
long contynuance is in soche ruyne and decay and filled 
96 
... men rriay wade over". 
During the summer of 1556 work recommenced on the 
fortifications at Berwick. Work was still continuing on 
the foundations of the Edwardian bulwark and the extensive 
range of its outworks. Progress was slow and was probably 
hampered by lack of finance. Added to this was the fact that 
the urgency had been taken out of the situation by the Truce 
of Vaucelles which relaxed international relations and curbed 
any immediate fears of Scottish aggression. The matter of 
finance for the fortifications became for the moment of 
secondary importance. 97 In July, £1000 was delivered to 
the Treasurer, Giles Heron, for the fortifications with a 
special word to Wharton that he cause the money" ... to be 
husbanded as the same maye be emploied and strecched as 
farre as maye be towardes the speciall advauncement of that 
service". 98 Wharton seems to have played an important role 
in making preparations for the works and was thanked several 
99 times by the Council for his efforts in that regard. In 
November 1556, the probability of the rupture of the Truce 
of Vaucelles and fears of increased pressure from the Scots 
as a result once again raised the importance of pressing 
h d . h h . . . 100 a ea Wlt t e fortlflcatlons. That same month the 
Council sent John Rogers, a military engineer with an exper-
tise second only to Richard Lee, to Berwick to review the 
works in conjunction with Wharton. They were to advise on 
the needs and the speedy advancement of the fort_ifica tions. 101 
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It is not possible to say whether other landlords 
followed the Crown's example in executing the provisions of 
the act. The sluggishness of the commissioners must have 
been something of a drawback to any landowner who wished to 
emulate the Crown's enthusiasm. The matter was not helped 
by the fact that Wharton, who was to have been the leading 
force behind the commission, was heavily occupied else-
102 
where. Nevertheless, the government upbraided the 
laxity of the commissioners and was determined that they 
should proceed with the task. In october 1556, Wharton was 
instructed to call them together again and see that they 
continue, " ... assuring them that as thier Majesties meane 
to have this matter goone thorough with all out of hande". 
All those failing to comply with the act were to be 
d h . . 103 h' h summone before t e Pr1vy Counc1l. T lS seems to ave 
been the last effort of the Council to goad the commissioners 
into action. The build up of the threat from Scotland sealed 
the fate of the commission which, it might be argued, had 
become superfluous or, at least, bound up in general policy. 
Now all the energies of the central government and northern 
administrators were concerted into providing for the imme-
diate defence of the border. This said, it will not do to 
blame the failure of the commissioners on administrative 
dilatoriness. Judging from the fortunes of future 
Elizabethan commissions which were equally conspicuous for 
their lack of success, we need not doubt that despite the 
determination of the government, entrenched interests simply 
proved too strong. Clearly, northern landlords were 
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unwilling to provide the finance necessary for the implement-
ation of the act. 104 
The Change of Regime 
With the notable exception of Lord Dacre the leading 
men of the North played very unheroic roles during the 
Marian accession crisis. The Earl of Shrewsbury, Lord 
President of the Council in the North, had been a lukewarm 
supporter of Northumberland's government and, like the rest 
of the Council, claimed to have been bullied into accepting 
Lady Jane Grey. Shrewsbury was heavily involved in the 
skilful diplomacy of the Imperial ambassadors that eventually 
105 led the council to support Mary. Despite this, Shrewsbury 
was not received into favour unequivocally by the new Queen. 
On 2 August, both he and two other Edwardian councillors, 
the Earl of Pembroke and the Marquis of Winchester, were 
d . d' d 106 h h refuse 1rnrne 1ate par ons. T e Queen, owever, soon 
showed her confidence in Shrewsbury. On 10 August, he was 
admitted to the Council, and, on 1 September, reappointed 
d . d 107 Lor Pres1 ent. 
The Earl of Westmorland had, like Shrewsbury, been 
rewarded by the Duke in the form of forgiven debts and 
lavish land grants in an additional bid to strengthen Dudley 
support in the North. The death of Edward VI saw 
Westmorland cautiously waiting in the wings to see which 
way the wind would blow. On 25 July, the Earl received a 
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grudging thanks from the Council for his neutrality, 
" ... with exhortatyon of a more ferventnes and request to 
108 
see the cowntrey in good quyat". The insistence on the 
latter is significant as it corroborates evidence from other 
sources suggesting that there was some unrest in the North 
during the accession crisis and the transition period 
between the two reigns. On 3 September 1553, the Countess 
of Shrewsbury writing to her husband of her success in 
obtaining the warrant for his reappointment to the Presidency 
echoed this. The Queen, the Countess wrote, 
... held up her hands, and besowght God to send yow 
good helthe and also prayed God to send yow good 
successe in her affayres in that cuntreye ... wherby 
I perceyve her hyghnes to be somewhat dowtfull of 
the quietnes of that cuntreye. 109 
This may be a reference to the struggles of rival supporters 
of Queen and Duke that the confused political situation the 
death of the young Edward had brought about. 
The position enjoyed in march administration by one 
of Northumberland's most prominent northern supporters, 
Lord Wharton, was immediately called into question. 
Wharton was instructed along with his subwardens to remain 
in office. For the moment there was to be no wholesale 
110 
ejection of Wardens. Wharton's relationship with the 
Duke brought his loyalty to the new regime under suspicion. 
Rumours were flying around that the Warden General had 
engaged in" ... rasynge ... hys force agayns(t) the lorde 
111 Dacres in the defence of the usurper's quarell". The 
Council could not afford to ignore these allegations and 
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Eure was instructed to send Wharton's accusers to explain 
themselves before the counci1. 112 In early November 1553, 
Noailles reported that a march officer named Captain 
Musgrave, in favour with the Duke and not included in the 
general pardon of Mary, had fled to Scotland with 300 
horse. 113 The report is of interest as the Musgraves were 
. . . h 114 h h h' pol1t1cal all1es of W arton. Alt oug 1s post as 
115 Deputy Warden General fell into abeyance, Wharton was 
d d d d . . h' 116 par one an no procee 1ngs were taken aga1nst 1m. 
The leniency of the new regime towards Wharton may 
well have been determined by the favour in which the new 
Queen held his son and heir, Sir Thomas. The latter's 
career might be construed as part of a calculated effort 
on the part of his father to keep a foot in both political 
camps, the careful insurance policy of a newly ennobled 
dynast against the worrying vicissitudes of changing regimes. 
Wharton operated in a world where the penalties of mis-
judged political calculations were severe. Sir Thomas had 
joined Princess Mary's household at Kenninghall becoming her 
steward in or before 1552. He accompanied her to 
Framlingham, becoming one of her earliest councillors. 
Thereafter, he sustained fairly frequent attendance as a 
. . 117 h . . Pr1vy Counclllor. W arton•s exper1ence of border affa1rs 
was invaluable,making up for the loss of Sir Robert Bowes 
who was not reappointed to Mary's council. As a reward 
for his loyalty when loyalty to her had been dangerousg 
Mary appointed Wharton Master of the Queen's Henchmen and 
bestowed upon him an impressive catalogue of important 
d h . 118 stewar s 1ps of Crown lands. 
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The most overt support for Mary came from Lord Dacre. 
On 12 July 1553, the Imperial ambassador declared that if 
Dacre were to join the Queen her forces would double in 
nUmbers; failing this, her position would be feeble unless 
h . d 119 . h d . t e Emperor 1ntervene . E1g t ays later 1t was reported 
that Dacre, accompanied by a large number of Lords and 
gentlemen from the North, had joined Mary, swelling her 
forces to such an extent that she was not only able to 
defend herself but able to take up arms against the Duke. 120 
Dacre soon reaped the fruits of his active loyalty. His new 
rise to power on the marches was as abrupt as his fall had 
been in the previous reign. In January 1554, he was 
appointed Warden of the West and Middle Marches, Keeper of 
Tynedale and Redesdale and captain of the city and castle 
of Carlisle. 121 With the wardenships went the chief 
stewardship of the Crown lands in the two marches. 122 
Change was also brought to the East March where Ralph Grey 
was replaced by Lord Conyers, the former Edwardian Warden 
123 
of the West March. Conyers was not appointed to the 
captaincy of Berwick which remained in the hands of 
Richard Norton who had replaced Sir Nicholas Stirley in or 
124 before February 1553. 
Dacre had not long served as Warden of the two 
marches before he asked in May 1554 to be relieved of the 
'dd h 125 Ml le Marc . The Warden was a stranger to the govern-
ment of the march and although Lord of the Barony of 
Morpeth, this was situated in the more peaceable southern 
lowlands of the wardenry. The main base of Dacre power and 
211 
influence was on the western border, and the level of 
lawlessness there made it desirable for him to concentrate 
his efforts on ruling a single march. Dacre's request was 
considered by the Council but it required the scare that 
rumours of French reinforcements for Scotland induced in 
the spring of 1555 finally to persuade the government to 
relieve the Warden of one of the two marches. In March 1555, 
the wardenry of the Middle March and the keeperships of the 
Dal . h 126 two es were g1ven to W arton. Again, provision for a 
base of support was made. With the wardenship went the 
stewardship of Hexhamshire and the constableship of Alnwick 
castle. The patent contained the proviso that " ... the said 
offices to be united and annexed to the said office of Lord 
d h 'dd h 127 War en oft e M1 lemarc e". These attached offices 
raised the fee of the wardenry by £46 6s Bd, a welcome 
financial increase, but, more importantly, it gave the 
Warden direct control over the Queen's tenants in the 
Hexham and Alnwick Lordships. The government was delibe-
rately strengthening the financial and manpower resources 
of the Warden. In May 1555, the Council laid down that all 
Crown offices that fell vacant in the marches were to be 
d h d . 128 annexe to t e war enr1es. The same concern for security 
led the Council to remove Norton as Captain of Berwick 
castle. Norton still remained as Captain of Norham while 
the captaincy of Berwick was given to the former Sheriff of 
129 Yorkshire, Sir William Vavasour. 
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In December 1555, the Council appointed Wharton to 
the east wardenry. The reason for Conyers leaving is not 
immediately apparent. He had already resigned from the 
west wardenry in 1552 being unable to control the situation 
h . 130 and may ave done so aga1n. Conyers had been grossly 
negligent in bringing to order Thomas Clavering, the Captain 
of Wark, whose riotous behaviour against both English and 
Scots was causing some alarm. Wharton had complained to 
h b . . 131 s rews ury aga1nst Conyers on several occas1ons. 
Wharton's promotion had been, as he himself admitted, through 
the good offices of the Lord President. Shrewsbury had been 
on the border in August 1555 and so was able to see the 
. h h h' 132 state of affa1rs on t e East Marc for 1mself. Wharton 
was an obvious choice. His re-emergence, surprising though 
it was, was simply due to necessity. There were no suitable 
candidates with sufficient power and influence to take over 
the East and Middle wardenries. Wharton's picture of the 
state of the border in late 1555 was bleak in the extreme, 
Twewlye all the marches haithe of late ronne so 
farre to disorder that yt wilbe harde to reforme 
the same and that do I fynde and am lyke so to do, 
(sic). Beinge overburdened with the Est marches 
and the towne of Berwyke. 133 
The Warden's scepticism about his ability to restore the 
situation was not mere false modesty. He sought to do his 
best but again reiterated his inadequacy, " Albeit I 
knowe I am not hable for many respectes having want of helth 
134 (and) want of power". Wharton realised that his lack of 
an appropriate landed base in the two marches would be an 
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impediment to his successful wardenship. His newly 
acquired stewardships of the Crown lands in the marches 
were no substitute for the steadfast loyalty and cooperation 
from his tenants a well established border magnate could 
command. However, noble houses with this sort of power 
and influence in the East and Middle Marches were no longer 
to be found. 
Mary's initial appointment to march government 
resulted in the collapse of the closely allied power struc-
ture that Wharton had rapidly built up in the previous 
reign. The Deputy Warden General's fall was sudden but not 
entirely unexpected in view of his role in Northumberland's 
border policy. Not only events but the paucity of suitable 
candidates for the wardenries had proved that the Marian 
government could not dispense with Wharton. Yet, despite 
his long and valuable experience, he himself on his own 
admission was poorly equipped for the task. 
The commission of 1553 
The response in Edinburgh to the accession of Mary 
came quickly. The new Queen had not long established 
herself on the throne before the Scottish government,taking 
advantage of her professed inclination towards peaceful co-
existence with Scotland,sent Ross Herald with a list of 
grievances. 135 This catalogue of infringements of Border 
Law though serious enough in itself was all the more 
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disconcerting in that it implicated several leading Crown 
officers in the marches, the very officials responsible for 
the maintenance of law and order. The Herald was to show 
the complaints to the French ambassador who was to transmit 
them to the Queen and Council. He was to impress upon the 
latter that the English borderers 
... or at the leist sum of thame ... ar of evill 
nature and indispositioun, inemyis to peax and 
quietnes, inclynit to stouthe and reif, accustomit 
to leif thairupoun dalie and nychtlie, makis inva-
sioun ... with gret cumpanyis of men togidder in 
plane reif, heirschippis and slauchterris, als weill 
in plane day lycht as in the nycht. 
The Scots claimed that Richard Norton, the Captain 
of Norham and Berwick, was illegally occupying the Tweed 
fishing of Holywell which, they asserted, belonged to the 
Scottish Warden of the West March, Lord Hume. Not only was 
redress unobtainable from the English Warden, but he himself 
in company with the Captain of Harbottle had engaged in 
sheep and cattle raids into Scotland, with, it was claimed, 
Lord Wharton's concurrence. Charges were also laid against 
the Captain of Wark who,the Scots alleged,came into 
Scotland with 120 men and slew two Scots, this on the very 
day of a meeting between the opposite Wardens for justice. 
The killings caused an uproar at the day of Truce as the 
Scots Warden appeared with the kin and friends of the slain 
men. 
After relating these and other outrages, the 
ambassador was to ask the Queen to appoint commissioners to 
meet with those of the Scots for redress and the taking of 
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order for the maintenance of the peace and quiet of the 
frontier" ... and gif this be refusit, that the Ambassa-
toure mak the Kyng (Henri) advertisment thairof". 
The timing of these incursions may be significant in 
that the borderers were taking advantage of the uncertainty 
of the situation at Westmin ster to escalate their raiding 
activities and pay off old scores; the alleged particip-
ation of leading march officials seems to bear this out. 
On the other hand, we must not assume that all the blame 
lay with the English. The council did not rebut the Scottish 
charges but it quickly came up with a list of similar accus-
. . h h 136 at1ons aga1nst t e Scots to counteract t em. They had 
no difficulty in drawing this up as the state of affairs 1n 
Scotland was also in many respects not conducive to the 
peace and stability of the border. The political situation 
was very unclear. Arran still held the office of Governor 
but effective power lay in the hands of Mary of Guise and 
the French. On the border itself the old feud between the 
two leading families of the Scottish Middle March reached 
a climax with both sides, as Leslie suggests, profiting 
from the political circumstances. The result was the murder 
in Edinburgh High Street of the Warden Walter Scott by his 
. 137 
r1val Walter Ker of cessford. 
It was obvious in the rapidly deteriorating 
situation that the Wardens could not be depended upon to 
dispense impartial justice. So neutral arbiters in the 
form of commissioners had to be appointed. The English 
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Council appointed as their representatives Sir Thomas 
Cornwallis, Sheriff of Norfolk and Suffolk, member of the 
Framlingham group and Privy Councillor, and Sir Robert 
138 Bowes. Bowes was ideally suited for the task. As a 
lawyer and former Warden, he had been one of the negotiators 
of the Treaty of Norham. This element of continuity with 
Edwardian border negotiations was important. Bowes, with 
a lawyer's concern for legal propriety, had seen many loop-
holes in the Treaty of Norham. In his report on the 
borders prepared in 1551, he noted that" ... there be many 
thinges imperfite and not concluded in the said treatye". 
Redress obtainable in cases of arson needed to be reformed; 
in cases of wounding and maining no adequate redress was 
available; nor was this all, there were " manye other 
partyculer cases wherein there is bothe hurt and wronge 
because they be not included within the treatye there 
139 lackethe remedye and redresse for them". The two commi-
ssioners were to be at Berwick before the feast of All 
. h h . h 140 Sa1nts to meet t ose of t e scott1s government. They, 
for their part, had likewise appointed two knights; Sir 
Robert Carnegie, a trusted servant of the Dowager and 
trained negotiator who had taken part in the early 
proceedings over the Debateable land, and an experienced 
lawyer, the Justice Clerk Sir John Bellenden. 
The indenture the commissioners produced has been 
called the 'first real code of Border Laws for peacetime 
since that of 1249' . 141 The commissioners were concerned 
to settle the more notorious border disput.es ar.d also to 
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reverse the situation that the breakdown in Warden negotia-
tions had brought about, especially the backlog of bills. 
As well as restating and redefining traditional Border Law, 
the commissioners introduced new remedies to secure the 
better administration and enforcement of the law. 
As far as individual disputes were concerned, the 
most acrimonious centred on the Debatable lands on the 
East March. English border officers had confiscated sheep 
and cattle which, they claimed, were pasturing within the 
142 bounds of England. The commissioners ordered Eure, the 
Warden of the Middle March, to regulate the matter and 
recompense or return the livestock to the Scots. If any 
livestock were found grazing in the opposite realm it was 
legitimate for the owner of the pasture or the Warden to 
impound them. They would only be restored to their owner 
on payment of a fine known as 'parkadge'. This was assessed 
at 1d Sterling for cattle and 1d Scots for every sheep for 
the first offence. The rate was to be doubled for every 
subsequent offence, " ... until such offenders shall be 
compelled (by occasion of distress, and the charge of so 
great and grievous Parkadge) to keep his cattel within the 
. . d h' 143 h d h 11m1ts and boun s of 1s own realm". T e or er oft e 
commissioners went some of the way to deal with this 
irritating problem but until both sides agreed as to what 
were the precise bounds the issue of straying livestock 
144 
would be fuel for further controversy. 
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The commissioners also attempted to settle the 
dispute over the profitable Tweed fishings which involved 
Lord Hurne, the Scottish Warden of the East March, and the 
captain of Norham. The seriousness of the problem did not 
simply stem from the fact that it concerned a Scottish 
nobleman and a prominent border official; the problem was 
essentially one of security. The fishing lay under the 
walls of Norham castle and since the Scots did most of their 
fishing at night, their presence was felt to be a threat to 
the safety of the stronghold. The Council claimed that 
because of this factor the Captains of Norham had long held 
h . h' . h 145 t e f1s 1ng,pay1ng a rent to t e Humes. The commi-
ssioners dropped this claim and ordered the Captain to 
restore the fishing to Lord Hurne in addition to paying him 
£33 6s 8d in compensation for the lost profits since the 
peace of Norham. Complaints regarding the Tweed fishing 
were to be made to the Wardens and the offender be called 
to a Day of Truce and be fyled in the same manner as for 
other offences. If the bill was found 'foul', then the 
offender was to pay" ... for every tyde that he maketh impe-
diment unto the party complainent, twenty shillings Sterling, 
and be therefore delivered to remain with the party grieved, 
. h b . . d 146 untlll t e same e fully sat1sf1e "· 
It was crucial to bring an end to these controversies 
especially since they involved the Wardens personally and 
leading march officers of both sides. The mutual coopera-
tion of these officials was essential to the administration 
of international justice. Once these disputes had been 
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solved the commissioners sought 
~ 
fully remedy their A 
adverse consequences. The main problem was the great number 
of unredressed bills. The commissioners agreed that these 
were due to the negligence and default of border officers 
and they were determined to work" ... until such time as 
every complainer's bill for offences done, since the last 
acceptation of the peace, shall be fully answered and 
redressed". 147 They were anxious in the face of the number 
of bills 'for a more special expedition of justice' between 
the Wardens. All complaints since the peace of Norham were 
to be enrolled and the rolls interchanged; the Warden 
Sergeant was to cause the accused to be at the next Day of 
Truce to answer the charges. If, as often was the case, the 
defendant could not be brought to trial, the Warden and the 
Assize were to proceed with the fyling of the bill pronounc-
ing it 'clean' or 'foul'. This procedure, of course, 
necessitated some prior investigation on the part of the 
Warden or his officers into the facts of the case. They 
were to" ... speire, search and enquire the Truth and verity 
148 
of these attempts". The Warden swore that at the next 
Day of Truce he would deliver a person to the plaintiff to 
act as surety until full redress was given. This newly 
improvised method known as fyling on the Warden's honour was 
designed to ensure that full and prompt recompense would be 
made to the plaintiff, 149 the Warden himself being made 
responsible under oath for the fulfilling of justice. The 
commissioners were at pains to emphasise the temporary 
nature of this expedient. The new method was instigated ln 
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response to a particular situation and would cease to be 
implemented when the excessive number of bills had been 
150 processed. Once established however the advantages of 
the new procedure -soon became apparent. The fyling of 
bills upon the Warden's honour became a popular and effi-
cient alternative to the more standard forms of justice. 151 
In addition to improving the modus operandi of Days 
of Truce, the commissioners endeavoured to create an orderly 
climate at these international meetings by attempting to 
suppress the outbursts of violence which frequently occurred 
during the course of them. The commissioners referred in 
particular to the custom of 'Baughling' or 'Reproving'. 
A 'Baughle', as described by Bowes in 1551, was at once an 
accusation of broken faith and a judicial challenge. If at 
a previous Day of Truce a borderer had bound himself either 
for payment of a ransom or entry of a pledge or for any 
other cause, and after complaint of the wronged party still 
failed to keep his word, it was customary at a Day of Truce 
... that the partie offended would beare a glove, 
or a picture of him that had so broken his truthe, 
and by the blast of a horne or crye to give knowledge 
to the whole assemblie, that such a person is an 
untrue and unfaithful man ... wiche is as much in the 
lawe of armes as to give unto him the lye, and appeale 
to fight with him in the quarrell. 152 
The commissioners' intention was not to eradicate the prac-
tice of baughling per se but merely to control it so that 
it would not disrupt the peaceful proceedings of Days of 
Truce. If the aggrieved party wished to baughle a person 
or persons of the opposite realm he had first to seek the 
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licence of both Wardens. Offenders who ignored this order 
were to be handed over to the opposite Warden and impri-
soned for a month. Their cause was to be forfeit at law 
and the person or persons baughled against were to be 
. d 153 acqu1tte . 
One of the greatest drawbacks to the administration 
of justice on the border was the prevalence of perjury. In 
the year prior to the commission of 1553, the Scots Privy 
Council drew up four articles suggesting reforms in the 
execution of international justice. The first drew 
attention to 
... the greit hurt, harame, skaith, and dampnaige 
that trew men ... incurris throw the said perjurye, 
quhilk is the veray occasioun of the lang delay of 
justice and involvis the parteis in greit lawbouris 
and expense. 154 
In an effort to stamp out this practice the Scots 
recommended that convicted perjurors should be imprisoned 
in the opposite realm for a year and then brought to a 
Day of Truce and there, "in face and pres ens of the pepill, 
to be brunt upoun the cheik with ane key or put to the 
deid". 155 The measures the commissioners proposed to take 
against perjurors were of a less drastic nature. The 
period of imprisonment was to be for three months and this 
was to be followed by a public denunciation at a Day of 
156 Truce. 
Another suggestion drawn up by the Scottish Privy 
Council was settled by the Indenture of 1553; this concerned 
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the overswearing of bills. If the defendant was suspected 
of exaggerating the number or value of his stolen livestock 
or goods, the Wardens were to appoint twelve jurors who 
would have power to 'moderate, diminish or qualifie' their 
nurnber. 157 
In an attempt to reform the criminal activities of 
the borderers, the commissioners singled out three parti-
cular march treasons for special mention. These were 
murder, violent injury and arson. As for the first crime, 
the commissioners had the experience that" ... the negligent 
omission of officers, in executing and performing the said 
laws in that point, hath been the occasion of such great 
enormities and disorders of both Realms". The Wardens were 
urged to observe the letter of the law and exact the full 
penalties in murder cases. In an effort to reduce violent 
injury and arson, the guilty were not only liable to pay 
the traditional damages but were to be handed over to the 
. w d b . . d . h 158 oppos1te ar en to e 1mpr1sone for s1x mont s. 
The underlying reason behind the commissioners 
meeting in 1553 was the breakdown in the normal machinery 
of international justice. This had been engendered not only 
by the instability of Scottish politics at the centre butalso 
by the feuding of surnames on the frontier itself contri-
buted to lawlessness and the weakness of judicial authority. 
In much the same way, the transition period between the 
death of Edward and the establishment of the new government 
gave rise to a conspicuous increase in criminal activity on 
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the part of English borderers. The commissioners began by 
attempting to solve individual disputes which had an addi-
tional paralysing effect on international cooperation. Then 
they made a brave attempt to speed up the administration of 
justice by the introduction of the system of fyling bills 
on the Warden's honour. In addition, they made provision 
to ensure that the proceedings of Days of Truce were more 
equitable and carried out in a manner conducive to justice. 
From prior recommendations of the Scots Privy Council on 
one hand and the English commissioner,Sir Robert Bowes,on 
the other, we can see that the Indenture was an authentic 
piece of cooperation between the two sides. The commi-
ssioners tried to avoid what they regarded in the light of 
experience to have been mistakes in the past. They were not 
content to slavishly follow established patterns or lines in 
the Indenture. It was a genuine attempt to reform and 
readjust border law. 
Administration at Work The Graham Problem 
Suspicion of Scotland and her French allies over-
shadowed negotiations between the Wardens until the final 
outbreak of hostilities between the two realms in the summer 
of 1557. Negotiations between the Wardens proceeded in fits 
and starts according to the prevailing state of Anglo-French 
relations. A marked feature of the period was the unusually 
detailed attention the Regent's government paid to the 
activities of the Wardens. Not only were their dealings with 
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their opposite numbers closely supervised by officials sent 
from Edinburgh but the Wardens themselves were often called 
before the Council to give an account of the situation. A 
more novel departure was the frequency with which the 
Scottish government negotiated directly with English Wardens 
h h d h . . . 159 . h over t e ea s of t e1r own off1c1als. Desp1te t e work 
of the commissioners in 1553, it was difficult for them to 
effectively remedy the state of affairs on the border. 
Progress made between Wardens depended as much on the 
internal political situation of the marches as on the inter-
national relationship between the two sides. It was 
impossible for the commissioners to bring order to the 
distracted state of the Scottish Middle Marches. Here, the 
feud between the Scotts and Kerrs was still a potent factor 
in creating instability, with the two surnames jostling for 
predominance. In April 1554, the Regent acknowledged that 
the two groups " ... quhilkis ar the principallis upon that 
bordoure hes bein grit impediment (to the peace) this lang 
b . 160 tyme yga1ne". Almost immediately after her assumption 
of the Regency, Mary of Guise informed the English Wardens 
of her intention to resolve this problem. The Scottish 
government's answer to this involved two measures. The 
leading members of the two surnames were called to 
Edinburgh in order to bind them to keep the peace,and,in 
order to restore order on the frontier the Regent herself 
d d . d. . d. . h 161 con ucte a JU 1c1al expe 1t1on t ere. The latter 
undertaken by her in July 1554,went a long way to improving 
the situation. At the end of that month, Conyers informed 
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~ Shrewbury that the Regent 
... hath travelled verie ernestlie to bring hir 
subjectes unto amytie and love one with another; and 
hath taken of dyverse surnames pledges for the 
observing and keping of good rule ... And for the 
redresse of these Marches betwene me and the wardens 
of Scotland I am well answered, and as to equytie and 
justice doth appertyn; and so good delyverie made on 
both parties. 162 
This close attention that the Regent's government 
paid to border matters and, more particularly, her direct 
communications with the English Wardens have resulted in 
the survival of a considerable proportion of correspondence 
163 
dealing with border affairs. The Regent's letters reveal 
her government to have been genuinely concerned with the 
uninterrupted flow of the course of justice subject of course 
to the climate of international relations. This 
required a constant and energetic oversight of the day to 
day dealings of the Wardens; a procedure which the proximity 
of Edinburgh to the frontier region facilitated. This 
policy also had the inherent drawback of involving the 
Scottish government in correspondence over routine matters 
often of a trivial nature which could have been very well 
settled by the Wardens. 
We have seen that the proceedings of Days of Truce 
were frequently hampered by delay owing to the 
vacillating behaviour of the Wardens. Both governments 
were engaged in a constant struggle to make local officials 
act in a responsible manner to overcome their endemic 
contentiousness which could so easily thwart justice. The 
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recurring intervention and degree of control the Scottish 
government exercised in international dealings during this 
period was such that a historian might ask how much energy 
the central government had to exert in overseeing and 
overruling Wardens before the question inevitably arose as 
to the need for their continued existence. 
We have discussed the measures the Regent took in 
order to control the feuds in the Middle Marches. These, 
of course, were essentially internal struggles whose 
suppression lay within the jurisdiction of the Scottish 
government. A much more difficult matter arose when these 
power struggles transversed the frontier line and so ceased 
to become merely domestic problems. This process can be 
readily examined if we turn our attention to the state of 
affairs on the West March. The situation there was a 
complex one but its far reaching effects make it worthy of 
examination. 
John, Master of Maxwell, had been acting Warden of 
the Scottish West March since March 1552 replacing his 
brother, Lord Maxwell, who was appointed a commissioner for 
the division of the Debatable land; Lord Maxwell died soon 
after and his brother continued in office. In August 1553, 
Maxwell resigned the West March to his uncle, Sir James 
Douglas of Drumlanrig. The reason for this as the Scots 
Council stated was that" ... the said Johnne Maister of 
Maxwell is becumin under deidlie feid with diverse clannis 
... quhairthrow he is nocht sa habill to serve as of 
0 164 0 h h h h befolr". Maxwell was at feud Wlt t e Jo nstones w o 
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naturally sought collusion with other enemies of the Warden» 
and readily found them in the surname of the Grahams on 
both sides of the border. 165 That same month» the English 
Council wrote to their Warden and the Grahams ordering the 
former to see order maintained among the inhabitants of the 
late Debatable land, " ... nowe knowen to be mere Englishe", 
166 
and instructing the Grahams to obey their Warden. In 
July 1554 the Regent,pursuing justice on behalf of the 
inhabitants of the Scottish West March claimed that the 
Grahams had murdered several Scots and even attacked the 
Warden himself, alleging that "Rychart Grahame and his 
complices to the nowmer of nyne scoir of men persewand him 
(the warden) sex mylis for his slauchter within the severall 
grund of Scotland". The following month the Regent charged 
the Grahams with being responsible for the murder of a 
167 
French soldier near Annan with Dacre's alleged complicity. 
There is no direct evidence that the English govern-
ment countenanced these acts of violence in order to put 
pressure on the Scots particularly to surrender fugitives, 
their harbouring of which was a very sore point. It is 
difficult at this time to make much sense of the welter of 
recriminations and decide on whose side the weight of the 
blame lay. The English government certainly reacted to 
Scottish complaints by attempting to bring the Grahams to 
order. In January 1555, three of the principal Grahams, 
Richard, Peter and William, were bound over before the 
Council for £200 each on promises of future obedience to 
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royal authority and also to" ... bring in the rebelles and 
suche others of thier surname as lately fledd into Scotlande 
. 168 
to be aunswerable to the lawe". In May of that year, a 
proclamation was issued offering pardon to the Grahams for 
past offences if they would submit themselves to the Warden 
and satisfy injuries committed by their surname against both 
169 English and Scots. The need for a greater degree of 
supervision over the West March was apparent, and so Dacre 
was removed from the Middle March . His replacement by 
Wharton meant that he could direct all of his attention to 
the particular problems of the West March. The Earl of 
Shrewsbury who was appointed Lieutenant on the border in 
June 1555 was also instructed to deal with the matter of 
170 the Grahams. The Council were careful to justify this 
to Dacre and they were especially concerned to allay 
Scottish suspicion of Shrewsbury's appointment. Dacre was 
ordered to inform the Scots that since he was personally 
involved, his servants having suffered at the hands of the 
Grahams, he was not considered sufficiently impartial to 
judge the matter. 171 The settlement imposed by Shrewsbury 
on the surname was relatively mild. Although the Earl was 
ordered to pardon all the Grahams except four members of 
the clan, he simply took bonds of the latter for their good 
behaviour and what compensation was due to Scotland and 
released them. The government seemed more concerned with 
curbing the Graham problem per se than appeasing the Scots. 
Dacre had advised against the Lieutenant's lenient action 
towards the Grahams. He suggested that hostages should be 
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taken from them since there were rumours that if war broke 
out they would defect to Scotland; the headsmen of the 
surname, he alleged, had already been in touch with the 
. d . h . . . . . 172 h Scott1sh War en w1t th1s 1ntent1on 1n m1nd. S rewsbury's 
clemency with respect to the Grahams was no more than a 
politic move to keep them loyal to the Crown in the light 
of suspected hostilities between England and Scotland. 
The late summer of 1555 was a period of great 
tension. The Scots pressed for justice through the French 
ambassador insisting that the West March was" ... la 
·' / . . . front1ere plus gastee, et qu1 avo1t le plus grand beso1ng 
. / 173 d'estre b1en redressee". D'Oysel was convinced that the 
English borderers suspected war. English fears were 
bolstered by the Regent's holding of justice courts at 
Jedburgh and Dumfries in August and September of 1555, 
accompanied by 300 French foot. The presence of a Danish 
fleet off the coast increased the alarm. The ambassador 
believed English reluctance to force the Grahams stemmed 
from the fact that Mary did not wish to punish men she might 
174 
need to use against the Scots in the event of war. His 
counterpart in London, Noailles, spent two days with the 
Council reading them word for word D'oysel's letters and 
memoires. The English could only offer excuses: refusal to 
do justice, they alleged, stemmed from the Scots and not 
from them. English vacillation over redress to the Scots 
for injuries caused by the Grahams, Noailles claimed, was 
part of deliberate government policy : "Ilz se nourrisent 
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en plaisir d'entendre nos plainctes, et que leurs subjectz 
f d . . 175 assent en urer 1nJures aux nostres". 
In an interview with Secretary Petre and Chancellor 
Gardiner, the latter summed up the state of affairs on the 
border to Noailles in frank terms that reflected a cynical 
insight into the political realities of the situation. 
Trouble was endemic on the border, the Chancellor told the 
ambassador, the Queen and Council sincerely wanted to see 
order and justice there, but crime was so common it was 
impossible to punish everyone and arrive at a perfect redress 
for the victims of theft or violence. The only solution 
was to hang a few malefactors as an example while the 
Wardens of either side would do their best to control the 
. d 176 rema1n er. 
As in 1553, the government responded to the frequent 
solicitations of the Scots and French by proposing that 
commissioners meet those of the Scots to redress all 
attempts since the meeting of 1553. Noailles believed that 
Mary had appointed the commissioners and that he was being 
treated with more civility because of French successes 1n 
Italy which culminated in the alliance in October 1555 of 
177 Paul IV and Henri against the Emperor. 
Prior to the summer of 1556, nothing is known of the 
meetings of the commissioners but they seem to have met in 
178 January of that year. The Truce of Vaucelles in 
February 1556 considerably relieved the situation and the 
machinery of Days of Truce was set in motion again. 
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On 13 May, Wharton informed Shrewsbury of the turn in 
events. The Scots, he wrote 
... begyn to countynance agayne the maner of peace, 
otherwyse thene they have don thes two monethes 
notwithstanding ther layt brags and doings, wherin 
they have ben somwhat met withall. 179 
In this new atmosphere the commissioners began 
serious negotiations in late June. On the 28th of that 
month, Sir Leonard BeckWith wrote to Shrewsbury that the 
Scots were willing to satisfy English complaints but so 
great was the number of back bills that the commissioners 
would have to sit till Michaelmas; in one march alone the 
180 English had 1000 bills of complaint against the Scots. 
The commissioners had barely got down to work when news 
came of an event of such magnitude that it was to poison 
relations between the two sides and dog the efforts of 
English negotiators up to the outbreak of hostilities in 
the summer of 1557. 
On 7 July 1556, the Scottish Warden of the West March 
and the Earl of Bothwell appointed by the Regent Lieutenant 
General on the border with a large body of Scottish and 
French troops took action against Scottish rebels on the 
west border. In the bloody skirmish that followed the 
rebels had the upper hand, upwards of eighteen of the 
government's forces were killed and forty taken prisoner. 
The Warden just managed to escape but the rebels were 
successful in capturing James Haliburton, Provost of Dundee 
and Keeper of Liddesdale, in addition to the French Captain 
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of Dunbar. Lord Dacre had sent his son Leonard to the Esk 
to prevent the rebels from fleeing into England and the 
Grahams had been called by the Warden to attend upon his 
son. Not only did the surname refuse to obey the Warden 
but, for the most part, they assisted the Scots rebels and 
d h h . 181 capture t e bulk of t e pr1soners. 
The Council reacted immediately commanding the 
Grahams on their allegiances to give up their prisoners; 
the situation was one of acute embarrassement since the 
outrage had taken place during the time of the commission. 
Dacre was written to several times throughout July and 
ordered to send the principal Grahams to Berwick to answer 
the bill fyled by the Scots. On August 13, the Council 
severely reprimanded the Warden for not following the orders 
of the commissioners 
... thier lordships do moche marvaill thereat, and 
not knowing what inconvenience maye followe thereof, 
have good hoope that his lordship bathe byn better 
advised syns ... there is no disorders on the Borders 
but in his wardenry. 182 
As for Dacre's equivocal role in the matter, D'Oysel 
believed that the Warden was deliberately inducing raids 
into Scotland to force the Dowager to release the former 
Warden Maxwell who had been imprisoned. According to 
Noailles, not only was Dacre involved but he was acting in 
collusion with Wharton" ... il n•est rien si vray que tous 
les deux sont amis des Grahames, principaulx offenseurs en 
ces d ' 183 ern1ers attentats". 
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The Council's hard line had the desired effect; the 
principal Grahams were sent to Berwick to answer the bill. 
Yet, despite the Council's order to them to give up their 
prisoners, the surname was in fact successful in ransoming 
them. The Grahams remained at Berwick at the command of 
the commissioners while the raid of 7 July was debated, but 
because the Scots were slow in bringing forth certain 
offenders of Liddesdale and Teviotdale, the Grahams were 
allowed home on sureties to appear before the commissioners 
when called. 184 This action clearly illustrates the quid 
pro quo mentality that could exist even where the adminis-
tration of justice was concerned. For the moment, the 
Graham affair was shelved and taken out of the Warden's 
hands into those of the commissioners. The Scots were still 
d h . . 185 concerne to keep t e affa1r a separate 1ssue. Never-
theless, they were prepared to get down to the more general 
business of further reform and modification of the march 
186 laws. 
The first matter the commissioners turned their 
attention to had also been a major topic of discussion in 
1553. This was the lack of enforcement of the laws concern-
ing murder. The guilty persons, they claimed, " hayth 
not been delyvered nor punyshed this fyfty yere and above 
187 to the evill example and great boldnes of lyke doers". 
The commissioners once again insisted that the laws dealing 
with the punishment of murderers be rigorously adhered to. 
For the first time, compensation was introduced for the 
victim's family. It was ordered that all the moveable 
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goods of the offender were to be handed over to the opposite 
Warden for the use of the wife and children of the slain or 
. . . 188 . . h1s next of k1n. Several other art1cles were d1rectly 
influenced by recent events. All borderers sheltering 
thieves, fugitives and rebels were to hand them over to the 
opposite realm within thirty days. If the fugitive had 
committed any crime in his own march, then the wronged party 
was to claim compensation at a Day of Truce. The receivers 
of the fugitive were to be made liable not only for payment 
of the bill but their goods were to become forfeit to the 
Crown where the receiver dwelt. To remedy the fact that no 
punishment was applicable for the unlawful detention of 
prisoners, the commissioners ordered that the detainer was 
to compensate his prisoner for income lost during his 
detention. This being done, the guilty person was to be 
handed over to the opposite Warden and be imprisoned for 
three months. 189 
The infrequency with which Days of Truce were held 
was a persistent cause of complaint. Delays or lack of 
confidence in these international courts could seriously 
increase tension as such a situation was a strong inducement 
to the borderers to take the law into their own hands. This 
problem was most noticeable during winter, " ... the officers 
not beyng long together in Wynter and the place of metynge 
not convenyent to contenew together for tempest of wedder"~ 90 
This was especially grave since it was during the winter 
h h h . h . 'd' . d 191 mont s t at a 1g proport1on of ra1 1ng was carr1e out. 
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The commissioners immediately arranged Days of Truce for all 
the marches on specific dates with the time and place noted 
for each meeting. If any complainant could not secure a 
verdict for his bill or delivery for it was not forthcoming, 
then he had the right to appeal to the commissioners. As to 
the vexed question of accommodation during inclement weather, 
the commissioners decided that the Wardens should appoint a 
number of towns in either realm suitable for the holding of 
Days of Truce, each side giving assurances that the peace 
would be maintained one day before the meeting and one or 
two days after it. 192 The commissioners also made some 
important changes to the machinery of Days of Truce. An 
impartial jury was rarely empanelled at these international 
gatherings. Everything militated against such an occurrence. 
Aside from the problems created by national bias, the closely 
knit structure of border society, the relatively small 
number of persons eligible for jury service and the tenurial 
relationship which bound one man to another, all combined to 
produce a situation in which juries could be easily 
influenced to produce a favourable verdict. To palliate 
the problem of securing reliable jurors the commissioners 
ordered that the twelve jurors were not only to sit for the 
duration of the meeting but were to continue to attend for 
the space of three months. At the end of this period all 
bills that the jurors had found foul were to be enrolled 
and the Wardens were to cause delivery to be made within 
eight days. After which, another twelve jurors would be 
appointed. This new system, whereby the jurors sat in 
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office for a determined period, ensured a continuity which 
the commissioners hoped might lead to a greater operational 
efficienCy at Days of Truce. By this means, the same 
jurors were made responsible for seeing the juridical 
processes of fyling, assessing compensation and ensuring 
its delivery, carried out from start to finish. In 
addition, fewer jurors made for more effective control. 
The Warden's duty of ensuring that juries acted with ade-
quate fairness in cases was made easier. The efforts of the 
commissioners to secure compensation for all bills were 
commendable but there was still a significant time lapse 
between the committing of the crime and the securing of 
compensation. However, there still remained the possibi-
lity, where poor men were concerned, that the Warden could 
require immediate redress from his opposite number. 
The Indenture of 1556 again demonstrates the extra-
ordinary flexibility of Border Law. The commissioners 
had been called together to remedy the state of confused 
lawlessness which seemed irreducible by the ordinary course 
of justice. Influenced by the prevailing situation, they 
introduced these modifications to curb what they saw as the 
most serious infringements of international law. What, of 
course, they could not influence, were the relations between 
the two governments; the determining factors lay outside 
their limited diplomatic purview. The effects of the 
commission were, in the short term, nullified by renewed 
embittered relations between the two sides. Although the 
criminal activities of the Grahams had heavily influenced 
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the proceedings of the commissioners, the Scots were 
determined that the matter should not be settled in general 
terms. As soon as the Indenture had been drawn up, the 
affair was raised again by the Scots. The English commi-
ssioners remarked wearily, "· .. thys heynous attemptate 
hayth a long tyme trobled us". 193 The matter had little 
chance of being settled to the satisfaction of the Scots 
owing to the limited manoeuvrability allowed to the English 
commissioners by the Council in London. The latter ordered 
the commissioners that they" ... shuld by all the best meanes 
they could devyse, procure to temper the matter of the 
Greames so as there be as little rigor usyd therein as may 
b " 194 e . The crux of the matter rested on an important 
principle of March Law which stated : 
..• yf one twoo or moo Ynglyshemen be at the commy-
ttyng of any attemptate in Scotland and albeit that 
100 moo or fewer Scottyshemen be the principal! 
comytters yet shall the Ynglishemen be fyled of 
that attemptate. 195 
The bill of 7 July had been fyled upon Richard, Thomas and 
Fergus Graham who were liable for payment of the whole sum 
of compensation. The commissioners had managed to persuade 
the Scots to forego the 'two doubles•, but even the amount 
involved in the principal was beyond the means of the 
196 
surname. 
Beckwith and the Chancellor of Durham were in 
Jedburgh from 16 to 25 November to settle the Graham affair. 
The Scots demanded delivery for the bill of 7 July and 
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refused to proceed in other matters, even the projected Days 
of Truce, until the matter was concluded. The hostile 
treatment offered to the two men reflects the prevailing 
state of relations. They were not met going in or coming 
out of the town, no suitable lodgings were provided. 
Scuffles broke out between their entourage and the Scots 
and the latter refused to accept English money except at a 
197 loss. 
The government still remained adamant that the 
commissioners were to continue to negotiate in the light of 
. . 198 h h former 1nstruct1ons. T ey were to use t e Scots refusal 
to deliver the traitor Pelham, " ... beyng a notable offender 
agaynst our own person" and other matters of grievance 
against the Scots to qualify their demands for the delivery 
of the Grahams. 
The worsening situation put paid to any further 
attempts to settle the matter which was still very much a 
burning issue with the Scots when a further commission met 
in the summer of 1557. 199 
The activities of the Grahams illustrate the 
complexity of border relationships both internally and 
across the frontier line. The Grahams were capable of 
aiding their Scottish surname allies in resisting the autho-
rity of the Scottish Crown, whilst the French suspected 
Dacre of encouraging the Grahams to create disorder in an 
effort to force the Dowager to release the imprisoned Warden 
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Maxwell. Unless we take French accusations at face value, 
it is difficult to demonstrate Dacre's complicity in the 
Grahams• criminal activity. The Warden's culpability must 
surely lie in his repeated failure in bringing the surname 
to order. Whether it was part of a deliberate policy or not, 
turning a blind eye can only have fostered their violent 
b h . 200 h . . . e av1our. W at we cannot fall to take cogn1sance of 1s 
just how far the government was prepared to go to protect 
the Grahams. The commissioners were appointed more, it 
seems, as a means to diffuse the situation on the border 
and placate the French than for a genuine rendering of 
justice. The Council showed no compunction in repeatedly 
instructing the commissioners to bring the Scots to mitigate 
the charges against the Grahams even though, as they them-
selves admitted, they were manifestly guilty. 201 The govern-
ment found itself in an equivocal position; it valued the 
military aid of the surname groups which was inextricably 
linked with border defence. The repercussions of handing 
the leaders of the Grahams over to the Scots or of 
countenancing the exaction of a fine that would force them 
in their extremity to join the Scots of their own accord 
were too serious for the government to risk, especially in 
a situation which threatened war. 
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199 Infra., p.257 ff. 
200 Vertot, v, 90-87. This was the traditional tactic 
used in open war, " as for the reformation of 
thoffendors in Northumbrelonde, we thinke it not 
convenient tattempte the same at this tyme, the warre 
beyng so hote as it is, but rather to wynke thereat 
for a tyme". Norfolk and Hereford to the Privy Council, 
October 28, 1542, Hamilton, I, 293. 
201 B.L., Harleian MSS., 289, f.58. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE THREAT FROM SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 1557-1558 
The Threat from Scotland 1557 
At the end of his stirring account of the Anglo-
Scottish conflict of 1557-8, Ralph Holinshed appended the 
following epilogue, 
Thus far for those yeares in the daies of Marie 
queene of England, betwixt the Englishmen and Scots 
whereof sith I have found none that hath written anie 
thing at all, I have yet set down these od notes, as 
I have learned the same of such as had good cause to 
know the truth thereof, being eie-witnesses' themselves 
of such enterprises and exploits as chanced in the 
same warres; namelie capteine Read, capteine Wood, 
capteine Erington, capteine Gurleie, and capteine 
Markham, with others which of their courtesie have 
willinglie imparted to me the report of diverse such 
things, as I wisht to be resolved in which accordinglie 
... I have here delivered, to the end the same maie 
give occasion to others (that maie happilie light upon 
more full instructions) to impart to posteritie a more 
perfect discourse, where otherwise the matter might 
peradventure wholie passe in forgetfulnesse. 1 
From the summer of 1557 until the signing of the Peace of 
Cateau-Cambresis in April 1559 Scotland and England were at 
war. It does not seem that any official declaration of war 
was made but from August 1557 the two nations clearly 
regarded themselves as belligerents. 2 There followed a 
period of hostility and limited border engagements which 
3 
contemporaries dubbed 'the two yeares warres•. The colour-
ful series of minor encounters related by Holinshed convey 
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a military naivety that betrays his sources. The 
chronicler employed a conventional but somewhat inappro-
priate vocabulary in describing the incidents that took 
place on the border during 1557/8. The stock terms •wars' 
and 'battles' convey an impression of military operations 
on a grand scale. Continental military commentators used 
a much more sophisticated jargon whichrepresented these 
encounters more accurately. The distinction is typified 
by D'Esse's account of an 'escarmouche' before Haddington 
in July 1548. As the great veteran commander of the 
Italian Wars commented sardonically, "Je ne scay si l'on 
doibt appeler cella bataille, comme font les gens de ce 
pais". 4 Sir William Maitland, the Scottish Chief Secre-
tary, with a more accurate reserve of which participating 
military captains were typically devoid, described the 
'wars • of 1557/8 as " ... manie roadis and li ttil recontres•: 5 
In late November 1556, the Council were informed that 
English exiles in France were plotting against Hammes 
and Guisnes and that there was a likelihood of a breakdown 
in the Truce of Vaucelles. Wharton was warned to temper 
his proceedings with the scots and despite the fact that the 
balance of compensation was in their favour, he was to 
confer with Dacre, " ... so as thier doinges on all parts 
maye be equall towching the delyverie of recompenses". 6 
The reinforcements sent to Calais early in December checked 
French plans. It was not until the French attempt against 
Douai on 5/6 January 1557 that the Truce was officially 
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broken. War was finally declared between France and Spain 
on 31 January and Mary was soon bringing pressure to bear 
on the Council for an English declaration against the 
7 French. The Council was bitterly divided over the pros-
pect of war. The uncertainty of the situation was plaguing 
Noailles who commented despairingly to Henri in early March, 
.._ 
On ne peult veo1r clair aux chases de de~a, et 
beaucoup moins asseurer celles qui sont a venir, 
p~i~ 9u'on ne peult ~sseoir jugement, ny sus.la 
ver1te, ny sur la ra1son, et qu'on ne scaurolt 
bastir icy sur autre fondement que sur la faveur 
.,., 
d'une femme tant enyvree de l'amour de son mary, 
qu'il ne luy chault d'offenser Dieu et le monde 
poureu qu'il soit content. 8 
The ambassador advised the King to do all that was possible 
so that Scotland should play its role in deterring Mary 
from military intervention on her husband's behalf. To 
achieve this the French bands in Scotland would need to 
be substantially reinforced. In January 1557, D'Oysel 
reported that there were only 1,200 French troops in 
'-. Scotland, just enough, " ... pour faire un peu de mine a 
nos voisins". 9 The latter was sceptical as to whether this 
would have any effect on Mary's decision, 
Je serois bien 
pouroit servir 
que son mary. 
ne se laissera 
petite chose. 
content qu'elle en eut peur, si cela 
- .._ a la garder d'entrer a la parte avec-
Mais ... je fais mon compte qu'elle 
dissuader de son entreprise pour si 
10 
For the Regent and her French advisers the prospect 
of war with England and the marriage of the young Queen of 
Scots with the Dauphin became inseparable. It was an uphill 
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effort for the Regent to reconcile the Scots to French 
rule. The good will towards the French so conspicuous in 
the aftermath of the Treaty of Boulogne had evaporated in 
the face of what the Scots increasingly saw as a French 
take over. Sporadic outbursts of violence against French-
11 
men became more and more frequent. If the Regent was to 
persuade the Scots to declare against England her political 
position needed to be strengthened. This, as she commented 
to her brother, could be achieved by pushing ahead with the 
marriage, 
mais pour vous faire cognoistre les opinions de 
ceste nation. Qui fut que je mectoys la charrus 
devant les boeufs, et me t~mpoys de penser viens 
asseurer de de~~' si au preallable le marriage nestois 
accomply, car ils estoient toniours en doubte soubs 
que seigneur ils debroient tumber. 12 
There was still some uncertainty as to whether Mary would 
marry the Dauphin. The Constable, Montmorency, who had 
still a strong influence over Henri opposed the marriage 
as it would lead to a dramatic increase in the power of his 
rivals, the Guise. He favoured the Queen's betrothal to 
some French Duke or lesser Prince. This would enable the 
couple to be sent back to Scotland, for he argued that the 
Scots would never accept to be ruled by lieutenants, and, 
should any rebellion result, the cost to France to crush it 
d h . . . 13 d h h . woul be pro.1b1t1ve. The Regent argue tat t e prom1se 
of Scottish participation in any future war between England 
and France in exchange for a firm French commitment to the 
marriage was a small price for Henri to pay. 14 To obtain 
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the adherence of the Scots to a policy of armed aggression 
against England and make them amenable to the marriage, 
the Regent had to convince the Scots that England posed 
an immediate military threat. At the rupture of the Truce 
of Vaucelles, the Regent had called a Parliament to 
ascertain who would follow if the matter came to war. 
Besides inventing rumours of English war preparations, the 
Regent could point with some justification to the troubles 
on the West March and the recalcitrance of the English 
commissioners in rendering justice in the Graham affair. 
/ The English, she argued, " ... de bouche ont. accorde le 
mieulx du monde, et mesmes ont les taus pass~ et sign~. 
Mais venans au poinct dexecuter, c•est toute collusion de 
15 leur coste". This stratagem was successful. The Scots 
Parliament agreed that if England invaded they would have 
insufficient means to protect the country, " ... et qu'eulx 
voian la Rayne d'angleterre mari~e au Roy despaigne ilz ne 
. . 16 h pouvent estre assez fortz sauve avolr ung malstre". T e 
Regent secured her two main objectives: not only did the 
Scots solicit her to send a delegation to Henri to persuade 
him to press ahead with the marriage but they agreed that 
if matters came to a breach between England and France the 
Scots would assist their old allies and that, "La Rayne 
' Regente se pourroi faire servir, s'il l'uy plaist, soit ala 
guerre, soit ~ la paix, des subjects dudict Royaulme, ainsy 
// que les Rays predecesseurs de la Rayne sa fille avoient 
/ 17 
accoustume". 
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These developments did not affect the Regent's 
determination to continue negotiations for the settlement 
of border grievances. The mission of Sir Robert Carnegie 
in connection with this had already been arranged as early 
as January 1557 and it was essential that it should proceed 
. . d . h E . h . . 18 even 1f only to avo1 mak1ng t e ngl1s susp1c1ous. 
. . . 
19 h h h Carnegle's 1nstruct1ons re earsed at lengt t e Scots• 
complaints against the Grahams since the summer of 1555. 
The Scots were particularly angry at the En9lish refusal 
to hand over any of the surname. This factor had so 
embittered relations between the Wardens that international 
justice was at a standstill. Last but not least, Captain 
Norton of Norham had still not paid the £20 compensation 
for his illegal occupation of the Tweed fishing which he 
had been instructed to hand over by the commissioners in 
1553. 20 The Scots were loud in their condemnation of the 
two Wardens Dacre and Wharton; all the troubles stemmed 
from " la fauvir que porte lesdict Lord Wharton et la 
n'gligence et conniiever du Lord Dacre". 
In answer to Carnegie's complaints the Council 
appointed commissioners to meet those of the Scots. 21 The 
commission deliberately predated the English declaration 
of war against the French. The government was anxious to 
placate the Scots and two of the commissioners, Westmorland 
and Tunstal, were specifically instructed to make it clear 
to them that no breach was intended on their side. 22 
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The commissioners met at Carlisle at the beginning 
of June. As expected the first issue the Scots raised was 
to demand redress in respect of the Grahams. The English, 
however, were no more prepared to hand over the Grahams 
than they had been in the previous year. In fact, the 
situation had become more serious as matters had taken a 
new turn. In March 1557, the headsmen of the Grahams on 
receiving knowledge that theirold adversary, Lord Maxwell, 
was to be reappointed to the Wardenry of the Scottish West 
March had asked licence of Dacre to meet with him. Whether 
or not the licence was issued is not known but the Grahams 
met Maxwell at Annan and patched up their old feud. Dacre 
reported that the Scots were fully aware of the likelihood 
of war and had pardoned their rebels on the West March. In 
correlation with this they were eagerly pressing for justice 
in the Graham affair. The Warden warned that if any of the 
Grahams were delivered as securityfor compensation, their kin 
would not be able to pay the fine and this would cause the whole 
23 
surname to defect to the Scots. The English commissioners 
were instructed by the Council to counteract Scottish claims 
with demands for redress of a recent raid by Annadalers on 
the English West March " ... they are willed to set fourthe 
the matter moore ernestly and to let it be the first thing 
they move at thier meating, as the Scottes have allwaies 
hitherunto pressed the case of the Greames bicaus it was 
d . ' h ' ' 24 ur1ng the t1me oft elate comm1ss1on". If the scots 
insisted, the commissioners were given the remarkable 
instruction to pay the compensation out of the Exchequer 
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rather than permit any of the Grahams to be handed over. 25 
Dacre cautioned against this arguing that it would be 
folly especially in view of the present climate of war, 
I verely can perceyve no other likelyhood in my 
simple oppynyon, but shortly it will growe to 
open warr ... it semeth therfore they wold get all 
they might, and then be at libertie to spye their 
tyme and to make warres uppon us with our owen 
money. 26 
This warning and the news that the commissioners were 
experiencing difficulties in reaching agreement with the 
Scots were interpreted as evidence of provocation. The 
commissioners were to remind the Scots that the meeting was 
agreed to by the government in order that frontier contra-
versies might be patched up by amicable agreement and new 
orders taken for the governance of the border, " ... and 
therein such temperence to be used as might serve for the 
maintenance of the peax and amitie betwene the Realmes". 
If the Scots were intent on raising other matters then it 
was evident that they were maliciously bent, 
for if there had byn nowe other things ment by 
the appointing of the commissioners but the rigoure 
and extremitie of the lawe then it had byn in vayne 
to send expresse personages to the borders for the 
onely doings of that which might well enough have byn 
don by the wardens. 27 
The fear that the Scots might use any cash the commissioners 
handed over by way of compensation for their war effort 
against England if hostilities eventually broke out led 
the Council to take a tougher line. Now the government 
stipulated that in regard to any money that might change 
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hands the commissioners were to make sure that" ... the 
delivery may goo arme in arme so as ye may allwayes receyve 
at theyre handes for so much as they shall receyve at yours 
... so as allwayes it be foreseen that they take not 
advauntage of receyveng more than they shall delyver for". 28 
No amount of argument could induce the Scots to drop 
their demands for settlement over the Graham affair. Being 
unable to conclude on the matter, the commissioners decided 
to confer with their respective sovereigns and meet again in 
mid September. The continuation of the peace was proclaimed 
29 
at Carlisle on 17 July. Officially, the peace stood but 
in reality the situation was in a state of flux. It was not 
an easy task for the commissioners to gauge the true meaning 
of the Scots towards England. The acceleration of the Scots 
raiding activities during the time of the commission 
convinced Westmorland that they were dissimulating, "I can 
do no other but verely beleve that they mynd no trueth, but 
to delay, and trifle the tyme with us, unto they be prepared 
and redy, if they may uppon a sudden to work some displeasure 
30 
unto this realme". The protestation of the Scottish 
commissioners that they wished to continue the peace is not 
easy to accept without demur. Cassillis•s willingness to 
divulge French troop movements and his boast that the Scots 
had hindered their passage should not be taken too 
seriously. 31 The Earl was not giving anything away as the 
government was already well informed of French troop land-
ings in Scotland. Cassillis•s remarks are compatible with 
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his known anti-French sympathies, but, on the other hand, 
they might simply have been a ruse to allay English 
. . . h . . 32 
susp1c1ons of Scott1s 1ntent1ons. The acute factious-
ness of Scottish politics left room for wide incompatibi-
lities between officials executing government policy and 
their views as private individuals. 
After the break-up of the meeting at Carlisle, the 
situation worsened. The Scots actively prepared for 
hostilities. They organised musters and saw to the repa-
ration of border fortresses. While Maxwell was promising 
Dacre redress for devastatory raids, the Scottish Warden 
himself was organising incursions into the English West 
March. 33 The East March was also suffering badly from 
Scottish depredations and Wharton was experiencing much 
difficulty in compelling English borderers not to act 
'extra judicia' by counter raiding in revenge. Matters 
were not helped by the fact that Lord Hume, in accordance 
. . . . h d' . . 34 w1th the Regent's 1nstruct1ons, was w1th ol 1ng JU$tlce. 
This aggression was not only confined to the land; several 
attacks had been made on En91ish fishing vessels off the 
. h 35 Scott1s coast. 
This hostility, of course, stemmed from the English 
declaration of war against the French. The Council's 
opposition to the war had fallen away when news reached 
London of Thomas Stafford's ineffectual attempt on 
Scarborough castle. Stafford with a handful of French and 
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English exiles had been set on land by two French ships 
' d 36 tak1ng troops to Scotlan . The surprise attack caught 
the tiny garrison unaware and the castle was quickly 
occupied on 28 April. Stafford 8 s hopes 'that his capture 
of the castle would be a rallying call for opponents of 
Mary's regime proved futile. His wild adventure came to 
an end when the Earl of Westrnorland,in the North on busi-
37 
ness, recaptured the castle and sent Stafford and his 
accomplices off to the Tower. 
The traditional explanation for Stafford's foolish 
attempt is that Henri was behind the fiasco. But the timing 
of the sequence of events raises a number of important 
questions which have been discussed in a recent reassess-
ment of the affair. The suggestion has been made that 
Paget, the Lord Privy Seal, was the agent provocateur 
38 behind the venture. There are reasons to believe that 
the Stafford affair was not the stroke of unexpected fortune 
to the Marian war party that historians have previously 
presumed. Noailles certainly knew nothing of the venture 
which, as he himself admitted, wrecked all that he had been 
trying to prevent, that is,English participation in the 
39 
war. The succession of events was a major puzzle to him, 
Il ne peult estre vray semblable qu'en ung mesme jour, 
ils ayent en la nouvelle de la perte dudict chasteau 
et de son recousvrement ensemble; qui me fait penser 
que c'est ung artifice, 
the effect of which would only make the Council more ready 
to accede to the war. After several interviews with the 
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Lord Privy Seal, Noailles was convinced he had arranged 
. , 
the affair, " ... la prat1que a este remise en forme par 
ceux qui ~l'avoient lors en main, et express~ment par Paget 
qui l'avoit par avant conduite, et en toutes les intelli-
d . 40 gences '1celle". 
Despite their efforts to contain the war on a single 
front by diplomatic means, which had been the reason d'etre 
of the Carlisle meeting, the Council seem· to have taken 
it for granted from the beginning that the war would have 
to be faced on two fronts and trouble could be expected from 
Scotland. Early in May 1557, Wharton and Dacre were 
summoned to London to participate in the preparation of the 
border for war. Noailles reported that both were present 
at the war Councils presided over by Pembroke in the latter's 
d . 41 lo g1ngs. At the same time, Shrewsbury was ordered to 
muster and make ready the forces within his lieutenancy. 
Captains were to be appointed and assigned to every hundred 
men so that all would be aware of their duties and be ready 
to mobilise when need required. Just how far England 
lingered behind the continent in terms of military develop-
ment can be seen in the Council's instructions to the Lord 
Lieutenant. 
, 
The government was careful to point out that 
the French in Scotland were well equipped with firearms and 
shot and Shrewsbury was to take this into consideration when 
preparing his men, "Ye shall doo well to travayle by such 
good meanes as ye may with all such as ye shall think mete 
be the furnisshing of them selfes with corselettes as many 
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as may and for the lack of corselettes with allamayne 
42 Ryvettes". Of the 600 horsemen Shrewsbury was to have 
ready, all were to carry light arms or at least staves; 
archers andbillmen as the Council recognised, " ... for the 
warres now used can stande but to very smale purpose". 43 
Despite this realistic note, it is clear from the massive 
provision made for them that the long and glorious history 
of the English longbow had by no means come to an end. 44 
The chief officers of the army included all the 
45 
northern Earls. As for the Wardens, their military 
expertise was not to be taken for granted. Pembroke and 
his advisers were to appoint four experts in military 
affairs, two each to serve with Wharton and Dacre. In fact, 
Sir James Croftes seems to have been the only adviser 
appointed. Before conferring with Wharton, Croftes was 
first directed to Shrewsbury to give his advice. Croftes 
had been convicted, tried and pardoned for his part in 
Wyatt's conspiracy. He was widely experienced in military 
affairs and had served on all the war fronts since the 
1540's. 46 The most immediate consideration was to ensure 
that the border should be in a thorough state of preparedness. 
As Shrewsbury and Westmorland pointed out, the premature 
raising of an army would be a gross error, a huge waste of 
money and supplies. The Wardens would be able to advise 
when the Scots mobilised, then with their preparations in 
order, the army could be quickly assembled and sent against 
47 them. The Council was not averse to this strategy but it 
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was unsure of the nature of the threat it was designed to 
meet, " ... it is uncerten whether they (the Scots) if they 
denounce warr woll invade with an army or not, and that it 
may bee that they woll rather onely make incursions than 
h . 48 ot erw1se". If the latter situation seemed more likely 
it was essential to provide for the security of the border 
as quickly as possible. On 4 July, order was sent out for 
the raising of 600 horse and 400 archers to strengthen the 
East and Middle Marches. These were to be ready by 
1 August; Sir Thomas Wharton who was to have command of 
the horse was despatched with £5000 for their coat and 
49 
conduct money. To protect the Iceland fishing fleet, a 
convoy of fifteen ships was sent north under the Vice 
Admiral, Sir John Clere. 50 
The Council were still unsure of Scottish intentions 
and whether or not to interpret the intensification of 
cross border raiding by the Scots as a covert declaration 
of war. Devon seamen, it appears, had already anticipated 
hostilities and had begun to attack Scottish merchant 
vessels. In early July, two ships were captured laden 
with salt and wines. On 29 July, the Council ordered their 
restoration as there was no valid reason for their capture, 
" ... but only a pretence of warre betwene this realme and 
Scotlande". The following day, this order was counter-
manded, the ships and goods were to be retained because 
" ... there have byn diverse invodes made of late upon the 
Borders of this realme by the Scottes, which was not before 
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51 
understanded". The change of opinion stemmed from news 
received from Wharton and Croftes that the Scots had 
escalated their raiding activities, " ... the Scots nyghtly 
and dayly mayketh incursions ... ther haith ben great 
damange don, wherby the bordors is much wasted ... and now 
ther corne•s redye to be gotten is in great danger to be 
d . d 52 1stroye ". The Scots, Wharton reported, were being · 
continually supplied by small vessels passing to and fro 
from France. The Regent and the Earl of Huntly were on the 
border, holding musters in the Scottish East March, and the 
French had begun to fortify Eyemouth in direct contravention 
of the Boulogne and Norham treaties. Such activities 
made the Warden intensely suspicious, " ... by all 
intelligence that I can learne they are about a great 
enterprise, to be don hastely with the lyght of this 
53 
mone". The news was taken by the government as a decla-
ration of war, the Scots were to be regarded as enemies and 
their ships lawful prize. Sir John Clere was ordered to 
intercept Scottish ships that were reported to be trans-
porting heavy artillery from Leith for an attack against 
Berwick. Additional ships were to be commandeered from 
Newcastle and Hull to enlarge Clere's fleet and an extra 
thousand troops were to be levied in the North Riding. 
The J.P.s and gentry of Northumberland were ordered to be 
more forthcoming in defending the East and Middle Marches~4 
Wharton's fear of imminent danger during the latter 
half of July had prompted him to write to Tunstal to send 
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the Bishopric levies to fulfil their traditional role in 
border defence. The Warden's appeals sparked off what 
might have grown into a long controversy. ·TUns tal, 
unyielding in maintaining the Palatine's privileges, 
insisted that the Bishopric levies were only to be mobi-
lised when the enemy invaded. After having consulted with 
the J.P.s, the Bishop argued that" ... the cuntrey dothe 
denye lyeng in guarysons to tary the comynge of th'enemye 
but whensoever th'enemye doth invade the realme, they will, 
uppon warnyng, be reddy to go to repulse him of theire owne 
coste". 55 There the matter rested as the Scots crossed the 
border in large numbers on 5 August; the following day, 
Sir Henry Percy reported that 600 Bishopric men were to go 
to Berwick, and the Bishop himself was to see them mustered 
at 'Gateshead Beacon' . 56 The •invasion• was a force of 
some 3,000 horse and foot led by Lords James and Robert, 
illigitimate sons of James V and the Warden, Lord Hume. 
They crossed into the East March with, it seems, the ori-
ginal intention of laying siege to Ford castle. However, 
after burning and pillaging in Glendale, they retreated. 
The forces of the Wardenry and Berwick garrison under 
Sir Henry Percy retaliated by a destructive raid into the 
57 Merse. News of the Scottish incursion was, at first, 
received with consternation in London but, when the true 
nature of the raid was ascertained, Westmorland was 
instructed to warn Shrewsbury to be more accurate about 
the strength of Scottish raids, " ... you may advertise our 
cousyn of Shrewsbury to take suche ordre that neither their 
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be slackness used in advertising of danger present or 
manifestly imminent, neither advertisment of great danger 
.. h . 58 h . h geven w1t out Just cause". T e Counc1l seems to ave 
been angry that in the light of information from the border · 
" wich we nowe perceyve was more sodayn and full of more 
terror than the case required ... hath byn cause of sum 
troble to owr subjectes and to our self thoccasion of 
59 
chardge not necessarye". The Bishopric levies were 
ordered to return and the levying of 1,000 North Riding men 
was cancelled. Likewise, requests to Philip to send ships 
60 to the North East coast were revoked. Nevertheless, 
caution and a ready state of preparedness were still the 
watchwords. The North Riding men were to go to the Earl 
of Northumberland when called and the Council, concerned 
about the lack of men equipped with firearms, decided to 
raise 300 arquebusiers under Cuthbert Vaughn to be sent to 
61 the border. 
Small scale raids and invasion scares continued. 
Throughout August, intelligence reports stated that the 
Scots were planning to besiege Norham and Wark. The Regent 
and D'Oysel's continued residence at Dunbar and Eyemouth 
62 gave substance to these reports. The Scots seem to have 
been encouraged by their success against Sir John Clere. 
The latter had been at Berwick on 6 August in consultation 
with Wharton and Northumberland. There, it was agreed 
that his small fleet should, " ... maike a shew in the fryth 
to gyve terrour to such pyrattes as lye there", and then 
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d d . h' h 63 procee to escort the Icelan f1s 1ng fleet orne. on 
Wednesday 11 August, the fleet entered Kirkwall in Orkney 
and set fire to the town but Clere's men failed to capture 
the castle. On 13 August, they tried to take the Bishop's 
palace but were repulsed by a force of some 3,000 Scots. 
In the rout Clere and 100 of his men were drowned or 
killed. 64 Despite the fleet's instructions to make diver-
sionary pillaging expeditions on the Scottish coast the 
ordinary rules of warfare were not to stand in the way of 
the Queen's religious scruples. Those of Clere's men who 
had taken part in robbing and desecrating churches and 
religious houses in Scotland were to be examined and the 
. . h d 65 gu1l ty pun1s e . Despite the uncertain nature of the 
Scottish menace, the Lord Lieutenant remained at York but 
kept in constant touch with Westmorland at Kirby Moorside, 
Northumberland at Alnwick and Wharton at Berwick. 
Northumberland argued that the army should be sent forward. 
Shrewsbury opposed this, as he informed the Council, on the 
grounds of finance and supply 
... wantyng money, I can do nothyng to any effecte, 
be ye necessite never so grett : And yf, accordyng 
to my L of northumberland's letter, I shuld rase 
th' ole force, & carry them forwards, having neather 
money nor wittalls to relyeffe them I shuld therby 
dryve the people, as I fere rather to muteny and 
grudge, then, otherwyse to retene them wyllng to 
serve. 66 
Westmorland was equally anxious to set forward with the 
Yorkshire and Bishopric levies, this, he urged, should be 
accomplished" ... streight way never regarding the lake of 
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money". Westmorland recommended to shrewsbury that the 
cash problem would be no impediment if the latter brought 
with him, ", .. all the worshipfull and wealthiest of the 
countrie, so that every man of worshipe may have the 
condution and guyding of his owne freinds and tenants". 
In this manner the Earl suggested that each gentleman in 
case of necessity could help to relieve his own company. 
Westmorland's reasoning behind his suggestion is a percep-
tive comment on the strength of the bonds of tenant 
loyalty, " ... I t~ink, the herts of the people is suche 
that they woll saner be persuaded by ther owne naturall 
lords & maisters, and more willinglie serve under theym 
h . h 67 Wh h for love ten w1t straungers for monye". enS rewsbury 
compromised and instructed Westmorland to proceed to 
Newcastle and no further north, the latter protested not 
for any considerations of security but because he feared 
his honour would be tarnished, " ... the countrie of 
Northumberland wold think I durst not come to ther releiff; 
and the Scotts therby emboldened thinking I was affrayed of 
theym". Above all, he feared his reputation vis ~ vis 
CassillisJ the present commander of the Scottish troops, 
would be sullied as the Earl was his personal enemy. 68 
This important concept of honour was firmly enshrined 
in the knightly values of war. Answering the call to arms 
was a traditional means of gaining honour as was the 
acceptance of such semi-military posts as the Wardenship: 
"···I heare you ar come to the Borders to winne honour", 
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wrote Croftes to Rutland upon the latter's appointment as 
Warden. 69 The Tudor ruling class still moved in a world 
of chivalry and knight-errantry epitomised in the often 
read courtly romances and the vigorous knightly exercises 
of the joust and tiltyard. Prowess in arms was an 
important attribute of nobility. War for the aristocracy 
meant military commands and the exercise of patronage in 
the appointment of lesser officers as well as the rewards 
and glory that accrued from success in the field. These 
factors were positive elements in encouraging the northern 
nobility especially young peers such as Northumberland and 
Westmorland to take up posts in defending the border against 
the Scots. They also explain why Shrewsbury , an elder and 
more cautious statesman with a respectable but not distin-
guished military career behind him,should have difficulty 
in restraining their precipitous military ardour. 
In the face of this disagreement over tactics, 
Sir James Croftes was sent to the Council in late August 
to present the opinions of the northern commanders. The 
decision of the Council was a complete vindication of 
Shrewsbury's judgement of the situation. As for the 
suggestion that an army should be raised immediately and 
sent to the border, the Council instructed that the Lord 
Lieutenant, '' ... shall use and doo and cause to be doune, 
as he shall thinke good by his discretion and as the force 
of thennymye and other circumstances shall requyre". 70 As 
soon as Croftes was back from London he carried news of 
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the council's decision to Northumberland and Westmorland. 
To make the matter entirely clear, a conference was 
arranged at the Neville castle of Brancepeth in early 
September. In line with Shrewsbury's earlier recommend-
ations, it was decided not to assemble the army, since the 
main contingents were in Lancashire, Cheshire and Derby-
shire and it would take at least three weeks for them to 
reach the border. Coupled with this was the shortage of 
victuals as the harvest had not yet fully been gathered 
in. This would make it impossible to maintain an army in 
the field for any length of time. Another factor to be 
considered was that the campaigning season would soon be 
over and aggression from the Scots on a large scale would 
be unlikely. It was also argued that raising an army might 
provoke the Scots unnecessarily. This was an important 
consideration, Westmorland in July had suggested that the 
warlike preparations of one side were simply escalating 
those of the other. After perusing Wharton's reports of 
the Scots incursions, the Earl poignantly remarked, "I 
beleve if the lord wharton dyd likewise remembre what 
occasion the Scots have to mistrust us, by our buyldings, 
and drawing of souldiours to our frounters he wold not 
'd h ' 71 cons1 er t e matter so straungelle". 
As an alternative to the army the conference decided 
that for the safety of the border strong garrisons should 
be laid, but their size and disposition 
were to be left to the discretion of the Wardens. The 
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conference also urged the Council to take further order 
for the safety of fishing vessels, since the Scots and 
French were daily capturing ships that now went unprotected 
since the defeat of Clere. Newcastle was furnishing 
eleven ships for the royal service at the town's expense 
and would agree to send eleven more if the government was 
willing to foot the bi11. 72 
The conference at Brancepeth had no sooner ended 
when a stream of intelligence reports, which continued 
throughout September, spoke of the coming forward of the 
Scottish army and warned that the Regent and D'Oysel had 
every intention of attempting to besiege Berwick. Eure and 
Wharton confidently reported that the Scots had 3,000 
arquebusiers and were encouraged by the news that the 
E 1 . h dl'd . d bl 73 ng lS not lnten to assem e an army. The neces-
sity of the French to put pressure on England through 
Scotland was more needful than ever. By late August, news 
had probably reached Scotland of the disastrous defeat of 
the French by Philip's army at St Quentin. Throughout 
September, the French circulated ridiculous rumours that 
the Regent's army of some 40,000 troops had captured 
several English border fortresses including Berwick. 74 
On 20 September, the Council instructed Shrewsbury 
to go to Newcastle with 4,000 men, but despite this order his 
basic instructions remained unchanged, "Ye shall not nede 
to make any full assemblie of the armie oneless they sholde 
go abowt with theyr mayne power to invade the realme". 
274 
A strong emphasis was to be laid on the accuracy of 
intelligence reports : "Your lordship allso sholde in such 
a weighty caase be thoroughly advertysed of the very 
certaynetie thereof ... before any great stirre were 
75 
made". Shrewsbury reached Newcastle on or before 
2 October. Four days later, he wrote that the Scots army 
was expected to cross the border at any day but their 
elusiveness was becoming a byword. With some understate-
ment, the lieutenant remarked to Northumberland " they 
have dyvers tymes this yeare illudyd us with their 
' 76 
apperences of settforwerds". Shrewsbury had taken muster 
of the forces of the Wardenry and remained in Newcastle 
with his force. All the garrisons were well supplied and 
furnished with 200 men in Wark, 320 in Norham and 1,600 in 
Berwick besides the labourers on the fortifications. To 
reinforce the Wardenry levies, 600 additional horse and 
400 foot were led by Lord Talbot. The latter: " laye 
scatteryd abrode in the vylliages from Morpeth forwards; 
dowting lest, lying together, they shulde waste the countrey, 
77 & wante vytells". The Scots were impeded not only by 
dissension among themselves and the appalling weather but 
also the extent of English preparedness, as Shrewsbury 
himself admitted, 
I think it may now come to passe, that consyderynge 
the countenans of our force & preparacon, they may 
now chaunge ther purpose, to lye at ye defence of 
ther owen contrey, then, otherwyse to invade till the 
light of the mone be wastyd; which if they do, the 
stryffe shalbe which of us may contynue longest 78 together for the tyme of yeare & wante of vyctualles. 
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Intelligence reports confirmed the Earl's conviction: 
the presence of the English navy off the east coast of 
Scotland had persuaded many Scots to desert from their 
army to go .·to protect their own lands. 79 The Regent 
and the Scottish army had come as far as Kelso on 
18 October. It was there that the Scots nobility refused 
to proceed any further. The Regent" ••• raged and reprievid 
them of theire promyses, whiche was to invaide and annoye 
England •.• arguments grewe great betwene them, wherewith 
she sorrowed, and wepp oppenlye ... Docye in great hevynes 
' 80 
wished hymself in Fraunce". The French King's lieutenant 
had attempted to lead the others on by taking some ordnance 
and the French contingents across the Tweed but there were 
too few French troops in Scotland to conduct an independent 
campaign. Apart from a minor skirmish before Wark, D'Oysel's 
men achieved little except to incite the nobility further 
. h . . b hm 81 aga1nst t e 1rasc1 le Frenc an. The refusal of the 
Scots to invade England at the behest of the French was a 
turning point in the campaign of 1557 but it was also an 
event of much more significance in the relationship between 
the Scottish Regent and nobility. In this major sign of 
opposition lay the beginnings of the Scottish revolution 
against France and Rome. Francophobia became an increas-
ingly important element in the minds of the Scottish 
nobility. When the Earl of Huntly agreed with the Regent 
and her invasion plans, "••. the others axed playnely 
82 
wheather he wolde be a Skottsman or a Frennsheman". It 
was in late 1557 that the leading Protestant nobles signed 
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an agreement, the first 'band' of the •congregation of 
Christ• which pledged to work for the establishment of the 
reformed religion in Scotland. The leaders of the Scots 
were well aware of the extent of English preparations and 
they had no wish to repeat another disastrous defeat on a 
par with Flodden or Pinkie. 
The threat of a large scale Scottish attack averted, 
Shrewsbury paid off the forces that had accompanied him to 
Newcastle and returned to York. The worsening weather 
heralding the onset of the northern winter made any new 
attack by the Scots unlikely. It also prevented any reta-
liation on the part of the English forces yet remaining, 
" ... the same thing which was impedyment to the Scots in ther 
interpryse is like to be lett to the doing of eny great matter 
on our part; both the dark nyghts, the shor.t dayes, & the 
highe waters, ther having this nyght past fallen a great 
reyne". 83 Minor engagements continued between the two 
sides, raid being followed by counter raid. The Earl of 
Northumberland repeatedly asked for reinforcements to deal 
with the situation. He justified his pleas by lengthy 
memoranda pointing to the presence of strong Scottish border 
garrisons, especially at Kelso and Eyemouth. The French and 
Scots, he argued, were well prepared and provisioned, " 
they have not onelie therby kept there own frontiers 
plenished to the uttermost but have destroyed and laid 
waste agreate parte of the borders of this realme". To 
ensure the adequate security of the border the Scots were 
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" eyther to be scourged with armyes or with great 
garysons for frontier war or bothe. And this present yeare 
the tyme bf armys being past there is no waie to be used 
84 but with frontier warr and great garysones". This was 
substantially Shrewsbury's argument but where the opinion 
of the two men differed was upon the numbers of the troops 
to be deployed. In late December 1557, excluding the forces 
at Berwick, the border garrisons numbered about 1,150 men 
serving under local gentry captains. These were scattered 
in bands of hundreds and fifties over the East and Middle 
85 Marches. Northumberland maintained that frontier garri-
sons involving some 2,500 men were essential, " ... without 
which nomber the places on the frontiers cannot be so 
furnyshed , but that some most necessary places on the 
frontiers shalbe leff cleane destitute oythers else the 
garrysons of so small nombers and strength they shall never 
b . . 86 e 1n savet1e". The government could expect the Warden 
to take an alarmist view of the situation; the danger lay 
when military commanders failed to see a forthcoming threat 
or underestimated its gravity. The Wardenry levies coupled 
with the forces in garrison would seem at first sight 
adequate defence and the council had intended arranging 
the matter of winter garrisons when Westmorland and 
Shrewsbury carne to London, but they acceded to Northurnber-
land's request to reinforce the border with an additional 
87 levy of 1,000 men. Despite Shrewsbury's protests his 
advice was ignored and the Earl was instructed to proceed 
with the levying of the men. 
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It was something of a sour note to the end of 
Shrewsbury's lieutenancy. The Earl had conducted a 
successf~l campaign in the face of many difficulties. 
There were considerable logistic problems involved in 
supplying mobilised troops, especially in an economy where 
the provisions market was to a large extent a regional one. 
The provisioning of the border with adequate food and 
supplies for large numbers of troops was a major headache 
for the government and stretched the organising ability of 
Tudor administrators to the limit. Consecutive bad 
harvests worsened,the victualling problem. That of 1556 
was exceptionally poor and Shrewsbury was warned at the 
beginning of his lieutenancy not to expect any large 
supplies from the South. As the Council explained "There 
is as good store of those things in those partes as in 
any other place of the Realme, the skarsitie being general! 
h . 88 at t 1s tyme". After the declaration of war against the 
French the Council again stressed the unlikelihood of 
sending supplies as it was possible that all 
available food stocks might have to be conserved to victual 
an army to repulse any French invasion. The defeats of the 
French put paid to any invasion from that quarter. The 
increasing threat from Scotland, however, made the victual!-
ing of the northern holds an urgent necessity in preparation 
for any eventual recourse to an army. Sea transport was the 
most convenient method for the provisioning of Berwick and 
Newcastle which were the major supply bases. But because of 
the activities of Scottish privateers, the merchants 
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however, were reluctant to accept the risk the sea passage 
involved. In October 1557, John Abingdon, the Surveyor of 
the Victuals in the North, urged Shrewsbury to hasten the 
sailing of the victual ships from the Tyne, reporting that 
merchants at Newcastle were insisting that for security 
reasons the corn be carried overland to Berwick 
... wich is impossible to do, for all the cariages 
betwen York & Newcastell will not serve that torne 
... I desyre yor L that the shippes may be compellid 
to come awaye; whose lange lyenge there, as I am 
enformed, hath almoste spilte all the grayne that 
they carye. 89 
The problem of the shortage of carts was especially acute 
as there was no alternative but to make use of overland 
90 
routes when supplying the garrisons of Wark and Norham. 
Besides the lack of carts, there was also an apparent short-
age of the wherewithal to draw them. When in August 
Shrewsbury informed the Council that the 140 horses 
required to transport ordnance could not be found in 
Northumberland, the Council roundly told the Earl to 
consider the claim " ..• that such a countrie as that is, 
so thoroughly occupied with telage and husbandrie cannot be 
without a farre greater number of horsses", was stuff and 
nonsense and the inhabitants were to supply the horses 
h . h 91 fort Wlt . 
The increasing prospect that an army would be 
assembled persuaded the government to send large supplies 
of victuals to Berwick ln August 1557. The Council 
stressed the necessity of using them with care and prudence 
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lest they be expended before the main army was called up. 
The government feared that the army might have to retire 
before the enemy if it lacked supplies. It proved 
impossible to supply all the needs of the army from the 
southern regions of the realm and the lieutenant was 
instructed to mobilise the efforts of the local inhabitants 
" ... ye must cause the countrie to followe the arrnie with 
victuals". 92 Despite the many difficulties, Abingdon 
reported in August that Berwick, Norham and Wark were all 
well victualled and he proudly boasted that if Shrewsbury 
came with 10,000 men he would be able to provide for them. 
Ironically enough, this was because, as the quartermaster 
himself admitted, many of the men had brought their own 
supplies. Perhaps they had foreseen a shortage of victuals, 
or, as Abingdon hinted, their prudent foresight might have 
been dictated by the small confidence the men placed in the 
quality of official rations. This was especially true of 
one of the staple foods, fish, as an embarrassed Abingdon 
complained to Treasurer Winchester, 
... moche of it was so broken in peces that there was 
no tale to be taken of yt, and the beste of yt will 
not holde the takinge upe by the tayle, at the sight 
wherof the souldiers and men of the towne did moche 
grudge and said that all refuse victuelles were 
alwayes sent hither ... I wolde wishe that men shulde 
truste more to the Kinges provisions. 93 
The prevailing shortage of foodstuffs also contri-
buted to the sharp rise in prices. 94 At the conference of 
Brancepeth, the commanders informed the Council that owing 
to the current dearth it was impossible for the soldiers 
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to live off their present daily wages. The once attractive 
enough rate of 6d per day for footmen and 9d for horsemen 
had become a pittance through inflation and high prices. 
To enable the men to cope with the increased cost of living 
they asked that their wages be raised to 8d and 12d per day 
respectively, or, as an alternative, they might be allowed 
an additional sum on pay days. 95 This was accepted by the 
government and a new schedule of rates was issued which 
} 
increased the soldiers pay to the amount the conference 
recommended. The Council was careful to provide for any 
subsequent fall in prices by stressing that the increase 
was not to be regarded as a permanent wage rise but as a 
ties 96 
reward 'of her Ma meer lyberalyty'. The Council in 
order to combat the problem of men who were not properly 
furnished with weapons and armour decided to make the 
allowance conditional, and so the stipulation was made 
that each man claiming the increase must be sufficiently 
. d . h h' 97 equ1ppe w1t 1s own weapons. 
These problems give us an idea of the sort of diffi-
culties Shrewsbury faced. They illustrate the minute 
attention to detail that was a crucial factor in the success 
of the campaign. Shrewsbury remained in close correspondence 
with the leading commanders who seem to have cooperated 
willingly with him. Besides taking advice on military 
affairs from Croftes, the Earl leaned heavily on the long 
border experience of Lord Wharton as well as another senior 
expert, Cuthbert Tunstal. The Bishop, now in his eighties, 
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was still very active in the service of the Crown, and 
. h . 98 h1s valued counsel was soug ton many occas1ons. 
At every stage of the campaign, Shrewsbury was 
closely supervised by the government which was determined 
to retain control over its resources and assess the true 
accuracy of the situation before any major decisions were 
made. The great distance between the field of operations 
and the seat of the government, of course, meant that 
Shrewsb~ry was given considerable latitude to use the wide 
powers that the commission of lieutenancy conveyed to act 
as the train of events demanded. The Council repeatedly 
' urged him to make sure of the Scots intentions before the 
main army was mobilised. The large sums expended on spies 
and informers bear eloquent testimony to the lieutenant's 
painstaking efforts to evaluate the military situation 
correctly. 99 He would not allow himself to be precipitated 
into action by inexperienced military hot heads such as 
Westmorland and Northumberland, a course which would have 
cost the government dearly. In the end, Shrewsbury's 
careful parsimony prevailed, ensuring that the government 
reacted sensibly and intelligently to the situation. 
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March Politics 1557-1558 ' 
The most outstanding political change on the border 
during the latter half of Mary's reign was the re-erection 
of the Earldom of Northumberland. The restoration of the 
Percy Earls stemmed directly from developments in the 
internal politics of the border as well as being a reaction 
to the increased threat from Scotland. Of great signifi-
cance were the ramifications of the dispute between the 
Herons and the Carrs over the castle and manor of Ford. 
Thomas Carr possessed the Lordship of Ford situated 
in the East March by right of his wife Elizabeth, the niece 
and heir general of Sir William Heron of Ford. George Heron 
of Chipchase also claimed Ford as one of the lateral 
d d . . . 100 d h d d escen ants of S1r W1ll1am Heron. Bloc a alrea y 
been spilt in the feud in 1549 when one Ralph Carr was 
101 
murdered; the Forsters were suspected. A report on the 
border in 1552 urged that the dispute be settled before more 
bloodshed ensued from rival factions supporting each party, 
" ... in this controversie many of the gentlemen of 
Northumberland be affected and favorable to one side or the 
th " 102 o er . The feud took a new turn when, on 27 March 1557, 
backed by George Heron a small party of twenty men of the 
Berwick garrison led by one of the constables, John Dixon, 
forcibly entered Ford and ejected the servants of Thomas 
Carr. The following day, another party which included 
Ralph Grey of Chillingham, the Deputy Warden of the East 
March, Giles Heron, Treasurer of Berwick - George Heron's 
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brother and Robert Barrow, the Mayor of Berwick, were 
attacked on their way to Ford by a small party of the Carrs. 
The Mayor and Treasurer of Berwick were slain and several 
h d d . d 103 . h ot ers were woun e or kllle . The repercuss1ons of t e 
'affray• at Ford were immediately apparent. On 2 April, 
the Sheriff and J.P.s of Northumberland wrote to Wharton 
and demanded his intervention. They informed the Council 
that since the event, 
... almoste no persone Rydethe unarmed but as suerlye 
uppon his garde as if he rode against the enemye of 
Scotland, whose doinges at this present well considered 
we have god knoweth lytle nede of anye cyville or 
domestyque devision or desencon amonges our selves ... 
this hundrethe yeres forepassed never happed there so 
perilous a sede of malicesid dissention and hateredd 
to be sowen in this contrey as is presentlye in plant-
ing and like to take rote if the same be not hustely 
mett with ... the fear wee have most honourable good 
lords of further or more bloodshede betwixt the said 
parties is more then any our wryting can express. 104 
The session which had been convened at Morpeth to take bonds 
of the two sides to keep the peace was adjourned because of 
the appearance of Sir John Forster, the Deputy Warden of 
the Middle March, and George Heron with 250 men, " ... in 
105 forceable and warlyke apparence of armor and weapon". 
The Justices were unable in the face of the armed antagonists 
to deal with the situation. The warden, therefore, took 
bonds of George Heron and his two deputies, Sir John Forster 
and Ralph Grey. The Carrs and their allies, however, 
refused to appear. The latter, it seems, felt that Wharton 
was deeply implicated with their enemies. It was difficult 
to think otherwise since two of the Herons• main protagonists 
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were Wharton's chief under-officers. Some of the Carrs 
had fled across the border to their kinsfolk in Scotland,and 
the rest placed themselves under the protection of the 
local Justices, one of whom, Cuthbert Horselyp was related 
to Thomas Carr, " ... my kynsemen towhom I am and owe to be 
a frynd in that I lawfullie maye". This affinity only led 
the Herons and their supporters to accuse the Sheriff and 
b . h 106 . h 'd J.P.s of e1ng of t e Carrs' party. W1th eac s1 e 
accusing the traditional administrators of justice of being 
partisan in their quarrelp it was clear that the matter 
would be irreconcilable by the ordinary processes of the 
law. In early April, a powerful commission consisting of 
the Earls of Shrewsbury and Westmorland and the Bishop of 
Durham was appointed to settle the affair. The Council 
instructed that Ford was to return to whose hands it had 
been in for the last three years or the matter was to be 
settled in Chancery. Attempts at arbitration were unsuccess-
ful and, in May 1557, the two sides were called before the 
. 107 h h . . counc11. T e outcome of t e1r appearance 1s unknown 
but the matter was by no means concluded. 108 
The dispute had come at a particularly awkward time 
for the government, hence the rapidity with which the Council 
acted in order to reconcile the two sides. As the Sheriff 
and J.P.s pointed out, the dissension between the gentry 
of the East and Middle Marches might jeopardise the war 
effort against Scotland, should hostilities break out. 
The dispute seriously weakened the government's confidence 
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in Wharton. His covert participation in the feud had 
compromised any theoretic neutrality he was supposed to 
maintain: 109 In vain, the Warden protested his innocence 
in the affair to Shrewsbury and the Council, "· .. I do 
assure yor L of theire unlawful! doing, or theire unlawful! 
assemblies, or any unlawful! acte, I was not of knowledge, 
nor am contented therwith". 110 Wharton, after. attending 
the meetings of the commissioners appointed to deal with 
the dispute at Ford, became increasingly aware of the tide 
of feeling rising against him. On 5 May, he wrote to the 
King and Queen complaining of" sundry conspiracies ... 
devised against me by private subjectes in Northumbland", 
and asked that his service be considered and the matter 
investigated: "I most humbly beseche your hiynnesses to 
commande tryall and accompte to be taken of my servyce and 
h . . . 111 of t e consp1rac1es aga1nst me". On 3 June, he was 
begging Shrewsbury to be his 'good lord', gloomily writing 
"I have small cause in thes partes of comford, except in 
112 their Highnes favor". 
The crucial factor accounting for the removal of 
Wharton from his position of the East and Middle Marches 
was "thobstinat ill demeanor of sundry northumberland men" 
who, despite several incursions by the Scots, had ignored 
Wharton's summons. 113 The increasingly refractory behaviour 
of the Northumberland gentry was evident not only in their 
opposition to the Warden but in their dissension over the 
Ford dispute. The affair had served to highlight Wharton's 
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contentious nature and inability to cooperate,with a broad 
section of the Northumberland gentry. Wharton was regarded 
as· a 'parvenu', one who had clim~ed to success over the 
shoulders of the great northern families. He owed his rise 
to wealth and station through service to the Crown. 
Wharton's origins lay in the minor gentry of Cumberland, 
he was a newcomer to Northumberland society, for the bulk -of 
his lands were situated in Westmorland and in north west 
Yorkshire. This lack of any landed interest in the East 
and Middle Marches forced Wharton to rely on the good will 
and cooperation of the local landowning classes to provide 
the manpower for border exercises. This was something they 
were increasingly unwilling to do. This tendency was one 
of the main considerations that urged the Queen to restore 
the power of the Percies in the marches, a development which 
made Wharton's eclipse final. 
On 30 April 1557, Thomas Percy was created Baron 
Percy, and, a day later, Earl of Northumberland, with the 
provision that failing heirs male of his own body, the 
114 title was to devolve on his brother, Sir Henry. 
Thomas Percy's change of fortune at the age of 29 was abrupt 
and sudden. After the attainder and execution of his father, 
Sir Thomas Percy, in 1537, for his involvement in the 
Pilgrimage of Grace, the boy had been placed together with his 
brother Henry in the care of Sir Thomas Tempest, a Yorkshire 
squire. 115 No details are subsequently known of their fate 
until March 1549 when Thomas was restored in the blood; 
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this permitted him to inherit his mother's property and 
that of other branches of his family. 116 In September 
1551, he and his brother Henry were granted an annuity of 
£66 out of the manor of Prudhoe. The following year, Thomas 
received four manors in Northumberland worth ~106 yearly. 
These, Langley, Swinhoe, Newham and Ellingham were, like 
. . 117 
Prudhoe,former Percy possess1ons. In 1555/6, a displite 
arose between the two Percy brothers and Thomas Carey, 
Marshal of Berwick, over the ownership of Prudhoe castle. 
The Council ordered Carey to leave them in peaceful 
possession and pay the elder brother £20 in compensation. 118 
On 16 August 1557, the whole of his uncle's huge 
inheritance was made over to him. This was mainly made up 
of a long list of manors worth an impressive £3,077 a 
119 year. 
During the first three years of the reign there was 
no indication that Mary would restore the power of the 
Percies. If it was simply nostalgia stemming from her 
predilection for an old catholic family that had suffered 
an abrupt reversal of fortune during the reign of her 
father, one cannot easily explain the lapse of time. Both 
the Howards and Courtenays who were ruthlessly destroyed 
by Henry were quickly reinstated by the new Queen very 
. h ' 120 . early on 1n t e re1gn. Efforts were not lack1ng on 
behalf of Thomas. In November 1555, the Dowager Countess 
of Northumberland petitioned the Queen for the restoration 
of her nephew. Despite Mary's •verie good and 
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comfortable words', the petition was not directly success-
ful in its aims although in the following month the 
Dowager was granted former Percy lands in Yorkshire worth 
121 £322 per year. 
The timing of the Percy restoration, in particular 
so soon after Stafford's fiasco at Scarborough, has leq 
Percy biographers to assume that Thomas was responsible 
for the capture of the castle. Both well known biographers 
of the family affirm the Percy's single handed capture of 
122 Scarborough. The origin of the story may have begun 
as a clever surmise of Bishop Percy writing at the turn 
h . h 123 . of t e n1neteent century. There 1s not a shred of 
evidence to prove direct Percy involvement at Scarborough. 
This said, there is no reason to suppose that the two 
brothers might not have aided Westmorland. The proclam-
ation againstStaffordafter his apprehension ascribed the 
success of his defeat to" ... the Erle of Westmorlande, 
and other noblemen and gentillmen, good subjectes of those 
124 partes". 
On 2 August 1557,the Earl was appointed joint 
Warden with Wharton of the East March and Captain of the 
town of Berwick. A week later, these offices were 
conferred on the Earl alone to which were added the 
Wardenry of the Middle March and the Keeperships of the 
two dales. 125 The Council hoped that the lustre of the 
Percy name might be a focus for unity and that the Earl 
might exercise sufficient influence to weld together the 
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discordant elements in Northumberland in an effort to 
maintain the security of the marches intact. The appoint-
rnent of the Earl, the Council stated, was a consequence of 
the •untowardnes of the northurnberlande men•. These were 
not only dilatory in rising to the fray to repulse 
Scottish incursions, they were also making difficulties 
over supplying draught animals and carts for Shrewsbury's 
. . . 126 . 
rn111tary preparat1ons. Of paramount 1rnportance were 
the Earl's vast estates in Northumberland, Cumberland and 
Yorkshire which contained the manpower to provide a basis 
for frontier defence and perhaps form the nucleus of an 
127 
army royal if such an expedient was thought necessary. 
The placing of these estates under a single landlord brought 
coherence and made for a more effective chain of command. 
The Earl played a prominent role in the defence of the 
border during 1557/8. He and his brother, Sir Henry, 
conducted small scale raids against the Scots. Besides, 
the Earl played an important part in the administration of 
the campaign of 1557. All the warrants for the payments 
of the extraordinary bands of horse and foot were signed by 
h . 128 liD. 
During the hostilities with Scotland, the Earl was 
not above using his office to weaken the position of the 
enemies of his house. This is particularly apparent in the 
case of the Forsters. The dominant member of the family 
was Sir John Forster, the second son of Sir Thomas Forster 
of Adderstone who had been a prominent member of the Crown 
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party in Northumberland during the reign of Henry VIII. 
With the appointment of the Earl as Warden, Forster lost 
his position as Deputy Warden of the Middle March that he 
had held under his brother in law, Lord Wharton. The Earl 
replaced him with his own brother in law, Francis 
Slingsby. 129 In December 1557, the Earl defended himself 
for having removed Sir John's brother, Roland, from the 
Captaincy of Wark. The Earl accused him of negligence: 
"I wold be lathe a man of his service shuld have the 
keapinge of such a place as is the principal keye of that 
frontier". Forster was also placed under virtual house 
arrest at Alnwick. As for the Council's retort that they 
had received reports that Forster had served well on the 
border, Northumberland claimed that he had evidence to the 
contrary. 130 The Earl placed Slingsby in the Captaincy, 
a decision which was accepted by the Council, but, since 
they could discern no concrete evidence of Forster's rnis-
h . d h. 131 management, t e Earl was 1nstructe to favour 1m. 
Another opportunity fell the Earl's way to attack 
the Forsters. This was the latest episode in the dispute 
between the Herons and the Carrs over the possession of the 
F d 132 or . In January 1558, Thomas Carr, the Marshall of 
Berwick, was murdered. On 31 January, the Council instructed 
the Earl to investigate the affair and bring the guilty to 
justice. 133 George Heron and Richard Lisle seem to have 
been the chief suspects. However, when the Council 
received the news that Northumberland and Westmorland were 
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to call Sir John Forster to Newcastle for questioning in 
connection with the murder, they were instructed not to 
mention the Carr affair unless they had positive evidence 
of Forster's involvement, as the latter was " ... a man 
of great servyce on the Borders and dyd notably well nowe 
of late". 134 The long drawn out dispute over Ford was by 
b h t d 135 no means roug t o an en . What this dispute 
so far had proved was that there were clearly limits to 
just how far the government would allow the Earl to use 
the power of his office to legitimise the pursuit of a 
personal feud. 
Forster's ally, Wharton, although deprived of the 
two Wardenries, was still left in charge of the town and 
castle of Berwick, a position from which he soon asked to 
be relieved. The Council was unwilling to consider his 
request because of the Scottish situation but they did 
agree to Wharton's request that Lord Eure be sent to aid 
h . . 136 E · · be 1m at Berwlck. ure was at Berw1ck 1n early Septem r 
whereupon Wharton recommended him for the Captaincy. 137 
As soon as the invasion threat of the Scots was lifted, 
the government accepted Wharton's advice and, on 
14 December 1557, Eure was appointed Captain of the town 
and castle. 138 Eure was instructed to confer with Wharton, 
" ... being of greate experience by long contynuance of 
service, towching his good advise and counsaill for the 
139 better government of that chardge". Wharton's long 
official career was at an end although he still served the 
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early Elizabethan government in an advisory capacity. In 
many ways he had seen events turn full circle. His rise 
had been at the expense of the great border magnates, now 
he was the victim of the short Marian revival of their 
power. 
Despite the fact that the Captaincy of Berwick 
eluded him, the Earl still persisted in his attempts to 
broaden the basis of Percy power. He appointed his brother, 
Sir Henry, as his deputy in the East March140 but the latter 
also obtained the Captaincy of Norham in controversial 
circumstances. The office lay in the gift of the Lord of 
the liberty of Norham, the Bishop of Durham. On the advice 
of the Crown Tunstal had appointed Richard Norton, 
veteran of the Pilgrimage of Grace. 141 Plagued by debts 
and ill health, Norton first farmed out the position to 
Thomas Clavering, a servant of Northumberland. He then 
sold the Captaincy to Sir Henry Percy for £300. The Bishop, 
disapproving of Norton's action,had complained to the 
counci1. 142 The latter wrote sharply to Norton admonishing 
him for trafficking with such an important office, "You 
make a merchandise and a matter of gayne of it". If Norton 
was incapable of residing at Norham, he was to leave it 
freely to some fit person. 143 Notwithstanding the Council's 
wishes to the contrary, it seems that Norton's agreement 
with Sir Henry stood and the latter retained the Captaincy. 
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The Percies had built up an impressive power 
structure on the border in a remarkably short space of time. 
Once again, the Wardenries of the East and Middle Marches 
were in the Earl's hands while the Percies or their 
followers monopolised the important offices, maintaining 
a complete dominance in the two marches. The inherent 
weakness of the Earl's position lay in the fragile life 
of the Queen. His rapid rise to power had left a sufficient 
residue of bitterness that was to be easily exploited by 
Mary's successor. 
Diplomacy and Defence 1558 
The government was well aware from the numerous 
intelligence reports obtained from Scotland of the tide of 
feeling that was rising against the French. The traditional 
Anglo-Scottish understanding that had existed between 
anglophile discontented Scottish nobles and the English 
government was in abeyance during Mary's reign. Protestant-
ism,which had also been an effective binding element between 
the two, of course, could no longer play a role under Mary. 
Yet, in May 1557, the Venetian ambassador reported that he 
had heard on good authority that if Mary were a man the 
d h d h h . 144 Scots woul place t emselves un er er aut or1ty. In 
September 1557, Wharton reported that a spy had informed 
him that, "The Scotts muche grudgeth against this warre 
occasioned by the French; and saith that there ar sondrie 
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noblemen in Scotland who wold have peace ... yf devyce were 
made they_ wold treate therefore setting Fraunce aparte", 
Philip's victories against Henri were having a disconcert-
ing effect on a reluctant Scottish nobility. 145 
Wharton's long experience of the Anglo-Scottish wars 
of the 1540's had demonstrated how effective a tactical 
weapon was the distribution of bribes among the Scottish 
nobility. Writing to Shrewsbury in September 1557 on the 
eve of the expected invasion of the Scots, Wharton felt that 
a useful opportunity had been lost, "Mary I thinke that 
suche practyse myght have ben used and with money as at the 
least dessention shold have bene sowne amongst them". 146 a 
Despite intelligence reports that the Duke wished to take 
over the Regency if he could have some understanding with 
England, the Council showed no interest in subverting the 
Scottish nobility, a policy which would have been anathema 
to the Queen. The association of Scottish anglophile 
nobles and Protestantism was sufficiently established to 
ensure that they would never receive assistance from Mary's 
government. Fortunately, events were to prove that oppo-
sition to the French in Scotland had become so strong that 
the Scots needed little encouragement from England to 
oppose the rule of the Regent and her French advisers. 
After the defeat of her invasion plans the Regent felt her 
position so weakened that she set covert negotiations on 
foot through William Kirkcaldy. 147 The Scots were prepared 
to accept a truce provided that leave could be granted for 
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a messenger to pass through England to win Henri's approval. 
The offer was linked with the Regent's efforts to recall 
the exiled Earl of Lennox to use him as a counterpoise 
against Chatelherault who, since his obstinacy over the 
invasion, could no longer be depended upon. 148 The Council 
t 
welcomed the Scots peace initiative as it coincided with 
Philip's efforts to restore relations between the two 
149 
realms. 
The King, to the great chagrin of Queen and Council, 
had consistently evaded breaking with Scotland. 150 Philip 
did not avoid the issue completely. The envoy he sent to 
Scotland at the end of 1557, Christopher d'Assonleville, 
submitted a written paper to the Council delineating with 
great clarity the reasons why the King could not afford to 
b . h d 151 h' . . . reak w1t Scotlan . P 111p's reasons were pr1mar1ly 
economic. He argued that the poverty of the Scots would 
weigh the balance of the chances of war in their favour. 
The late war declared by the Emperor against the Scots in 
1544 at the behest of Henry VIII had proved this. 152 The 
Low Countries were not only worried that in the event of 
war Scots privateers would plague their navigational routes 
especially with the Baltic but also that the fishing grounds 
off Scotland, rich in herring and white fis~would be closed 
to them for the same reasons. Protective convoys would be 
out of the question since so many ships were engaged in the 
war with France. Moreover, it was argued that the Low 
Countries would not be able to retaliate by seizing Scottish 
merchandjse in their ports since, although they were 
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Scotland's main trading partner, the volume of trade was 
small. The King maintained that it was far better to 
concentrate all his efforts on France, the power on which 
Scotland depended, than to weaken his forces by dividing 
them. D'Assonleville was instructed to go to Scotland to 
try and pacify the situation. The envoy was to tread 
lightly and in no way threaten the Scots or use any language 
that might be interpreted as a declaration of war. 153 
After an audience with the Queen and conferences with 
the Council in OctDber 1557, d'Assonleville argued that 
stronger terms had to be used with the Scots; they must be 
warned that if they persisted with their invasion threats 
Philip would be forced to declare the Scots his enemies and 
aid the English with arms and troops. The Council were 
. / . protest1ng that •ceste doulce legat1on' would be to no 
effect; not only would it not persuade the Scots to lay down 
their arms but it would be a positive encouragement to them. 
It might be used as an indication that the English were 
afraid and on the defensive. The Council insisted that war 
had erupted on the border because of the aid Mary had 
given Philip. Then, there carne a statement which perhaps 
struck at the root of the matter. The Council had informed 
the envoy that they did not desire Philip's declaration of 
war against the Scots because they were afraid of them (by 
now the main threat from Scotland had passed) but for the 
sake of the Queen's honour and reputation and so that all 
would know that the King had the Queen's welfare at heart. 
298 
Another jarring factor that troubled the Council was the 
galling thought that this important diplomatic initiativ~ 
coming as it did from Philip,might be construed by the 
Scots and French as an indication that their military 
' h h d ' 154 Ph ' 1 ' d m1g twas el 1n awe. 1 1p's reluctance to eclare 
war against the Scots because he was afraid he might harm 
the interests of his subjects in the Low Countries indi-
cates the sort of difficulty that presented itself as a 
consequence of the King's divided interests. The economic 
considerations of the richest part of his empire outweighed 
any loss of prestige that might befall him in England. 
On 23 December, Philip instructed d'Assonleville to 
go to Scotland. His original instructions remained 
unchanged. It was impossible to reconcile the interests 
of the Flemings and the English but in order to safeguard 
the Queen's honour the envoy was to inform the Scots that 
he was sent at the behest of the Estates of the Low 
Countries rather than Philip. It was a poor compromise, 
155 
and no substitute for a declaration of war. The mission 
of d'Assonleville coincided with Scottish and English 
negotiations for a temporary cessation of hostilities. The 
Regent had appointed Lord Hume, her commissioner, to 
156 
conclude a temporary truce. After several meetings with 
the Earl of Northumberland and Sir Henry Percy, a truce was 
157 
concluded on 14 January to last for twelve days. 
D'Assonleville's arrival in Scotland also coincided with 
the momentous news of the fall of Calais. The taking of 
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the town by the French brought a whole new element to the 
situation that d'Assonleville's instructions had not 
accounted for. Nevertheless, the envoy still stressed that 
if the two Queens were reconciled they might turn their 
joint efforts to persuading Henri and Philip to come to the 
negotiating table. 158 The Regent brushed aside any quibbling 
over who or where d'Assonleville came from, clearly welcoming 
Philip's peace initiative. She calmly wrote to him that the 
English had been the aggressors and she had been forced to 
resort to arms for her own defence. 159 
The truce had allowed the Regent to send the Scottish 
Vice-Chancellor, de Roubay, through England to France to 
seek Henri's advice. She reinforced her intention never 
to make peace with England unless Mary made peace with 
France. The Regent was also anxious to allay Henri's 
suspicions over the matter of the truce. The latter, she 
argued, had virtually no bearing on the border war since, 
due to the appalling winter weather, it was impossible to 
attempt any hostilities against England. Besides, the 
extent of English reinforcements made any major offensive 
b h 1 . 160 y t e Scots un lkely. 
The taking of Calais on 7 January 1558 by the Duke 
of Guise in a daring mid winter campaign was a great 
victory for the French which did more than enough to restore 
their confidence after the disastrous defeat of St Quentin. 
Calais was also a Guise triumph, the Duke became overnight 
a national hero. When the news reached Scotland of his 
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victory, his sister, the Regent" •.. comrnandet to kendle 
fyres and bleises throuch al tounes in sygne of blythnes 
. b . . 161 to all; of sa no lea v1cto1re". In England, the fall 
of the town engendered a profound shock, the news" ... was 
the hevest tydy (ngs to London) and to England that ever 
was hard of". 162 Even if we dismiss as exaggerated Feria's 
report that the people registered their protest by staying 
163 
away from mass, it does give us some idea of the psycho-
logical effect the loss of the town involved. It was a blow 
to the government's prestige which it could not afford to 
repeat. D'Oysel reported that since the taking of Calais 
the Queen and Council" ... estans entres en plus grande 
jalousie de la ville de Barvick que de coustume". 164 The 
two far flung outposts of England's medieval empire made 
ready comparison as Feria remarked to Philip in August 1557 
Berwick, " ... which in those parts amounts to what Calais 
165 is in these parts, as your Majesty knows". As the two 
major fortified strongholds of the realm and the two 
heaviest single items of government expenditure, the two 
towns were always coupled together in Council minutes when 
preparations for defence were discussed. That the concern 
for the security of the two towns went hand-in-hand is 
even illustrated in the grants of letters of denizenship : 
new citizens were to have special licence to dwell in 
. . 166 Cala1s or Berw1ck. 
D'Assonleville's reports from Scotland confirmed 
everything that the government had ever suspected about 
Scottish designs, most especially that they had their eyes 
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on Berwick. The envoy reported to Westmorland on his 
return from Scotland that "The cheiff marke wherat they 
shoot is Barwicke, yt haith bene the chieff praktice of 
the Scotes all this yere to have Barwicke", and he rein-
167 forced this view in the memorial he prepared for the Queen. 
D'Oysel certainly appreciated the propaganda coup French 
prestige in Scotland would reap with a successful attack 
on Berwick. Its capture, as the ambassador correctly pointed 
out, "ce seroit descouvrir tout cler le royaume d•Angleterre, 
, 
ne se presentant outre ledit Barvich aucune forteresse qui 
. / . ' so1t arrester une armee Jusques a londres". D'Oysel had 
proposed to the Scottish nobility that" •.. voyant ceste 
grande conqueste de Callays ... il falloit suyvre ceste 
,/ d' . h '-bonne fortune pour aller ass1eger le 1t Barv1c a ce 
printemps", suggesting by this means that the Duke could 
d h . h. f 168 D . re eem 1mself of 1s most recent volte ace. esp1te 
the ambassador's enthusiasm, he was sufficiently experienced 
in military affairs to be aware of the realities of the 
situation and that such an enterprise would be impossible 
without massive French reinforcements of artillery and 
. 169 
suppl1es. 
The government responded quickly to the fall of 
Calais by making vigo{oi.\.S efforts to strengthen Berwick. 
A new initiative was taken on the fortifications there. 170 
The Earl of Northumberland was appointed to raise 1,000 
borderers to be put in Berwick, " ... uppon all eventes if 
the same shalbe distressed". Individual summonses as well 
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as letters to the Sheriff of Nottinghamshire, Stafford-
shire and Shropshire were sent raising 2,000 more men. 171 
Plans were set in motion for the raising of German 
mercenaries for the North. Gunners from the captured 
. . 172 d' fortress of Gu1snes were sent to Berw1ck. To coor 1nate 
all these preparations, the Earl of Westmorland was 
appointed Lieutenant of the North. 173 
Notwithstanding these precautions efforts were still 
continued on the diplomatic front. The truce which expired 
on 26 January was 'renewed till 15 March,while in February 
the young laird of Lethington was sent to London. 174 
Lethington's mission was not successful as the Regent's 
proviso for desisting from armed aggression was that Mary 
make peace with France or persuade her husband to do so. 
Both proposals were clearly out of the question and the 
Council did not even wait for a reply from the Queen to 
Lethington's message before determining the failure of his 
. . 175 IDlSSlOn. 
This was the last attempt to bring about a peaceful 
solution to the conflict on the border during the reign of 
. . . 176 b . . . h Mary. Desultory ra1d1ng commenced aga1n, eg1nn1ng Wlt 
what was probably the most important engagement of the 
1558 campaigning season. On 28 April, Sir Thomas Percy 
and Sir George Bowes, Marshal of Berwick, with 7-800 horse 
and 2,000 foot entered the Scottish East March and burnt 
several villages including the town of Langton, the head-
quarters of the Lieutenant, the Earl of Glencairn,causing 
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the Earl to flee. The Scots garrison at Kelso were alerted 
as was Lord Hume, the Warden. Together they mustered 2,000 
horse and 500 foot. These followed the English meeting up 
with them at Swinton. In the subsequent engagement, 
according to Holinshed, the English shot and powder failed 
~ •. by reason of the mistie morning had made much of their 
powder da nkish". After a long encounter the English had 
the upper hand, 100 Scots were slain and 400 were taken 
. 177 pr1soner. 
Although the Scottish government could not afford 
to keep large numbers of troops in wages as the English 
could, it was able to maintain a steady force by appointing 
Lieutenants on the border to serve for a month, or so, these 
commanded men of the allotted Sheriffdoms. The system 
d b . 178 operate on a rota as1s. As for reinforcements on the 
English side, the government placed firm hopes in the 
3,000 Germans whose recruitment Sir William Pickering had 
been arranging since March 1558. The men had been raised, 
equipped, paid for one month and their transport arranged. 
They were expected to arrive at Newcastle on 26 June. 
The Council ordered the Lieutenant to confer with the Mayor 
and his colleagues to make advanced preparations for their 
lodging and victualling in the town where they were to rest 
for a short time after their arrival, £4,000 was set aside 
for their wages and £2,000 delivered to Bertram Anderson 
for victuals and supplies. Despite these preparations the 
troops never arrived as Philip decided he had a more urgent 
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need of the men and promptly took them over1 to make matters 
worse, he soon dismissed them. Once again, the 
incident is illustrative of where Philip's priorities 
1 179 ay. The government attempted to offset this drawback 
to some extent by raising 400 demi-lances, this time out-
side Westmorland's lieutenancy in the southern counties. 
There were signs of reluctance to comply with the quotas 
allotted and a special committee of the Council had to be 
set up to answer the complaints of those appointed to raise 
180 
men. In late July, Viscount Montague, the Lieutenant of 
Sussex, was written to and informed that the Queen" ... can-
not but take yt yll that this servyce is slacked and dis-
apointed by the faulte of some of that County of Sussex". 
Individuals were straitly ordered to furnish the men, others 
d h . d . h 181 were calle before t e Counc11 or clappe 1n t e Fleet. 
It would be wrong to read too much into this evi-
dence or see it as a sign of significant opposition to the 
Marian government. It might be more likely attributed to 
lack of enthusiasm over having to serve in the North more 
than anything else. Another important factor was the 
renewed outbreak of influenza that swept the country in 
1558. 182 The muster commissioners for Derbyshire ascribed 
their difficulties in raising the 1,500 foot requested by 
Westmorland in April to the disastrous effects of the 
epidemic: "This pore lyttle countrie was never lesse able 
to furnishe any greate nombre", they argued," ... by 
reason of longe sicknes, whiche hath contynewed a greate 
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tyrne in this country and yet contynewethe,and by the deathe 
183 
of manye, and those moste able and tallest persons". 
Westmorland was still calling for the Derbyshire men early 
in July and was forced to write to Shrewsbury in whose •rule' 
Derbyshire lay to hurry forward the men. They eventually 
184 
arrived on the border in early August. 
Equipping large numbers of men for border service 
posed a considerable problem, for the government was almost 
wholly dependent on imported munitions, especially from the 
Netherlands. To obtain these, export licences had to be 
granted by Philip. During the latter half of Mary's reign, 
the government was importing arms in such massive quantities 
that Philip was worried lest they fell into the wrong 
hands . 18 5 M . . t f bu . d ass1ve cons1gnmen s o argue ses, pow er, 
bills, cannon and shot were sent to Berwick in February, 
186 June, August and September 1558. These were used in the 
incessant raiding which carried on throughout the summer 
and autumn of 1558, which kept the Scots on the defensive. 
The Council continually urged individual captains in the 
same vein, " ... bycause the chiefest tyme to annoye then-
nemyes by burninge and spoyling their corne and provisions 
b h . . 187 efore t e same can be put 1n suertye lS nowe". The 
government's attitude was that since these forces had to be 
kept upon the border as a defensive measure, they should not 
be kept idle. This was typified by the Council's letter to 
Dacre in May 1558, " ... seing he hath an augmentacion of 
force uppon the Marches, so temploye the same as the Quenes 
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Majestie have no juste cause to thinke her charges there 
yll bestowed, but that he use all the meanes he can to 
. 188 
annoye thennemye". 
These raids, though undoubtedly more significant in 
frequency and severity, were in many ways legitimising the 
conditions of theft and violence that were a perennial 
feature of border life. They certainly cannot be compared 
to the 'rough wooing', the devastatory raids carried out 
during the Anglo-Scottish wars of the 1540's. However, 
one method of gauging their effect would be to look for 
signs of 'assured' Scots, those borderers pressurised by 
English aggression into swearing loyalty to Mary and even 
collaborating with the English in raids against their own 
189 
countrymen. Surviving indications of Scots seeking 
assurance are few. At the conference of Brancepeth in 
September 1557, Lord Dacre had reported that the Armstrongs 
of Scotland were prepared to serve England. In February 
of the next year, the Receiver of Cumberland was ordered 
to pay on Dacre's warrant the wages of 9d per day to 
Sandy Armstrong and each of his ten sons for their service 
to the Warden during the war. 190 After the failure of the 
Regent's invasion plans in October 1557, increased fears 
191 
of English aggression made more Scots assure. This 
said, it must be added that the bulk of the assured men 
seem to have come from the former Debatable land and 
LiddesdaleJ these places had furnished a large amount of 
assured men in the 1540's and were areas that nourished a 
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long tradition of violence and disorder. The government 
was continually worried that assured men were doubling up 
their role and acting as spies. In June 1558, the Council 
ordered the practice of receiving Scots under assurance to 
stop. Nevertheless, it seems to have continued. On 
21 September, the Council wrote to Leonard Dacre, the 
Deputy Warden of the West March, repeating the order, 
•.. albeit this sorte of receyving such as yelde 
themselfes cannot be accoumpted otherwise in him 
than zeale of good servyce, yet the nature of those 
men being consydered here, and how falseley they 
have served after their submyssyon, and oftentymes 
put the wardein towhome they have submytted themselfes 
in daunger. 
The Deputy Warden was to keep a close eye on those Scots 
h . d . h' . 192 e reta1ne 1n 1s serv1ce. The sheer bulk of the 
entries in the Privy Council Registers during the summer 
and autumn of 1558 is eloquent testimony to the government's 
control of the situation. The flood of letters to individual 
commanders giving constant encouragement to raid into 
Scotland, the warnings that they were not to jeopardise 
themselves and the many thanks given after successful 
exploits show how important the Council regarded the 
maintenance of the military pressure on the Scots. 
In September 1558, the Council instructed 
Westmorland to begin reducing the extraordinary bands of 
horse and foot and make arrangements for winter garrisons. 
Again, there was some variance between the commanders as 
to the numbers that should be retained. Northumberland 
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argued, as he had done the previous year, that a larger 
force than Westmorland had decided upon should be kept. 
On this occasion, the Council was not inclined to agree 
with him, answering "Yt cannot but seame a superfluous 
charge to have more nombers there", and adding" .•. which 
if they had been well imployed, the Scottes had had no 
leasure to burn Belforde". 193 This was not the only 
occasion upon which there was disagreement betweeri 
Westmorland and Northumberland. In May 1558, the Council 
wrote to the two Earls,Northumberland in his capacity as 
Warden and Westmorland as Lord Lieutenant,demanding that they 
take order to bring to justice some criminals in Tynedale. 
The Council suggested that rivalry between the two men was 
hindering their service and providing a bad example on 
the border. The government may have been afraid that a 
d I . d bo . 194 renewe Percy Nev111e feu was a ut to spr1ng up. 
The dispute between the two Earls was one of the matters 
that the Bishop of Ely and Sir William Cordell were sent 
to reconcile in June 1558. 195 The reduction of the 
garrisons was among the last arrangements that Westmorland 
made; his commission as Lord Lieutenant was not renewed by 
Elizabeth. 
The government had been successful in maintaining 
the border in defensive strength and had managed to keep 
up the pressure on Scotland by relentless raiding. The 
endless musters and 'quartering' of men by the Scots on 
their border although not a financial drain on the Scottish 
Exchequer since the men were unpaid, was a potent factor 
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in contributing to the Regent's unpopularity. The lack 
of enthusiasm,and prosecutions for rton attendance show 
how much opposition there was to the military service on 
h bo d 196 h' . . t e r er. In stark contrast to t 1s s1tuat1on on 
the Scottish side, the English borderers cooperated 
loyally with the government's policies. Despite the fact 
that hostilities had begun because of the English decla-
ration of war on the French and there was no sign of a 
peaceful solution on the border as long as Philip and 
Henri remained enemies, signs of resistance or recalci-
trance are noticeably non existent after the appointment 
of the Earl of Northumberland as Warden. Any unwilling-
ness seems to have stemmed from genuine difficulties in 
the face of the severe influenza epidemic. However, 
there were signsp as the Council in the North reported 
in the spring of 1558p that the economic strain of the 
. b . . 11 197 confl1ct was eg1nn1ng to te . The continuation of 
the war between France and Spain effectively prevented 
any large scale reinforcements being sent to Scotland. 
Nevertheless, the government was still determined not to 
be put off guard; with the spectre of Calais before its 
eyes, even the rumour of French reinforcements for 
Scotland was enough to justify the maintenance of a large 
standing force on the border. 
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Finance and Fortifications 
The violent death of Giles Heron at the 'affray' at 
Ford in March 1557 left the Treasurership of Berwick 
vacant. No details of Heron's period of office have 
survived, nor is it known who was responsible for finance 
at Berwick in the interval after his death; one can . 
h . h 198 only assume t at 1t was W arton. The series of Berwick 
accounts resumes withthe appointment of Alan Bellingham in 
May 1557. 199 Bellingham was in charge of the payment of 
the Garrison at Berwick and the W~rdens as well as being 
responsible for the wages of the extraordinary bands of 
horse and foot and the workmen and labourers on the forti-
. . 200 h f1cat1ons. He was to make all payments under W arton's 
warrant but with the appointment of the Earl of 
Northumberland as Warden, Wharton's responsibilities were 
confined to payments within Berwick and the payments for 
the extraordinary bands were to be made under the Earl's 
warrant. 201 In early August 1557, Bellingham was despatched 
202 to the border with £9,000 out of the Exchequer. Between 
July 1557 and February 1558, Bellingham received £27,000, 
the bulk of which came from the Exchequer by virtue of 
Privy Seal warrants. There were no regular arrangements 
for the despatch of cash to Berwick. Money tended to be 
allotted spasmodically as the need arose. The rest of the 
money sent to Bellingham was made up of receipts from the 
Crown lands in the North. In July 1557, the Council ordered 
that all sums due to the Crown in the North were to be made 
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h . 203 over to t e Treasurer of Berw1ck. This involved some 
£7,200 from Sir Thomas Gargrave, Receiver of Yorkshire, 
and £1,300 from Crown lands in Northumberland and Durham. 204 
The extraordinary bands of horse and foot raised during the 
latter half of September 1557 to meet the invasion threat 
from Scotland account for most of the payments disbursed 
by Bellingham. Over the period of his account wages 
were paid to 2,300 light horse and 2,900 foot in addition 
to Vaughn's 300 arquebusiers. These were all paid to the 
last day of January at a total cost of £21,276, while the 
cost of the ordinary garrison of Berwick accounted for 
£1,772. 205 
Captain Vaughn's band alone which had been recruited 
in mid August 1557 and which was to remain on the border 
206 
until December 1560 cost £328 per month. Bellingham 
was not made responsible for the payment of the 4,000 men 
serving under Shrewsbury in late September as Sir Thomas 
Gargrave was appointed Treasurer of the troops at Newcastle. 
Gargrave's account has not survived but he was sent £15,000 
1n August 1557 to pay the expenses of the men, the rest was 
to be made up of the receipts of the Crown lands in York-
shire. By 9 November, the Lieutenant's men had been 
dismissed and paid, and the £2,000 surplus was sent to 
. h 207 Bell1ng am. 
At the turn of the year, the fall of Calais increased 
the government's fears that Berwick was at risk. Reinforce-
ments were sent to the border and a new initiative was 
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taken with the fortifications. The subsidy bill of 
February 1558 recalled the expense the government had 
already sustained in the war against France and Scotland. 
In particular, it drew attention to the present financial 
burden entailed by the 'greate power and nomber of 
soldiers• that had to be maintained on the border for the 
defence of the realm towards Scotland. 208 To cope with 
the new order a new Treasurer, Sir William Ingoldsby,was 
appointed. 
Bellingham,had been complaining of illness and had 
asked to be dismissed in December 1557. 209 
Ingoldsby's account stretches from 16 January 1558 
to 30 November 1560. 210 The usefulness of the account is 
in many ways restricted. In particular, payments made to 
the Captains for the troops employed on the border are 
recorded in lump sums which cannot be practicably broken 
down. In much the same way, recruitment of bands of horse 
and foot continued throughout the three year period, with 
bands being raised and dismissed over varying periods. It 
is impossible from Ingoldsby's account to attempt an 
accurate assessment of the men serving on the border at 
any given time, a problem that not unreasonably concerned 
h . 211 t e Counc11. Fortunately, a sufficient amount of 
financial statements and summaries of accounts survive 
for us to arrive at a fairly accurate evaluation of border 
f . d . h M . 212 1nances ur1ng t e last year of ary's re1gn. 
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In January 1558, there were 2,275 horse and 5,499 
foot in active service in Berwick and on the marches. Quite 
a high proportion of men numbering over 800 were noted apart; 
of these, some 480 were reported as being sick, one suspects 
h h . . d . . . 213 tat t e 1nfluenza ep1 em1c was tak1ng 1ts toll. · Despite 
slight variations, the numbers of horse and foot seem to 
214" have remained at this high level until October 1558. The 
total monthly wages of the troops and workmen amounted to 
£10,838. These had been paid from January to mid April and 
Ingoldsby had £28,492 towards the £32,514 due when the pay 
fell again in July. 215 
The accounts of the other chief officers at Berwick 
were all in surplus in July 1558. Abingdon, the Quarter-
master, still retained £10,194 after paying freight charges 
and repairs to the brew and bake houses amounting to £1,243 
and the wages of some 185 staff which included bakers, 
brewers, butchers, keepers of the oxen and 'clarkes of the 
butter and cheese' . 216 The Surveyor of the Ordnance, 
Thomas Gower, after paying the wages of the 'bowyers 
fletchers and other artificous' had £668 in hand. 217 
Despite the Council's instructions to the Lord 
Lieutenant in March 1558 that in the disbursement of cash 
he was to exercise", .. good husbandry consyderinge the 
scarsytie of money and dyffyculty to provyde the same". 
The heavy monthly wages bill continued throughout the 
summer and early autumn financed by a relentless stream 
218 
of Exchequer warrants. In October, with the campaigning 
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season at a close, the extraordinary bands of horse and 
foot were discharged and only 1,500 horse and foot retained 
f 
. . . 219 
or w1nter garr1sons. 
Even though regular payments were made to the troops 
and for the fortifications, there were signs in 1558 that 
the government was having difficulty in meeting its 
obligations. For the massive wages bill that was incurred 
in paying off the troops in October 1558 the government 
used money borrowed from the merchants of the Staple and 
from the Mayor and Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne, while 
£700 from the clerical subsidy of the diocese of Durham was 
also diverted to Ingoldsby. So costly was the wages bill 
that the air of urgency can be well understood in the 
Council's letter to Nicholas Brigham, one of the tellers of 
the Exchequer. He was to tell out all the monies coming to 
him to Edward Hughes, the Lord Treasurer's servant, who was 
usually appointed to carry funds to Berwick, even though a 
h . h d b . d 220 warrant for t 1s purpose a not een 1ssue . 
Another important financial outlay on the border 
aside from the payment of soldiers•wages was the money 
expended upon the fortifications. Additional work was 
carried out on Carlisle castle during late 1557 and early 
1558, but the sum involved was sma11. 221 Although the 
government had once contemplated building a new fort at 
Netherby to countervail the French garrisons at Langholm 
d h . d . . d 222 an Annan, t e 1 ea never mater1al1se ; instead all the 
building energies of the government were concentrated on the 
works at Berwick. 
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Work recommenced in the spring of 1557. During the 
early part of the year, the costs remained small,averaging 
out from February to June at some £40 per month. In July, 
the month after the declaration of war against the French, 
the wages bill leaped to £286 per month,accounted for by 
some 400 masons, hewers and labourers working on the 
Edwardian bulwark. 223 The work provided a means of employ-
ment for the borderers; although the government recruited 
masons and 'hard hewers• from Kent, the pay roll of the 
labourers reads like a list of border surnames with Homes, 
Reades, Potts, Johnsons and Bells earning 5d per day. 224 
Tools for the works were purchased from merchants in 
Berwick but were also shipped from Newcastle and Scarborough. 
Wood was brought from the Lordship of Prudhoe by •servantes 
unto my ladye perse• to Newcastle and then conveyed to 
. b 225 Berw1ck y sea. Even when winter set in, work did not 
slacken off so that for the twelve months from February 1557 
to February 1558 £2,165 was spent on the wages of the work-
226 
men alone. The loss of Calais 1n January 1558 was a 
blow to the government's prestige of unparalleled magnitude, 
after which intelligence and rumour that the French and 
Scots had plans to take Berwick were too important to be 
ignored. The loss of Calais was the crucial factor that 
led the government to replace Berwick's antiquated defences 
by a modern bastioned system. 
The introduction of the bastion was one of the most 
important military developments of the late fifteenth and 
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early sixteenth centuries. Its use was made necessary by 
the increased efficiency of artillery. The development of 
large siege cannon rendered obsolete the high and relatively 
thin masonry walls of medieval castles and towns. To combat 
this, military engineers in central Italy~ where siege war-
fare was common, evolved a more sophisticated type of 
fortress capable of mounting and resisting powerful cannon. 
The thin high curtain walls of the middle ages now became 
relatively short, thick, solid structures constructed of 
broad banks of earth encased in masonry. In this way they 
were able to withstand and absorb more intense bombardment. 
A series of wide ditches and outworks impeded the advance 
of the attacker but,more revolutionary still, were the 
arrow shaped bastions constructed all around the fortress. 
These provided flanking observation and flanking fire so 
enabling the defenders to gain maximum fire advantage over 
the enemy by being able to aim shot in virtually any 
d . . 227 1rect1on. The idea that the border fortresses should 
be developed into a defensive system more suitable to the 
needs of contemporary warfare was in the minds of almost 
every commission that reviewed the fortifications during 
this period. Most extant surveys recommended that 
bulwarks should be added and that free standing walls should 
228 
'be massively rampiered with earthe'. 
Of course~ one might argue that it is easy to 
exaggerate the obsolescence of the border fortresses and 
claim that they presented an adequate defence against the 
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Scots who were considered to be notoriously inept at siege 
warfare. 229 Yet, the English government of the mid 
sixteenth century had not only Scotland to contend with 
north of the border but France - at that time the most 
powerful military state in Europe. France had been able 
to send 10,000 men to Scotland in 1548 and she might do 
so again. This explains the susceptibility of the Council 
to rumours of French reinforcements for Scotland. The 
military presence of the French north of the border, no 
matter how small, was a factor that the Marian government 
had to bear in mind and take measures against. 
The cost of these new fortifications was enormously 
high and many European towns preferred to carry out make-
shift improvements by lowering their walls and simply back-
ing them with earth whilst they filled in old artillery 
fortresses with the same material. No such rudimentary 
device was considered at Berwick but because of the 
prohibitive cost the government's energies were concentrated 
solely on remodernising its defences, 
In January 1558, Sir Richard Lee, who had already 
in the previous reign been responsible for planning forti-
fications at Berwick, was sent to the town with 800 
. 230 . d p1oneers. Lee was appo1nte to take charge of the 
fortifications; at first, he worked in cooperation with 
Ridgeway until the latter was dismissed in March 1558. 
Originally, it seems to have been decided that the works 
should encompass the precincts of the old medieval town 
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but, for reasons of economy, it was decided to reduce the 
circumvallation of the old walls by a third. This involved 
the abandonment of the ancient castle in the north west 
corner of the town. Commission was granted to Lee and 
the chief officers in Berwick to see to the demolition 
of the houses in this area and make reasonable compensation 
231 to the owners. The commission was broadened in June·1558 
to include the lowering of the castle walls. It also 
granted powers to the Surveyor and others to execute all 
such measures they deemed necessary for the advance of the 
. . . 232 fort1f1cat1ons. 
With over 1,200 men employed on the works, costs rose 
phenomenally from a monthly average of £180 in 1557 to 
£1,520 in February 1558, remaining at that level certainly 
. h d h . 233 h . h . untll t e en of t e re1gn. T e 1mportance t e Counc1l 
attached to the progress of the new fortifications 1s 
illustrated by the constant attention paid to them during 
the course of 1558. Westmorland was urged to make sure 
that money always remained available for the works, 
234 
'although others shuld remayne unpayed'. In June 1558, 
the Bishop of Ely and Sir William Cordell were sent as 
commissioners to the north, among other things,to inspect 
h . . . d h . 235 h . t e fort1f1cat1ons an report on t e1r progress. T e1r 
report seems to have been favourable and they recommended 
that the works be carried on throughout the winter. Lee 
wished them to continue only till Michaelmas which was 
the usual seasonal stopping date but it appears that at 
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the insistence of the Queen, he was urged to carry on as 
h h . d 236 t e weat er perm1tte . 
Although the major part of the new fortifications 
at Berwick were carried out during the reign of Elizabeth, 
it is too easily forgotten that the project was planned and 
begun during the reign of her predecessor. The large 
financial outlay that the extraordinary bands of horse and 
foot engendered coupled with the considerable costs of the 
works is firm proof of the government's commitment to the 
security of the border. Mary's order that the works were 
to proceed without the usual winter break manifests the 
urgency with which the government set store upon their 
speedy progress. Mary's council had no need to be reminded 
by repeated Spanish cautions that another debacle on a par 
with Calais was to be avoided at all costs. 237 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EARLY ELIZABETHAN BORDER 
Peace and the Politics of the English Intervention in 
Scotland. 
The continuing hostilities on the border remained 
an abiding concern for the new government. since the out-
break of the conflict was an indirect result of the war 
with France, it was inevitable that in the peace nego-
tiations, which began in September 1558, France and 
Scotland should be the subject of joint discussion. For 
the moment, the main weight of diplomatic activity 
surrounded the burning question of Calais. It quickly 
became clear that the French would never willingly surrender 
the town and a renewed offensive for its recovery seemed 
. . h h' . 'd 1 unl1kely w1t out P 1l1p's a1 . As long as he remained 
King of England, it was just possible that he would have 
refused the cession of the town by treaty. However, the 
Queen's death on 17 November finally set the seal on the 
town's fate. Almost from the outset, the commissioners had 
cast heavy doubts about the practicability of insisting on 
the restitution of Calais. They added the suggestion that 
such a weighty matter should be brought before Parliament. 
It was a surprising recommendation and was probably put 
forward as a means of protecting the Queen from any odium 
that might result if the permanent surrender of the town 
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was formally agreed upon. The Queen and Council were ready 
to accept the proposal but Mary wished to consult Philip 
beforehand. In a letter to the peace commissioners, on 
8 November, the Council reiterated a familiar theme : the 
war in which Calais was lost had been declared at the 
request of the King. If Philip's allies were restored to 
territories long since relinquished by conquest and Calais 
remained French, the resultant effect on public opinion 
d b d . 2 woul e 1sastrous. Further, in the same letter in some-
what ambiguous terms, the Council stated that since the 
King's commissioners were so near to a peaceful settlement 
and the realm was exhausted by the war, they were prepared 
to suffer the loss of Calais for the sake of the peace of 
Christendom. Philip's advice was also solicited as to 
whether the commissioners should conclude a peace without 
h . . . 3 t e rest1tut1on of Cala1s. Yet, at the same time, the 
council was hesitant over the wisdom of relinquishing the 
bridge-head. The French still remained firmly implanted 
in Scotland, so with the retention of Calais the English 
would at least have a continental base from which to impede 
h d . . 4 any Frenc expe 1t1onary force. 
The first gesture of Elizabeth's government was an 
unequivocal demand for the restoration of the town. The 
English commissioners were also to inform the French that, 
if they desired the inclusion of Scotland in the peace, then 
the fort at Eyemouth which posed a threat to Berwick had to 
5 be rased. At the turn of the year, when the government had 
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begun to take stock of its military and financial position, 
there was a slowly growing acceptance of the inevitable. 
Elizabeth continued to insist on the restoration of Calais 
as long as she dared but the drain on the government's 
resources and the poor showing at the musters persuaded 
the Council that a peaceful solution was the most desirable 
6 
course. A face-saving compromise on the lines of the 
Treaty of Boulogne by which Calais would be returned to 
England after eight years was slowly gaining ground. 
Baulked of Calais, the English placed a renewed 
emphasis on the importance of securing a separate peace 
with Scotland, arguing that, in the last analysis, peace 
with their northern neighbour was more pressing than peace 
with the French. As the Queen informed the commissioners, 
II for certain it is as you all three know, that the 
greatest burden of these our wars resteth upon Scotland, 
and be daily like if they continue to be greater and 
greater". Careful to employ all safeguards, the government 
was bent on securing a separate peace with Scotland by 
formal treaty rather than a 'bare comprehension' of the 
Scots in any treaty between France and England. 7 
Elizabeth's view of the scottish problem differed 
widely from her sister's. The growlng religious discontent 
north of the border and the Protestant tone of the new 
regime in the South compelled Elizabeth, whether she liked 
it or not, to regard Scotland in the context of Reform-
ation politics. Thus, the most important feature of 
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Elizabeth's policy towards Scotland which distinguished it 
from Mary's was the willingness of the English government 
to cooperate with the Scots on the common ground of 
Protestantism. This cooperation was designed not only to 
bring about a peaceful solution to the situation on the 
border but also to establish a friendly Protestant, anti-
French regime in Edinburgh. 
There were signs that the Scots were anx1ous to 
obtain peace. The Dowager was kept informed of the nego-
tiations on the continent and there were indications that 
the growing financial burden that the hostilities on the 
border entailed was becoming difficult to meet. It was 
reported in January 1559 that the Scottish bands of horse 
on the border were refusing to serve for lack of pay, 
while Sir Henry Percy wrote that the Scots had asked for a 
truce at the persuasion of D'Oyse1. 8 Later that month, 
Percy reported the details of a border interview he had 
with Chatelherault. 9 The latter declared that many of the 
Scottish nobility were eager to see peace on the border. 
Percy remarked on the recent similarity of the political 
situation of the two realms. Scotland, because of her ties 
with France, was at war with England, and the latte~ by a 
similar dynastic marriage with Spain, had been driven along 
the same path into conflict with Scotland. By the recent 
death of Mary England had been delivered from these 
conditions and Percy suggested that Scotland might do the 
same1 a Protestant establishment would form the basis of 
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friendship and mutual cooperation between the two realms. 
Chatelherault dismissed any prospect of attempting armed 
resistance against the Scottish Crown as the time was not 
propitious but he was willing to give several important 
guarantees. He would dissuade the Scots from invading 
England at the behest of the French and he would forewarn 
Elizabeth if any enterprise was to be attempted against· 
Berwick. He also added that if England was driven to arms 
against the French in Scotland, his countrymen would 
support the English. Of more immediate importance, the 
Duke, following Percy's suggestion, would do all he could 
to support the idea of a truce. 
This meeting was the first significant step in the 
negotiations between the English and the Scots that led 
to the eventual armed cooperation of the two in expelling 
the French. It gave Cecil an important indication of the 
state of mind of the heir to the Scottish throne. In this 
light, Percy's frankness in his dealings with Chatelherault 
is easily understood. 
It seems improbable that he negotiated at such a 
level without the prior knowledge and consent of the 
government. Percy had already been in London on border 
affairs at the time of the Queen's accession and so had had 
the opportunity to consult with cecil on the matter. The 
nature of the correspondence between Percy, Cecil and 
Sir Thomas Parry, suggests previous discussion of the 
affair between the three men. 
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On 24 January, Percy reported that the Scots desired 
a month long truce to enable the Dowager to send the 
Scottish Secretary, Maitland of Lethington, to talk of 
peace. 10 Instructions were sent to the Earl of 
Northumberland, informing him how to proceed if the Scots 
sought a truce. Negotiations towards an armistice took a 
more official line when the Dowager suggested that Lethington 
and Sarlabois, the French Captain of Dunbar, should meet in 
11 
commission with Sir James Croftes and Percy. The four 
men met on 17 February and it was decided to send an envoy 
to Elizabeth. A preliminary cessation of hostilities was 
d . . . 1 d b . d 12 agree upon unt11 an off1c1a truce coul e negot1ate . 
At the meeting, Lethington inquired of Croftes as to whether 
the war between France and Spain would prejudice negotiations 
between Henri and Elizabeth. Croftes•s reply hints at the 
shift in emphasis English foreign policy was taking. He 
informed the Secretary that the alliance between Elizabeth 
and Philip",,, stood not so straight" as that between France 
and Scotland and that which ever tended to the benefit of 
England would be the one adhered to. 13 The despatch of 
Lethington as peace commissioner coincided with the news 
from Cateau-Cambresis that a treaty had finally been 
concluded. 14 
The main aspect of the treaty between Elizabeth and 
Henri centred round the face-saving compromise that had been 
decided upon in February. Although, of course, no one 
considered seriously that Henri would ever hand back Calais, 
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for Elizabeth the clause was an acceptable solution to the 
foreign policy debacle of her sister's reign. 
The loss of Calais was an important factor in that 
there was now no impediment to the sailing of a French fleet. 
For the first time in her history, France controlled the 
whole of her northern seaboard. In the light of this f.act 
the commissioners endeavoured to provide for the security 
of the realm by the best possible means. Two treaties 
were concluded by the Queen's commissioners at Cateau-
Cambresis.15 Scotland was included in the treaty between 
Elizabeth and Henri with the provision that Eyemouth 
should be dismantled as a violation of the Treaty of 
Boulogne. This was reaffirmed in a separate peace between 
the Queen and the sovereigns of Scotland, Francis and Mary. 
The latter treaty also referred to 'certain articles' 
which, it stated, could only be resolved by commissioners 
on the border itself. To settle these matters, delegates 
of the two realms were to meet on the border within two 
months. Until this was accomplished, the Edwardian Treaty 
of Norham was to remain in force. 
On 7 April, the Council wrote to Northumberland 
informing him that peace had been settled; Croftes, the 
new Captain of Berwick, was also notified to ensure that 
the peace was proclaimed simultaneously on both sides of 
16 the border. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty 
of Cateau-Cambresis, the government appointed commissioners 
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to settle the peace on the border1 these included the 
17 Bishop of Durham, the two Wardens and Sir James Croftes. 
Tunstal was anxious that the matter be prosecuted with all 
haste since the treaty was dated 2 April and specified 
that the Queen must conclude with the Scots within two 
18 
months. The Dowager, however, was so heavily engaged 
in maintaining her authority against the Protestant 
insurgents that, only after an armistice had been agreed 
upon between her and the Congregation at Perth, could the 
commissioners finally meet. 
The first meeting was held in the church of Our Lady 
19 
at Upsetlington on the last day of May. After rejecting 
Scottish proposals that individuals be allowed to pass 
through England without passports and that the series of 
earthworks lately set up to protect the bounds of Berwick 
be removed, the commissioners got down to work. The outcome 
of their deliberations, the Treaty of Upsetlington, was 
essentially a recast of the Treaty of Norham; of course, 
. d . d 20 the clauses relat1ng to the Debateable lan were om1tte . 
The commissioners remained together until the end of June 
to ensure the smooth beginning of the peace and to supervise 
the initial meetings between the Wardens, "• .. leste lyke 
effecte contrarye to peaxe shoulde ensewe, as dyd the last 
21 yere of peax proclamed at Carlysle". 
An important matter left out of the treaty was that 
of the 'assured' Scots. The Scottish commissioners were 
insistent that the Wardens deliver up all pledges for the 
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assured men or answer for their activities, treating them 
E 1 . h bo d t D f Truce. 22 Th t f as ng 1s r erers a ays o e ou come o 
the Scots' demands is not known. Nevertheless, the 
English government was clearly anxious that these rnen,who 
had abandoned their loyalty to Scotland in order to serve 
the interests of England, should be protected from charges 
of treason by their government once the peace had been 
establ1.shed. 23 Wh th t t d e er or no agreernen s were rna e on 
behalf of these men, the Scottish government was in no 
position to take punitive action against them, nor was it 
politically expedient to do so as the Dowager was concerned 
to win as many of the borderers over to her side as possible. 
In spite of the peace of Upsetlington, the border 
remained in a state of uneasy tension; France's 
continued maintenance of garrisoning forces in Scotland 
still posed a dangerous threat to England's northern 
frontier. 24 The eruption of the Protestant rebellion against 
the DOwager in May 1559 only exacerbated an already worrying 
situation, since it gave the French the excuse to send more 
troops into Scotland to restore the government's authority. 
The Elizabethan religious settlement of 1559 further 
complicated English policy towards Scotland since it placed 
the two sides of the border on opposite sides of the 
religious divide. This change was especially important 
corning as it did so soon after the Treaty of Cateau-
Cambresis. The 'rapprochement• of France and Spain made 
united action by these Catholic monarchs against the 
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heretical Elizabeth a dangerous possibility for the future. 
Free from their war commitments, there had been renewed 
efforts against heresy in both France and Spain and nearer 
home, in Scotland itself. 25 These events only served to 
fuel the widespread belief amongst Protestants of an 
international Catholic crusade designed to crush them. 
The 'Device for the alteration of Religion' which belongs 
to the beginning of Elizabeth's reign took it for granted 
that, as a consequence of the reestablishment of Protest-
antism, the Pope would excommunicate Elizabeth, place an 
interdict on the realm and encourage the Catholic 
sovereigns to invade. The French, it stated, would over-
run the border. To obviate this, it recommended, "· •. for 
certainty to fortify Berwick, and to employ demilances and 
h h h . 26 orsemen forte safety oft e front1er". Another 
factor that weakened Elizabeth's position was that in 
Catholic eyes, she was regarded as illegitimate, the child 
of the unlawful union of Henry and Ann Boleyn. Her 
bastardy had been reaffirmed in the first Parliament of 
27 Mary. During the Cateau-Cambresis negotiations, the 
French envoys questioned Elizabeth's title to the throne 
and the French ambassador was labouring at Rome to 
have Elizabeth declared illegitimate and the Queen of 
28 Scots Mary's successor. 
The danger from France reached new proportions after 
the death of Henri in July 1559. With the accession of 
Francis and Mary, France and Scotland became one monarchy. 
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The direction of French affairs was assumed by the Queen's 
Guise uncles who publicly asserted their niece's title to 
the English throne. With this overwhelming evidence of 
French hostility, Elizabeth and her ministers could not 
afford to ignore the opportunities for English policy which 
presented themselves in Scotland with the revolt of the 
Protestant Lords of the Congregation. 
The religious and political dissension north of the 
border had come to a head in May 1559 after the iconoclastic 
riots that followed John Knox's preaching in Perth. The 
armed forces of the Congregation occupied the town and by 
the end of June, Edinburgh itself. The Dowager and her 
French troops were forced to retreat to Dunbar. 
The English government kept a close eye on events in 
Scotland. Lethington and Kirkcaldy informed Cecil of the 
progress of the Protestants through Sir Henry Percy and 
Croftes. Cross-border communications were facilitated by 
the fact that negotiations between Cecil and the Congreg-
ation 29 were carried on under the guise of Days of Truce. 
Percy and Croftes played key roles as intermediaries 
between the Scottish Protestants and the English government. 
Croftes suggested to Cecil in late June that letters should 
be addressed jointly to both border officials as Percy was 
h . . . h 30 •somet 1ng r1pe 1n t ese matters'. In July, Knox 
himself was in correspondence with Percy, repeating 
Kirkcaldy's requests for assistance for the Protestants 
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' h h 31 aga1nst t e Frenc . The initial reaction of the 
government was lukewarm; Kirkcaldy's integrity was suspect, 
but the Congregation's pleas were not entirely to be 
ignored. Cecil urged Percy to obtain from Kirkcaldy more 
specific details of the Protestants' intentions and what 
help they required from England. He was to give the Scots 
the vague assurance that Elizabeth would not stand idly by 
32 
and see their country oppressed by the French. At the 
same time, Cecil mapped out future English policy towards 
Scotland. The Scottish Protestants were to be encouraged 
first with fair promises, then with money, and lastly with 
33 
arms. Care was to be taken not to ignore ambassador 
Throckmorton's advice from Paris, "••• to nourish and 
entertain the garboyle in Scotland as much as may be". 34 
Efforts were also to be made to push the Scottish Protestants 
into action and they were to be encouraged to secure unani-
mity among themselves. Cecil urged Croftes in July 1559, 
" in any wise do you endevor to kyndle ye fyar for if it 
shuld quench ye opportunitie therof will not arrive in our 
1yves". 35 
The distrust with which the Scots were held was an 
important element in inducing the government not to commit 
itself too far in Scottish affairs at this juncture. The 
Scots had not yet won the outright backing of Chatelherault 
whose support as second person in the realm was essential 
to the success of their cause. The English were not slow 
to realise the importance of the presence of the Duke's son 
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in Scotland. Croftes was_at pains to stress to Cecil 
the necessity of hurrying the young Earl of Arran out of 
France to keep up the momentum of the Protestant LordSJ 
the Duke would make no move towards the Congregation unless 
he could be assured of the safety of his heir. 36 The 
suggestion was also made to the Congregation that some 
respectable individuals should come forward with a concrete 
plan on which a basis for English aid could be made. Cecil 
further confided to Percy that Knox's continued particip-
ation in the negotiations was out of the question. Though 
esteemed for his learning, the fiery Calvinist's anti-
feminist views were sufficiently well known to make him 
. b h 37 persona non grata at El1za et 's court. 
By mid July, after a series of meetings between 
Croftes, Percy and Kirkcaldy, the English had succeeded in 
persuading the Congregation to expel the French and take 
measures to prevent any other extraneous forces being 
allowed into Scotland. The Congregation were also to decide 
on what foundation the two sides would work together and 
. . h . d 38 what offers they could make 1n return for Engl1s a1 . 
On 19 July, the Protestants made their formal 
application for English support. Their main purpose, they 
asserted, was the reformation of religion and the maintenance 
of Scotland's liberties against the French. They denied 
attempting to subvert the authority of the Crown but hinted 
that the intransigence of the Dowager, the French and the 
Clergy and their turning a deaf ear to their petitions 
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would force them to seek new measures. This they would 
d ' hE 1' h 'd d d ' 39 o w1t ng 1s a1 an a v1ce. 
This inference that the Congregation might seek the 
deposition of the Dowager was quickly seized upon by 
Cecil as the next logical step into which to persuade the 
Congregation. A suggestion along these lines was made ~y 
Croftes. The latter informed Whitlaw, a messenger of the 
Protestants, that although the members of the Congregation 
who had written were noblemen, they did not constitute a 
recognised and established authority with whom Elizabeth 
could meaningfully negotiate. The Queen, Cecil remonstrated 
" •.• wolde not enter to knyt uni tie with a confuse multi tude•: 
Croftes also took the Congregation to task for the fact that 
no serious effort had been made by their forces to expel 
40 the French. This goading of the Congregation into action, 
especially before the English had committed themselves to 
aid them militarily, although not received without a 
measure of resentment, was successful in producing the 
desired political effect. On 1 August, Knox was sent by 
the Congregation to Holy Island to meet Percy and Croftes. 
He carried with him proposals for an offensive-defensive 
league between Elizabeth and the Protestants as well as a 
41 
request for arms, money and men. 
This formal application by the congregation for armed 
assistance placed Elizabeth in a dilemma. The idea of aiding 
rebels against their lawful sovereign was repellent to her. 
Further, Cecil was forced to play down the religious aspect 
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of the Scots' requests as the Queen had no wish to be seen 
as the patron of radical Protestantism. There always 
remained the possibility that Philip, Elizabeth's only 
powerful ally, would aid his brother-in-law. On the other 
hand, it seemed more likely that England could, once again, 
capitalise on the inveterate hostility between the 
Habsburg and Valois monarchies, and on the whole secular 
considerations usually succeeded in quashing any plans for 
cooperation on religious principles. For Philip, the 
spectre of a Valois imperium from Shetland to the Pyrenees 
was enough to prevent him from joining hands with France 
against England. 42 Yet, even if Philip allowed dynastic 
contingencies to outweigh religious ones, the prospect of 
war with France was daunting enough; peace had only lately 
been signed with Henri, and that, after an unsuccessful 
war. 
Another factor was the difficulty in assessing just 
how far the Scots could be relied upon. The Dowager was a 
resourceful political opponent who might easily induce a 
divided Scottish nobility and the large body of neutrals to 
compromise rather than risk everything against the French. 
conversely, failure to act in support of the Scots 
Protestants might drive them into coming to terms with the 
Dowager and the French hold on Scotland would be 
strengthened. 
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Overshadowing all were the dangerous pretensions of 
the House of Guise who continued to press the claims of 
their niece, the Queen of Scots. Elizabeth and her 
ministers were convinced that it would only be a matter of 
time before the French declared war in an attempt to 
depose her. The choice lay between allowing the Congreg-
ation to be beaten and then resisting the combined forc~s 
of France and Scotland, or aiding the Scottish Protestants. 
Financing the Scots would spare English manpower, an 
important consideration since the realm was weakened by 
the recent influenza epidemic and experienced war leaders 
were not to be found. 
The alternative to aiding the Scots was to keep the 
realm, and the border in particular, on a permanent war 
footing. This would be prohibitively expensive. Berwick, 
the key to the northern defences, would require double 
the 2,000 troops it now held, and 10,000 more troops would 
be needed to withstand any siege. To prevent the border 
being devastated, strong garrisons requiring another 
4-5,000 men would have to be laid. Maintaining these 
charges for as short a time as three months would place an 
intolerable burden on the Exchequer. Cecil's arguments 
were conclusive : aiding the Scots was the surest and most 
. bo d . 43 cost effect1ve means to guarantee r er secur1ty. 
Elizabeth was pledged to a policy of non-intervention 
by the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis. She could not, 
therefore, openly assist the Scots without first searching 
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for acceptable alternatives; a compromise solution would 
be to subsidise the Congregation covertly. The sending of 
Sir Ralph Sadler to the North with £3 9 000 in August 1559 
involved Elizabeth in no immediate political commitments 
towards the Scots but the move served to demonstrate to 
them that England favoured their cause. 
The negotiations between Elizabeth and the 
Protestants now entered a new and more important phase. 
Croftes and Percy had acted circumspectly in their dealings 
with the Congregation. Now, the time had come for a more 
professional diplomat to handle the proceedings. In 
addition, the problem involved in transmitting intelligence 
quickly from Berwick to London was an important factor, 
especially when considering the alternating fortunes of 
the Congregation. This made it necessary to have a trusted 
expert •in loco' with sufficient discretion to deal with 
any sudden change of circumstances that might occur. 
Originally, it was envisaged by Cecil that Sadler, Croftes 
and Percy should work in conjunction with each other but 
Sadler's outspoken distrust of the latter temporarily 
ended his role in the proceedings. 44 
The weeks following Sadler's residence in Berwick 
witnessed a rapid deterioration in the position of the 
Congregation. Although the Dowager had been deposed and 
her authority transferred to a Council of Regency under 
the leadership of Chatelherault, in early November the 
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Protestants abandoned Edinburgh in panic and their forces 
b d . . . h 45 egan to 1m1n1s . The situation became one of deadlock 
with the French strongly positioned in Leith, awaiting 
expected reinforcements by sea. 
The poor showing of the Congregation only added to 
the government's conviction of their unreliability as 
political allies. Sadler and Croftes continued to 
recommend that money and advice were to be the only aid 
gl'ven to them. 46 Th t · · t · 1 D b e urn1ng po1n came 1n ear y ecem er 
with the news (which later proved to be false) that a 
47 
number of French bands had occupied Eyemouth. Cecil noted 
the impact of the news on the Council "This daye, your 
48 
advertisement of the matter of Aymouth maketh us styrr". 
A small fleet of a dozen men of war under Admiral Winter 
with accompanying victual and munition ships was sent to 
blockade the Firth of the Forth while the Duke of Norfolk 
49 
was appointed Lieutenant General north of the Trent. 
Norfolk's appointment as Lieutenant was a surprising 
one. Although as England's only Duke, he was her premier 
peer, he was also young and ignorant of military affairs. 
Paradoxically, the Duke's martial inexperience was a factor 
in his appointment. As Cecil remarked to Sadler, Norfolk 
could be depended upon not to act upon his own initiative, 
"One notable quallitee he hath, wherin is great commend-
ation He will doo nothyng almost of any moment in his 
. b d . 50 prlvate causees, ut uppon a v1se". Norfolk received his 
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instructions onC~ristmas Day. He was to be responsible 
for the coordination of all military preparations, organis-
ing men and supplies for the army as well as seeing to the 
needs of Winter's fleet. The actual command of the army 
was given to Lord Grey. In his communications with the 
Dowager, Norfolk was to inform her that he was sent to see 
to the defence of the North, since after subduing Scotland, 
the French intended to invade across the border. If the 
Dowager refused to dismiss her French forces, hostages were 
to be taken of the Congregation and Grey's army sent into 
51 Scotland. 
Norfolk was instructed to use Sadler as his right 
hand man,and Grey,as a seasoned military commande~ was 
especially recommended to him. In addition, the Duke was 
provided with the Queen's letters missive to the northern 
b . . h d . h 52 no 1l1ty w ose a v1ce e was to use. In a set of secret 
instructions, Norfolk was also required to keep an eye on 
those in the North whose religious conformity was suspect. 
By the same, he was instructed to mollify Shrewsbury and 
explain to him why he was not granted the Lieutenancy. 
The reasons for the latter are obscure. It may simply be 
that Shrewsbury wasnot attracted by the prospect of another 
term as Lieutenant having barely recouped the financial 
losses of the previous one. A more likely reason was that 
the Earl was something of a spent forceJ old and ailing, he 
was now approaching sixty and might not have survived the 
. h h . 53 r1gours of anot er nort ern campa1gn. 
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By 26 January, Westmorland, Dacre and Wharton were 
with Norfolk in Newcastle. Their arrival coincided with 
the first news of Winter's engagements with the French ships 
in the Forth. Significantly enough, Norfolk kept from the 
northern peers the true nature of Winter's expedition and 
stuck to the official line that the fleet had been sent 
against pirates "••. because they should not myslyke that 
h . h 54 they were not made prevye to t e I><nngs ere". 
As soon as Norfolk had set off for Newcastle, the 
Queen's instinctive hesitancy made her draw back. She 
ordered that the gathering of the army on the border should 
be halted and instructed Norfolk to confer with Sadler as 
to whether Winter's blockade of the Forth was not sufficient 
aid to the Scots. Besides, some experienced captains and 
gunners from Berwick were to be sent secre.tly to Scotland 
' h h' d ' . 55 w1t a s 1p-loa of mun1t1ons. 
Elizabeth was desperately searching for alternatives 
to avoid a bloody campaign. The Queen would have been only 
too happy to see the Scots expel the French by themselves 
without her open aid. Not the least of her misgivings was 
the fear that the Scots might come to terms with the French 
with disastrous consequences for the English. 56 
Elizabeth's fears over the latter prospect were 
engendered by the fact that there remained a large body 
of influential neutral Scots. It was essential for the 
success of English policy to create a unified front of the 
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Scottish nobility. Sadler and Croftes had repeatedly 
stressed this factor in their communications with the 
Congregation. Sadler's experience as a diplomat in Scotland 
during Henry's reign made him wary. Then, it had been a 
virtually impossible task to create an Anglophile party 
among the quicksands of Scottish factional politics. His 
cautious approach was demonstrated when he and Croftes 
remarked to the leaders of the Congregation in December 
1559, " .•. and what those noble men do meane, which in this 
case do sitte still and withdraw themselfs from your partie, 
b . 57 surely we cannot ut merva1le". In particular, the 
government was concerned about the Scots in the Merse and 
Teviotdale who had;not yet openly declared for the 
Congregation; these were led by Walter Ker of cesford and 
Alexander, fifth Lord Hume, Wardens respectively of the 
Middle and East Marches. 58 The two men were strong 
supporters of the Dowager. She had worked hard to retain 
their loyalty by offering them rewards and pensions. 59 
It was essential to win over these two powerful conserva-
tives, not only to ensure the unimpeded passage of the 
English army into Lothian and the safety of the supply 
routes into Scotland, but also because the 
army would have to rely almost exclusively on the Merse 
for victuals. Further, the adherence of the two Wardens 
to the English cause would ensure the security of the 
h . . d 60 border once the bulk of t e army was occup1ed 1n Scotlan . 
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As early as August 1559p Croftes had sought to use 
Sir John Forster as a negotiator with the Scottish 
borderers but he alleged that Forster was afraid to lay 
himself open to charges of march treason because of 
unlicensed dealings with the Scots, especially in view of 
61 the fact that Northumberland, the Warden, was his enemy. 
Knox, predictably,saw Protestantism as the surest factor 
in winning over the borderers to the Congregation. He 
wrote several times (without success) recommending 
Elizabeth to license preachers to be able to minister on 
both sides of the border, " yf the hartes of the 
bordoraris of both partes can be united together in geddes 
62 fear, our victorie shalbe easy". 
The negotiations that Sadler and Croftes carried on 
with the two Scottish Wardens, using Days of Truce as a 
convenient guise, proved inconclusive. It was only after 
Winter's fleet had entered the Forth that the two reopened 
d . . 63 1SCUSS10nS. A meeting was arranged between the two 
Wardens and CroftesJ Cesford, however, did not attend. 
Hume informed Croftes that, although the Kers were still 
undecided, he himself wished to remain neutral until he 
64 
sought further advice from the Earl of Huntly. Hume 
promised Croftes that he would keep good order in the East 
March and allow his people to victual the army and serve 
the Congregation. If the Dowager summoned him, he would 
obey, but he would only take with him a small detachment 
65 
of twenty horse. The following month, further attempts 
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were made to induce the Kers to support the Congregation 
through the Keeper of Tynedale, George Heron, and his 
. 66 brother, Roger. Thereafter, the negotiations were 
brought to a halt as they ceased to have any practical 
importance, the Warden's neutrality being regarded as a 
sufficient guarantee. Despite this, Norfolk was careful 
to provide for all contingencies and raised 600 light horse 
to patrol the border once the main army had crossed. 67 
h . . 68 In t e renewed set of 1nstruct1ons issued to 
Norfolk in mid February 1560 before the formal treaty 
between the Queen and the Congregation, the basic principles 
on which the English were to aid the Scots remained the 
same; again, they centered upon the exigencies of 
English national security. Norfolk was instructed to 
decide with the Scots not only the most appropriate strategy 
for expelling the French but also to consult with them on 
how Scotland could be protected against any new incoming 
French forces, "··· ye may informe them,that the chardge 
wer intollerable for us, to mayntene a continuell Army by 
sea in those North Partes for that Purpose". It was taken 
for granted that the French would retaliate by a declaration 
of war, "··. it is a thing most evident that the French will 
enterr into an oppen hostilitie with us and our realme, 
uppon this our ayde gyven them". Guarantees of mutual aid 
and assistance were to be negotiated with the Scots" ..• or 
els so to establish a condord betwixt both these realmes, 
and specially uppon these frontyers as the one might live in 
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a suerty of the other without jelosye or doubt". Norfolk 
was to give priority to the security of Berwick. If the 
Queen could be certain of continued Scottish amity and 
assistance should the French invade across the border, the 
financial burden the defence of Berwick entailed might be 
curbed. The suggestion was even raised as to whether the 
English might maintain a small garrison at Eyemouth to 
protect Berwick. The offensive-defensive treaty concluded 
at Berwick on 27 February encapsulated these aims, although 
the matter of Eyemouth was quietly dropped. The treaty 
provided that if the French invaded England, the Scots 
would provide Elizabeth with 2,000 horse and 1,000 foot at 
the Queen's expense. If the invasion occurred north of 
h d . h . 69 York, t e Scots woul f1nance t e1r own forces. 
On 24 March, Elizabeth announced her intention of 
maintaining peace with France and Scotland. The proclamation 
drew attention to the overweening ambition of the House of 
Guise and the provocative actions of the French and their 
belligerent preparations. Their forces north of the 
border, it was argued, constituted a threat to English 
. . 70 . h 
nat1onal secur1ty. Almost Slmultaneously, t e army under 
Lord Grey entered Scotland and laid siege to the French in 
. h . 71 . Le1th. T e campa1gn was a far from glor1ous one. The 
siege was grossly mismanaged and the French put up a 
stubborn resistance, seriously weakening the morale of the 
besiegers by fierce sorties. An attempt to take the town 
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by assault on 7 May ended in disastrous failure with the 
loss of some 500 lives. Only the seasoned troops from the 
Berwick bands were singled out for their conspicuous 
72 bravery. 
Despite these drawbacks, the growing desperateness 
of the situation in Leith meant that the French could not 
hold out much longer. English naval supremacy in the Forth 
and the outbreak of the French wars of religion made any 
supplies or reinforcements from France an unlikely prospect. 
By mid May, the French were ready to talk of peace. On 
this occasion, contrary to the proceedings at Berwick, the 
negotiations were not conducted by Norfolk. Instead, Cecil, 
accompanied by that veteran of English diplomats, 
Dr. Nicholas Wotton, was appointed to treat of peace. 
Originally, it was agreed that the two sides should meet at 
Newcastle, but on the death of the Dowager, the meeting 
was transferred to the Scottish capital. By the provisions 
of the Treaty of Edinburgh?3 concluded on 6 July, all 
French forces were to be evacuated except 60 troops 1n 
Inchkeith and 60 in Dunbar. French troops or munitions were 
to be prevented from entering Scotland and Eyemouth was to 
be demolished. By agreeing to drop the arms and title of 
England, Francis and Mary tacitly accepted Elizabeth's right 
to the English throne. 
Since it was deemed to be in derogation of their 
majesty that sovereigns should enter into a treaty with their 
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subjects, the agreement was concluded between the English 
and French. However, to ensure the continued influence of 
the Congregation and English interests in Scottish politics, 
certain concessions were granted to the Scots. These 
included the setting up of a ruling Council just less than 
half of whose members were to be chosen by the Scots,and the 
remainder were to be appointed by Mary. The Queen was also 
to confirm the summoning of a Scottish Parliament to settle 
the affairs of the realm. 
The only pdssible warranty for the security of the 
border at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign was a peaceful 
understanding with the Franco-Scottish monarchy. In the 
political climate that followed the Queen's accession, 
with evidence of French hostility streaming from every 
quarter, the treaty agreements concluded at Cateau-Cambresis 
and Upsetlington could not be relied upon to provide a basis 
for peace. An alternative strategy was a garrisoning policy 
of the Anglo-Scottish border which the Crown could not possi-
bly afford to maintain effectively, especially if England had 
to compete with the combined power and resources of France and 
Scotland. The only remaining possibility was the ejection of 
the French from the Scottish mainland by force with no 
guarantee that they would not simply return. Faced with 
this dilemma the revolt of the Protestant Lords of the 
Congregation was a unique opportunity for the new regime. 
Cecil at once seized on the political significance of the 
revolt. He saw in it not only an occasion to rid England 
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of the military threat north of the border but also a chance 
to further the advancement of the Protestant cause. Forging 
strong ideological links with Scotland would provide a more 
lasting basis for Anglo-Scottish amity than heretofore. 
To persuade the Queen to intervene in Scottish affairs was 
an uphill task. The argument that was to have the greatest 
weight with Elizabeth was that she was obliged to act irt the 
interest of her own self-preservation against the menace of 
France. The Queen would not commit herself to aid the Scots 
unless she was assured that they could be taken seriously. 
The congregation for their part refused to hazard themselves 
irrevocably in overt rebellion without strong guarantees of 
English backing. It took eight long months of negotiations 
to resolve this diplomatic impasse. Full credit has been 
given to the part played by Cecil in the drawn out nego-
tiations but little recognition has been given to the roles 
played by Sadler, Percy and Croftes. Their effort was 
crucial to the success of the intervention policy. Not only 
did they act with unflagging loyalty as intermediaries 
between the Congregation and the court but their experience 
of and proximity to the arena of events coupled with their 
intelligent assessments of the accuracy of information and 
significance of the situation north of the border had a 
positive influence in the shaping of that policy. 
Of the military achievement of the Leith campaign, 
the Chronicler Hayward commented 
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It is certayne that if we respect either the prepa-
racions, or the atchivement, or the continance of this 
warre, it was not great; but if we regard the end 
which it atteyned, or the effects which did ensue, 
it was a very great and weightye warre. 74 
Although the Queen of Scots remained in power, the new 
role exercised by the Protestant nobility in government was 
an effective bridling force. Another factor working in. 
England's favour was that the Protestant Lords refused to 
relinquish their league with Elizabeth. Protestantism was 
successfully cutting through old loyalties neutralising the 
threat once posed by the Franco-Scottish monarchy. 
The Treaty of Edinburgh has rightly been seen as one 
of the great triumphs of Elizabethan foreign policy. It 
saw the beginning of a new concord between the two realms 
based on a common faith and common interests. In stark 
contrast with her father's bludgeoning and ultimately 
fruitless tactics, Elizabeth's achievement was considerable. 
Cooperation and not integration was to be the key to the 
success of Elizabethan policy towards Scotland. Both sides 
of the border could look forward to four decades of peace, 
adequate time in which to" .•. weare out that hatred 
betwene the two nations which former hostilitie had made 
75 
almost naturall". 
367 
The Change of Regime the Border 1558-1559 
On 18 November, the day following the accession of 
Elizabeth, cecil drew up for the Council a memorandum of 
business to be transacted. The Chief-Secretary placed the 
affairs of the Anglo-Scottish border second only in 
importance to the renewal of the commission of the envoys 
. 76 . 
at cateau-cambres1s. It was a forceful rem1nder that 
the new Queen inherited her sister's war with the Scots. 
Two days later at Hatfield at the first session of the new 
council, Eure was .instructed to continue with the new 
fortifications at Berwick, " so as at the least there 
be somuche doone as shulde have been doone if the late 
77 Quene had l:y-ved". While orders were given for the 
despatch of ordnance, munitions and victuals to the town, 
the new government set about assessing the military 
situation. Sir Thomas Percy,who was in London at the time 
of the Queen's accession, had reported that some of the 
bands serving on the border were lacking in numbers; to 
remedy this, his brother, the Earl was instructed 
... to cause furthewith in most secrete manner 
certain discrete gentlemen, not being Northumberland 
men or Borderers, to repayre at oone instant tyme to 
all the severall places where any nombers are placed, 
and to take musters of them to see how many are 
wanting. 78 
E . d h . 79 ure was 1nstructe to perform t e same task at Berw1ck. 
In an attempt to countervail absenteeism among officers 
and troops, a proclamation was issued ordering all men in 
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wages on the border to return immediately on pain of 
forfeiture of pay. 80 At the same time, the Master of 
the Ordnance in the North, Thomas Gower, and John Abingdon, 
the Surveyor of the Victuals, were called to London to 
. h . h 81 g1ve an account of t e1r c arges. 
On the border itself, the desultory series of raids 
continued unabated. since the dismissal of the bulk of 
the garrisons in the late autumn of 1558, the East and 
Middle Marches seem to have suffered particularly badly 
from the cumulative effect of the Scottish incursions. It 
was claimed that "The Skote rydes as far as Morpeth as 
peacebly as in Tividale". Upon entering the villages of 
the East March, " ... the Skotes byd rise the greate hoste 
of Skotland is comyng all your towne shalbe burned, yf ye 
"82 
wyle be my prisoner I wyll save thy hors corne and Rattle. 
On 22 December in a daring raid the barmkin at Cornhill 
between Wark and Norham was captured by the Scots and 
French, the Captain was killed and his entire garrison of 
100 light horse and 40 of the townsmen were captured. 83 
The outrage at Cornhill prompted Northumberland to request 
reinforcements. The Earl argued, "• .. we be habell nothinge 
to withstand the enemyes power they be of so great force 
h . h . . h d . 84 av1nge t ere countrle strong Wlt all, an we so Welke". 
The Scots with their effectively organised system of 
quartering managed to maintain a steady raiding pressure 
. . h d . dd 85 especlally 1n t e East an Ml le Marches. The Earl 
insisted to the Council that unless the inequality of forces 
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" be spedelye repaired so as our force be to counter-
vail thother, ye shall in shorte tyme have the borders 
d.. . d 86 utterly 1stro1e ". 
The winter garrisons left by Westmorland were 
clearly insufficient to patrol large areas of the border 
especially since priority was given to the guarding of the 
main fortified strongholds. When in December the former 
Lieutenant's advice was sought regarding the military 
situation on the border, he remonstrated that the forces 
he had left were adequate. Westmorland claimed that the 
defect in border security lay in the failure to enforce 
the watch devised by Wharton. Lack of forewarning of 
Scottish raids through the absence of a proper system of 
watch meant that reinforcements could not be quickly 
dispatched to countervail the marauders. 87 
It was difficult to decide how to react effectively 
to the constant raiding of the Scots. On 10 January 1559, 
the Council wrote to Leonard Dacre, Deputy Warden of the 
West March, commending him for his activities against the 
Scots; yet, at the same time adding that they" .•. wysshed 
he had forborne thannoyinge of them, and stande only uppon 
. "88 his owne guarde, consyderinge they wyll seke to revenge 1t. 
The following day on receipt of Northumberland's letter the 
Council urgedthe Earl to confer with Lord Dacre to arrange 
counter measures against the Scots, " ... which the lordes 
thinke shalbe best doone if they agree uppon some enterprise 
againste them at oone tyme". Further reinforcements were 
h h d 1 . h h . . 89 to be sent to elp t e Earl ea w1t t e s1tuat1on. 
However, peace offers from the Dowager in late January 
and the likelihood of the negotiations at Cateau-Cambresis 
drawing to a successful conclusion enabled the council to 
cancel their former orders. 90 
The government continually protested that the 
combined total of the northern garrisons exceeded that of 
the Scots' forces. Although an exaggeration, this state-
ment might have been nearer the truth if the bands on the 
border had been up to full strength. The incoming muster 
returns confirmed the Council's worst fears regarding 
undermanning. Northumberland's diligence in taking secret 
musters was commented on favourably but the Council 
"••. muche myslyked that there are such lackes of the 
91 
nombers". Musters,especially on active service were 
notoriously inaccurate,mainly because unscrupulous Captains 
had every financial inducement to make them so. It was 
relatively easy to make up depleted bands with anyone 
willing to pass as a soldier for the day in return for an 
appropriate reward. One correspondent writing from Berwick 
in December 1558 sardonically observed that on muster day 
all agricultural pursuits were halted as every ploughman 
h d . 92 a a crown for muster1ng. Deliberate undermanning by 
Captains who pocketed the proceeds was perhaps a contri-
butory factor in the weakness of the northern garrisons 
but there is also evidence that the effects of the influenza 
epidemic were taking their to11. 93 
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Reports of the muster commissioners from other parts of the 
country bear this out. The Justices of Cheshire in February 
1559 declared the reason for the poor attendance at the 
musters was due, 
... not onelie to the great nomber bothe of men and 
barnes imployed in service northwarde these late 
yeares past. But also extreme sicknes aswell the 
plage as quartern and other extreme diseases. 94 
From Staffordshire, the commissioners complained of 'the 
great mortalitie of late•. 95 
Yet, even allowing for these factors, a comparison 
between the muster returns of the East and Middle Marches 
for 1559 and 1584 illustrates the wild discrepancies that 
could occur in the figures. The 1559 muster 'of all the 
inhabitants of the two marches' shows 2,988 foot and 
1,830 horse, while in 1584 the totals amounted to 7,450 and 
3,139 respectively. 96 The 1559 figures bear no relation 
to the true manpower of the marches, this was also true 
97 
of the country as a whole. 
The peace settlement enabled the government to 
discharge the residue of the garrisons in Northumberland but 
undue concern for financial stringency was putting at 
risk the military security of Berwick especially since the 
progress of the new fortifications meant that the defences 
of the town were seriously weakened. In March 1559, the 
government removed Lord Eure from the Captaincy of Berwick 
and appointed Sir James Croftes. 98 The new Captain was 
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bitterly opposed to what he regarded as the government's 
over hasty troop reductions at Berwick so soon after the 
peace with Scotland had been proclaimed. In late June 1559, 
he protested that besides the continuance of the French 
bands and the slowness of the Scots in dismantling the 
fortifications at Eyemouth, the Dowager had not dismissed 
her forces because of the Protestant rebellion but she had 
merely withdrawn them into Lothian. He also warned that 
despite the opposition between the Dowager and the 
Congregation, " ... they wyll sone inoughe be freyndes yf 
h d h . 99 aney advauntage may be a oft 1s towne". In July, 
Croftes repeated his protests in vigorous terms to Lord 
Robert Dudley, not only were the Council imprudent in reduc-
ing the garrison but they failed to consult him beforehand 
I have written to declare my opynion, but yt comythe 
alwayes to late, for they make me not privy till they 
have fyrst determyned ••• nowe the Councell hath 
determyned, yt ys late to wryte for you know the 
peryl therof, and this secrasye I must put into 
your handes. Assuredly the doers of these matters 
are eyther careless or els they understand not the 
state of thinges here. 100 
Reflecting the rising influence of the Dudley faction at 
court, Croftes urged "••• this thing in especial!, I beseche 
your lordshippe to be meanes there be no more demynishement 
. h . h d d 'b . 101 or alterat1on ere Wlt out goo ell erat1on". 
The government's drive to reduce expenditure 
made Croftes•s position as Captain increasingly 
difficult as the Council decided to withdraw the extra 
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allowance that had been paid to the soldiers on the border 
. 1557 102 s1nce . In March 1559, Croftes•s request that the 
payment be continued was refused. The Captain was instructed 
"••• to persuade the sowldiours to be contented with their 
ordynary interteignement untyll that her Hieghnes be of 
103 better habyllytie to consyder them". Croftes advised 
upon the inexpediency of discontinuing the allowance as.one 
of the reasons for its introduction had been to encourage 
the men to better arm themselves. Every man with armour 
was paid 10d per day, 2d more than those soldiers without,and 
of this sum the Captain took 1d per day until the armour 
was paid for. The results of the scheme were such that at 
Berwick, " the rarest thing that ys to be observed in a 
muster ys a naked pyke or an harquebusshe without a 
. " 104 
murr1on . 
Aside from financial considerations the reasons for 
the Council's adverse reaction to Croftes's request are 
not easily understood especially since lack of armour was 
widely thought to be one of the reasons for the country's 
military weakness. Sir Thomas Challoner, Elizabeth's 
ambassador to Philip, noted how well informed the Kingts 
former ambassador to London, Count de Feria, was of England's 
affairs, adding that the Count had told him how sad he was 
to see England's plight, without money, soldiers, armour 
105 
or experience in war. 
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Comments on England's military weakness were not 
only restricted to foreigners. Sir John Brende, an 
experienced military writer who had been appointed Muster 
Master at Berwick in Edward's reign and who was to recom-
mend that a new establishment be brought into being at 
Berwick, ruefully observed" ..• our men in thes dais are 
so without armor and disciplyne that they seme not compar-
able to the foreyn nations yt be so well armed and in 
' d d' 106 contynuall exerc1se an lScaplyne". It is not known 
whether the men that were discharged after March 1559 were 
paid according to the old rates or not. In December 1559 
Sadler continued to pay the supplementary allowance awarded 
in Mary's reign to the garrison at Berwick because supplies 
d h d ' d 107 were so ear t e men coul not 11ve on a groat a ay. 
That this policy was generalised seems a strong possibilit~ 
however, the 'benevolence• only became an official wage 
rise after the drawing up of the New Establishment at 
Berwick. 
Croftes also received the backing of Sadler in 
another controversy engendered by the government's short-
sighted attempts at financial retrenchment. This concerned 
another Marian measure designed to improve the efficiency 
of the soldier. In February 1558, at the request of Eure, 
and Sir John Brende, the Council instructed Westmorland 
to permit the Master of the Ordnance at Berwick to allow 
monthly two pounds of gunpowder free of charge to the 
harquebusiers serving in the town, 'for their training and 
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encouragement' • This allowance was distributed until 
May 1559 after which Gower's warrant ran out. In spite of 
this, the Master of the Ordnance continued the allocation 
which the men hoped to enjoy freely. In October 1559, 
Sadler and Croftes informed the Council of the dispute that 
had arisen between the Captains at Berwick and Gower. The 
latter wished to have the money for the powder allowance 
docked from the men's pay. Sadler and Croftes, although 
aware of the danger of the free powder allowance becoming 
customary, were none the less impressed by its beneficial 
effects, 
•.• though we thinke that it had ben moch better to 
have relieved the souldeours som other way, because 
we lyke not the president, yet sithens it is passed, 
and that therby tharquebutiers here are becom so 
perfite in their feate that for so many we thinke 
there be no better of no nacyon. 109 
Norfolk was also impressed by the skill of the harquebusiers 
at Berwick and strongly recommended their employment at 
Leith. Events proved that his confidence in them was not 
. 110 
m1staken. To end the controversy, Sadler and Croftes 
suggested that the men should have their powder allowance 
freely provided up to the present and thereafter the practice 
should be discontinued. Although the New Establishment recog-
nised the need for the garrison to have an allowance of powder 
for training purposes,- the cost was docked from the 
d . 111 sol 1er's wages. 
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These controversies served to bring to light the 
more general disorganised state of affairs at Berwick. 
Problems over the administration of the town and garrison 
presented themselves from every quarter. In August 1559, 
the council decided to send Sir Ralph Sadler in an effort 
to improve the efficiency of the town. 
Sadler was an experienced administrator who had 
begun his career in Cromwell's secretariat. He rose 
rapidly in the latter's service becoming Groom of the 
Chamber in 1535 and Joint Principal Secretary with 
Wriothesley in 1540. However, Sadler's chief claim to fame 
was his long experience in Scottish affairs. It was in this 
connection that Noailles referred to him as 'homme d'esprit 
112 
et de grande menee•. Sadler had been Henry'VIII's chief 
agent in Scottish affairs from 1537 onwards and was the main 
architect of the ill-fated Treaty of Greenwich. Sadler was 
a confirmed Protestant whose own religious convictions led 
him to judge other men's ability in the light of their 
religious affiliation. The application of this principle 
was one of the main drawbacks that prevented Sadler from 
coming to grips with the complexities of Scottish 
politics. 113 It also became the overriding factor in his 
estimation of the suitability of leading march administrators. 
Sadler's wide commission reflected the government's 
confidence in him. 114 Although the main purpose of his 
mission was to negotiate with the Scottish Protestants, he 
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was also instructed to take order for the fortifications 
at Berwick and the government and administration of the 
border. 
At Berwick, Sadler worked conscientiously with 
Croftes in the running of the town, particularly in dealing 
with the two perennial problems of the Captain, those of 
securing an adequate supply of victuals and making sure the 
men were paid as promptly as possible. No innovations were 
made in the administration of Berwick,though it wasrealised 
that change was long overdue and the government in fact 
was in the process of formulating a new order for the town. 
Sadler had little to do with the organisation of the New 
Establishment; at Berwick, his energies aside from the 
important negotiations with the Scottish Protestants were 
devoted mainly to Wardenry affairs, and it is to these that 
we must now turn. 
Sadler's arrival in Berwick saw the beginning of his 
unremitting campaign to undermine the power of the Percies 
and their adherents. Although he had been instructed to 
use the advice of Croftes and Sir Henry Percy,who had been 
closely involved in the negotiations with the Scottish 
Protestants since the beginning of the reign, Sadler declined 
to involve the latter and began to criticize his role in 
the administration of the march, 
As for Sir H Percy, I saw him not yet; for he hath not 
ben nere the fronteirs syns I cam hither, nor a good 
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while before; nor do I judge him a man of such 
integryte as in any wise may be comparable to 
Sir James Croft, 115 
Percy had been in London at the time of the Queen's 
accession and had warned the government that the bands on 
the border were lacking in numbers. He was rewarded by the 
. . h 40 116 1559 h . Councll w1t £ . In January , t e Counc11 
117 
commended his 'forwardnes and actyvytye• against the Scots. 
In June of that year, Percy solicited Cecil for the Captaincy 
of Tynemouth vacated by the death of Sir Thomas Hilton, and 
. . d' 118 h d . d h1s request was granted 1mme lately. Percy a carr1e on a 
direct correspondence with Cecil and Sir Thomas Parry, the 
influential Controller of the Household, since the beginning 
of the reign, giving advice on Scottish and border affairs. 
This correspondence and his long involvement in the Scottish 
negotiations illustrate the strong links which the Earl's 
brother had forged early on in the reign with the leaders 
of the new regime. These connections were to shield him 
from the attacks of men in the mould of Sadler who opposed 
the reestablishment of Percy power on the border. 
The Earl was not so fortunate. Northumberland had 
. d d h . . h . 119 been conf1rme as War en at t e beg1nn1ng of t e re1gn. 
Criticisms of his rule on the border, however, soon reached 
120 the ears of the government. Sadler only added fuel to 
the flames, Northumberland was in his view:",,. a very 
unrnete man for the charge which is comytted unto him here•: 121 
This was only the beginning of a steady campaign to erode the 
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Earl's influence on the border and prepare the way for 
his dismissal from the two Wardenries. 
Sadler was determined to make an issue of the 
dispute between the Earl and Lady Carnaby. The latter 
was the widow of Sir Reynold Carnaby who had been the 
most prominent leader of the Crown party on the border 
throughout the 1530's and early 1540's. Carnaby used his 
influence over the sixth Earl, (the uncle of the present 
Earl), to split him from his family and friends. He bore 
much of the responsibility for the Earl's reckless prodi-
gality and eventually persuaded Northumberland to surrender 
his estates to the Crown. 122 Carnaby died in 1543 leaving 
a widow, Dorothy Forster, the sister of Sir John Forster who 
was himself prominent among the present Earl's enemies. 
In June 1559, Northumberland petitioned the Council 
for the use of Lady Carnaby's house situated in the former 
abbey at Hexham for use as a residence for the Keeper of 
d . . b 123 dl . . Tyne ale, Franc1s Sl1ngs y. Among Sa er's 1nstruct1ons 
was a letter from the Queen which he was to deliver to Lady 
Carnaby requesting her to lend her house to Slingsby. 124 
Upon his arrival in Berwick, Sadler ordered the Earl to 
proceed no further in the affair. The delay angered 
Northumberland who complained that the authority of his 
office was being held in contempt, "· .. foras moche as the 
usage of that matter by the said ladie and her frendes 
hathe bene and is suche evell example of disobedience to 
h . . 125 t auctor1t1e". Sadler for his part now claimed that 
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although he possessed the Queen's letters to Lady Carnaby 
the task.of their delivery had been left to his discretion, 
he now argued that Hexham was not a suitable residence for 
126 the Keeper of Tynedale. The matter was finally settled 
after the Earl sent Slingsby to complain to the Council. 
A face-saving compromise was devised whereby the Keeper· 
was to remain in Lady Carnaby's house for two or three 
weeks or longer if she agreed, thereafter he was to seek 
. 'd 127 an alternat1ve res1 ence. 
The affair was not to be an isolated incident for 
Sadler sought to bring the whole question of the Earl's 
rule in the East and Middle Marches into doubt, 
It is more than xx yeres ago syns I had som under-
standing of this frontier, and yet dyd I never know 
it in such disorder; for now the officer spoyleth 
the thefe, without bringing forth his person to 
tryall by the law; and the thefe robbeth the trew 
man, and the trew men take assuraunce of the theves 
that they shall not robbe them, and give them yerely 
rent and tribute ... All of which procedeth of the 
lacke of stoute and wise officers. 128 
Northumberland's dealings with the Scots as Warden 
were also made difficult by Sadler's ambiguous role. There 
were many deferrals of Days of Truce after the Treaty of 
Upsetlington, mainly due to the turmoils between the 
Dowager and the Congregation. In addition, there was much 
friction between the Wardens as Hume and cesford and the 
Keeper of Liddisdale, the Earl of Bothwell, were strong 
supporters of the Dowager and were well aware of the covert 
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negotiations of Sir Henry Percy and his brother the Earl 
with the Congregation. 129 At the request of the Dowager, 
a commission was appointed in July 1559 to deal with the 
ransoms and exchange of prisoners from either side as well 
as to settle outstanding border disputes. Northumberland 
and Croftes were appointed and later Sadler was included 
. h . . 130 1n t e comm1sS1on. The original meeting 6 planned at 
Norham on 5 September, was cancelled by Sadler and Croftes 
who were heavily engaged in arranging the safe passage of 
the Earl of Arran across the border. Northumberland was 
not a party to the underlying purpose of Sadler's mission 
and was puzzled by the deferral of the meeting with the 
. h . . 131 Scott1s comm1ss1oners. 
It was only after Arran had been safely conveyed 
into Teviotdale that the commissioners met at the Kirk of 
1 . h . h . . 132 . d d Upset 1ngton. T e art1c1es of t e comm1ss1on prov1 e 
for the immediate exchange of bills by the Wardens and 
their settlement at an early Day of Truce. The rest of the 
articles set out the arrangements dealing with the ransom 
and exchange of prisoners. All controversies arising out 
of the latter were to be dealt with by the Wardens. 
Although Northumberland had been present at the first 
meeting, the Earl was not a signatory to the concluding 
articles. He remained as Warden but his position was under 
threat. In a dispute with Bothwell over the implementation 
of the articles, the Earl was unable to argue his case as 
Sadler had not even bothered to send him a copy, which, as 
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the Warden bitterly complained to Sadler, 
... I am enformed was assigned by you and them, and 
never as yet sent unto me; which is not a lytell 
marvale to me, considering the most parte of the 
same articles shuld have bene put in execution by me. 
It seamyth the quenes majesties pore subiects 
is rather further dreven of for the having of 
justice by our last sytting in comyssion, then if 
suche comyssion had never ben sytt on. Therefore 
I wold wish, and do think it most convenient, you 
shuld take in hand to procede for the help and 
relieve of this pore countrie, as ye were put in 
trust when ye cam in comyssion for that purpose. For 
I am sure ye are not amynded that I shuld do any good, 
when ye kepe from me the originall that I shuld be 
directed by. 133 
The letter eloquently conveys the resentment of a magnate 
official who felt his whole position in the marches to be 
under threat. 
134 The memoranda written by Sadler during his 
'investigation• into the Earl's tenure of the Wardenries 
were designed to procure as much damning evidence as 
possible against Northumberland to ensure his dismissal 
from his offices. They are of interest because although 
they appear to be investigative articles drawn up as a 
prelude to the investigation itself, the incriminating 
evidence is confused with the proposed articles of enquiry, 
reinforcing the fact that an impartial investigation into 
the Earl's conduct as Warden was not Sadler's intention. 
The catalogue of accusations constituted a wholesale 
condemnation of the Earl's rule in the East and Middle 
Marches. 
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As an alternative to the rule of the Percies, Sadler 
submitted to Cecil a series of recommendations for the 
government of the borders. As Warden of the East March, 
Sadler suggested Sir James Croftes. The latteri however, 
was unwilling to accept the post on financial grounds and 
was reluctant to stay in the North for health reasons. If 
Croftes was unwilling to accept the post, then the Wardenry 
coupled with the Captaincy of Berwick might be granted to 
d h . . 135 . Lor Grey, t e former Capta1n of Gu1snes. To 1ncrease 
the rewards of the, office Sadler suggested that Grey might 
136 
also have Sir Thomas Percy's Captaincy of Norham. As 
Grey's deputy in the Middle March, Sadler recommended 
Sir John Forster, suggesting that Forster could reside at 
Harbottle to keep both Tynedale and'Redesdale in order. 
With monotonous predictability, Sadler also put forward the 
names of Wharton and Sir Thomas Dacre as replacements for 
d . h h 137 Lor Dacre 1n t e West Marc . 
Sadler was suggesting no less than a complete reversal 
of the Marian personnel of March government and the putting 
back of the clock to 1553. Not all of his recommendations 
were accepted by the government but the decision to dismiss 
the Earl was quickly acted upon. On 30 October, 
Northumberland was summoned to court and instructed to remit 
his offices to Sadler. 138 The latter, shocked by the prospect 
of taking over the Wardenriesinow disclaimed all knowledge 
of border affairs, and claimed he was not equipped for the 
role, 
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••. how I am hable to bere these charges, I pray you 
consider; for, as you knowe, I have no lands or rents 
in this countrey, nor I have no tenaunts here to call 
uppon to kepe on horsback with me at all tymes, but 
must hire and enterteyn men for that purpose. 139 
Sadler was also concerned about the irregularity of the 
situation,as the Earl upon leaving Alnwick, either as a 
gesture of defiance or because he was ignorant of the true 
circumstances of his recall to court, had proclaimed Sadler 
his deputy in the two marches, "••• so as he taketh him 
self to be still wardenJ and if he may so remayn, and 
receyve thenterteignment and profite of the office, and I 
140 to have all the travaile and charge". Sadler's anxiety 
that the Earl might continue as Warden was unfounded as 
Northumberland's summons to court constituted a dismissal 
from his office. 
In November, Sadler proceeded to oust all the Earl's 
major officers in march administration and replace them by 
conspicuous opponents of the Percies. That month he wrote 
to Cecil, informing him"··· I have more for frendshippe•s 
sake than for anything ells, gotten Sir J Forster to execute 
under me in the wardenrye of the middell marches, who, I 
assure you, is more sufficient for the same than I am". 141 
Forster was instructed by Sadler to dismiss the Earl's 
brother-in-law, Marmaduke Slingsby, from the Keepership of 
Tynedale. Forster's reply to Sadler describes the circums-
tances attending the appointment of a new Keeper. Slingsby 
had written to the bailiffs of Tynedale instructing the 
chief surname leaders or Headsmen to appear at Hexham at 
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9 am on 23 November when a new Keeper would be assigned to 
them. The order was apparently ignored, whereupon Forster 
sent warning throughout the dale ordering the Headsmen to 
appear before him at Chipchase or they would be proclaimed 
as rebels. He was evidently pleased with the effect of 
this hard line approach, 
..• the saide daie the moste parte of all the holle 
countrye came unto me without eny such assurance, as 
thaie have bene accoustomed to have of other there 
kepperes heretofore; wherof many of them ware such 
as haive bene rebelles theise towe yeres by past, and 
never came to my lord nor Mr Slengsbye•: 
Forster appointed his kinsman, George Heron, as Keeper. 
John Hall, the Keeper of Redesdale, who had been replaced 
by the Earl in favour of Christopher Rokesby, was reinstated 
. . 142 1n offlce. 
In spite of Sadler's efforts to discredit Lord 
Dacre, there was no such reversion of personnel in the West 
March. Sadler accused Dacre of fomenting feud between the 
Grahams and the Maxwells. The Warden of the Scottish West 
March, the Master of Maxwell, was a Protestant and Sadler 
alleged that Dacre wished to prevent Maxwell from joining 
the Congregation by encouraging the Grahams who" ..• ryde 
and spoyle his countrey •.. so that he is so occupied there 
to defend the same, that he hath yet no leysour to loke 
143 thother waye". Sadler argued that Dacre was loth that 
the Protestants should prosper on either side of the borderp 
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What polycie it is to comrnytte rule and auctoryte to 
such men as your wardens here be, with their other 
faults not unknowen to you, being indeed rank papists 
you can judge and consider better then we can; but 
we, as our dueties do requyre, wish that shoulde have 
the rule of these frontierrs, as favour the quenes 
maiesties procedinges. 144 
By attacking the Wardens' religious beliefs, Sadler 
sought to bring into suspicion their loyalty to the Crown. 
Since the enactment of the Statutes of Supremacy and 
Uniformity, loyalty to the established church and to the 
Crown became synonymous. That religious non-conformity was 
a potential threat to the unity of the State and could only 
be regarded as civil disobedience was a principle upheld by 
Protestants and Catholics alike. 
Sadler recommended that Dacre be summoned to court, 
but as for Cecil's request to have something concrete with 
which to accuse the Warden, he was afraid that even a charge 
of negligence might not stand. cecil might suggest that 
the Warden's sickness rendered him unfit to carry out his 
d . . 145 ut1es effectlvely. 
The news that Dacre was to go to London and the 
likelihood that he would be deprived of his Wardenship 
encouraged his enemies to apply further pressure. In 
October 1559, Wharton, Dacre's old opponent, wrote to Sadler 
asking him to favour Sir Thomas Dacre, Lord Dacre's ille-
gitimate brothe~ and his son Christopher as the two branches 
of the family were locked in bitter feud. Sadler sent 
Christopher Dacre to Cecil informing him that both he and 
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his father had been, "••• verye extremely delt withall by 
the lord Dacre, and have suffered grete injurye at his 
hands these VI yeres and more ... ••. 
The affair,though trivial enough,illustrates the 
methods a Warden could use to make life intolerable for 
those in his march if he happened to be at feud with them. 
Sir Thomas's son had been out hunting in his father's park 
which lay adjacent to the Warden's. Dacre had imprisoned 
him on a charge of trespass, fictitious or not, and would 
not permit his release unless he and other gentlemen would 
agree to be bound by recognisance for Christopher's re-
entry upon twenty days warning. Dacre, as Sadler remons-
trated, "··· for so small a matier, hath shewed some malice 
and great extremyte, and more then law and reason wolde, in 
that he semeth in his own cause to be both judge and 
partie". 146 Sadler's accusations against Dacre were in a 
similar vein to those he had used in order to discredit 
Northumberland. The emphasis on the magnate official 
abusing the authority that had been granted him by the 
Crown for his own private interests, Sadler knew, would 
strike a powerful note with Elizabeth's Council. Both 
peers had been too closely connected with the discredited 
Marian regime for the new government to continue to favour 
them. By attacking their religious convictions, Sadler 
brought into question the loyalty of these powerful 
territorial magnates to the Crown, during a 
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politically sensitive period when the new Queen herself 
was expressing fears of a Catholic led revolt against her. 
Although Dacre's position was seriously undermined 
by Sadler, the Warden managed to hold on to the West March 
. h' . 1563 147 tlll lS eventual removal ln . Northumberland's 
political eclipse on the border was irreversible; a much 
more powerful figure than Dacre, the government decided to 
remove him from all influence in border affairs rather than 
try to secure his loyal cooperation by retaining him in 
office. Sadler's campaign was an effective one. Yet, his 
bold lecturing of the Earl, full of accusations that 
Northumberland was exceeding the authority of his office, 
was not done entirely on his own initiative. He knew he had 
the powerful support of the Council behind him. Of 
all Sadler's charges against Northumberland, the accusation 
of administrative incompetence is the most difficult to 
sustain. Seen from the relative efficiency and stability 
of the central government at Westminister, it was very 
easy for a bureaucrat trained in Cromwell's household to 
have a jaundiced view of border affairs, especially since 
an already inadequate system of regional government had been 
thrown into turmoil during two years of disruptive hosti-
lities with the Scots. Sadler's professed concern for 
administrative efficiency and law and order on the marches, 
genuine though it might have been, accords little with his 
appointment of Sir John Forster as his Deputy Warden. 
Sadler must have aware of the latter's reputation. Left 
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to his own ends the unscrupulous Forster was to rule the 
Middle March through a mixture of brute force and 
corruption for the next three decades. Much the same 
can be said for his recommendation of Sir James Croftes 
as Warden: Croftes was not only later under a cloud for 
his maladministration at Berwick but was blamed for the 
failure of the assault at Leith. Northumberland's dismissal 
stemmed from the new government's distrust of his Catholic 
sympathies especially when combined with his powerful 
position as Warden in the two marches. Sadler's suspicion 
of Catholics on principle and his support for the Forster 
faction on the border led him to wage a successful campaign 
for the Earl's discharge from the Wardenries. Humiliated 
and deprived of a part in what he saw as the traditional 
role of his family in border office, the resentment 
Northumberland began to harbour against the new regime 
reached its climax in the disastrous rebellion of 1569. 
Reorganisation and Reform Berwick and the Border 1559-1560 
In the wake of the loss of Calais the new government 
was as sensitive as Mary's had been over the security of the 
town of Berwick. We have seen that one of the first acts 
of Elizabeth's Council was to order that the fortifications 
there should be continued. The progress of the latter 
impressed Salder on his arrival in the town, " ... surely the 
works are wourthie the seing, and, as we thinke, be both 
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fayre, and lykelye to be made very strong, wherein grete 
expedition hathe ben used hitherto". Both he and Croftes 
recommended that the fortifications be given urgent priority 
as the defences of the town were still weak. The two men 
suggested that there should be a temporary increase in the 
strength of the garrison to protect Berwick during the 
148 
course of the works. The ordinary garrison of the town 
was far from large and could fluctuate considerably. In 
1557/8, it stood at 132 horse and 63 foot. By August 1559, 
these figures had shrunk to 76 horse and 32 foot. 149 This 
force, however, only made up part of the armed strength of 
the town. The rest consisted of the armed retinues of the 
. . h . 150 
maJor offlcers of t e garr1son. These were generally 
made up of their household servants and their presence in 
the town therefore depended on the residence of their 
masters. This explains why the government was so preoccupied 
with the absenteeism of border officials. Another cause for 
concern was the widespread practice of pocketing the ~ages 
of prescribed retinues so that ·often the armed strength of 
. d . 151 h' 1 the town rema1ne merely f1gures on paper. T 1s atter 
practice was so notorious at Berwick that Elizabeth herself 
personally stressed to Norfolk the importance of stamping 
out the systemised fraud, " ... your majestie told me in your 
gallerye, alongest your garden, that Barwick bandes had ben 
152 
afore tyme, farr out of order". Yet, even allowing for 
a full complement of men it was felt that 2-300 soldiers 
were insufficient to guard the town effectively. Not only 
was it desirable to increase troop numbers but a thorough 
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overhaul of the military organisation of Berwick was long 
overdue. Slackness and some abuses in the offices of the 
Treasurer, Surveyor of the Victuals and Ordnance had lately 
come to light. 153 The increased cost of living had led to 
many requests for salary increases and since these had been 
granted or refused in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, it was 
expedient that the wages of the men from the Captain down-
wards should be reviewed. 
The recommendation that a new order should be drawn 
up for Berwick seems to have originated with the Muster 
Master, Sir John Brende, a recognised expert on military 
affairs. 154 The suggestion seems to have been made early 
in 1559 when hopes of an early end to the hostilities with 
the Scots seemed fairly certain. In lengthy memoranda, 
which bear frequent annotations by Cecil, Brende put 
forward his case for the reorganisation of Berwick "• .• wich 
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nowe by other losses we have lernyd to be of moment". 
Brende justified the additional expenses he anticipated the 
Crown would have to bear in implementing his plans by 
emphasising the unique importance of Berwick. The Scots 
and French would not risk a full scale invasion over the 
border while a strongly fortified and garrisoned Berwick, 
" ... lie upon their backs". For Brende it was essential 
that, in addition to the ordinary garrison, Berwick should 
have an extra force of 1,000 men in peacetime and 2,000 in 
war. In connection with the victualling of Berwick, Brende 
drew attention to the important fact that the most 
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vulnerable part of the town, the south-east corner which 
relied for its defences on the old medieval wallp was where 
the magazines, brewhouses and bakehouses were situated. To 
overcome this weakness, Brende recommended that a Lord 
Lieutenant should be appointed annually from August to 
October, establishing armed headquarters at Tweedmouth, the 
town in Norhamshire that faced Berwick on the south bank of 
the Tweed. In the event of any s1ege, this camp could be 
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supplied and provisioned by sea from Holy Island. 
By May 1559., Brende•s suggestion had the official 
recognition of cecil who encouraged him to draw up an out-
line of a new establishment using the advice of Croftes and 
. . h d 157 S1r Rlc ar Lee. Brende now turned his attention to the 
financial provisions of the reorganisation of the town. 
Cecil's insistence on a reduction in expenditure was an 
almost impossible objective to attain especially since with 
the unfinished fortifications more men were required to man 
the walls. Apart from this factor, the dearness of victuals 
made the old rate of 6d per day difficult for the men to 
live on. Brende argued that at the last pay he had been at 
pains to persuade many of the men to stay on. " ..• everie 
one is so desyrous to retorne towardes the sonne from 
the sowernes of this northerne ayer"; because of the 
unwillingness of troops to serve in the North, men must 
have some 'allurement' to draw them to garrison service at 
Berwick. Some financial provision for retired troops would 
be an added factor in persuading men to serve on the 
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border. 158 These and other suggestions were drawn up in 
a draft of the New Establishment in May but the government's 
preoccupation with Scottish affairs made it impossible to 
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carry on with the plans. 
After the Treaty of Edinburgh the task was revived 
and the New Establishment at Berwick became a major par~ 
of a general reorganisation of border defences. Cecil had 
passed through Berwick on his way to Edinburgh and the 
settlement of the frontier was evidently on his mind; 
writing to Petre he asked that if a peace treaty was secured 
"• •. gett me leave to make a long jornay to court : for I 
h d . 160 covett to peruse all t e frontyers, an so to Carllle". 
Whether in fact Cecil got as far as Carlisle is improbable. 
He was heavily engaged after the Treaty of Edinburgh making 
sure the provisions of the treaty were carried out and 
arranging the dismissal of the English army. However, his 
short stay in Berwick in late July gave him a unique 
opportunity to review the situation at first hand. By 
28 July, Cecil was back in London and the following month 
was spent drawing up the New Establishment incorporating 
many of the former recommendations made by Brende. By 
early September, the plans had been drafted and the new 
161 
scheme was to come into practice from 8 September. 
In accordance with Brende's suggestion, the provision 
for the separate defence of the town and castle was 
abolished especially as the latter had been abandoned for 
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defensive purposes in the new fortifications. The 
Captaincies of both the town and castle were coalesced 
into the ·new designation of governor. The fees accorded 
to the office were not on the face of it any different 
from thosewhich had been allocated to the Captains of the 
town and castle. The Governor was allowed £133 6s 8d and 
£40 for •espiall money'. Temporary provision, however, ·was 
made for a. more liberal allowance to take into account the 
dignity of Lord Grey's peerage, but since Berwick through-
out Elizabeth's reign was largely governed by a member of 
' the nobility, the distinction became irrelevant. Grey was 
paid an extra £200, " ..• for his better mayntenaunce in 
consideracon of his baronage". He was also allowed a 
Captain at £13 6s 8d per annum and a Secretary at a similar 
rate. Salaries of £6 13s 4d were allocated to the governor's 
domestic staff. These were designated as household servants 
in the New Establishment but it is clear that they and the 
40 soldiers that had previously been allowed to the Captain 
of the castle were one and the same thing and that Grey's 
personal servants were expected to double up as soldiers 
when required. 
The fees for the Wardenry of the East March were 
accorded at £400 per annum, a slight rise on the previous 
figure. 162 The total cost of the Governor's establishment, 
taking into account his fees for the East Wardenry amounted 
to £1,090 13s 4d. The Council had acted upon Brende's 
recommendation that in order to attract competent men into 
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service at Berwick, the government had to assign 
appropriate rates of pay. In the same way, the fees of the 
other officers were significantly raised. The Marshal's 
fee was trebled from the old figure of £33 6s 8d to £100 
per annum. The Treasurer's fee was raised from £20 to £100 
per annum. The office of Chamberlain which had been 
responsible for the management of Crown property in Berwick 
was abolished; its functions were now to be fulfilled by 
the Treasurer. The number of the town's Constables was 
halved to four; the salaries of the remainder were doubled 
to £20 per annum. 
Perhaps, the most radical change was in the size of 
garrisoning crews,which were massively increased. There 
was unanimous agreement that to be adequately defended 
Berwick required a garrison of at least 1,000 men. 
Sadler suggested that the garrison should be maintained at 
1,500 during the time of the fortifications and 1,000 after. 
Brende was also of the opinion that 1,000 men were the 
. . . d . . 163 
m1n1mum requ1re as a garr1son1ng force. In the New 
Establishment the distinction between the old ordinary 
garrison and the extraordinary bands was done away with. 
Berwick was to be provided with an adequate garrison of 
trained men, a sufficient permanent force which would even 
in time of danger ensure its security. The new garrison 
was to consist of 1,150 men of whom 800 were to be harque-
busiers and 350 gunners. The 'benevolence' that had been 
granted in the previous reign now became finally accepted 
as a permanent 1vage rise. 
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Provision was made for the sick and retired men of 
the garrison in the New Establishment. Three surgeons were 
appointed to see to the medical needs of the soldiers. 
Sir Francis Leek, Lord Grey's predecessor, protested in 
vain at the insufficiency of that number and lamented the 
164 dismissal of many good surgeons. The number of pensioners 
was to be confined to 56 with the rate of pension payable 
according to former rank, starting at 10d per day to 
'good old souldiers' and rising to 20d daily for Captains. 
The appointment of pensioners was to be left to the 
d h . '1 165 h th h' f . governor an 1s Councl . As for t e o er c 1e off1cers 
of Berwick, the Carpenter and Master Mason, these continued 
to be paid following the terms of their original patents. 
The fees of the Mayor, Customer and Controller of the 
Customs continued unaltered at £10 per annum each for the 
former two and £5 for the latter. The almost derisory 
payment to the Mayor reflects the overwhelming ascendancy 
of the military government of the town and the continued 
decline in the influence of the Mayor and freemen. 
The New Establishment led to the appointment of many 
new chief officers to the town. These were issued with fresh 
instructions designed to lead to improvements in efficiency 
and curb wastage in the administration of the garrison. 
Efforts were made to reduce the charges of the Ordnance 
office. It was claimed that since 1554 the office had cost 
£280 a year to run, little or no control over expenditure 
had encouraged peculation by the Master of the Ordnance, 
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John Benet. 166 A new scheme for the Ordnance office at 
Berwick led to the establishment of a Clerk of the Ordnance 
to take charge of all manner of ordnance, armour and 
munition, delivering none of these from the magazines 
without the signed order of the Master of the Ordnance 
and the Controller. These orders were to be used as a 
warrant to the Treasurer to deduct the necessary payment 
from the men's wages. These provisions, the government 
hoped, would result in a considerable saving on the admi-
nistration of the office which was reduced to £127 15s per 
167 
annum. 
A new Surveyor of the Works and Keeper of the Store, 
Thomas Jennison, was appointed with strict instructions to 
avoid all excess and waste. His duties included equipping 
the workmen with the necessary tools and providing them 
with adequate provisions at reasonable prices. In order to 
minimise the opportunity for fraud, Jennison was to render 
h . t . 1 168 1s account w1ce year y. 
sweeping changes were made in the key office of 
Treasurer. Ingoldsby who had been in office since January 
1558 was dismissed. The Queen, with some exaggeration, 
charged him with not rendering an account for four years, 
adding significantly"· •. forasmuch as we mynde to knowe 
yor proceedinges in our causes thoroughly and to have 
allwayes more certain notice of thestate of our affaires 
there, then we hither to have had : we are resolved to 
disburden you of that charge". 169 The Treasurership was 
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given to Valentine Brown, " uppon commendacon of yor 
faithefulnes and skyll in matters of receipte and 
. 170 
accomptes". Brown, one of the Auditors of the Exchequer, 
had been frequently employed in the North during the two 
previous reigns to examine accounts. He was appointed in 
December 1559 to take charge of the cash sent to finance 
the expedition into Scotland and had acted as paymaster at 
Leith. During his stay at Berwick, Brown informed Cecil 
that he suspected financial mismanagement especially in the 
Office of the Works, and he also joined in the chorus of 
. . d b . . . 171 complalnts aga1nst Ingol s y•s 1neff1c1ency as Treasurer. 
Brown became a central figure in the New Establish-
ment at Berwick; he not only exercised the office of 
b . d h . 172 Treasurer ut was also appo1nte Surveyor of t e Vlctuals 
at lOs per day,besides, as we have already noted, fulfilling 
the duties of the now defunct Chamberlain's office. Brown's 
prime task was to ensure that Berwick was adequately supplied 
with victuals at prices the troops could afford. Upon his 
appointment, he received £3,000 in •prest• to enable him to 
lay in a sufficient stock of victuals. Since the troops 
paid for their rations out of their wages, the government in 
theory recouped its initial outlay from the Treasurer who 
docked what was due from each man's pay. Brown was given 
authority to enter into agreements with private merchants 
for the supplying of the town. To ensure that the garrison 
could buy food at reasonable prices Brown was to make a 
monthly declaration of the standard prices of the basic 
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commodities in the soldiers• diet. Any complaint regarding 
high prices was to be referred to the Governor and then to 
h . . . 173 t e Pr1vy Counc11. 
To accompany the New Establishment at Berwick, a 
new set of rules was issued for the government of the town 
and garrison. The original 'Statutes and Ordinances• of 
Berwick were presumably drawn up after the town was retaken 
by the English in 1482; however, they might originate from 
an earlier date. This comprehensive set of military regul-
ations laid down the duties of the garrison and various 
punishments, from loss of pay to imprisonment or even death 
f ld . h . f . d h 174 h .. or so 1ers w o 1n r1nge t ern. T ese prov1s1ons were 
designed to ensure maximum security for Berwick. Their 
emphasis on the maintenance of an effective system of watch 
again illustrates the key importance of Berwick as a frontier 
town, the actual conquest of which lay barely outside living 
memory and whose loss the Scots still resented. 
Any soldier on watch who allowed men on the battle-
ments without first demanding the •watchword' was to be 
imprisoned and fined. Fighting between watchmen was punish-
able by death as was failure to alert the garrison when 
danger threatened. Clerks of the Watch who accepted bribes 
from men wishing to avoid watch service were to forfeit 20s 
to the maintenance of the Tweed bridge. The Yeomen Porters 
were responsible for the guarding of the town's gates and 
the searching of all incoming traffic. Particular attention 
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was to be paid to Scots who were not to be allowed into 
the town without a royal safe conduct or the Captain's 
licence. Each evening the Porters were to bring the keys 
of the town to the Master Porter who in turn submitted them 
to the Captain who retained them till the following morning. 
The reason for the new set of rules was clearly 
stated. The preamble in the Queen's name began, 
Wee do certenly understand .•• our towne of Barwick 
at this present is in very evill estate, by reason 
ye aunciente lawes and orders therof be neglected and 
for our garrison there is farr greater at this present 
then either it was in deed or ever was ment upon the 
making of the foresaid auncient lawes. 175 
The new rules were not entirely to replace the old ones 
but were to be obeyed in addition to them. 
The first provisions dealt with the organisation of 
the spiritual welfare of the garrison, " ... bicause 
foundacon of all worldely strengths is to be laid and 
the 
stablished with the fear and service of almighty God". It 
was ordered that the church was to be prepared by the 
Surveyor of the Works "••• and kept and preserved to thuse 
onelie of praier, ministracon of Sacraments and preaching 
God's worde and no other profane use". 176 The Governor 
and the principal officers of the town were to attend 
church twice daily, 'at least on Holydays and Sundays•. 
Aside from reasons of security, the smallness of the church 
meant that it was impossible for all the garrison to attend 
services simultaneously. The rules stated that the 
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Governor and Council were to see that "••• there may not 
be one soldier or other person having pay of us in the town 
but that at the least come in 14 or 21 daies he may be 
appointed and knowen to come to church". Each soldier was 
to hear a sermon at least once a month, and defaulters were 
177 to be fined three days wages. 
The ecclesiastical organisation of the town was 
completely revised. In September 1560, the Dean of Durham, 
Dr. Horne, had preached at Berwick to some effect and Leeke 
urged upon Cecil the necessity of sending a permanent 
preacher, warning him "••• yf ye tracke of tyme and do not 
sende a preacher hyther shortely I dowte they wyll reytorne 
178 to theyre owlde vomytte and become to muche oblyvyous". 
In place of an 'unlernyd curate' at £7 per annum, an 
elaborate ecclesiastical structure was set up. This included 
a preacher who received a stipend of £80 per annum, a curate 
at £40 as well as a coadjutor, clerk and sexton and several 
assistants. The cost of the new ministry was to be met by 
a quarterly levy on the pay of the men, ranging from 13s 4d 
179 from the Captain to 2d from a footman. 
The rules were principally designed to ensure the 
good order and discipline of the garrison. They strongly 
emphasised the fact that soldiers were forbidden to exercise 
d h h h . 180 any craft or tra e ot er tan t e mak1ng of arms. This 
regulation was laid down not only to confine the troops' 
activities to the specialised art of soldiering but also 
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to protect the interests of the Merchant Freemen of BerwiCk. 
Brende, however, had recommended that the troops should be 
allowed to trade insisting that this would have a salutary 
effect, "••• for ther shuld be but one kinde of people 
within the towne, for all soldiours wold become marchauntes, 
and marchauntes soldiours". The recurrence of this order 
suggests that it was a difficult ruling to enforce. The 
garrisoning troops had much free time on their hands and 
the temptation to supplement their wages was too great to 
avoid; the burge~ses frequently complained that the troops 
engaged in the keeping of •tippling houses• and other 
trades. 181 
A series of measures were included in the new rules 
regularising practices which had been established in the 
previous reign. The free allowance of powder for gun 
practice which had been introduced in February 1558 was 
continued,though its provisions were radically altered. 
Instead of 2 lbs of gunpowder being issued freely per month 
the new ruling allowed a mere half an ounce quarterly or 
at every muster, the cost of which was to be deducted from 
h d . 182 h b . . . t e sol 1ers• wages. As for t e pro lem of ma1nta1n1ng 
an adequate supply of armour in the town, the supplementary 
payment that had been allowed to troops who were well armed 
was now frozen into the general wage increase, so some other 
means of encouragement had to be sought. The new orders 
stated that the Governor could compel any soldier leaving 
Berwick to hand over his armour to be compulsorily purchased 
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by the Master of the Ordnance. This would permit it to 
b d du d . 183 e sol to the man's replacement at a re ce pr1ce. 
The new rules included an attempt to resolve the 
many problems involved in the distribution of the men's 
pay. A new order of pay was drawn up "••• bicause there 
hath bin found great deceipte in the payment of ye extra-
ordinary band, for the same hath not bin paid by view and 
pole as thordinary of the towne hath bin". 184 This referred 
to the system of paying the Captains the soldiers• wages 
according to the numbers they presented on paper, rather 
than by a head count. In the new order of pay, the distinc-
tion between the ordinary and extraordinary garrison was 
abolished. Each Captain was to make two rolls of his band, 
one of which he was to retain, and the other he was to hand 
over to the Clerk of the Check. On pay day, the men were 
to be individually called and paid in the presence of the 
Governor,Marshall and Clerk of the Check. This method of 
payment by poll was instituted to stamp out the financial 
abuses involved in the handing over of lump sums to the 
. h . . 185 Capta1ns merely on the strength of t e1r muster f1gures. 
Despite their well defined thoroughness, the newrules 
were not meant to be definitive. The Governor and Council 
were empowered to introduce new regulations as they saw fit, 
provided that the punishments prescribed for their infringe-
ment fell short of the death penalty. The Counci~ which 
was responsible for the overall government of Berwick was 
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small, it was made up of the Governor, Marshall, Porter and 
Treasurer. The exclusion of the civil establishment from 
any significant involvement in the running of Berwick's 
affairs was the final step in the complete militarisation 
of the town. The Mayor and his colleagues were reduced to 
the roles of passive bystanders assessing market tolls and 
regulating the price of salmon. It was the unsuccessfui 
culmination of a long struggle by the Mayor and Burgesses 
for a greater say in the government of Berwick. Bowes, who 
in 1551 had made a number of recommendations which consti-
tuted the last attempt at an accord between the two rival 
authorities had noted that"··· the greatest common wealthe 
and suretie of ye towne consistethe in the good agreement 
186 
of the captayne and souldiors with the Maior and inhabitants~ 
He suggested that the Mayor should be a member of the 
governing Council, taking his place as next in authority to 
the Captain. The advantage of this arrangement, Bowes 
argued,was that "••• the better reputacon and estimacon 
that the Capten taketh the Maior, and specyally in open 
presens of the people, the more able shall he be to rule and 
order the inhabitants and commonynaltie". 187 The unwilling-
ness of the government to take any steps to reverse the 
declining role of the Mayor, particularly since the New 
Establishment provided it with the opportunity, was short-
sighted. It resulted in a long series of embittered and 
strained relations between the civil and military 
establishments of the town. 188 
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The reorganisation of the military government of 
Berwick and the drawing up of the new rules were designed 
to place 'the town on a sure footing after the years of 
uncertainty brought about by the French presence in 
Scotland. The new measures were a bold attempt to improve 
the military efficiency of the town1 although throughout 
they bear the marks of Cecil's thoroughness, they were by 
no means a one man exercise, but the result of the steady 
cooperation between the Secretary and the military experts. 
cecil was fully aware of the need to economise and cut down 
on excessive waste but he also realised that if an effective 
and well trained garrison was to be had at Berwick, it could 
not be done cheaply. The New Establishment cost a massive 
£22,080 per year to maintain. This bears no relation to 
the normal annual running costs of the town and East March 
during the reign of Mary which totalled some £2,776. 189 
Efficient officers and seasoned men could only be drawn to 
serve in the town if attractive rates of pay were 
offered, an important factor since Berwick could not be 
adequately defended without a fuller and more professional 
establishment. The new importance of artillery and advances 
in siege warfare not only made it necessary greatly to 
increase the amount of gunners in the garrison but it also 
accounted for the wholesale commitment of the Elizabethan 
government to the continuance of the fortifications at 
Berwick. 190 These factors explain why the government thought 
itself justified in embarking upon the considerable financial 
outlay its arrangements for the security of the town involved. 
406 
At the same time as the reorganisation of Berwick, 
the government sought to settle the future of some of the 
other major fortified border holds. Although the main 
attention of the military engineers was devoted to Berwick, 
Brende had urged that Wark and Norham should be considered 
for improvement. 191 Wark continued to remain in the hands 
of the Greys;although surveyed by Lee in 1560 it was clearly 
thought to be expendable and the castle soon ceased to play 
any role in Elizabethan frontier fortification policy. 
This was fa'r from the case with the castle of Norham 
and its appurtenances. Tunstal's opposition to the 
Elizabethan ecclesiastical settlement made his deprivation 
a likelihood. The uncertainty over his episcopacy and his 
eventual dispossession gave rise to many suggestions that a 
portion of the rich revenues of the see of Durham could be 
used to contribute to the cost of the defence of the 
frontier and, in particular, that Norham should be taken 
192 into the Queen's hands. Tunstal's refusal to take the 
h . b 1559 d h' d . . 193 oat of supremacy 1n Septem er le to 1s epr1vat1on. 
The resulting vacancy of the see, as Cecil pointed out, now 
. d h . . . . 194 perrn1tte t e Queen to 1ntervene 1n ep1scopal affa1rs. 
Under the provisions of 1 Eliz. c.19 a significant 
proportion of the temporal possessions of the Bishopric 
including Norhamshire were taken into the Crown's hands and 
h . 1566 h d h h' . d 195 w en 1n t ese were restore , Nor arns 1re was reta1ne . 
In 1568, Norharn and its domains were leased to the Governor 
of Berwick, Lord Hunsdon. 196 The castle and estates 
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continued to be attached to the Governorship throughout the 
reign of Elizabeth. At the close of the century, when after 
a family quarrel Hunsdon took Norham from his son Sir John 
carey and gave it to his brother Sir Robert, the former 
protested in vigorous terms. It was inexpedient that the 
Governorship of Berwick and Norhamshire should be in separate 
hands because of the status of the latter as a liberty which 
would" ... ever breed controversies and contentions", but 
Sir John stressed the economic importance of the Lordship. 
Norhamshire was essential as it provided coal, horse fodder, 
poultry and game for the Governor's house. Besides, the 
lucrative leases of the Tweed salmon fishings went with the 
Captaincy of Norham, and no nobleman, he postulated, would 
. . . h 197 
accept the Governorsh1p of Berw1ck w1thout Nor am. 
The arrangement by which Elizabeth's government took 
over the Keepership of Norham did not result in any major 
repair work being carried out on the castle. In 1580, it 
was reported that Norham and its sister Wark were, " ... so 
. d d d . h 198 greatly 1n ruyne an ecay, as no man are dwell 1n t em". 
Once again, the major responsibility for the defence of the 
East March was placed upon Berwick but Norhamshire,lying as 
it did out on a limb from the bulk of the episcopal lands 
in the Bishopric and situated so conveniently near the 
frontier,proved too valuable a commodity for an impecunious 
Elizabethan government to ignore. 
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As for the settlement of other fortified border 
holds held by the Crown, the government chose not to 
exercise ·such a free hand as at Berwick probably because 
the economies to be made were so small they did not justify 
involving trusted and loyal servants in financial losses. 
In the Middle March a garrison continued at Tynemouth under 
the Captaincy of Sir Henry Percy. The latter was paid 
according to the terms of his patent with an extra reward 
of £33 6s 8d per annum and an allowance for eleven house-
hold servants and nine gunners, the total cost of which 
' 199 
amounted yearly to £274 6s 8d. The redoubtable Captain 
Read continued to command the small garrisoning force on Holy 
Island and the Fame Islands till the end of Elizabeth's reign. 
Again, Read was paid according to his patent with extra pay 
for an additional sixteen soldiers. This brought the total 
armed force in pay on the islands to twenty one at an annual 
cost of £362 17s 6d. 200 
As for the West March, the retinue of the Captain of 
Bewcastle remained unaltered; however, the number of gunners 
' d d 201 h h h h at Carllsle was re uce to ten. Alt oug t e West Marc 
still remained an unsettled part of the border, it was felt 
that the main military threat from Scotland was on the east 
border and this explains the government's neglect of the 
' ' ' ' 202 fort1f1cat1ons at Carllsle. 
A much more difficult problem for the new regime after 
the Treaty of Edinburgh was the settlement of the Wardenries. 
Both the East and Middle Marches were without official 
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Wardens and the Captaincy of Berwick was vacant. Grey had 
left the two Wardenries upon his appointment to lead the 
army into Scotland, and his offices had been conferred 
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upon Sadler. When the latter was sent to Leith early 
in April 1559, Norfolk took charge with Sir John Forster 
and Sir Francis Leeke as aides. Croftes was removed from 
the Captaincy of Berwick after reports had reached the 
government of his financial maladministration and his 
of his role in the assault of mishandling 
Leith. 204 In July 1560, Leeke was appointed temporary 
. . d . 205 Captaln on Cecll's recommen at1on. Leeke's task was a 
difficult one, for thereturn to peace on the border was not 
a transition to be easily achieved. The New Establishment 
at Berwick, with the greater number of troops involved,rneant 
that discipline was difficult to enforce, especially by 
Leeke who was regarded as an interim Captain. Exasperated, 
he asked Cecil for stronger powers when dealing with 
recalcitrant troops, as imprisonment proved a weak deterrent, 
It of necessytie some seyvere punyshment by losying a hand 
or a member muste be used for the terror of those whiche 
206 
nowe daylye desythe and otherweys offend thoffycers heare". 
The disorders among the troops were not only confined to 
Berwick, bands of marauding discharged soldiers were causing 
chaos in Northumberland, robbing the inhabitants and each 
h h . d 207 ot er of t e1r recently earne pay. 
In Leeke's opinion, matters could only be remedied 
by the appointment of a "••• goode carefull warden to the 
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charge of the wardenrye for that ys the towchestone of one 
pyece of our comonweale". Leeke recommended that "••• the 
choyse of an honest trewe and dylygent man who wyll rather 
starve than be corrupted ys thonely meane to redres all thes 
208 dysordered people". 
Before making the new appointments to the Warden~ies 9 
the council solicited the advice of Norfolk as to the future 
government of the North. The late Lieutenant made the 
improbable suggestion that effective royal authority in the 
North could only be exercised if the offices of Warden 
General, Captain of Berwick and President of the Council in 
h d b h . d. . d 209 the North were el y t e same 1n lVl ual. Later, and 
more practically, Norfolk recommended Grey for the East 
March and the Governorship of Berwick with Sir Ralph Grey 
of Wark as his Deputy Warden. To increase Grey's standing 
on the border and in consideration of his noble status, 
Norfolk proposed that Grey should also be given the Middle 
March with Sir John Forster serving as his deputy. Alter-
natively, Grey's authority could be confined to Berwick and 
the East March and Sir Thomas Percy could be made Warden of 
the Middle March. 210 On 22 october 1560 9 Grey was nominated 
to the East March and on 5 November he was appointed Governor 
of Berwick. 211 The government's choice of him was in many 
ways inevitable, Grey possessed the qualities which were 
in short supply in early Elizabethan Englandp he was an 
experienced and respected soldier of noble status. 
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Grey's appointment was welcomed by the new Scottish 
regime, as during the siege of Leith he had become personally 
acquainted with many of the leaders of the Congregation. 
These ties,forrned when the two sides were engaged in the 
common purpose of expelling the French, were to have an 
important bearing on the future of cross border cooperation 
between frontier officials. 
Grey energetically set about reconciling some of the 
bitter feuds among the gentry of the East and Middle Marches 
in which ironically enough the Forsters, the family of the 
Warden of the latter March, were taking a prominent part. 
Grey as Governor also continued Leeke's work of restoring 
d . . 212 or er 1n Berw1ck. At the same time, a new beginning was 
attempted in Tynedale and Redesdale with the issue of a 
royal proclamation of pardon to the inhabitants of the two 
dales, for all crimes excepting high treason and wilful 
murder. 213 
The government resisted the temptation of placing a 
Percy in the Middle March as Norfolk had recommended and 
instead appointed the formidable Sir John Forster. The 
latter at the age of sixty, far from being a spent force 
still had thirty five years of what can best be described 
as political gangsterism ahead of him. 214 
Only in the West March were there no major upheavals 
in personnel. Lord Dacre continued as Warden against all 
odds. Norfolk, following Sadler and Wharton,had been 
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bitterly critical of Dacre's rule in the West March. Writing 
to Cecil the Duke remarked, "·. o it pitieth me to see in 
what estate now it standeth, I thinke the wilde Yrish be in 
d . d th th t d ' " 215 N h no more 1sor er an now a war enry 1s o a-one, e 
argued, was more fit to rule there than Wharton, but the 
latter's 'dedly feode' with Maxwell made his appointment 
out of the question. Norfolk proposed Sir Thomas Dacre: 
the Warden's estranged half brother and ally of Wharton as 
. 216 
an alternat1ve. 
Dacre probably owed his continuance as Warden to a 
series of negative factors, not the least of which was his 
age, for he was already over 60. Rather than appoint 
Sir Thomas and increase tension in the March by exacerbat-
ing the antagonism between the two men, the government 
thought it best, at this juncture, to let him end his days 
in office. In a similar way, Elizabeth, who was anxious to 
court the favour of the Scots, did not want to make the 
provocative move of appointing an enemy of the Scottish 
Warden to the West March. Cecil had sounded out the 
possibility of appointing Wharton with Randolph his agent 
in Scotland, the latter quickly dismissed the idea and 
urged that Dacre be continued in office. 217 
We have seen that English concern to continue good 
relations with the Scots after the Treaty of Edinburgh, had 
some bearing on the Queen•s appointment of Wardens. The 
political gains of the Anglo-Scottish victory were not to 
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be dissipated, especially in connection with English 
frontier policy. Norfolk suggested that in order to foster 
Scottish good will, the Queen should distribute, 
.•. certen annuall pencons the wich although it 
well serve at the furst somewhat arguable, yet in 
every fowre or fyre yeres it will redowble the 
charge that this realme hath ben contynuallie dryven 
unto upon that frontier. 218 
For the moment in the heady days immediately after the 
expulsion of the French this policy was scarcely necessary. 
That is not to say that the English were not ready to capi-
talise on the political debt and good will accumulated 
through the aid given and the joint action of Elizabeth 
and the Congregation. The presence of a friendly regime 
north of the border was something of a rarity and augured 
well for the peace and stability of the frontier. For a 
brief space prior to and just after the coming of the Queen 
of Scots, amicable relations· continued. 
The new Scottish government was anxious to show 
itself ready to do justice. Immediately after the peace, 
arrangements were made for the convening of Days of Truce. 219 
At the same time, Randolph reported that some of the 
weightiest discussions in the Scottish Parliament had 
concerned the question of law and order on the frontier. 
He also noted that the embassy sent to Elizabeth thanking 
her for her support would discuss border policy with the 
220 English government. 
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On the border itself, Randolph reported that Maxwell 
was restoring order to the Scottish West March but was not 
receiving the like cooperation from Lord Dacre in respect 
of the Grahams• offences. The worsening situation between 
the two officials led to Dacre's eventual dismissal in 
1563. 221 In the Middle March there appears to have been 
some initial unwillingness on Ker of Cesford•s part to meet 
for the settlement of justice but after English complaints 
Ker was summoned before the Scottish Council and a Day of 
222 Truce was arranged. Soon after Grey's arrival in 
Berwick in early November, meetings were appointed between 
his deputy in the East March, Sir Ralph Grey and Lord Hume. 
Cecil carefully annotated Grey•s correspondence that a 
letter was to be sent from the Queen to Hume encouraging 
his 'forwardness' . 223 In mid December, the Earl of Arran 
was appointed Lord Lieutenant on the Scottish border for 
the administering of justice.··- The leading border gentry 
and surname heads were summoned to a border court at Jedburgh. 
Peace bonds were renewed and assurances were taken for old 
feuds. It was also agreed, on the English model,that the 
gentry and surname heads would be made responsible for 
. . . d 224 br1ng1ng 1n offen ers to answer at Days of Truce. Nego-
tiations for the peaceful settlement of the border were 
carried on through a variety of channels. Grey was in 
frequent contact with the Scottish Council and Randolph, 
Cecil's agent, who acted as ex-officio ambassador,was 
himself frequently in touch with the Scottish Wardens. The 
415 
latter were also involved in direct correspondence with 
cecil and the Queen. While the strong personal relation-
ships between the leaders of the two governments made for 
effective administrative cooperation, the complex criss-
crossing of correspondence on border affairs reflects not 
only the diversity of interests in maintaining peace and 
stability on the frontier but the degree of close harmony, 
built up during the crisis, in which the two regimes for 
the moment functioned. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCWSION 
"He maketh peace 1n thy borders" 
Ps.147:14 
Traditionally, Crown policy towards the border had 
two basic aims, political and strategic. The government 
wished to maintain law and order and make sure that 
executive decisions made at the centre were carried out 
in the locality. In addition, the government bore the 
responsibility for seeing that the realm was adequately 
defended against the potentially hostile state that formed 
its northern neighbour. 
The border was an area of crucial strategic 
importance, any visible weakness in English control would 
invite occupation by the Scots. We have seen how sensitive 
English officials were to any threat, however minor,to 
'h h . 1 h d d Engl1s control over t e reg1on. T e bor er was Englan 's 
defensive bulwark against the Scots, a factor which was of 
paramount importance to English governments in deciding 
frontier policy. The administration and control of the 
border posed many problems. Borders almost by definition 
were inherently lawless areas, and theft and violence were 
commonplace in border society. There ct.rJcA~ a variety of 
reasons for this. The practice of warfare had almost 
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become second nature to many borderers. Long centuries of 
Anglo-Scottish hostilities had engendered a tradition of 
violence. In times of open warfare, lawlessness became 
part of official government policy to be used against the 
Scots. The violence, however, was difficult to control 
once the official peace had been agreed upon. At the 
beginning of the decade, peace had just been declared with 
Scotland after a war that had lasted since 1542. The threat 
of a renewal of the conflict was ever present and at the 
end of the decade an English army left Scotland after 
helping the Scots to expel the French. 
In the example of the Grahams can be seen the 
ambivalent attitude that the government could adopt towards 
perpetrators of violence. 2 Here, crime was discussed in 
the context of the capabilities and concerns of the state. 
Faced with the considerable problems that stood in the way 
of bringing the surname to justice, both Mary and Elizabeth 
offered them royal pardons in an attempt to restore order 
in the West March. Similarly, despite the recidivist 
tendencies of the Grahams, the Marian Council repeatedly 
insisted on their immunity from prosecution, fearing that 
if they were handed over to the Scots for punishment there 
would be dangerous repercussions for the peace and security 
of the border. 
Other factors contributed to the lawlessness of 
border society. Geography had a part to play. The border 
constituted a vast upland area through which communications 
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were difficult. The region, on the periphery of the realm, 
was far removed from central government, which, faced with 
the enormity of the problem, had often been weak and 
inefficient in maintaining order. In the light of this, 
the borderers had sought protection and security through 
the solidarity of kindred groups which in themselves became 
sources of disorder through the organised blood feuds which 
they pursued. 
Lawlessness was both an internal and an international 
problem. To deal'with both aspects of crime, a unique 
judicial system had grown up. Purely domestic law breaking 
carne under the aegis of the Warden Courts which were presided 
over by the chief officer of the Crown in the marches, the 
Lord Warden. International crime demanded international 
machinery. This took the form of a Day of Truce at which 
both English and Scottish Wardens met for mutual redress of 
wrongs. On both sides of the border implicit faith was 
placed by central governments in the judicial system of 
international redress. Periods of peaceful cooperation 
with the Scots were always marked by attempts to reform and 
redefine border law and the judicial procedures involved 
in its enforcement. Yet, however perfect the machinery 
was, it was the driving force behind it that counted. Any 
criticisms that were raised by central governments were not 
levelled at the system of law enforcement itself but at the 
failure of officials to operate it effectively. It is not 
an easy task to discern just how efficient both internal 
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and international law enforcement was. The historian can 
only work within the limitations of surviving evidence and, 
therefore, many conclusions must of necessity be tentative. 
What is clear is that the difficulties that jeopardised the 
capacity of these courts to administer justice were formi-
dable. In the light of this, what emerges is that there 
was a wide distinction between precept and practice and 
that the most the Crown could do was to bring violence 
within tolerable limits, obviating the worse excesses. 
If no marked differences can be seen between the 
policies of government over the decade in the pursuance of 
this goal, the same cannot be said of the choice of Warden. 
The Warden was the chief officer of the Crown in the 
Marches. Therefore, it was crucial that he was a loyal and 
trusted servant who would show himself ready to execute 
Crown policy. Unusual latitude was given to the Warden in 
his march in the discharging of his functions. The Crown, 
however, was not prepared to defend the Wardens irres-
pective of the state of affairs nor did it shrink from 
imposing the ultimate sanction - dismissal. 
The rapid succession of three governments over the 
decade meant that there was a high turnover of border 
officials as each government installed its own supporters. 
This led to a certain amount of administrative.disruption 
for, as one Elizabethan border official later complained, 
" the often alteracion and chaunge of officers makes 
the people, beinge rude by nature, to be very untowarde and 
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out of provision of suche furniture as they ar bounde by 
the tenor of ther laundes to have in redines for her 
I I I 3 MaJest1es serv1se". 
After Northumberland had secured his dominance over 
the Council, he sought to strengthen his position and pre-
empt any rising in Somerset's favour in the North, by 
exercising a firm control over the border. In 1551, his 
close supporter Henry Grey, Marquis of Dorset, was appointed 
Warden General. Dorset owed his shortlived rise solely to 
eminence of rank and political impotence. At this critical 
moment in Northumberland's consolidation of power, firm 
political allegiance was the criterion for appointments to 
the most important border offices and not administrative 
competence. Finally, Northumberland's drive to assert his 
influence over the border was pushed to its logical conclu-
sion, when in late 1551, the Duke himself assumed the 
Warden Generalship and installed one of his close supporters, 
Lord Wharton, as his deputy. Wharton developed a coherent 
set of ideas about border policy which he attempted to 
follow with consistency. Although he was able, intelligent 
and possessed much administrative aptitude, Wharton was 
hampered by other factors. Outside the West March he 
commanded little influence and respect and, in particular, 
he lacked the landed interest which was a prerequisite for 
the effective carrying out of his duties. 
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The accession of Mary brought her firm supporter, 
Lord Dacre, into prominence again and the eclipse of 
Wharton paved the way for the startling rise of Thomas 
Percy, the seventh Earl of Northumberland. With Dacre in 
the West March, Northumberland occupying the other two 
Wardenries and Westmorland as Lord Lieutenant, the years 
1557/8 can be regarded as the mid-Tudor honeymoon of the 
old established border magnates. This state of affairs 
was short-lived, for the accession of Elizabeth brought about 
a rapid reversal of the situation. The new Queen was 
suspicious of those recipients of her sister's favour, 
while her ministers feared the power and influence wielded 
by the border magnates. They represented insular provin-
cialism and conservative catholicism in a centralising 
though not yet obviously Protestant state. 
The Earl of Northumberland's political decline early 
in Elizabeth's reign was as rapid as his climb to power had 
been during her sister's. The Earl had worked hard to 
build up Percy power in the two marches but the building of 
an effective patronage network took time and in using the 
authority of his office to weaken his opponents, 
Northumberland had made many enemies. A surprising factor 
is that the Earl was not supported by his brother, Sir 
Henry Percy, who was in Cecil's favour. The signs of 
fratricidal strife which had been so disastrous to the 
former generation of Percies in the 1530's were already 
visible late in Mary's reign. The instrument of the Earl's 
downfall was his implacable enemy, Sadler. However, the 
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latter's bold lecturing of the Earl, shot through with 
allegations that he was unlawfully abusing the authority 
of his office, was not entirely carried out on his own 
initiative. Sadler knew that he had the powerful support 
of Cecil and others on the Council to back him. In his 
vilification campaign against Northumberland, Sadler was 
aided and supported by the Earl's enemies, the Wharton-· 
Forster faction,who were to profit considerably by the 
Warden's fall. 
A preoccupation with administrative change and 
development only emphasises one side of the government's 
perspective of border affairs which was essentially a 
dual one. The other important consideration which the Crown 
had to bear in mind was that the border faced a realm which 
was more often than not hostile. During the mid-sixteenth 
century, however, Crown policy towards the border was not 
only motivated by the exigencies of the Scottish situation 
but also by fear of France. The presence of the French in 
Scotland had important ramifications for the border policy 
of English governments. With the advantage of historical 
hindsight, we can see that in fact Henri after 1550 regarded 
Scotland as a poor military investment. Nevertheless, 
contemporaries viewed with alarm the continuing consolid-
ation of French power in Scotland. Constantly in the back 
of their minds was the fact that the French had deployed 
10,000 troops in Scotland in 1548 to secure a political 
objective, and they had been successful. There was little 
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to stop them repeating the tactic if the political stakes 
. . h' h 4 were suff1c1ently 1g . 
This threat was a powerful factor in influencing the 
government's attitude to the border, enhancing a greater 
awareness of its vulnerability. Thus, the frontier took 
on a new significance. The French, for their part, 
skilfully used the small numbers of their troops north of 
the border as a diplomatic ploy to give witness to their 
continuing commitment to Scotland. This was particularly 
evident during the reign of Mary, the purpose being to force 
the government to divert its resources from aiding Philip 
against the French and concentrate them on the defence of 
the border. The French consistently exaggerated the 
numbers of their troops in Scotland. In May 1557, for 
example, the Venetian ambassador noted that 1,500 French 
reinforcements had been sent to Scotland while Noailles, 
sceptical as to how long he could keep up the pretence, 
admitted that only 500 Gascons had been sent to replace the 
5 bands already there. 
The Marian government tried hard to keep Scottish 
participation in the war on the side of France from becoming 
an eventuality but Mary was bent on aiding Philip whatever 
the repercussions might be north of the border. This said, 
Mary's government took positive and firm action to forestall 
a Scottish invasion, diplomatically and militarily. The 
commission under Westmorland and TUnstal to answer Scottish 
grievances was appointed almost simultaneously with the 
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declaration of war against the French in the hope that this 
would defuse the situation and that the war against the 
French would be confined to a single front. Philip himself 
took an interest in the diplomatic relations with the Scots 
through the mission of D'Assonleville. The latter probably 
did more harm than good for it reinforced Philip's adamant 
refusal, despite English pleas, to declare war against the 
Scots. Philip was prepared to jettison English amour-propre 
rather than jeopardise the economic interests of his subjects 
in the low countries. 
Militarily the borderers responded well. Commanders 
reported that the people cooperated with their military 
plans. Signs of opposition were conspicuously absent despite 
the fact that hostilities had begun because of Mary's declar-
ation of war against the French. English interests were not 
directly involved and it was apparent to everyone that the 
declaration had been made merely on Philip's instigation. 
However, one must not be too hasty in concluding that 
absence of opposition to the war should be taken as a sign 
of support for government policy. A more plausible reason 
for the cooperation of the borderers is that the preparations 
against the Scots afforded them opportunities for military 
employment and held out prospects of legitimate booty and 
plunder. 
Although it was recognised that" ... the devysion of 
religion 1n Scotland is of great importaunce••, 6 no attempt 
was made to exploit the religious dissension prevalent among 
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the Scots. Mary's Catholic principles preempted this. 
Despite lack of English initiative in this direction, the 
divisions in the Scottish camp caused by opposition to the 
Dowager's French policy and fear of the military preparedness 
of the English were crucial factors in the failure of the 
projected invasion of 1557. 
The Franco-Scottish threat was heightened at the 
beginning of Elizabeth's reign as, in French and even 
Scottish eyes, Mary Queen of Scots was regarded as the 
legitimate Queen of England. Fortunately for Elizabeth, the 
political situation in Scotland at the beginning of her reign 
presented her with an opportunity to do something definitive 
about the military threat that the French presence in 
Scotland posed to England. The end of the decade saw franco-
phobia in Scotland reaching high water mark and this was 
coupled with the violent· beginnings of the Scottish 
Reformation. These two factors together formed the found-
ations on which Anglo-Scottish cooperation could be based. 
The expulsion of the French and the new and lasting pact 
of amity and friendship between Scotland and England meant 
that the threat of an overland invasion had been lifted. 
The task of officials was reduced to curbing cross frontier 
incidents and maintaining a tolerable degree of law and 
order. Now that the frontier no longer posed a threat to 
the security of the realm, it was left to an intensely 
parochial world of its own. The problem of the border now 
simply amounted to upholding internal order. 
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Perhaps the most significant ramification of the 
French presence in Scotland was the new emphasis that the 
government placed on the border defences. At the beginning 
of the decade, these were in a universal state of disrepair. 
It was Northumberland's government that first focussed 
attention on the fortifications at Berwick. The preoccup-
ation with the defences of this key border stronghold was 
to be a prominent feature of the decade. The building 
programme at Berwick was continued by the Marian government 
who further introduced comprehensive legisla·tion in an 
attempt to overhaul completely the border's defensive 
system. 
The 1555 act laid the responsibility for the repair 
of fortifications on the owners of the land on which they 
were situated. The act also provided for the enclosing and 
ditching of ground near the border in an effort to stimulate 
the economy and increase the density of the population 
living near the frontier line itself. The government 
attempted to put the act into effect only to have its 
attention diverted by the hostilities of 1557/8. The 
Elizabethan government set up a commission for the implement-
ation of the provisions of the act but results were not 
forthcoming. The act remained a dead letter. Its failure 
is illustrative of one of the basic problems of the Crown 
in dealing with the localities. The Achilles heel of all 
local administration was the government's inability to 
subject declarations to independent verification· The 
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Crown was forced to rely on local administrators with 
vested interests and divided loyalties both to Crown and 
countY• 
One of the greatest influences on the government's 
fortification policy was the loss of Calais. This led the 
Marian government to concentrate all its attention on 
Berwick. Work on the Edward VI citadel and piecemeal repairs 
were abandoned, and a massive reorganisation of the defences 
which was to transform the old medieval town was embarked 
upon. Berwick's fortifications were remodelled using the 
new system of bastions, which were designed to withstand the 
might of the latest heavy siege artillery. The Elizabethan 
government not only continued to devote attention to the 
fortifications but in keeping with the renewed importance 
of the town, its antiquated military organisation was both 
extensively restructured and considerably expanded. These 
measures were designed to increase the military efficiency 
of Berwick, putting it on a sure footing and ensuring that 
its security would never again be at a risk. 
The works at Berwick were continued by Elizabeth even 
after the French threat had been lifted. The reasons for 
this are not immediately apparent. It may be that the 
government felt the peace might prove an uneasy one and that 
it would have been foolhardy to abandon the work and jeopar-
dise the future security of the border. However, it seems 
more likely that by 1560 the fortifications at Berwick had 
acquired a prestige value and had become something of a 
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status symbol illustrating the firm commitment of 
Elizabeth's government to a strong frontier policy. 
The increased involvement of government during the 
decade in border affairs coupled with the new fortifications 
and military reforms meant that the cost of border adminis-
tration and defence soared dramatically. The ordinary costs 
of border administration for the year 1557/8 amounted to 
close on £5,000 per annum while the Elizabethan establishment 
at Berwick alone cost £22,080 a year to maintain. The 
mounting costs were due to the considerable increase in 
the garrisoning crews as laid down in the New Establishment. 
The cost of rebuilding and repairing fortifications was an 
additional burden. Every Treasurer's account makes mention 
of sizeable sums set aside for this purpose. After the fall 
of Calais fortification costs rocketed; the wages of the 
workmen alone after February 1558 amounted to £1,520 per 
month while the Treasurer of Berwick, Ingoldsby, estimated 
that over £50,000 had been spent on the fortifications there 
from January 1558 to November 1560. 
Although salaries and fees to military and civil 
personnel usually came to a fixed annual amount, it was 
difficult for the government to plan its financial policy 
towards the border with any great precision. Periods of 
tension with the Scots were frequent and the government had 
to cater for this by raising extraordinary bands of troops. 
During the years 1557/8 with the threat of invasion hanging 
over the border the government had to recruit and equip 
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large numbers of men and maintain them for considerable 
periods. In January 1558, there were close on 8,000 troops 
in wages on the border. 
Although some cash was designated from fixed sources 
there was in fact very little permanent provision made to 
pay for border government. The customs revenues of the 
ports of Newcastle and Berwick were assigned to the 
Treasurer of Berwick and in September 1550 the Privy Council 
ordered that he was to receive annually £1,000 from the 
Receiver of Crown 'lands in Yorkshire and £2,000 from 
Cumberland. This provision, however, fell far short of even 
the ordinary expenses of border government. To supply the 
remainder two main sources were used. If a subsidy was 
being gathered, the cash, usually from Yorkshire, was paid 
over to the Treasurer of Berwick~but more regular funds 
were obtained from the Receivers of Crown lands in the North. 
This procedure meant that carriage costs and the difficulties 
and dangers of transporting large amounts of cash through 
the country were minimised. However, during periods of 
crisis, when large numbers of men were in wages, or when, 
in order to finance the fortifications,considerable amounts 
of cash were needed, money was dispatched directly from the 
Exchequer. 
Despite these somewhat ad hoc arrangements, it is 
surprising that the financial side of border administration 
functioned so well. It was only in the autumn of 1558, when 
the government was paying off large numbers of troops, and 
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in the summer of 1560, when the English army was in Scotland, 
that the Crown showed signs of being unable to meet the 
onerous financial demands imposed upon it. On both these 
occasions the government resorted to borrowing from 
Newcastle Merchants to pay its troops and was forced to 
keep them in wages longer than necessary because it lacked 
7 the cash to pay them off. 
Although the financial machinery of border adminis-
tration operated with reasonable efficiency cases of fraud 
and peculation were revealed. Embezzlement, especially on 
a small scale,proved difficult to control. Close supervision 
of financial operations was clearly necessary as much of the 
abuses in the system were due to delays in accounting. 
Opportunities for peculation were enormous, not only because 
of the general lack of supervision but because thenumber of 
troops and workmen rose and fell so frequently and revenues 
came in intermittently from such a variety of sources. 
Attempts were made to tighten up the system by the 
Elizabethan reforms which provided for more frequent render-
ing of accounts for audit. In addition, reforms in the 
method of payment to troops and workmen, it was hoped, would 
limit possibilities for fraud. 
We have discussed the manifold facets of border 
government and examined the various factors that the Crown 
had to take into consideration in framing its border policy. 
The task was complex and difficult and required adminis-
trative aptitude as much as political foresight. 
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Throughout the decade, successive governments had not only 
to take cognizance of the fact that they were responsible 
for the governance of an area of crucial strategic 
importance facing a more often than not hostile state, but 
that state was linked with another potential enemy which 
seemed bent on European hegemony. This factor had a 
decisive influence on border policy during the decade. 
Both Northumberland and Mary had no choice but to accept 
the fait accompli of French dominance in Scotland and adapt 
their border policy accordingly. Northumberland embarked 
upon a serious fortification policy to strengthen the 
border,which was continued by Mary. During the invasion 
threat of 1557/8, the government showed leadership and 
energy in its preparations and the danger was averted. 
The loss of Calais added new vigour to the fortifi-
cations programme. The reign of Mary, so often seen as a 
hiatus in the development of Tudor England, saw the govern-
ment on the contrary efficient and energetic in safeguarding 
the security of the border and constructively providing for 
the future. Elizabeth was singularly fortunate in that 
the political and religious circumstances in both realms 
were favourable for a successful expulsion of the French. 
Even though the Elizabethan regime only had to deal with 
Scotland, a much more manageable prospect, it carried on 
with the Berwick fortifications and organised an important 
series of military reforms to ensure the security of the 
border's chief stronghold. 
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The governing of the border was carried out through 
a complex administrative structure, controlled by the Crown 
through appointed officials. Since these men wielded great 
power and influence, it was of prime importance to the 
government which individuals held the Wardenships. Each 
successive government sought to install its own candidates 
and each change of regime was accompanied by important 
alterations in the personnel of border government. No 
regime sought radically to change the system or evolve an 
alternative method of organisation but important procedural 
changes were made to the judicial system to improve its 
operational efficiency while the laws which governed inter-
national relations were amended and codified. 
Despite these developments it is clear from what we 
have seen of the actual working of border government, 
especially with regard to law enforcement,that control was 
weak. The Crown was often forced to compromise and give 
way; it was obliged to function no matter how haphazardly 
within the existing politico-judicial framework. There was 
no alternative to a tried and tested system that maintained 
a tolerable degree of order. The only effective solution 
to match the complexity of the problem was the union of the 
two realms. 
Both the nature of the sixteenth century Anglo-
Scottish border with its dual series of administrators and 
policing officials rarely willing to cooperate with each 
other, and the virtual impunity with which marauders could 
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pass to and fro were a recipe if not for anarchy then 
endemic lawlessness. The problem could only be tackled by 
the ubiquitous force of law untrarnmelled by territorial 
restrictions. It only began to resolve itself after 1603 
when the border from being the 'uttermost parte of the 
realme' became the 'Middle Shires' of the Stuart Crown. 
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CONCLUSION 
Notes 
1 Supra., p.28. 
2 Supra., p.223 ff. 
3 C.B.P. I, 227. 
4 Leslie was probably correct in assessing the 
5 Ven. Cal., VI, 873; P.R.O., 31/3/23/f.202. During 
the early months of Elizabeth's reign when the French 
hold on Scotland was in jeopardy and the threat of 
English intervention ever present, the French changed 
their tactics and protested at the smallness of their 
troop numbers in Scotland. 
6 A.P.C. VI, 388. 
7 The prompt dismissal of troops, especially where 
large numbers were involved was a matter of urgent 
necessity. The reason was summed up eloquently by 
the Captain of Berwick, Sir James Croftes, who 
argued that it was 
... better to pay a greate interest for the lone 
of money than to want of that whiche shulde make 
a thorowe pay to all men at thys dischardge, and 
howe that those that remayne in wages for want of 
tresor increaseth her hyhnes chardges above all 
kynd of interest to multiplycations above doubles 
or tryples yor wysdome can consyder". 
Croftes to Cecil, 14 April 1559, P.R.o., SP59/1/151. 
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APPENDIX A 
Paid Borderers ? .... The Controversy 
By far the most important features of border service 
were the unpaid military duties incumbent on borderers. 1 
All the able bodied inhabitants of the four northern 
counties irrespective of whether the terms of their tenure 
prescribed military service or not, were bound to obey the 
summons of the Warden. They were to be ready in 'defens-
ible array• to follow and assist him either in the 
2 
maintenance of domestic order or to resist the enemy. 
There were differing views as to what length of time 
borderers were liable to serve. Bowes argued that they 
should serve freely for eight days at a time. 3 Yet, in 
January 1558p the Council stated that ten days was the usual 
time. Different arrangements existed for the Bishopric 
. h . h . d 4 lev1es, but ere aga1n, as we ave seen, controversy re1gne . 
Despite these organisational dissimilarities one 
thing was clear. The borderers were to serve without wages, 
although not without some form of remuneration. Both Bowes 
and Wharton agreed that •rewards' could be distributed among 
the borderers in recognition of their extended service. 5 
There is abundant evidence forthe disbursement of this sort 
of payment to borderers for their services during the decade 
1550-1560. Basicallyp there were two methods of distribution. 
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Lump sums were paid out to the headsmen or surname leaders~ 
(one must assumethat these were broken down and shared among 
the men) or more commonly~ a small regular sum was paid to 
each l'ndl'vl'dual. 6 I t f th E h n mos o e xc equer accounts 
stretching over the decade, no distinction is made between 
borderers and other troops in pay. However, Alan 
Bellingham's account which covers the period 21 July 1557-
14 February 1558 makes it clear that the 1,200 borderers 
in pay were given 9d per day compared to a Shilling a day 
for •inlande men' . 7 The Records are usually silent on the 
number of borderers of lower social status who served but 
the accounts are full of the names of the northern gentry 
h d . 8 w o frequently serve as capta1ns. 
Any examination of the military situation on the 
border reveals a continually recurring theme~ that is, the 
central government's anxiety about the numbers of borderers 
in receipt of regular wages. There were obvious powerful 
financial reasons behind this concern but there was also 
the added factor that when local inhabitants served for 
wages, they ceased to serve as borderers. It was not a 
straightforward task for the government to secure the unpaid 
services of the borderers. In January 1551, the Council 
rather belatedly wrote to Sir Robert Bowes~ the Warden of 
the East and Middle Marches, asking him to certify the 
reason why the light horsemen of Northumberland were granted 
wages during the Scottish war, 9 'contrary to custom'. 
must be said that the Crown tried hard to minimise the 
It 
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number of Northumberland men in wages. To protect the 
border during the invasion scare of 1557/8, the Marian 
government decided to resort to the partial use of mercen-
aries.10 In view of this, orders were sent out in 
November 1557 commanding that all borderers in wages were 
to be discharged except 300, "••• yonge men without fermys 
or offices ... or suche as we have had there habitations 
11 
or dwellinge laid waste". These men were paid the full 
rate of a shilling a day while the remaining borderers in 
paid service were given 9d per day. However, when in 
January 1558, an estimated 200 additional borderers were 
recruited to protect Berwick while reinforcements came from 
the South, the Council ordered that after the customary ten 
12 days'free service the men were to be paid only 6d per day. 
There was a persistent emphasis on the fact that the 
payments were to be regarded as rewards and not wages. The 
Crown was very sensitive about the subject and was careful 
to dispel any notion that borderers should be paid on the 
same terms as other troops. When in January 1558 George 
Bowes, the new Marshal of Berwick, was appointed to bring 
100 foot and 50 horse to Berwick, the Council stipulated 
that of the borderers 1n Bowes's retinue only 20 were to 
be allowed wages, " ... which we have byn pleased to toller-
ate ... so as it be reputed and taken as his howsholde 
servants". The government regarded the payment of these 
men as a concession on the condition that Bowes passed them 
off as ordinary members of his household. 13 
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Throughout this welter of administrative inconsis-
tency and compromise, the Council clung to the basic 
principle that borderers should offer their military service 
freely to the government. This was the obvious motive 
behind the council's decision in August 1558 to investigate 
what instructions had been issued since the Anglo-Scottish 
conflict began regarding the allowance in wages of 
Northumberland men. Similarly, in September, when 
Westmorland was in the process of organising a scheme of 
winter garrisons, the Council ordered that "••• as for the 
interteyning of the Northumberland men in wages", 
Westmorland was to "••• retayne as fewe of them as may be 
..• consydering that they have at all tymes served when 
soever they are called, for their owne defence, without 
14 
charging the Prynce". 
The early Elizabethan Council reiterated similar 
instructions but in January 1559 sir James Croftes, the 
Captain of Berwick, reported that most of the extraordinary 
horse bands were made up of Northumberland menJ it is 
also clear that throughout the Scottish campaign many 
borderers were retained in wages. 15 
The clauses of the New Establishment reaffirmed 
traditional practice when they ordained that the garrison 
men were to "••• have neither wyfe nor howse nor habitation 
in Berwick or the border" the ruling, however, was 
. . d 16 Vlrtually 1gnore . 
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It seems clear that throughout the period under our 
consideration, the Crown pursued a vacillatory policy as 
far as the paid service of the borderers was concerned, 
and it was prepared to relent in certain circumstances. 
It is equally clear that any firm line regarding this policy 
was beyond the power of the Council to enforce. The reasons 
why border commanders continually circumvented the instruc-
tions of the central government and employed borderers in 
military service are manifold. They are of interest because 
they not only relate to the particularities of border 
warfare but also they provide informative insights into the 
characteristics of the borderers themselves. 
Border warfare was essentially guerilla warfare, 
made up of long and irregular campaigns of raid and counter-
raid; it consisted in the main of frequent skirmishes and 
indecisive minor encounters. In view of this, it was felt 
by frontier commanders that borderers had the special skills 
that made them the most effective fighters in these circums-
tances. 
Of paramount importance was the fact that they were 
excellent light horsemen. The quality of border horseman-
ship was widely testified and compared favourably against 
the poor performance of 'inlande men'. One commentator in 
Edward VI's reign argued against the employment of southern 
men on the grounds that their service did not justify their 
expense~ since they too often contrived to remain in 
garrison and were loath to take part in active service, 
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.. 
. . . they are not used to the skirmish nor can (they) well 
sett on horseback to runne with their speares". The writer 
also alleged that their lack of martial skills made them 
ready bait for the Scots who took both prisoners and horses~ 
he also added scathingly that the men of Northumberland 
. d . h h h . d . 17 consp1re w1t t e Scots for t e1r estruct1on. Not 
only were the equitational skills of the borderers held in 
high esteem but equally important was the fact that owing 
to the obligations of border servic~horses were in ready 
supply. Leslie commented of the borderers that, "••• A 
filthie thing they esteime it and a very abiecte man thay 
halde him that gangis upon his fute, ony voyage quhairthrouch 
cumis that al ar horsmen". 18 
Even in peacetime the maintenance of order over such 
a wide area depended heavily on the mounted retinues of the 
Wardens and their ability to move quickly from place to place 
and act decisively in restoring law and order. The traCking 
down of horse and cattle thieves and following the fray 
required an intimate knowledge of the routes, fords and hill 
passes of the difficult border terrain. Border commanders 
placed a premium on the skill and experience of fighting 
troops. The poor showing of the besieging army at Leith 
and the fiasco of the assault on the town in May 1560 
confirmed the opinions of many contemporaries regarding the 
poor quality of English soldiering. At Leith, the exception 
to the rule were the men of the Berwick garrison the bulk 
of whom were certainly borderers :they were praised 
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frequently for their skill and bravery by their military 
19 
commanders. 
At the end of Elizabeth's reign Lord Eure summed 
up the various arguments why the paid service of the 
borderers was indispensable for frontier defence.20 Eure 
stated that they were more suitable than inland men because 
they were conversant with the difficult terrain and they 
also had a knowledge of the various Scottish surname groups. 
He also used the traditional argument against the use of 
mercenaries when speaking of the fighting qualities of 
inland men. Eure alleged that borderers made better troops 
because they were fighting in defence of their families 
and property and not merely for lucre. Eure also made the 
point that the risks of incurring deadly feud during service 
obliged the borderers to see themselves well horsed and 
armed. On the other hand, he added that many borderers, 
although bound by the terms of their tenure to keep horses 
for the Queen's service, were too poor to do so and so he 
allowed them wages. 
The poverty factor is an ever recurring one. There 
are many indications that borderers were not prepared to 
serve without some form of financial remuneration, whether 
it took the shape of regular pay or infrequent 'rewards'. 
In addition, there are suggestions that borderers in 
contrast to many southern men were prepared to tolerate the 
harsh conditions and low wages that went with frontier 
service. 
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Throughout the latter half of the sixteenth century 
TUdor governments still clung to the principle that 
borderers should be responsible for the defence of their 
region. Initially, they were to serve on a quasi-feudal basis 
for a limited period, and then for any extended length of 
service they were to receive intermittent payments in the 
guise of 'rewards'. The Crown was reluctant to make use of 
the regular employment of indigenous horse and foot because 
it argued they should serve anyway. The principle was based 
on the fact that the border counties and the Bishopric were 
exempt from Parliamentary taxation. This argument, however, 
hardly carriedmuchweight since it only affected the wealthier 
borderers and there is abundant evidence that these were in 
fact often in regular pay. The justification that ordinary 
borderers should serve without pay because their region was 
granted immunity from Parliamentary taxation is in many 
respects irrelevant since the bulk of borderers would have 
been too poor to pay taxes anyway. 
Despite the government's insistence, we have seen 
that for a variety of very valid reasons border commanders 
realised that the ruling regarding the paid employment of 
borderers was impracticable to apply. It remained very much 
a dead letter and as long as there remained a border the 
inhabitants of the region continued in the paid service of 
its defence. Border commanders availed themselves of the 
experience and skills of the local inhabitants that made 
them the fittest individuals for the task of protecting the 
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frontier. At the same time, military service on the border 
constituted a supplementary means of livelihood and helped 
to alleviate the under-employment that was so noticeable 
a feature of pastoral economies such as the Anglo-Scottish 
border. Above all, the controversy over the paid service 
of the borderers reveals the dichotomy between practice 
and principle, between the demands of a distant central 
government and the exigencies of the situation facing 
border officials that is such a familiar theme in border 
history. 
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Notes 
1 For other aspects of border service,Supra.,pp.26,53,153ff 
2 R.T. IV, i, 38-39; Leges, 339-340; P.R.O., SP15/ 
4/30; A.P.C. V, 14-15. 
3 R.T. IV, i, 39-39; P.R.O., SP15/8/72. 
4 P.R.O., SP15/8/72; Supra., pp.266-267. 
5 R.T. IV, i, 68-69; Leges, 341-342. 
6 P.R.O., £101/64/3, 12 : E351/225, SP15/8/52 (i). 
7 Ibid. 
8 P.R.O., E351/223, 3471, £101/64/3, P.R.O., SP15/8/121. 
9 A.P.C. III, 202. 
10 P.R.O., SP15/8/102-105; A.P.C. VI, 242. The 
mercenaries in fact never came and so the discharge 
order was ignored. For the abortive scheme to hire 
the mercenaries, see D. M. Loades, The Reign of Mary 
Tudor, London 1979, 381. 
11 P.R.O., SP15/8/41, 43, 46; A.P.C. VI, 271. 
12 P.R.O., SP15/8/72. 
13 P.R.O., SP15/8/64, 65. 
14 A.P.C. VI, 399, 405. 
15 Cal. For., 1558-59, 289; P.R.O., SP59/3/30. 
16 P.R.O., SP59/1/199; C.B.P., II, 539-541. 
17 P.R.O., SP15/4/32. There was always a risk of 
collusion between borderers on both sides of the 
frontier during times of open warfare, see Patten's 
comments, Supra.,pp.l9-20; Wharton himself,in June 1548, 
voiced the same drawback to the employment of borderers 
in frontier warfare when he complained" ... oure owen 
borderers ar of too greate accquayntaunce with the 
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ennernyes". P.R.o.~ SPlS/2/65. Despite this evidence 
these two commentators seem to be lone voices, their 
r~arks, though of interest, are heavily outweighed 
by contrary opinion and contrary factual evidence. 
18 Leslie, I, 99. 
19 P.R.O., SP52/3/185, 193. 
20 C.B.P., II, 471. 
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APPENDIX B 
B.L., MSS. Cotton Caligula B 9 IV, f.259 
A proclemacone to be made in all the market towns 
within the countye of Northomberland. 
(Jan (?) 1558) 
Henry Earle of Westmoreland, Lord Neville, Knight 
of the moste noble ordere of the Gartere and the Kyng and 
Queenes Majesties leiftenaunt Generall of the Northe partes 
in theyre Highneses name straightely chargethe and comanndeth 
that all mannere of strangeres Scoteshemene and frenche men 
aswell mene as womene inhabetynge or beinge within the 
county of Northumberland doe within XIII dayes nexte aftere 
this proclamacone avoyd this Realme orelse come unto the 
sayd lord leiftenante within the affoarsaid space wheare 
soever he shalbe and to showe unto his lordshipe by what 
authoretye they doe abyde in this Realme under payene of 
Imprisonemente and to be lawefull prisoneres unto all 
Englishemene that shall take them aftere that daye. 
Also that noo Inglisheman have any talke or conference 
with any Scotte or frencheman privie or openlie aftere this 
proclamacion under payne of deathe without speciall lycence 
in writyng signed with the hand of the said lord lieufte-
nante, the Right honorable the earle of Northumberland lord 
warden of the easte and mydle marches of England for againste 
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Scotlande, the lord Everes capten of the Kyng and Qu~enes 
majesties Town and Castelle of Barwicke or Sir Henry Percye 
Knyght deputye warden unto the said Earle of Northumberland 
or one of them for any tyme that he or they shall so talk 
with Scotte or frencheman. 
Also that no Inglysheman wich hathe byn is or sh~lbe 
hearafter taken prisoner shall make his returne or enter in 
to Scotland or come into this realme out of the same by any 
other waye but by Northumberland and to make his apparaunce 
theare to the captayne as well att his entry as at his 
retorne under payne of deathe and that no Scotyshman make 
his enterye or retuerne any other waye but as is afforsayde 
and lykewise make his apparaunce before the captaine theare 
to the intent the same may bee by them recorded under payne 
of being taken prisoner againe and to be lawfull prisonere 
to any Englysheman that shall fynd them passyng or repassyng 
any other waye. 
Also that no Northumberlande man nor none other 
Englisheman doo buye any horse of any souldiere beinge an 
Inlande man and appoynted to serve under payne of forfeiture 
of the horse he so boughte and his duble price and imprisone-
mente at the said lord lyfetenantes pleasure and that no 
souldiere as is afforsayd to serve doe sell his horse under 
payne of loosyng bathe his yeares and to be in prisone in 
Irones one whole yeare. 
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Also that noe souldyere departe or goe from his 
Captayne without spessyall lycence and a pasporte sygned 
with the hand ether of the afforsaid Earle of Northumberland 
the lord Everes or Sir Henry Pearsye and Mr Bravnd Mustere 
master or twoe of them whearof the Muster master alwaies to 
be one, and the same to sarve but to the said lord lyueten-
aunt unto whom they shall sue for further lycence as they 
passe by under payne of deathe. 
God save the Kynge and Queenes Majesties. 
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APPENDIX C 
B.L.~ MSS. Cotton Caligula B~ IVP f.258 
Artycles sette foarthe concernynge such captaynes 
and soulderes as bee serving or shall serve-uppon 
the fronntyeres against the Scotes 
(Jan (?) 1558) 
Fyrste that every Captayne agaynst the nexte musters 
provide and forsee that their souldyeres be furneshed of 
Arrnore and weapone every one in his Band of service that is 
to saye. 
That the lyghte horsemen be horsed suffytyently and 
that every one have his swoard,daggere coate of plate, skull, 
speare or bowe and sheafe of arrowes at the leaste. 
That the hargabushere have his hargabush his flaske 
tuche boxe, swoarde, dagere and municion at the leaste. 
That the Archer have his Bowe his Sheafe of arrowes, 
swoard, daggere, corselet, almain rivete or jacke of plate. 
An yf any of the said sowldyeres lacke of his furne-
ture they shall have no wages but according to the old rate, 
but all such as have theire furneture shall have such wages 
as bathe byn latly encreased of the Queenes Majesties 
benevolence. 
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That yf any captayne bringe in any person to the 
mustores to mustere for a daye wich is not or hathe not byne 
of his bande befoare, the said Captayne shalbe soare 
punished and displaced of his rowme and the persone so 
mustering sheefe both his eares. 
That yf any persone lend to any souldyere horse to 
muster, wich all the same shalbe a forfeyture and the 
owneres to loose the property of the same for evere. 
That no captayne shall tak into his bande any soul-
diere betweene the musters, but he shall present the daye 
of his takinge in to the muster master or his clerkes and 
also the daye of deathe, discharge or departure, of any 
souldyere or else to be allowed noe wages for the same. 
That noe captayne shall give parsporte to his soul-
dieres but onely the lord wardene wich parsporte must be 
presented to be recorded by the clerk of the musterers 
oreles they to receave no wages duringe theire absence. 
That no captayne shall take into his bande or retayne 
any man that is or hathe byne free with in the towne of 
Barwick or appo}~ted to be a laborere or yet any that is 
servante to any man dwellyng in Barwick or Northumberland 
uppon payne of grevos punneshemente and wante of wages of 
such persones as shalbe retayned. 
That no souldyere appoynted to any captayne shall 
Runne awaye or departe from service or his Ensygne without 
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speciall pasporte of the lorde warden uppon payne to suffer 
deathe for the same accordinge to a statute made in that 
behalf. 
That no souldier wich is or shalbe sette foarthe of 
the inland contreyes to serve one horseback shall sell, putt 
awaye or willingly suffer his horse to be taken away up~on 
payne of grevos puneshment bothe of the buyere and the 
Seller and that it shall be lawfulle for the captayne or 
petty capten of every such souldier to seasone uppon the 
horse so sold or put awaye by coven or otherwise, and the 
same to retayne and keepe for the maintenaunce of his Band 
not withstanding any salle made or money recorded and yf 
the said horse be put awaye by the buyer then the said 
buyer shall remayne in prisone till syche time as he hath 
revealed the horse agayne. 
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APPENDIX D 
MAJOR MARCH OFFICERS 1550 - 1560 
I WARDENS AND DEPUTY WARDENS OF THE MARCHES 
A The East March 
Henry Manners, Earl of Rutland,appointed Warden of 
the East and Middle Marches, May 1549. 1 
Sir Robert Bowes appointed Warden of the East and 
Middle Marches, January 1550. 2 
Henry Grey, Marquis of Dorset, appointed Warden 
General of all three marches, February 1551. 3 
Sir Nicholas Stirley (Captain of Berwick) appointed 
by the Council Dorset's Deputy in April 1551, later 
confirmed under Northumberland. 4 
John Dudley,Duke of Northumberland, appointed 
Warden General of the three marches, October 1551. 5 
Thomas Lord Wharton appointed Deputy Warden General, 
July 1552. 6 
Ralph Grey of Chillingham appointed Deputy Warden, 
November 1552. 7 
8 John Lord Conyers appointed Warden, December 1553. 
Thomas Lord Wharton, appointed Warden, December 1555. 9 
Thomas Percy, Earl of Northumberland, appointed 10 Warden of the East and Middle Marches, August 1557. 
Sir Ralph Sadler appointed 'Caretaker' Warden of the 
two marches (no patent issued) after the dismissal of 
Northumberland, October 1559. 11 
William Lord Grey of Wilton appointed Warden of the 
East and Middle Marches, December 1559. 12 
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Sir Ralph Sadlerp appointed °Caretaker 0 Warden of 
the two marches while Grey was in Scotlandp March 
1560. 13 
Thomas Howard,Duke of Norfolk,Lord Lieutenant with 
Sir John Forster and Sir Francis Leeke as aides, 
worked in cooperation with Sadler and took charge 
when the latter went into Scotland in May 1560. 14 
William Lord Grey of Wilton appointed Warden, 
October 1560. 15 
B The Middle Marches 
Henry Manners, Earl of Rutland, appointed Warden of 
the East and Middle Marches, May 1549, (see East 
March). 
Sir Robert Bowes appointed Warden of the East and 
Middle Marches, January 1550, (see East March). 
Henry Grey, Marquis of Dorset, appointed Warden 
General of all three marches, February 1551, (see 
East March). 
Robert Lord Ogle appointed by the Council Dorset's 
Deputy in April 1551, later confirmed under Northum-
berland. 16 
John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, appointed Warden 
General of all three marches, October 1551, (see East 
March) . 
Thomas Lord Wharton appointed Deputy Warden General, 
July 1552, (see East March). 
William Lord Eure, appointed Warden, November 1552. 17 
William Lord Dacre appointed Warden to Middle and 
West March, January 1554. 18 
19 Thomas Lord Wharton appointed Warden, March 1555. 
Thomas Percy, Earl of Northumberlandp appointed 
Warden of the East and Middle Marches, August 1557, 
(see East March) 
October 1559 - November 1560, (see East March). 
20 Sir John Forster, appointed Wardenp November 1560. 
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C The West March 
Thomas Lord Dacre appointed Warden, April 1549. 21 
Henry Grey, Marquis of Dorset, appointed Warden 
General of all three marches, February 1551, (see 
East March). 
John Lord Conyers appointed Dorset's Deputy by the 
Council in April 1551, confirmed under Northumberland 
Northumberland. 22 
.John Dudley, Duke of Northumberland, appointed · 
Warden General of all three marches, October 1551, 
(see East March). 
Thomas Lord Wharton appointed Deputy Warden General, 
July 1552, (see East March). 
Sir Thomas Dacre of Lanercost appointed Warden, 
November 1552. 23 
William Lord Dacre appointed Warden of the West and 
Middl~ Marches, January 1554. 
II CAPTAINS OF BERWICK - UPON - TWEED 
Sir Nicholas Stirley, 1546 - August 1552. 24 
Richard Norton, November (?) 1552. 25 
26 Sir William Vavasour, May 1555. 
Thomas Lord Wharton, August 1556. 27 
William Lord Eure, December 1557. 28 
Sir James Croftes, April 1559. 29 
Sir Francis Leeke (temporary Captain), July 1560. 30 
William Lord Grey of Wilton, November 1560. 31 
III CAPTAINS OF CARLISLE 
William Lord Dacre, August 1549. 32 
33 Sir Richard Musgrave, November 1552. 
34 William Lord Dacre, January 1554. 
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